"Nuclear Weapon States are Terrorist States"
(Winter, 1998)
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After the Second World War, the world witnessed the devastating power of nuclear weapons and began to think about the moral problems of nuclear weapons, since nuclear weapons are related to the mass killing of civilians. Even though the killing of civilians had been considered illegal before the second World War, using atom bombs at the end of the Second World War seriously ignited debates over immorality of using nuclear weapons. Since the purpose of using nuclear weapons is to magnify the destructiveness and the number of casualties to achieve its political goals, it is not likely to avoid the responsibility for using "immoral" nuclear weapons as a means to the ends. However, what terrorists are trying to do to achieve its political goals is the same as the states which use nuclear weapons to achieve their goals. That is to say, terrorist groups are likely to setup indiscriminate targets and to evoke fear by attacking the innocent. In this respect, what I propose is that nuclear weapons are also a means for terror and that states that have nuclear weapons have to be categorized as a terrorist state. I develop my research through three steps. First, I define what is terrorism and what are the characteristics of nuclear weapons. By studying this two aspects, we may establish close relationships between these two. Second, I examined the legal perspectives of terrorism and nuclear weapons, that is, I examined how the international laws regulate illegal weapons and what are prohibited targets to attack. Finally, I reviewed the history of the use of nuclear weapons. In this section I demonstrated how some states use nuclear weapons and why these activities related to nuclear weapons have to be regarded as an act of terror.
Characteristics of Terror and Nuclear Weapons
Any use of nuclear weapons is likely to be regarded as an act of terror because of its characteristics; mass-killing, killing innocent people, its indiscriminate targets, fear and so on. The methods which terrorist groups mostly seek are the weapons which have the characteristics of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons best fit a terrorist strategy.
1.What Is Terrorism?
There has been many attempts to define terror and terrorism but there is no one clear definition which may be accepted without any argument since different cultures, different polities claim different concept of terrorism, for example, it is said that one man's terrorism is others' freedom fighting. Even though it is not easy to make a clear definition of terrorism or terror, I may introduce several definitions which have been suggested by scholars and some political institutions. Ingrid Detter De Lupis says that '...the new type of terrorism that has flourished in recent years has another element: it is basically and predominantly exercised against random targets, often innocent civilians. This type of terrorism invariably implies a demand that certain acts be taken by someone else. The demand may be clearly expressed or merely assumed to be understood by whoever is empowered to take the acts requested. Terrorism is thus basically 'extortionate' as its perpetrators seek to obtain certain ends by force. Normally there will be political demands. There is very little difference in technique between this type of politically extortionate terrorism and the type for private ends. Alex Schmid argues that terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby-in contrast to assassination-the direct targets of violence are not main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly or selectively from target population, and serve as message generators. Threat-and violence- based communication processes between terrorist, victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target, turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. L. Paul Bermer III, a former US ambassador, addressed before the Commonwealth Club that 'our government believes that terrorist acts have certain characteristics. They are premeditated and politically motivated. They are conducted against noncombatant targets and usually have as their goal trying to intimidate or influence a government's policy. ......Democratic nations must treat terrorists as criminals, for to do otherwise legitimizes terrorists not only in their own eyes but in the eyes of others.' Michael Walzer argues in his book, Just and Unjust Wars that the word "terrorism" is used most often to describe revolutionary violence. .....Its purpose is to destroy the morale of a nation or a class, to undercut its solidarity; its method is the random murder of innocent people. Randomness is the crucial feature of terrorist activity. .....In war, terrorism is a way of avoiding engagement with the enemy army. It represents an extreme form of the strategy of the "indirect approach." It is so indirect that many soldiers have refused to call it war at all. This is a matter as much of professional pride as of moral judgment. It seems evident that most definitions above focus on the randomness of target as a main characteristics of terrorism since indiscriminate attack is most likely to evoke the mood of fear. Thus, we may conclude that indiscriminate targeting is the main factor which decide whether a behavior of a group against another group is terror or not. However, it is true that terrorists can be discriminate in their choice of targets, for example, a head of state, political leaders, symbolic targets such as embassy, but that kind of discriminate targeting could be justifiable for political reasons. That is, we may call this kind of act of terror "political" crime, and those who commit the "political" crime can often enjoy a type of special protection in the forms of political asylum. If a terror is done against a specific target because of things it has done or it has affected others, it is rather, I think, a matter of politics between the two or more related sides than a matter of terrorism. Thus, in my study I mainly focus on indiscriminate targeting of terrorism as one of the main characteristics of terrorism. In this study, I employ Cindy C. Comb's definition of terror. Cindy C. Comb argues that terrorism is an act comprised of at least four crucial elements (1) it is an act of violence; (2) it has a political motive or goal; (3) it is perpetrated against innocent persons; and (4) it is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result. Conclusively, I suggest that any attempt to gain power through intimidation which ignores civilians life is an act of terror regardless of its consequences. With this respect, it is clear that nuclear weapons are the weapon which meets the characteristics as a means of terrorism, since it cannot avoid civilian victims in any use, that is, any use of nuclear weapons entails loss of the innocent and nuclear weapons are useful when it is able to create an atmosphere of fear. It is worth considering a statement of a British admiral in World War II, protesting the terror of German cities: "We are a hopelessly unmilitary nation to imagine that we win the war by bombing German women and children instead of defeating their army and navy."
