The Political Career and Personal Qualities of Richelieu
(a research paper on Richelieu)
The greatness and admiration of Richelieu do not come only from his
ideas on government comprehensibility, intelligence and progressiveness
but also because during his time as a minister he was able, to great extent,
to fulfill his clear-cut plan to create the strong state and the absolute
monarchy. Richelieu achieved this goal through several courses of action.
First-of-all, the central policy of Richelieu was to preserve and extend
the authority of the government. Richelieu created an administration apparatus
with men completely dependent himself and thus facilitated tremendously
the implementation of his policies. He established a church utterly loyal
to the monarchy. In fact, the French state had far more extensive control
over the revenue of the church than in any other Catholic country. Richelieu
had achieved another goal--neutralizing the Huguenots. "As a party"
he claimed, the Huguenots had been ruined but this was not so in the direct
sense of the word. He did so by tolerating religious differences in order
to preserve national unity. Although the Premier Minister considered the
noblesse as a vital factor in the state machine, he foresaw the danger
of those nobles that were considering themselves excluded from a share
of central power and thus could revert to territorial independence (Pennington,
266-67). Contrary to the intention of Richelieu to consolidate sovereignty,
their whole life was a defiance of sovereign law. Richelieu had the skills
and intellect to find a way to deal with the conspiracies and plots against
his regime--selective revenge, counter-attacking and finally lèse-majesté.
He was also able to diminish the role of the Parliement that was an evident
obstacle to centralization and absolutism. When confronted with the problem
of Huguenot apprisings, Richelieu with both his political shrewdness and
genuine humanity advised the King to confirm the Edict of Nantes and pardon
the rebellion. The "Peace of Grace" achieved the deserved award
for the Huguenots did not disturb the security of the state the next few
decades (Briggs, 98). With the king supreme at home, Richelieu in 1635
carried France into the Thirty Years' War. The reason was mostly imbedded
in the threat that the Hapsburg states, Austria and Spain presented to
France. Another motive that lies behind it was that although a risky endeavor
the war contributed to the consolidation of the state.
Richelieu was a man of many personal qualities. His powerful and analytic
intellect was characterized by a reliance on reason, strong will and ability
to govern others. He was, in fact, a born leader who possessed in abundance
the personal qualities that are associated with effective use of political
power. Even before becoming Premier Minister, the political ideas and concepts
of Richelieu are well-matured. In his early statements, authoritarianism
is essential. He believed in the divine right of the king and adhered to
the doctrine of divine right sovereignty. He had a comprehensive view of
well-defined, divinely ordained authority at all levels of society and
was devoted to authoritarianism and legitimacy. Richelieu had a clear view
of the way the society was supposed to function. Everyone played a specific
role in the system, making their contributions--the clergy through their
prayers, the nobles with their arms under the control of the king, and
the peuple, as the Cardinal used to call the common people, through continued
obedience. For him the monarchy was the divinely appointed mechanism. Its
purpose was peace and order in society, every subject contributing to the
life of the whole. The final result that he envisioned was peace for the
state, prosperity for the king, and greatness for the monarchy (Church,
82-85).
The reality was, however, completely different from what Richelieu was
striving towards. As O1Connell put it: "France was not an entity,
but a congeries of antiquated centres of administrative gravity".
The provincial governments were the main source of instability. The provinces
were ruled by governors, who were nominally for the Crown but more often
stood against it. some of them used the royal authority to become "petty
sovereigns". In certain provinces there were provincial Estates, duplications
of the States General. All the Midi had a vast degree of autonomy, and
even the center and west had not renounced their privileges and were engaged
in constant struggle with the Crown to defend them. Even when the Crown
proposed trivial things it encountered the obstacle of provincial liberties.
In addition, the cities, composed of oligarchies of men of the robe and
of trade, had their liberties. Richelieu followed the traditional logic
of absolute monarchy and reinforced the system of penetration into the
provincial administrative structure by creating officers answerable to
the Crown, who would duplicate and gradually absorb the function of revenue-raising,
defense, police and the courts. Richelieu went much further in consolidating
the role of the Crown in the whole country and created the so-called intendants.
