"Difficulties in Facing with Low-Intensity Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era"
(Spring, 1999)
[doc. file(104k) here]

Introduction
LIC in the Post-Cold War World
1. LIC and the End of Cold War Structure
2. More Justiciable Disputes
Difficulties in Facing with LIC
1. Characteristics of LIC in the Post-Cold War Era
2.Asymmetric Warfare
3. Ethnicity
4. Involvement of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
5. Limits of the US Intervention
How to Deal with LIC?
1. Based on the International Law
2. Through the Internatioanl Organizations
3. Advantages
Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

The US-leading NATO is currently trying to solve the problem of Kosovo but it seems to be faced with many problems. Even though it seems right: stopping genocide, NATO is not only having a hard time in achieving its goals but also is under attack facing criticism from other major powers. China and Russia two of the five permanent member of the UN Security Council have condemned the U.S. and NATO for intervening in a domestic matter. Finally, the president of Russia has warned NATO about the possibility of a third world war. The Kosovo crisis does not appear to be improving. Why is this the case? This study tries to figure out the difficulties occurring with low-intensity conflicts in the post-Cold War world and also partly tries to answer the reason why the U.S. and NATO's efforts to restore the peace in the region entails more serious problems.

The thesis of this paper is that the United States cannot solve the problems of low-intensity conflict by itself in the post-Cold War era because in low-intensity conflict situation the superiority of military power does not have significant meaning. It is hypothesized that the "nature" of low-intensity conflicts makes it hardly possible to solve the LIC problems unilaterally, even collectively. Most low-intensity conflicts are to be solved better by the legitimate international dispute-settlement organization, which is designated to do so. However, the purpose of this study is neither to discount the good will of the United States' devotion for world peace nor criticize it for humanitarian intervention knowing that the US is the only country that is able and willing to do that in the post-Cold War world, but to suggest better ways for it to help world peace.

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There are different ideas defining what low-intensity conflicts are. An author like Claude C. Sturgill lists synonyms of low-intensity conflicts which are ambiguous wars, civil war conflict short of war, covert wars, dark wars, foreign internal defense, fourth-dimension warfare, guerrilla warfare, high-probability conflict, indirect war, low-level war, people's war, protracted war, sublimated war, unconventional warfare, and so on.

Low-intensity conflict is a politico-military confrontation between competing states or groups below conventional war and the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. In this study, however, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, terrorist activities, narcotic warfare, and peacekeeping operation are mainly considered in the scope of concern.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have had wide-range consequences for the Third World. It is believed that for the first time in a century, war and the threat of war between developed countries is off the international agenda. This represents a momentous shift in world history, but, unfortunately, it does not mean peace. New strategic issues have emerged, born of the break-up of the Soviet Union and with regard to the regional impact of post-communist rivalries.

Regional conflicts are somewhat fettered due to the high level confrontation of the powers. During the Cold War regional conflicts were heavily overlaid by the East-West competition, as the United States and the Soviet Union rushed to take on the patrons role for one side or the other, thereby transforming conflicts with very different bases into extensions of the communist-anti communist competition. In other words, since the superpower confrontation was oriented from ideologies of each side, other issues such as ethnicity, religion, border conflicts among small states were relatively under control of the superpowers. The two powers played an important role as a buffer in order to avoid direct military confrontations, which might result from the escalation of regional conflicts to high level conflict between themselves. The super powers thus intervened in conflict regions of the developing world, engaged in crisis bargaining, and managed to contain their conflict.

However, the advantage that Cold War brought in terms of regional peace by repressing the ethnic conflicts that had been virulent in Europe and elsewhere has evaporated, and there is a clear trend of increasing ethnic and regional conflicts as we see from contemporary events in the former Eastern Bloc. Now that Moscow and Washington no longer wield as much influence as they once did, these conflicts will not be decreased in the coming future. Already, with the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, India and Pakistan have been showing the growing tendency of low-intensity conflicts.

2. More Justiciable Disputes

Even though there seems to be an evident trend of increase in LIC, it is fortunate that at least there does not exist the non-democratic superpower any more which can strategically hamper the international cooperation for peace. That is, there lies before the international community a good opportunity to solve the problem of international disputes in more rational and logical ways.