The main characteristics of nuclear weapons are mass-destructiveness and fear. To be effective, nuclear bombs have to be destructive as much as possible and the fear from that outcome has to be devastating to move an opposing group toward certain goals. Without mass-killing and harm to the non-combatant, it is not likely to meet its ends. A single megaton attack, with an explosive power equivalent to a million tons of TNT, on a city of the size of Detroit would cause at least 220,000 prompt fatalities and further 420,000 casualties, many of whom would subsequently die. Moreover, The largest hydrogen bomb tested has 65 megatons of power of destructiveness which is 5200 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. The long-term effects would be far worse and the damage could spread the suffering over a wide geographical area and the resulting genetic malformations could extend into the next generation and beyond. Recent research studies have suggested that a major counterforce attack, involving more than 3,000 high-yield surface bursts at missile soils, could plunge much of the globe into dark and smoke. Most research about nuclear weapons make it clear that nuclear weapons are tools of mass-killing and anti-humanity. However, some uses of nuclear weapons, so called strategic nuclear weapons, might not cause civilian death by its direct attack, for example, its use in anti-submarine warfare or a 'demonstration' shot or neutron bomb, but because of its inevitability of escalation, it is not likely to avoid subsequent tragedy, that is, mutual mass destruction. With respect to 'strategic' use of nuclear weapons, we need to consider two points; effectiveness and acceptability. That is, if states use limited nuclear weapons which minimize the casualties, it does not have more effectiveness than conventional weapons. It means that nuclear weapons are less likely to be used to get the result which is easily gained by conventional weapons. Developing nuclear weapons has as its aim more immense power to destroy. Further more, the use of limited nuclear weapons is not likely to happen. All weapons are built to be used. It is not reasonable to think that a country will lose a war( for moral reasons) by not using nuclear weapons, even though it has nuclear weapons and knows they are the only reliable weapons to defeat its enemy. Secondly, we may consider the acceptability of non nuclear states' having limited nuclear weapons. Given the fact that neutron bombs and submarine attacks, for example, are not aimed at killing civilians , does it justifies use of nuclear weapons strategically? Also, can the nuclear states accept other states' developing limited nuclear weapons? The answer would be 'No.' In this regard, the strategic use of nuclear weapons cannot justify the nuclear terror and strategic nuclear weapons are out of the question. In summary, with respect to destructiveness, any use of nuclear weapons results in killing innocent people and any target of nuclear weapons is random and indiscriminate, which is the strategy of terrorists.
What we also must consider is the terroristic characteristics of nuclear weapons and how the deterrence works. The nuclear deterrence is a "balance of terror." Both sides, for instance, the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, are so terrified that no further terrorism is necessary. The reason for the acceptance of deterrent strategy, most people would say, is that preparing to kill, even threatening to kill, is not at all the same thing as killing. Indeed it is not, but it is frightening close-else deterrence wouldn't work-and it is in the nature of that closeness that the moral problems lies. Deterrence depends upon a readiness to kill populations in other states. It is as if the states should seek to prevent murder by threatening to kill the family and friends of every murderer-a domestic version of the policy of "massive retaliation". The more willing to kill people of the opposition, the more deterrence is likely to work. The immorality lies in the threat itself, not in its present or even its likely consequences. If both sides during the Cold War, for example, did not show the capability of devastating power to each other, and if both sides were not chickened by estimating each others' "black mail", deterrence would not work. In short, deterrence would not work without "black mail." However, this is how terrorism works. By targeting indiscriminately and taking hostages, terrorist groups "black mail" and threaten other political groups and their members. Thus, with respect to the strategies of nuclear weapons, we may conclude that use of nuclear weapons is an act of terror because it heavily relies on this "black mail," which is one of the main strategies of terrorism.
