The
majority of the so-called Albanian elite who have historically been portrayed
as the force behind Albanian national consciousness were Muslims who
studied under an informative mix of ‘traditional’ curricula and were tutored,
in their native districts, by hoxhas and then later past on to medreses.
Isa Blumi
The
Role of Education in the Albanian Identity and its Myths
Quoted
from:
Albanian
Identities: Myth and History
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page: 53
http://www.oocities.org/CapitolHill/Lobby/7681/faqe_53.jpg
Isa Blumi, an insider from
Albania, confirms the observation that the Albanian nationalist elites have
primarily been Muslims or ‘ex-Muslims. This section deals with analyzing
the implications of what seems to be a Muslim group-strategy dominating
Albanian ethnic consciousness ever since the 1870s. We will look at how the
Muslim elites tried to reconcile otherwise logically irreconcilable
contradictions in their cross-religious “Albanianist’ ideology, that
officially exalted equality of all regardless of religious ancestry - and yet
reserved the echelons of political power mostly to ancestral Muslims and
occasionally a co-opted Christian.
…there was
an attempt in some circles to exalt the Albanians’ Muslim identity on the
grounds that those Albanians who became Muslim were the only true Albanians –
arguing that the Islamic religion was the strongest factor in the survival
of the Albanians… Some even put forth the theory that Skenderbeg should
not be the national hero because he betrayed the Turks by serving the
Christians.
Quoted
from:
Albanian
Identities: Myth and History
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page: 102
http://www.oocities.org/CapitolHill/Lobby/7681/faqe_102.jpg
According to Lubonja, the Islamic religion was the strongest
factor in the survival of the Albanians. This seems logical because 70% of
Albanians are Muslim. It is even possible that Muslims became proportionally
greater than the Christians through out breeding the Christians by having more
children per generation. Unlike most Christian families, in the last three
centuries, Muslim families typically number five children or more. Islam
ensured a higher birthrate in Albania for centuries than Christianity ever
could have and probably was as important as Lubonja says it was to Albanian
survival.
If not in survival, then at least in a major northward
population expansion of Muslim Albanians into Kosovo and western Macedonia.
This is why the Albanian population in these regions is 99% Muslim and why most
toponyms in there, including the name of Kosovo itself – originate from
southern Serbian dialects. They descend from Ottoman Era Muslim convert
colonists. Along with the Ottoman Era ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo by
Albanian Muslim colonists, the higher Muslim
birthrate reduced the proportion of Serb Christians in Kosovo & western
Macedonia, just as it reduced proportion of Albanian Christians south of
Kosovo. In fact, all Christians, regardless of ethnicity, were persecuted by
the Albanian ancestral Muslim nationalist elites.
Most Albanians who were educated
by Enver Hoxha’s propaganda machine are ignorant of these religious divisions,
their implications and the attempts made by earlier nationalists to conceal the
inconsistencies in the formation of the national ideology. Contemporary
Albanians are the product of two generations worth of brainwashing in a North
Korea-type Communist dictatorship. Discussing these subjects id also taboo in
Albanian society. Next we turn to Ger Dujzings for more information…
This
obsession with religious discord shows that confessional differences
certainly mattered in Albania: for several centuries, under the Ottomans,
religion had been the primary source of identification, and although nationalist
rhetoric declared it to be unimportant (and religious fanaticism to be alien to
the Albanian soul), reality on the ground was sometimes quite different.
…there are many instances of religious inspired animosities, which
present-day Albanian historiography tends to ignore. Examples are Sunni
hostility towards Bektashis in southern Albania, and the conflicts between
Catholics and Muslims in the north, as in the towns of Gjakove [sic] and
Shkodra.
Ger
Dujzings
Quoted
from:
Albanian Identities:
Myth and History
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page: 62
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Dujzings’ observations are pretty
straight foreword. The ex-Muslim nationalist elites are exposed as liars,
deliberately ignoring the historical record to create the illusion of peaceful
and equal co-existence when, instead, the Albanian Muslim converts were living
a life of privilege within the Ottoman hierarchy while Albanian, Greek and Serb
Christians were kept under heavy taxation.
