Introduction
The campesinos and indigenous people of Chiapas
who have fought to recover a piece of land have most suffered the repression
of illegal police forces which, depending on the origin and their procedures,
can be distinguished as gunmen, white guards or paramilitary forces.
Traditionally, large landowners and cattle ranchers have used these types
of illegal forces. We
often tend to use the terms indistinctly, but they do have a difference,
at least here in Chiapas, and we therefore offer our readers a brief
definition of each.
Gunmen: When a cattle rancher or large landowner needs a personal or home security force, he will generally hire two, three or more men, adept in the use of small weapons. Traditionally they follow their employer everywhere. When they are at the ranch, they are easily spotted hanging around the home, or on horseback checking out the property; they wear hats, blue jeans, dark glasses, long jackets or vests to hide a pistol. When they enter a city, they often use private vehicles with tinted glass, keeping an eye on their boss from a prudent distance and with a low profile, individually or in groups of two. They are often called "hounds", in reference to their good hunting abilities. Their job is to "hunt" those who would harm their boss or his properties. Some cattle ranchers and large landowners hire them to protect their families as well.
White Guards: The name white guards is taken from the ex-USSR. After the October 1917 Revolution, the Soviet government handed out land to those needing it, but it encountered resistance from property owners private police, sometimes called white guards. The Soviets chose to fight them with red guards.
The white guards in Chiapas came into existence
during the
governorship of Samuel Leon Brindis (1958-1964), through a 1961 decree
that permitted cattle ranchers to carry arms and hire "private police",
thus virtually legalizing the white guards. In parts of Chiapas where no
authorities existed, cattle ranchers and landowners made their own laws,
using the white guards to enforce their will. These landed interests
often rotated public posts among themselves, allowing them to decree "certificates
of agrarian inaffectability" (i.e., the government is barred from expropriating
their holdings). They were thus able to set aside for themselves
some 224,619 hectares of land during 1934-1988.
During the period of Governor Patrocinio Gonzalez in the early 90s, the policy changed and there was a movement to do away with these types of "traditional landholders", because they were an obstacle to the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. These had to be weakened and another group, the "modern cattle ranchers" strengthened. These modern ranchers operate on Chiapas Pacific coast, use no gunmen or white guards. But while the latter are now preferred, given an overall push towards modern practices, the former remain in existence, and so too their henchmen.
When groups of gunmen from various landholders
come together at a
municipal (county) or regional level, they organize to train in the
use of heavy-caliber weapons. Should their forces be insufficient,
campesinos from the PRI (Party of the Institutional Revolution) or the
CNC (PRI-linked campesino organization) will be hired to defend landholdings
from possible takeovers, to intimidate, attack and murder campesinos who
are struggling
for land. On occasion, they have been used to annihilate certain
groups disputing landholders interests or who were competing in illegal
businesses.
On many occasions it is the white guards who, in coordination with the Public Security Police, expel campesinos from land that has been reclaimedGovernmental authorities turn a blind eye to their activities because they are useful in certain moments. One such moment came in Chicomuselo municipality on 10 January 1995, when white guards, identified with a yellow ribbon tied to their left arm, joined with forces of the Public Security Police to battle campesinos of the OCEZ-CNPA who had taken the municipal presidents office. The tally: 7 campesinos dead, various wounded, among them the parish priest who was in the belfry when hit by two bullets.
Paramilitary: These are groups of campesinos and Indians, organized
in a police-military structure who act in a more coordinated fashion, whether
within community groups or mass organizations. They don't depend
so much on large landowners and cattle ranchers as they do on the federal
army, Public Security Police, on the government and on governmental institutions
that finance them by means of development projects and other handouts.
They respond more to political interests, and not so much on a need to
defend landholdings. These groups are said to be a part of the PRI
and are generally linked to a deputy (i.e., congressional representative)
of that party.
PARAMILITARIZATION
At the start of the governorship of Eduardo Robledo in 1994 and before the rise of the paramilitary groups per se, the Secretary General of the (state) Government, Eraclio Zepeda, and Undersecretary Uriel Jarquin chose to support and strengthen the UNAL (Lombardist National Unity). An attempt to penetrate NGOs was made through the creation of ARELIDH, with the improbable name of Revolutionary Association for the Liberation of Human Rights, and through AEDPCH (Democratic State Assembly of the Chiapaneco People), from where alliances were struck with the CRIACH (Council of Indigenous Representatives of the Altos of Chiapas). The principal means of co-optation were the encouragement of land takeovers in the countryside, the granting of taxi licenses in the city to foment strife between organizations, death threats to leaders, etc.
Later, after the UNAL was strengthened, Robledo and Zepeda founded, in alliance with CRIACH, an organization known as APAZ (Zapatista Alliance Political Grouping), notorious for two aspects: its presence among some indigenous groups and its Zapatista rhetoric. This organization made a major effort to divide, co-opt, encourage confrontation, murder leaders, etc., of the independent (i.e., non-governmental) popular movement, with activities similar to paramilitary groups. With its seemingly pro-Zapatista discourse, the group created public confusion, slandered the true Zapatista movement, and cast dispersion on the reputation of Bishop Samuel Ruiz. They also created ill will towards the Dioceses of San Cristobal among the "True Coletos". (Coletos is a nickname for residents of San Cristobal. TrueColetos is an expression which certain, rather conservative, generations-old residents of San Cristobal gave to themselves, to set them off from newcomers and other interlopers, who, according to the Coletos, bring with them unacceptable values, customs and a political ideas).