Attempts by the international community to construct general treaties dealing with terrorism have been largely unsuccessful. But on treaties or conventions which deal instead with specific aspects of terrorism, greater progress has been made. For example, the Geneva Conventions created one of the most successful international regulations which can be used as the basis for dealing with terrorism. In this chapter, thus, I employ the Geneva Conventions to demonstrate what kind of behavior of offenders are prohibited by international laws and what kind of methods are not usable to achieve political goals. In order to categorize a specific action by a political group into a terror, we need to consider whether it violates human rights or not. To protect human rights is the main issue to justify the weapon used to achieve political goals. Before I move onto the Geneva Conventions, however, I start with stating the just war tradition, so called, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.
In order to decide whether using nuclear weapons is just or not, it would be very worthwhile to consider the just war tradition. Since the just war tradition has been the basis of the conduct of war, we may have criteria for just means for war and just means for political ends. However, a distinction has traditionally been made between the right to wage war and the rights and duties which operate once war has started. The unlimited right to start war, the jus ad bellum, has gradually been restricted in state practice. Only certain wars would be allowed: if the war was 'just' it could be waged, but otherwise a state could not resort to war under international law. The jus ad bellum prescribes that war is permissible if and only if:
The jus in bello adds two further conditions governing the conduct of war:
With respect to terrorism and nuclear weapons, we need to put more of our focus on jus in bello. Even in a war time, considering jus in bello, it is clear that any weapon which requires the life of non-combatant should be regarded as violating the just war tradition. To make matters worse, the use of nuclear weapons requires a great amount of casualties. It is clear that in the case of nuclear attack, regardless whether it is just war or unjust war, no one guarantees the immunity of non-combatants.
2. Civilian Immunity: Human Rights
Terrorist acts against innocent persons by state, as well as acts of terrorism by non-state groups, are as illegal in times of war as they are in times of peace. The Laws of war offer neither justification nor protection for the willful and wanton taking of innocent life as we see from the previous discussion, Jus ad bellum and jus in bello. If terrorism, by its very nature involves victimizing an innocent third party, in order to achieve a political goal and to evoke a particular emotional response in an audience, then it seems reasonable to say that terrorism is illegal under the laws of war. In Article 27, the Geneva Convention on Civilians, emphasizes that "they are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honor, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs ..... and shall at all times be treated humanely, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof." Article 33 of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons(1949) provides that no protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited. Protected persons in this Convention are civilians who have the misfortune to be living in a combat zone or occupied territory. What Article 27 and 33 clearly makes is, in my view, that on the one hand, using terrorism against civilians is prohibited, on the other hand, collective penalties for what a person does not commit is also prohibited. However Article 46 of Protocol I codifies the customary international law doctrine that the civilian population as such, as well as individual citizens, may not be made the object of direct military attack. One significant provision in Article 46 states that "Acts or threats of violence which have the primary object of spreading terror among the civilian population are prohibited." This Article goes on to prohibit indiscriminate military attacks which may also attack civilians or civilian objectives without distinction. This Article further states that a bombardment that treats as a single military object a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located within a city, town or village, or other area which has a concentration of civilians is considered to be indiscriminate and is therefore prohibited. What it means is that a state committing an attack on a city or town with nuclear weapons would be to commit an act of terrorism under international law. The convention makes it clear that states as well as groups are prohibited from punishing the innocent in efforts to stop the war or the insurgents in guerrilla warfare. With respect to nuclear weapons, victimizing civilians to stop the war is essential. It is fictional idea that a state may use nuclear weapons over the least populated rural desert in an enemy state only to demonstrate its capability rather than over a populated city in real warfare. However this aspect of nuclear weapons also violates Article 50 of Protocol I. This article also codified customary international law concerning what is called the rule of proportionality. Generally speaking, this refers to the need for the loss of civilian life to be minimal compared with the military advantage gained. However using nuclear weapons is far from making sure that the military objectives which they expect to gain justify the minimal loss of civilian life which may occur. There are two important points here. One is that the objective is assumed to be a military, never a civilian, target. The Law makes it clear that, whereas legitimate attacks may be expected against military targets, there is no legal expectation or right to launch attacks against civilian targets. On the contrary, the civilians within the target zone are to be protected against the effects of that attack, as far as militarily possible. The other point is that, while military reality makes note of the fact that some civilian injury may occur during an attack, the injury or death of civilians should be incidental to the operations, on a scale proportionate to the military objective sought. If civilian casualties are expected to be high, then the attack cannot be justified under international law. It is, then, clear that nuclear weapons cannot be used for any purpose without violation of international laws which prevent violation of human rights and dignity, since any group, especially a state, uses nuclear weapons knows that it will cost civilian lives, and that the death of civilians is not incidental. Thus we may say that using nuclear weapons even with the knowledge of the necessary killing of the innocent is killing them for the purpose of terrorism.
