HTML pages designed & maintained by Alifuru67 Copyright © 1999/2000 - 1364283024 & 1367286044		Want to Help? Beware Megawati, a puppet of the elite By DAMIEN KINGSBURY Thursday 31 May 2001 To argue that Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia's likely next president, should not be assessed by Western or indeed universal standards (as done by Nick Feik in his article, "Why Megawati is ready to lead Indonesia", on this page yesterday) is to adopt a type of cultural relativism that was used to rationalise Australia's acceptance of President Suharto's three decades of brutal rule and robbery. Megawati's position in Indonesian politics is curious, in that she is almost entirely a symbolic leader, with little or no administrative or conceptual capacity. Her political ascendancy began only after her siblings rejected a request by the then Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) to join it to cement political support lingering from the presidency of her father, Sukarno. Of his children, she was, in fact, the party's third choice. Megawati's election to the chair of the PDI, in December 1993, was primarily due to the support of senior army generals, Agum Gumelar and Hendropriyono, who were then moving against Suharto. Both became ministers in post-Suharto governments. Megawati was far from the forefront of the forces that brought down Suharto. In the lead-up to Suharto's fall she was remarkably quiet, which was widely regarded as a political failure. She has failed to act on a number of other occasions. When President Abdurrahman Wahid asked her to help settle the Ambon issue, she responded by going shopping in Hong Kong. When she finally did visit Ambon, months later, all she left in her wake was an upsurge in communal violence. Similarly, when her party won about a third of the votes in the 1999 elections, Megawati, typically, did nothing. Wahid did, forming a coalition and legitimately beating her to the presidency. If Megawati is modest about her talents, it is because, as she has admitted to a close mutual friend, she has few. She said privately in 1997 that she did not want to be president, nor was capable of the task. Megawati would be happier as a Javanese queen - a figurehead - and not an executive leader. Certainly she has never displayed democratic credentials. And her current party, the PDI-Perjuangan (Struggle), is deeply divided, to the extent that it has elected numerous former Suharto appointees to regional party positions. Members of her closer political coterie, which is in many cases corrupt, see her as a vehicle for their personal ambitions, not as a leader in her own right. Critically, this is the view of the Indonesian army. On a recent visit to Jakarta, I had this confirmed to me by one of the most senior generals, and others have not been shy in agreeing that Megawati is both amenable to their ideas of how to run the state - with greater force - and to being receptive to their input on related matters. Indeed, if and when Megawati comes to power, it will be with the support of a supreme legislature of which about two-thirds are a hangover from Suharto's era. Megawati is popular, however, with about a third of the population. During the 1999 elections, to which I was an accredited observer, I asked people why they liked her. They replied that she represented "freedom" and "democracy". I asked what these terms meant, and drew blank responses. Her party was essentially bereft of policies, as she was, and remains. Feik suggests Megawati's "halus" (polite, refined) behavior is peculiarly Javanese. This raises some questions, the first of which is the appropriateness of pre-modern courtly Javanese modes in a contemporary political setting. A parallel idea would be the reimposition of mediaeval court values in contemporary parliamentary political society. Another related question is the validity of a specifically Javanese cultural-political system, with attendant values of power, deference and superiority, to Indonesia's non-Javanese outer islanders and, indeed, to many Javanese who wish to be rid of such social repression. Notions of "halus" derive from Java's traditional elites and fit poorly with concepts of political representation. And then there is always the possibility that Megawati saying nothing is not really polite and refined, but vacuous, which seems at least as well supported by the evidence. Wahid has been his own worst enemy as president, but he has tried to reform the army and judiciary, and moved against some corrupt individuals. It is these latter features that have counted against him most. And it seems Megawati will become president because of this. Megawati's presidency is unlikely to be activist, especially in key areas of economic, legal and military reform. Indeed, she could be seen as little more than a glove-puppet for those elite forces that want a return to a revised version of Suharto's New Order. Unfortunately for Indonesia, this is probably what will happen. Dr Damien Kingsbury, a senior lecturer in international development at Deakin University, has just completed the second, updated edition of The Politics of Indonesia (Oxford University Press). E-mail: dlk@deakin.edu.au Copyright © 1999-2001  - Ambon Berdarah On-Line * http://www.go.to/ambon HTML pages designed and maintained by Alifuru67 * http://www.oocities.org/maluku67 Send your comments to alifuru67@egroups.com