These divisive activities were not as successful as their
founders might have hoped When this organization failed to achieve
it ends, another actor was brought on stage in Chiapas: the paramilitary
groups.There had been no paramilitary movement for the past 15 years in
Chiapas. It was not until after the governments military offensive of February
1995 against the EZLN that paramilitary activities became known. Not surprisingly,
paramilitary groups have come into existence where there is a significant
independent or Zapatista organization. The first group to surface
was the "Chinchulines" in the municipality of Bachajon. Later
on 5 May 1996, the rank-and-file support for the groups in conflict
in Bachajon settled their dispute, but this did not mean an end to the
Chinchulines.
After the EZLNs National Consultation on Democracy in 1995, a paramilitary group known as "Paz y Justicia" appeared in the municipalities of Tila, Sabanilla, Tumbala, and Salto de Agua, openly led by local PRI deputy Samuel Sanchez, member of SOCAMA (Campesino Teacher Solidarity). The outcome of the Consultation in these municipalities was heavily in favor of the EZLN, and the government, faced with the difficulty of openly confronting the Zapatista movement with the armed forces, chose to do so with Paz y Justicia and other paramilitary groups.
In the area of Venustiano Carranza, where organizations
such as OCEZ-Casa del Pueblo, Union de Organizaciones, Ejidos y Comunidades
and the Comite de Campesinos, among others, have strength, another paramilitary
group was formed. This one is called "Alianza San Bartolome de los
Llanos", made up of expelled members of the Casa del Pueblo. When
this group was
founded, PRI federal deputy Eucario Orantes was present, leading members
of the Casa del Pueblo to accuse him of being its principal promoter.
In San Cristobal, the "True Coletos", known for their belligerency against the Diocese and who attacked the diocesan curia on 19 February 1995, was founded in the presence of local PRI deputy Jorge Lescieur, leading two urban-rights groups, BACOSAN and CIUSPAZ, to accuse him of being behind the illicit activities of this conservative group.
Many of these right wing organizations have failed to accomplish
their objectives, given the resistance and internal strength of the popular
groups they have wished to destroy. In indigenous areas the paramilitary
groups have grown thanks to the bilingual teachers, members of SOCAMA.
There are, however, teachers who now oppose the use of SOCAMA to cover
up
paramilitary activities in the Northern and Altos Areas, and in response
have formed FRECOMA (Teachers Convergence Front).
There is evidence that the PRI groups are arming
and training in an operations center in the municipality of Chenalho.
"In the town of Los Chorros there is a group of 56 PRI members that stand
guard nightly to impede the return of 56 displaced families, who support
the EZLN. In order to be able to return, PRI members are demanding
between 5,000-10,000
pesos (US$588-1,1763), and forcing returning families to join the PRI.
To stand guard, members are getting paid 750 pesos (US$88) every two weeks
(cf.: Angelica Inda y Andres Aubry, Paramilitares, La Jornada del Campo,
page. 12, 29 October 1997). The obvious question is where the money
comes from and who is paying them? Might the funds be part of grants
disbursed when President Zedillo visits Chiapas?
Since its founding, the paramilitary group Paz y Justicia has grown in strength and changed its name to Desarrollo (Development), Paz y Justicia, obtaining its legal recognition as a "civil association". This legal move allows it to receive government funds for development.
Sources state that the Chinchulines are once again active, coordinating with "...the Alianza San Bartolome, to whom military training is being given in the town of Joibe in the municipality of Chilon..." (cf.: Ibid.). The Chinchulines group has been seen in the company of a captain of the army and a PRI deputy in the town of Laja Tendida, municipality of Venustiano Carranza, purportedly to recruit members, strengthen paramilitary forces and to being training in the area. (cf.: Denouncement made by members of the Casa del Pueblo in Altamirano municipality).
In the municipality of Oxchuc, the new paramilitary group known as MIRA (Antizapatista Indigenous Revolutionary Movement), supposedly linked to PRI federal deputy Norberto Santiz, hopes to make the area its principal center of operations, a strategic point given its access to the Selva region, the main base of operations of the EZLN. Members of the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) in Oxchuc have denounced that the MIRA undertakes operations in the towns of San Rosa, San Fernando and 20 de Noviembre (La Jornada, 23 October 1997).
On 10 September, the PRDs ex-candidate for federal deputy in Ocosingo, Nicolas Lopez was ambushed on the Altamirano-Ocosingo road. His vehicle was hit four times by bullets. The same day, the commander of the municipal police of Ocosingo was victim of a similar attack, not far from the military roadblock at Cuxulja. There has been speculation that these attacks were linked to the MIRA.