So far I have discussed the theoretical approach of the characteristics of nuclear weapons as a method of terror. From now on I will review historic events which show how the states have used nuclear weapons as terrorism tools. It could be true that a state might not use nuclear weapons for the purpose of terror at that time, but it is an act of terror when the outcome of it turns out to be that of terrorism. Thus, we need to review those events to make it clear that nuclear attack is an act of terror. However, I would like to reiterate that terrorism has a political motive or goal, it is perpetrated against innocent persons, and is staged to be played before an audience whose reaction of fear and terror is the desired result at this point. According to Joel Kovel's study, the U.S. has made no fewer than twenty-two specific uses of nuclear weapons in one international crisis or another. The U.S. has been used nuclear weapons for political reason. That is, even though they were of different degrees and substance, the U.S. has used them to intimidate political opposition or to win conflicts. Among them, I reflect on two historic events: The atomic bombing on Hiroshima, Japan, and the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis .
On 6 August 1945, an American B29 bomber code-named the Enola Gay released an atomic bomb at the height of 31,000 feet over Hiroshima in Japan. There was a sudden and catastrophic explosion as those 700 grams of uranium produced an explosive power equivalent to 13,000 tons of TNT, or 13 kilotons. At the point of explosion, the material in the bomb reached several million degrees centigrade(comparable to that in the center of the sun) and then, within a second, expanded violently to form an incandescent fireball nearly 1,000 feet in diameter. The city and its inhabitants below were instantaneously hit by an enormous and searing blast of heat and radiation and, second later, by a colossal shock wave. Figures for the total number of casualties are imprecise, but of the approximately 350,000 people in Hiroshima on the day of the bombing, some 80,000 were killed instantly or mortally wounded. The surviving injured hopelessly outnumbered the remaining medical services: ninety per cent of all doctors and nurses in the city had been killed or injured, and only three out of city's fifty-five hospitals and first aid centers remained usable. Estimates about the number of deaths caused by the bombing of Hiroshima vary widely but the most recent states that by 1950, some 200,000 people had died as the result of the atomic bomb.
What we have to consider seriously in this historic event is the reason why the civilians of Hiroshima had to be killed. For what reason can the targeting of people, the noncombatant, of Hiroshima as the target for an atomic bomb attack be justified? How did the people of Hiroshima forfeit their rights? Perhaps their taxes paid for some of the ships and planes used in the attack on Pearl Harbor; perhaps they sent their sons into the navy and air force with prayers for their success; perhaps they celebrated the actual event, after being told that their country had won a great victory in the face of an imminent American threat. Surely there is nothing here that makes these people liable to direct attack. When Truman was considering a target for the first bomb, he asked one of his staffs which Japanese cities were devoted exclusively to war production since he did not want to violate the 'laws of war.' His way to proportionate aim, however, cannot justify his employing an atom bomb because of the ambiguity of the reasoning: How and who can decide it? The only possible defense of the Hiroshima attack is a utilitarian calculation made with scale, a calculation made, then, where there was no room for it, a claim to override the rules of war and the rights of Japanese civilians. In 1945, American policy was fixed on the demand for the unconditional surrender of Japan. The Japanese had by that time lost the war, but they were by no means ready to accept this demand. The leaders of their armed forces expected an invasion of the Japan main islands and were preparing for a last-ditch resistance. Thus, Truman's military advisors thought that the war might continue late into 1946 and that there would be as many as million additional American casualties for their Japanese main island invasion. As a result they came up with the solution of a quick end to the war: the atom bomb. Regarding this decision, we need to consider two points. One is America's demand for unconditional surrender of Japan, and the other is the calculation of the potential number of American deaths. Both are crucial factors in the decision to make use of the atomic bomb. Reflecting on the former, if America did not persist in achieving the unconditional surrender of Japan, and, instead, tried to find a way to a negotiated peace, Japan would have accepted peace talks acknowledging that the character of Japanese military was not likely to accept unconditional surrender, and that Japan was about to lose in war. For the latter, the calculation of the plausible number of American casualties were not so trustworthy. Therefore no one can justify the use of atomic bomb causing 200,000 civilian deaths. Thus, we may conclude that the atomic bomb over Hiroshima violated jus in bellum, and was, therefore, unjustifiable. Further it is possible to think that what American decision-makers thought to gain with the atomic bomb was the impact of it- material damaging and psychological frightening effects.