Before the religion of the
Albanians was declared to be ‘Albanianism,’ the Muslim nationalist
elites were trying to create a different kind of Albanian national identity
based on the Shia Muslim Bektashi sect. Natalie Clayer discusses it in detail
in the book. It is a hilarious description of the very first attempt by the
Muslim elites to manufacture a cohesive Albanian identity based on a loose
combination of a peripheral Muslim cult with Christian trappings. It was abandoned
– because it was an idiotic idea in the first place. Here we will quote
Clayer’s thesis:
Where
religion among the Albanians is concerned, we are confronted with many myths: superficiality
of religion, exceptional religious tolerance, conversion to Islam to preserve
Albanian ethnic and national identity vis a vis the pressure exerted by the
Serbs and Greeks
Natalie
Clayer
Quoted
from:
Albanian
Identities: Myth and History
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page: 127
http://www.oocities.org/CapitolHill/Lobby/7681/faqe_127.jpg
Superficiality of religion,
exceptional religious tolerance, conversion to Islam to preserve Albanian
ethnic and national identity are all myths imposed by the ancestral Muslim
nationalist elites to bridge the gap between them and the Christians, while
Muslims actually retain all the political power and the cultural and political
destiny of the entire country. Contemporary Albanian nationalism and its
forerunner, Albanian nationalism since the 1870s – have both always strived to
preserve the old Ottoman balance of power with ancestral Muslims holding the
reigns and making the decisions w and Christians mostly just following along.
The Albanian nationalist elites
are always, almost as a rule, Muslim or ‘ex-Muslim.’ The Prizrenites were all
Muslims and so were the Enverist ruling circles (Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu,
Qemal Stafa, Ramiz Alija, Ismail Kadare); so are the KLA. It wouldn’t be so bad
if the ex-Muslim elites weren’t actually doing more good than harm. These
nationalist elites have actually caused Albanians a lot of suffering. Zogu took
up the spirit of the League of Prizren and he robbed the country; the Enverists
did their damage through cultural isolation while the KLA have turned ‘free’
Kosovo into a cesspool of AIDS and prostitution.
We turn to Noel Malcolm for a more detailed picture of how
the ancestral Muslim elites struggled to shape public opinion in their image
through propaganda…
[Albanians]
“have been the only Balkan people really attached to the Ottoman Empire, always
happy to support it, always happy to strengthen it and to profit by its
strength”[38].
A similar picture can be derived from the writings of Eqrem bey Vlora, or indeed from the comments of Isa Boletini reported by Audrey Herbert.
Writers
such as Konica, Noli, Cekrezi and Dako were responding, not just to immediate
political requirements, but to the dictates of the whole mythical pattern of
thinking itself.
”I wish I
could break every connection between Albania and Turkey…” [40]
One could
hardly wish for a more explicit statement about the mythic approach to time:
half a millennium of human history can simply be erased, and what remains
on either side of it can be ‘connected’ as if nothing at all happened in
between.
[38]
Ismail Qemal Vlora, ‘Albania and the Albanians’ (The Quarterly Review, 1917)
Vol. 2, #5
[40] Faik
Konica, “Albania: the rock garden”
Noel
Malcolm
Quoted
from:
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page: 83 x
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Here Malcolm takes a more critical
than usual position toward Albanians, calling the Albanian approach to time mythic
& quoting Albanian historical figures like Noli, Cekrezi, Dako, Vlora and
Konica to supprt his statement. The desire of the ancestral Muslim elites is to
erase the past oppression of the Christian population existed in order
to ensure that the same ancestral Muslim elite maintained power and leadership
of all Albanians.
The ancestral Muslim elites are
always downplaying the dominant status they enjoyed over Albanian and other
Christians in the Ottoman hierarchy. Indeed, in pursuit of the fantasy of
Albanian homogeny they downplay the fact that because ancestral Muslims
dominate the elites – the country has retained much Turko-Oriental culture that
keeps Albania undeveloped in some spheres like blood feuds, low status of
women, Oriental cultural attitudes and practices…
Misha elaborates:
After
almost 500 years of Ottoman rule and 300 years with a Muslim majority
population Albania was more influenced by Turko-Oriental culture than
perhaps any other country in the region. Bernard Fischer writes ‘Although
official ties with the Ottomans were severed in 1912, a strong, rather negative
Ottoman legacy remained. A unique Weltanschung [World-view] was created,
and it included a strong distrust of the government and the city.
Albania
remained a divided country…in which few people identified themselves
primarily as Albanian nationals.
Pirro
Misha
Quoted
from:
Albanian
Identities: Myth and History
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page: 46
http://www.oocities.org/CapitolHill/Lobby/7681/faqe_46.jpg
Where shall we start?
Few people actually identified
themselves primarily as Albanian nationals in 1912.
‘Albanianism’ wasn’t the religion
of the Albanians until just 60 years ago after Enver took over the propaganda
machine and imposed Vaso Pasha’s famous lie.
Misha also goes on to describe how
the ex-Muslim Enverist elite misled the two generations of Albanians into
believing that Albanians were religiously indifferent throughout the Ottoman
era.
Malcolm has more to say about the
Muslim Albanians’ complicity in the Ottoman hierarchy and how they benefited for
350 years from the oppression of their Christian neighbors as he compares how
the Albanian mythmakers would deal with a given subject versus modern scholars:
Modern
scholars would also think it necessary to refer to the many examples of
co-operation (sometimes to mutual advantage) between inhabitants of
Albanian lands and their foreign rulers – above all, in the case of
the Ottomans, with their innumerable officials and official of Albanian
origin (including more than 40 grand vezirs).