Paramilitary groups are also organizing in the municipalities of Simojovel and Huitiupan and have already caused casualties. On 22 September 1997 in the town of Mercedes Isidoro, assailants who were in a red pickup wounded a member of the EZLN with arms fire, but when he didn't die, they ran the truck over him. Another incident occurred in the town of Chitamukum, Simojovel municipality on 3 October 1997 in which three members of the EZLN were murdered by PRI members. Another member of the EZLN was shot to death in the town of Emiliano Zapata, municipality of Huitiupan last August by a group of unknown assailants. (La Jornada, 23 October 1997).
CARACTERISTICS OF THE PARAMILITARIZATION IN CHIAPAS
OBJECTIVES: Cover over the army's "dirty war" of counterinsurgency; its dirty war against the civilian population; repression against social and independent organizations; create instability within the jurisdiction of the Diocese of San Cristobal; evade denouncements of human rights violations and thus not sully the honor of the army; impede easy detection of the strategists behind the war; allow impunity to reign; blame the Diocese, priests and Bishop Samuel Ruiz of the violence.
COMMAND:
a) Civilian: Local and federal deputies of the PRI;
b) Military: commanders from the federal army and the Public Security Police. In rural areas: ex-military personnel, ex-members of Public Security and PRI members.
MILITIA: PRI campesinos who control crossroads and create terror among the population.
INCENTIVES: Privileges for PRI municipal presidents; strengthening of regional power of caciques (local strongmen); political advantages for the PRI; monetary rewards, goods, arms, salaries, etc.
FINANCING:
a) Governmental: channeled through mayors offices and
regional development programs to strengthen certain local political cliques;
b) Independent fund raising: by charging displaced people
for the right to return to their homes; for the right to pass roadblocks,
for having joined a particular group under coercion, etc.
ALLIES: Some Protestant sects, cattle ranchers, merchants, owners of transport vehicles, teachers from SOCAMA, right-wing Catholic groups such as Amatulis, some journalists, some municipal mayors, development institutions funded by the federal or state governments.
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING: PRI members, the federal army, Public Security Police.
ADDENDUM: In the event of a natural disaster, so-called emergency programs are carried out by the army; army incursions with the pretext of fighting drug traffickers; implementation of certain development programs, above all those having to do with reforestation; advantage is taken of intracommunity squabbles; social services are carried out by cadets from the Military College; limited "good-will" support given for the return of the displaced; control of roads, schools, health centers, plus having the services of some newspapers and journalists.
RESULTS: Unraveling of the social fabric within communities; increase in human rights violations; tension in communities; increase in violence; spreading of paramilitary activity from the Northern Area to the Altos; defamation in newspapers and physical abuse against catechists, priests, Bishops of San Cristobal, nuns, etc; greater investment for development programs; greater division among organizations and communities; decreased observation by independent sources of the Northern Area; decreased possibilities of placing members of the armed forces on trial.
RECENT CHRONOLOGY
Chenalho: Displaced people from Los Chorros, presently in San Cristobal, denounced that on 17-18 October 1997 Public Security Police accompanied PRI members from Los Chorros to the hamlets of Yibelho and Acteal, where they set ablaze homes of PRD members. In a separate incident, Public Security Police were reported to have entered and sealed off the town of Tzanembolom.
According to the local press, starting 19 October 1997, task forces from the CISEN (Center for National Security Investigations) from the Attorney General's Office and from the SEDENA (Secretary of Defense) have been entering communities where confrontations between indigenous groups have been reported, in order to analyze the political and social situation in Chiapas. It is thought that they are in several communities in Chenalho.
A teacher was murdered recently in Chenalho for having quit a group of 14 indigenous persons who were recruited, armed and trained as a paramilitary group.
Simojovel: Nuns from the Diocese of San Cristobal
denounced that on 12 October in the town of Galeano, Lucas Sanchez, who
held a religious post within the Catholic Church, was murdered. On
15 October in the town of La Paz, catechist Mariano Gomez was murdered,
apparently by PRI members. PRI members are also said to have suffered
casualties.
Oxchuc: Paramilitary groups linked to the
MIRA are said to be operating in some communities that border on the Huixtan
and Oxchuc municipalities. PRI members in these communities are said
to have closed the Catholic church; the few members of the PRD have been
constantly under attack.
Nuns from the parish at Oxchuc denounced that on 12 October during a demonstration held by PRD members and civil society, Public Security Police went into the church's belfry to watch what was going on.
Altamirano: State government funds are financing the construction of an unpaved road from La Laguna to the town of La Realidad, in the rebellious municipality of San Pedro de Michoacan, where the General Command of the EZLN is supposedly located.
Salto de Agua: The army has set up a new military camp between the municipal capital and the town of Pantianeja.
Tila: This past week, a caravan led by San
Cristobal bishops Samuel Ruiz and Raul Vera was fired upon as it traveled
through Chenalho municipality on a pastoral mission. The prelates
were unharmed but three members of the caravan were injured. Hours
later, Ruiz's sister was attacked in San Cristobal and required hospitalization.
Bishop Ruiz declared that the two incidents were not unrelated.
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