For the United States, the Cuban Missile Crisis began on October 15,1962 when reconnaissance photographs taken by a U-2 spy plane revealed installation under construction for medium-and intermedium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Early the next day, President John Kennedy was informed of the missile installations. Kennedy immediately organized the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, so called ExCom, a group of his twelve immediately advisors to handle the crisis. After seven days of guarded and intense debate within the upper echelons of government, Kennedy concluded to impose a naval quarantine around Cuba. He wished to prevent the arrival of more Soviet offensive weapons on the island. On October 22, Kennedy announced the discovery of the missile installations to the public and his decision to quarantine the island. He also proclaimed that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba would be regarded as an attack on the United States by the Soviet Union and demanded that the Soviet remove all of their offensive weapons from Cuba. During the public phase of the Crisis, tension began to build on both sides. On the 25th Kennedy pulled the quarantine line back and raised military readiness to DEFCON 2. On October 27, a U-2 was shot down by a SAM missile over Cuba, and the tension was at high level. Finally, October 28, Khrushchev announced that he would dismantle the installations and return the missiles to the Soviet Union, expressing his trust that the United States would not invade Cuba, and tension began to ease.
From this historic event of the Cuban Missile Crisis, we may have to think more about the problem of deterrence. The way in which deterrence works seems to me the same as the way terrorist groups use 'black mail.' Terrorist groups use black mail to threaten the opponent and achieve their political goals. This is how deterrence works. Both terrorist black mail and deterrence are 'the Game of Chicken.' That is to say, each side in the game relies on the rationality of irrationality. They may say, " One of us has to be reasonable and it is not going to be me, so it has to be you." How can this be done effectively, and efficiently communicated? The enemy has to be convinced you are stark, raving mad or totally reckless, obliviously to the danger and out of control. In the event of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the reason why Khrushchev dismantled the missile installations from Cuba could be that he was chickened by Kennedy's 'black mail.' It seems to me evident that Kennedy relied on his rationality of irrationality in the game of chicken and he won since he conceived Khrushchev with his overwhelming 'irrationality.' At this point, however, we face the problem of deterrence. The reason for our acceptance of deterrence strategy is that preparing to kill, even threatening to kill, is not at all the same thing as killing. To make deterrence work, one side has to show their willingness and likeliness to kill the opponent. We may review the moralists arguments of deterrence. British Roman Catholics, for example, assert that "deterrence rests, in the end, on the intention to use nuclear weapons," not that in some or many of its forms it may or might rest on either present murderous intention of on a "conditional willingness" to do murder. They go further in their argument that "If we find that 'having' nuclear weapons involves intending to explode them over predominantly civilian targets, no more need to be said; this intention is criminal, just as the action is criminal." In this respect, we may find that the nuclear logic in the deterrence strategy, as we see from the Cuban Missile Crisis, is that employed by terrorists: 'black mail.'
Mainly focused on the mass destructiveness of nuclear weapons, my study has concluded that any use of nuclear weapons is an act of terror regardless of it is used by 'terrorist' or by a legitimate 'state.' Nuclear weapons must have devastating capabilities of destructiveness in order to be 'effective' weapons. Killing civilians naturally results from the devastating power of nuclear weapons. Thus, it is clear that any use of nuclear weapons necessarily entails the loss of civilian life. Given the fact that any political entity knows the necessity of mass killing in the use of nuclear weapons, how can we justify using nuclear weapons? As moralists argue, if an action is morally wrong, it is wrong to intend to do it. We know that any use of nuclear weapons will result in killing the innocent, thus, using nuclear weapons is wrong. It is also wrong to posses and intend to use nuclear weapons. Thus, even possession of nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence cannot be justified in this regard. Nuclear terror is inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons themselves. In conclusion, any state which possesses and uses nuclear weapons has to be regarded as a terrorist state.
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