The common classification of disputes divided them into two categories: political and legal. The former are commonly referred to as nonjusticiable, the latter as justiciable. The basic difference, appears to be that nonjusticiable disputes are those in which non-legal considerations play such an important role that the application of legal rules would not settle the dispute. Justiciable disputes, on the other hand, are those in which there is not only a question of law, but the law also is truly relevant to the dispute and can be utilized to settle them. With this respect, the conflicts between the Unite States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War can be considered as nonjusticiable disputes. Which means that disputes relating the interest of these two countries were not to be solved not by rule but by non-regular negotiations and strategic calculations. It was unreasonable to expect the rule of law in settlement of disputes during that time because these two superpowers were, literally, above the law. However, in the post-Cold War era, the world is having a better opportunity to establish an international system which can rely on international laws to settle disputes more peacefully and reasonably due to the absence of the main obstacle, that is, the communist Soviet Union.

In practice, there is a growing tendency of international community to rely more on International Court of Justice in settling their international disputes, if not significant in number. This trend can be seen from the number of disputes that have been filed in the International Court of Justice (See Table-1).

Table-1 Utilization of ICJ

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What seems important is that low-intensity conflicts are not likely to be solved by merely relying on the superiority of military forces as we have witnessed from various foregoing events. In low-intensity conflicts, technological and military supremacy does not automatically guarantee victory on the battlefield. For example, it could not prevent America's defeat in the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union lost the war with Afghanistan, or Russia's more recent defeat in Chechyna. Even though these two superpowers are believed to have great power to destroy the whole world, they still lost the war. Why did it happen? When we think about the characteristics of the LIC, the answer will be readily found.

The main characteristics of LIC in the post-Cold War world are: that it tends to be asymmetric warfare; that ethnicity tends to be deeply involved; and that Weapons of Mass Destruction are easily available to the parties in LIC. The characteristics of LIC not only show that it is hard to confront but also imply that the US is not ready to give clear solutions for LIC all over the world.

Asymmetric warfare is one of the typical types of strategy that can be adopted in any low-intensity conflict and it becomes one of the most significant sources of difficulties facing LIC. In broad terms, asymmetrical warfare simply means warfare that seeks to avoid an opponent's strengths; it is an approach that tries to focus whatever may be to one side's comparative advantages against its enemy's relative weakness.

They do not fight to win but not to lose because, in general, parties involved in LIC do not have an organized regular military force which can be manipulated to confront the conventional military force of adversary. Which means that it is hardly possible for them to achieve their goal through achieving superior military build-ups. Most parties in LIC do not have enough financial sources, legitimacy, and popular support, that is, they are inclined to have inferior sources in terms of military power, economic supply, and, in some cases, legitimacy. Consequently, for them, by not being totally defeated, they can hurt the adversary's legitimacy and power. Their goals are regarded as partly achieved.

In this sense, low-intensity conflicts are inclined to be protracted warfare. For example, in case of insurgency, an insurgent group strategically attempts to wear down and weaken a military superior foe over time. Its major goal, attrition, is accomplished by prolonged war and exhausting a less dedicated foe. Tactically, insurgency usually involves irregular, part-time, often nonuniformed forces who employ such tactics as ambush, hit-and run, and avoidance of contact, therefore superiority at the point of engagement does not guarantee victory. For the government to be truly triumphal, it must destroy the insurgency; as long as the insurgency exists, the authority of the government is compromised. In contrast, an insurgency need not be victorious to enjoy success. As long as the insurgency continues to survive, the more the government's authority is eroded because prolonged conflicts imply the impotence of legitimate government, while it strengthen the appeal of insurgency to people. This leads the situation in favor of the insurgent group.

Within the same context, time is the weapon in low-intensity conflicts. In case of insurgency, its success is measured by avoiding defeat as noted. As long as the insurgent force continues to exist, the government cannot claim victory. Moreover, the longer the insurgency endures, the more legitimacy is likely to accumulate in behalf of insurgency. Thus, the insurgency wins, or at least has the potential to win, as long as it avoids losing. Extracted time itself can be regarded as advantageous in LIC.

Another nature of low-intensity conflict is its psychological aspect. Quite clearly, many cases of LIC, especially terrorism, principally aim to affect its targets more psychologically than physically. In future low-intensity conflicts an enemy to the US may perceive its comparative advantage against the United States and the West not in technological terms, but in the "collective psyche and will of his people." Increasingly, opponents will seek to present Western militaries with moral and ethical conundrums. Knowingly, low-intensity conflicts are not directly involved in the security of the US or other outer intervening forces, military forces in operation are very vulnerable to psychological propaganda and appeals.