Noel
Malcolm
Quoted
from:
Albanian
Identities: Myth and History
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page: 83
http://www.oocities.org/CapitolHill/Lobby/7681/faqe_83.jpg
It is this kind of power and
privilege that the Albanian Muslim were in danger of losing with the weakening
of the Ottoman Empire after 1870. The Albanian Muslims easily monopolized
Albanian nationalism because they were 70% of the population. This is why they
have wanted Kosovo to be part of Albania.
Greater Albania would result in
the eventual submergence of the Albanian Christian population statistically.
Kosovo Albanians are 99% Muslim. Incorporation of 2 000 000 Muslim Albanians
into Albania would reduce the Christian population from 30% to less than 10%.
Muslims will make up 90% of the country. With that kind of Islamic homogeneity,
Albania could easily at some point in the future become more ideologically oriented
to Islam if their common interests should collide again. “Modern scholars would
also think it necessary to refer to the many examples of co-operation
(sometimes to mutual advantage) between inhabitants of Albanian lands
and their foreign rulers.” If western Macedonia becomes annexed to
Albania, there will be a Christian population of 5% in Albania. The religion of
the Albanians wouldn’t have to be ‘Albanianism’ any more in a 95% Muslim
Greater Albania. Christians would become redundant.
Most of the scholars within
Albania who sympathize with the scholars being quoted here from Albanian
Identities: Myth and History are Christians. Even Kaplan Resulli, Ardian
Qosi, Pirro Misha and Fatos Lubonja are all Christians. Ardian Vehbiu and Isa
Blumi are Muslims who are very critical of the present Muslim, Turko-Oriental
cultural legacy in Albania. All Albanian Christians should ask themselves if
they are happy with the way the ancestral Muslim elites have been running the
country and ruling the minds of the people the last decades of the Ottoman Era
and if they are o.k. with being submerged into statistical insignificance.
Unfortunately,
due to Enver Hoxha’s persecution of Catholics after WWII, the role of
Austrian and Italian schools in the preparation of Italian intelligentsia has
yet to be fully explored.
Isa Blumi
The
Role of Education in the Albanian Identity and its Myths
Quoted
from:
Albanian
Identities: Myth and History
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page:
55-56
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http://www.oocities.org/CapitolHill/Lobby/7681/faqe_56.jpg
As a group-strategy, the important
thing for these nationalist elites is that they are composed of ancestral
Muslims and always a few co-opted Christians. This was the case even in Hoxha’s
time when the official ideology was atheist (e.g. Enver Hoxha, Mehmet
Shehu, Qemal Stafa, Ramiz Alija, Ismail Kadare). Ancestral Muslims always
composed the core of the Albanian nationalist elites even when the official
ideology was supposed to be atheist.
Above, Blumi discussed how
ancestral Muslim elites persecuted the Albanian Christian population for
reasons that obviously didn’t apply to the Albanian Muslim population even
under an officially ‘atheist’ regime that is supposed to promote ‘Albanianism’
as a ‘religion’. That kind of thing will be difficult will become more frequent
when Albanian Christians become 5% of the population of a ‘Greater Albania’.
This article below is only a forewarning of things to come when Christians
become statistically insignificant:
…the old
myths of national romanticism like that of Skenderbeg and ‘the religion of the
Albanians is Albanianism’ remain the dominant mythologies in Albanian
cultural and political life today.
Quoted
from:
Albanian
Identities: Myth and History
Edited by:
Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers & Bernd J. Fischer
Page: 102
http://www.oocities.org/CapitolHill/Lobby/7681/faqe_102.jpg
The question is: will every
segment of the Albanian population continue believe these myths? Is it really to the advantage of every segment
of the Albanian population to continue to believe these myths and to perpetuate
the Greater Albanian myth? That depends on men like Albanians such as Lubonja,
Misha, Blumi, Qosi, Vebiu, Resulli et al. and on how strongly the ancestral
Muslim elites have managed to engrain their myths into the ethno-psyche of
Albanian Christians.
In a ‘Greater Albania’ with a 5%
Christian population, ‘Albanianism’ need no longer be the religion of all Albanians.
It will them be Islam. When one considers that the Muslim elites always
conveniently shift alliances in the interests of practicality, co-operation
with Al Qaeda in particular and the Islamic World in general seems practical in
a virtually homogenous 95% Muslim ‘Greater Albania’. Albanian Christians will then be seen as a hindrance, just as
they are seen in all Muslim societies with a statistically insignificant
Christian population and subjected to whatever 2nd class treatment
is customary in such unfortunate countries. Being reduced to statistical
insignificance inside a ‘Greater Albania’ is absolutely NOT in the interest of
Albanian Christians.