Finally, in LIC, political aspect plays an important role in victory. The secret to winning wars is to determine what it is about the enemy that is absoultely necessary for is continued prosecution of hostilities - the center of gravity - and then destroy it. The purpose of all wars is to achieve certain political objectives. Dr. Stephen Sloan points out that, in low-intensity conflicts, the single most important dimension is legitimacy, the moral right to govern. Again, all the characteristics of LIC shown above work advantageously for parties in LIC in terms of the political aspect.

In the post-Cold War era, ethnic hatreds, which were submerged during the Cold War due to the system-wide high level conflict between the superpowers, have risen to the forefront of low-intensity conflict. However, once ethnicity is involved in disputes, clear solutions are not readily found. Ethnic conflicts are mainly stem not from temporary accidental events but from history-long relations between ethnic groups. There lies the origin of the difficulties in dealing with ethnic disputes. Ethnic disputes are not to be solved by financial incentives, by negotiations, and by political bargains. Ethnic groups' national pride and hatred against certain group cannot be negotiated. It will last until the source of the conflict is totally eradicated from the region. That is, it is not until one side successfully finishes the annihilation of the adversary ethnic group or evacuates it from the region that ethnic conflicts are assuaged. Some people believe that ethnic hatreds come from the memory of the past. It is impossible to remove all the past resentment from the memory of the people. It may also be impossible to stop ethnic hatred by force. By the same token, the current NATO operation may temporarily cease the ethnic cleansing in Balkan but it will continuously repeated in the long run.

Moreover, when it comes to ethnicity in LIC, the significance of the existence of relevant ethnic groups has to be counted. Once ethnicity is the hardcore of the dispute, it is very easy to get outer support by relying on emotional appeal to its neighbors as we see from the Kosovo case. Knowing that the war against external support for targeted government is a critical factor to success in a LIC, the contemporary Kosovo case clearly shows the limit of the US intervention since Russia has decided to supply Milosevic with oil despite the decision of NATO embargo.

The use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the context of terrorism committed by non-state actors is another profound challenge for the US in confronting LIC. After the end of the Cold War, the environment of proliferation of WMD is more in favor of the groups attempting to have them. Nuclear weapons have the recent focus of concern because the breakup of the Soviet Union has created more opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons. There have been reported numerous cases of leakage of nuclear materials and personnel. Nuclear leakage problems of the former Soviet Union, mainly of Russia, arise from the loose control over the nuclear materials and facilities. Nuclear materials are being stored in installations that lack proper security, which are located inside a highly unstable country. In addition, given the incentives that wealthy proliferators can offer and the liberalization of travel and emigration from Russia, it would be too much to expect that none of the nuclear scientist and technicians would accept these temptations form potential proliferators. A latest South Korean report shows that a number of scientists from the former Soviet Union have been deeply involved in the recent North Korean multistage missile launch.

With respect to other WMD, biological and chemical weapons, there is relative ease accessing the materials and technologies. These WMD have similar powers to cause casualties and many cause more serious problems. Technologies required in developing WMD have been wide spread. Potential targets, US citizens and deployed soldiers, are easily found all over the world. This adds more serious concern in facing LIC. For instance, it is needless to emphasize the easy access to WMD considering that even a Japanese religious sect was able to make chemical weapons today.

WMD, once regarded as a symbol of high technology and wealth, is turning into the most useful means for the poor. WMD have been degraded as weapons for the poor and for the weak. As mentioned, groups relating LIC are relatively weaker than the US or other outer interventions, thus for them, WMD become the most attractive option to adopt when a country like the US is involved.

One more aspect to consider with WMD involvement in LIC is the strategic usefulness of it. WMD may function well in deterring high-level conflicts among the powers but not likely in LIC situation. It is useful for the groups involving LIC because it can deter the US despite its relative weakness. For the US, it is useless because the deterring target is ambiguous. Deterrence works when there is a clear target group to deter. There is no clear significant number of victims that can be jeopardized by deterrent retaliation threat. Moreover, dictators of many smaller nations have not always worried about sacrificing the lives of their citizens, especially when the regional advantages of frustrating or humiliating the US are within grasp. As Steven E. Miller simply points out, deterrence will not work well when dealing with ambiguous borders or disputed territories. Furthermore, more significant problem with WMD is that the motivation for using these weapons of mass destruction is not necessarily to deter aggressors; they are likely to acquire them to use. For instance, terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, Tokyo subway, and Oklahoma City demonstrate that religious, ethnic, nationalist, criminal, or simply politically disaffected groups have become more aggressive in seeking to further aims by using weapons that cause large-scale casualties. Having said that, WMD, obtained by the poor, functions better for deterrence purposes than the powers. It doubles the difficulties the US attempts to face with LIC.

Not only the characteristics of LIC make it difficult for the US to be involved in LIC but also there exist some side effects and limits of the US intervention in LIC. First of all, it is precisely in the low-intensity environment, where political and economic conditions in less-developed societies give rise to armed conflict, that low-intensity conflict planners believe the US has been historically unprepared for engagement. For example, US military organizations and operations have been mainly oriented to prepare for the possible scenarios of high-intensity conflicts such as with the Soviet Union or other superpowers than for low-intensity conflicts. Thus, today's LIC calls for reorienting strategy away from ideas based on anti-Warsaw Pact NATO situation and towards a comprehensive approach to conflict in a more complex third world environment.

When the US is solely involved in LIC, it turns out that the US becomes the enemy of the group in conflict. It brings significant side effects for the US intervening in LIC. First, it may provoke patriotism from the people in conflict, even though the leader of country or terrorist group is committing anti-humane crime. He may rely on patriotism for gaining support from his people and by manipulating a congregation of people's emotion against the US. In that case, the criminality of his behavior can be distracted from people's attention and that significantly limits the US intervention in LIC.

We do not have to go far to find examples of this side effect. See the case of Kosovo crisis. It is clear that Slobodan Milosevic is performing genocide and it is clearly a anti-humane criminal under international law. The US is leading NATO in endeavoring to stop this. However, its people and other powers' focus seem to have been diverted from the issue of ethnic cleansing to the US-NATO hegemonic operation in the region. That is, the Milosevic who might be regarded as an international criminal, manipulates US intervention as anti-American propaganda in order to gain support from people and countries not in favor of the US and the West. It seems to be successful in this manipulation. Thus, it dilutes the fundamental problem and distracts the focus from the criminality to national politics.

Where once the "Western way of war" meant that adversaries risked wars often characterized by decisive battles where the annihilation of enemy forces was sought, today we see the emergence of a Western mindset markedly more sensitive to casualties on both sides. Enemies to the US may consider this humanitarian concern as yet another advantage on which they can capitalize in ways the Western mindset consider unthinkable: they may purposely put their own people in jeopardy if doing so complicates or adversary affects the West's use of its military power. It is a very useful strategy for them but an seriously obstacle to intervention. For example, when Western military action seemed imminent, Sadam Hussein surrounded his palaces and other buildings with noncombatant civilians in order to discourage attacks by Western forces sensitive to the effect on the public regarding civilian deaths. It seems to be working well even in the Kosovo case. Yugo media has shown its people's patriotic human shield on historic bridge and continuously informed the world with the report of innocent civilian death to manipulate western mindset.

When the US is involved in LIC, this is neither motivated from national security nor from patriotism. Only humanitarian concern brought the US involvement in LIC. When the US happens to have a significant number of casualties in battle, US citizens will be easily moved against their country's unnecessary intervention. As wee see from the Vietnam War, even in the height of the ideological confrontation, the US intervention meets easy attack from domestic anti-war opinion and was not willing to fight to death for the sake of the other nation. US soldiers are not trained to die for other nations. Thus, in severe case of LIC, the US lonely humanitarian intervention is likely to end up with unsuccessful achievement.

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In the coming future where more and more international ethnic, regional, and cultural disputes are expected for many reasons, the civilized world will have to determine whether what we call international law is to be continued as a mere code of etiquette or is to be a real body of laws imposing obligations much more definite and inevitable than they have been heretofore.

In theory, most of LIC can be controlled by current international law. Terrorism, genocide, narcotic warfare, and war crimes in insurgency, all these anti-human crimes are prohibited by international laws. However, in actuality, the international legal system's contribution to the deterrence of aggression, particularly in the LIC spectrum, is negligible. Thus, the legal system needlessly becomes largely irrelevant in dealing with a central challenge of LIC in our age. However, this practice does not help the world with promoting peaceful settlement of disputes at all. Disputes solutions based on force or military power will never bring a desirable effect on world peace because it paradoxically means the rule of self-help and the rule of power which may result in more reliance on military capacity in conflict settlements. We must strengthen the overall international legal system to sanction illegal anti-humane activities involving LIC severely.

To make international disputes justiciable has to be conceived most importantly in order to deal with LIC effectively. When a society is believed to be in order, it has to be ruled by certain laws and rules that create the structure of expectation. For example, the US gets involved in certain LIC or not when it does not seriously concern the US national interest. US responses to LIC is case by case. We cannot expect an international law it applys to all cases. Needless to say, this does not help create order in the international community. It drives the world towards more uncertainty dealing with LIC. Thus, there is more need for relying on international law in order to solve LIC problems.

2. Through International Organizations

During June and July 1998, hundreds of delegates from 160 nations met at the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization complex to construct what advocates called "the last global institution to be created in this century": the International Criminal Court (ICC). Late in July, following grueling hours of debates, a global "consensus" was declared by the ICC Plenary Session, and the announcement was made that 120 nations had voted in favor of approving the new "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court." Only the US and six other countries voted against the statute. Twenty-one nations abstained. The ICC will come into existence in Hague once 60 countries have ratified the treaty.

The international community currently has the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a system of peaceful settlement of international disputes. The ICJ jurisdiction covers legal disputes concerning (1) the interpretation of a treaty; (2) any question of international law; (3) the existence of any fact that would constitute a breach of an international obligation; and (4) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. However, different from the ICJ, the International Criminal Court claims universal jurisdiction to try individuals charged with genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression, anywhere on earth, even if the supposed defendants are citizens of a nation that has refused to ratify the treaty and the alleged crime has taken place inside the boundary of that nation. Therefore, it can be said that more wide variety of LIC is subject to be settled by a legitimate legal system and open a great opportunity for peaceful settlement of international disputes including LIC.

Most importantly, assuming that the ICC reaches decisions over LIC relating anti-humane crimes strictly based on the international law, ICC decisions can provide the law enforcement organization, which can be the US as a delegate, with a strong legitimacy.

All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered. All members of the UN shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. It is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the UN Carter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Charter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". Probably that is the only legitimate way to deal with LIC. Even if Article 51 of the UN Charter accepts the existence of a regional collective security system it is only temporary and not a legitimate solution in the end different from what we are witnessing from the NATO operation in the Kosovo crisis. Article 51 says that:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security (emphasis by the writer).

The UN force has been designed for peace keeping operations and all member states are obliged to support and help it. Now that there exists no more obstacles for international cooperation for peace in the post-Cold War, it is possible to place more power on UN peace keeping operations. However, power brings special responsibilities, and temptations. The Powerful must resist the dual but opposite calls of unilateralism and isolationism if the UN is to succeed. The endeavors of the UN will require the fullest engagement of all of its members, large and small, if the present renewed opportunity is to be seized.

It is important to know that the US is not to carry out its justice but the justice of the international community to get support from the international community in dealing with LIC. There is a possibility of different views of justice. Justice requires legitimacy; without widespread acceptance of NATO intervention as part of current justice system, current intervention in Kosovo will appear to be built on neither law nor justice, but on power alone. It will then be only a matter of time before the meddling of the illegitimate intervention is rejected.

Once ICC and UN force operate successfully with full back up from the powers, it would enhance the deterrent to international crimes by increasing the likelihood that criminals are prosecuted, convicted, and punished irrespective of their political position. It would demonstrate the conviction that international crimes are crimes against all peoples and would reflect the determination that international criminals be held accountable for their actions.

With respect acceptance, too often in wartime situations, only the vanquished forces are prosecuted for their crimes. However, when ICC rules and International organizations enforce the international law, efforts of dismantling LIC are more likely to be accepted by parties in LIC expecting fairness. In fact, under the ICC, even US soldiers serving in UN peacekeeping ventures or US airmen in Kosovo operation could stand at risk of war crimes, which is one of the main reasons why the US is not signing the ICC agreement. However, there is no doubt that it will contribute considerably in enhancing LIC parties' acceptance of international solutions with expectation of impartiality.

Now that the US has shown its strong will to solve international disputes by force based on its own judgement, others will also consider the use of force as the only decisive means to deal with it. Knowing that military force rather than international law is the answer to disputes, will Russia and China enhance their military build up? Will North Korea and Iraq give up their attempt to acquire WMD? The US attempts of good will for world peace, in an improper way, ironically drives the world towards rule of force not to rule of law. As far as this trend continues, all parties in LIC will keep building up their military strength.

One of the most significant advantages that the US can enjoy by cooperating with an international legal system is that it may relieve its financial burden of a lonely struggle for restoring world peace from the LIC. This kind of operation costs more money than ever. Roughly speaking, the marginal annual costs for deployment of a division-sized force tend to be $2 billion to $4 billion. That amount covers 15,000 or so combat troops plus roughly twice as many support personnel. For air control operations over Iraq and Bosnia, for example, the US Air Force has recently devoted about on wing of flight aircraft in each theater at an annual cost about $200 million per operation. For operations and maintenance, costs in the Gulf War were about $ 11 billion for the six-month period. The General Accounting Office estimated that the United States spent $ 3.7 billion in fiscal year 1995 on peace operations broadly defined.

More recently, it is estimated that the cost of bombing Serbia in the current Kosovo campaign has been estimated to be at least $320 million. As is well known, in order to avoid innocent civilian victims, the US tends to use more and more high-tech weapons such as smart bombs. Any subsequent deployment of "peacekeepers" will cost $2 billion per year, based on the current cost of similar troop maintenance in Bosnia. The previous Bosnian U.S. military operation expenditure to date is $9.4 billion. In the Kosovo operation, each cruise missile costs about $1 million. How many were fired so far? More seriously, when ground force is deployed in the region it may provoke more serious financial problems. For one-way transportation of about half a million personnel and their associated equipment, much of it heavy ground equipment, the Department of Defense required about $3.5 billion. All these financial burdens not only become a hardship for the US government budget but also can diminish the support from its citizens who pay for this "humanitarian" intervention at the cost of their possible welfare.

There are millions of U.S. citizens outside the United States who can easily become the targets of terrorist groups. An International criminal court and UN force would ease the dilemma faced by nations, most likely the US, that must choose between fulfilling their obligations under international law and the safety of their own citizens. With an international court terrorists, for example, would be less able to target the citizens of particular states as potential hostages or objects or revenge. That is, the US citizens will not have to be endangered by being a target, since the international justice system will prosecute those terrorists and terrorists will be an enemy of the entire world.

By punishing the persons actually responsible for international crimes, an international tribunal may reduce instances of entire nations being punished for their leaders' edicts, as is the case when sanctions and embargoes are imposed on a state.

For example, we need to think about the suffering that innocent people receive from the military solution. NATO has committed air attacks for a month in Kosovo case and it is estimated that most of the infrastructure of Yugoslavia has been ruined. It can potentially weaken Milosevic's government, but what about its people's pain? Their only fault is to have their misleading leader. Does this fault justify NATO attacks on industrial facilities and storage? What is necessary is to punish the person who is responsible for the crime, not all the people under the leader's rule. Economic sanction also can kill, at least harm, innocent people who have no power to leverage and influence their leader or government. This is the same as weapons of mass-destruction killing the non-combatant to gain military goals.

However, once it becomes possible for the international community to make the leader of a country an international criminal figure, the only thing to do is bring him/her to the international court and punish him/her by international law. It may save a lot of people in the country from unnecessary suffering resulting from economic sanctions, embargoes, and reprisal military attacks.

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With respect to the Kosovo crisis, President Yeltsin has not only barked his hostility to NATO's air and missile strikes, he is sending Russian intelligence-gathering ships to the Adriatic. He has hinted that his nuclear missiles could be retargeted at NATO cities; has said that the use of NATO troops in Kosovo, to end Serb attacks on the mostly Muslim population, could even turn a potential cold war hot by drawing Russia into the fighting on Serba's side, possibly provoking a wider conflict in Europe or even a "third world War". Given that, what is the meaning of the US-leading NATO operation in Kosovo? If the good will of the US leads the world to more serious threats to peace, there has to be a reconsideration of US policy. Although it has parted company bitterly with the West over air strikes, Russia had fully supported the peace deal that Milosevic tore up. That included a far-reaching degree of autonomy for the Kosovars and an international peacekeeping force to ensure Milosevic kept his word. There seems, then, to exist a certain degree of consensus for restoring peace in the region. Thus, for the US, again, the reorientation of its course to reach peace has to be taken.

The nature of low intensity conflicts makes it hard for the United States to intervene in regional conflicts. The only credible way to solve LIC problems seems that it has to be done through the international organizations based on the rule of international laws. The U.S. can be a global cop and, maybe, it is the only country which is able and willing to do the job, but it must not be forgotten that the police neither judge what is right and what is wrong nor make the rules to follow. The job that the police do is law enforcement. No one can be a law enforcer while he/she is the judge at the same time. We call it "checks and balances," one of the basic rules in democracy.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary General of the UN, has said that if conflicts have gone unresolved, it is not because techniques for peaceful settlement were unknown or inadequate but the lack of political will of parties to seek a solution to their differences through such means as are suggested in Charter of the UN. If someone argues that it sounds right to rely on the UN in LIC based on international law, then it has to be asked why the most significant power has hampered UN operations for peace. We cannot have a court of universal jurisdiction without the world's major military power on board.

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