They were given authority over the justices, officers and subjects of the
Crown, with the power of resolution and decision of "affairs concerning
our service, repose and security, to receive request, administer justice,
preside over courts and policy, and assist the governors and lieutenant-generals"
(O'Connell, 130). Richelieu had also managed to create an extensive network
of spies, men of confidence, pamphleteers who disseminated the ideas of
Richelieu before their implementation. All this effectively contributed
to a centralization of authority and reduced the risks of promoting the
policies of state-building.
It is interesting to note that even as a mere Bishop of Luçon, Richelieu
was convinced that the state, because of its special purposes and interests,
had to differentiate itself from the code of Christian ethics that prevailed
among individuals and to operate on a different level. The Cardinal always
adhered to the maxim that the means justify the ends. His religious beliefs,
therefore, are quite explainable. Although he devoutly believed in the
Roman Church1s great mission, Richelieu sought to assign the church a more
practical meaning. There was are distinctive tendency in his policies towards
laxism and willingness to accommodate religious principles to practical,
human reality. Richelieu realized that reason of state necessitated a partial
autonomy of political affairs from theological determinants. A more loose
religious morality was needed. In his Instruction du chrétien he
repeatedly emphasized the sufficiency of a far less rigorous route to salvation
than it was required by most of the contemporary religious leaders (Church,
86-87). Richelieu used such arguments to justify his position that the
state is above everything and that religion is a mere instrument to promote
the policies of the state. The church, thus became a mere tool for the
promotion of state policies and increasing the royal power. The Cardinal
also considered it to be entirely normal and appropriate to work for religious
objectives through the instrumentality of the state. He gave his policies
a religious justification, usually defining the good of the state in religious
terms. It is clear that to Richelieu the monarchical state and church were
the two great, correlative, interlocking institutions and according to
him they were "divinely authorized to lead and control humanity in
their respective spheres" (Church, 86). Richelieu did not use the
church to defend his intentions but the Cardinal did not hesitate infringe
on the traditionally established rights of the clergy. When the treasury
was short of money because the involvement of France in the Thirty Years
War, Richelieu made it clear that the crown might tax clerical wealth without
the consent of its holders. Thus the administration demanded on several
times subsidies from the clergy and claimed the right to tax them. Although
Pope Urban VIII condemned such attacks upon ecclesiastical property, the
Parlement did not react. As we can see, Richelieu adroitly and extensively
used the potential of the church in realizing his idea of centralized state.
An important obstacle to the solidification of absolutism and centralization
of power was the Parlement, which was conservative, independent and resistant
to pressure. Bernard de La Roche-Flavin in 1617 summed up its authority
as follows: "It has the function of verifying, ratifying, limiting
or restraining" (O1Connell, 131). In eight provinces there were parlements
similar in role and function to the Parliement in Paris. This only demonstrates
the incongruity of the state system. The Parlement at the time of Richelieu
claimed that all decrees were of legal effect only if ratified or approved
by it. This was true even if they were made in the presence of the King.
Richelieu had to struggle during his whole career in order to gain control
over the judicial system and finally succeeded when an ordinance was issued
in 1641 which forbade the Parlement in future to occupy itself with political
concerns. The restriction of judicial functions of the Parlement would
have been something unheard of twenty years before and particularly here
we can see the contribution of the Cardinal to the creation of a more centralized
authority. According to Bernard de La Roche-Flavin, France was composed
of "three sorts of government on the whole, that is to say, the monarchy,
aristocracy and republic, so that one may serve as a brake upon and a counterpoise
to the other." Richelieu put all his effort in undoing this system
by placing as much power as possible in the hands of the monarch. The opposition
of the Parlement to his measures he described as "altogether beyond
the bounds of reason" (O1Connell, 131).
It is the reason of things that lies behind the logic of Richelieu1s conceptions
of solidifying the central authority. In an age when there was solid faith
in the power of human reason to perceive the true structure of things,
the Cardinal derived his concepts of absolutism on the basis of a firm
belief in the institution of monarchy as a rational system of government.
On the other hand, he assumed that the monarchy was the necessary power
to restrain the irrational tendencies in men. Richelieu made every reasonable
effort to make the existing system more efficient by staffing it with his
protégés, controlling its operations and adding certain elements
that increased effective power at the center (Church, 174).
When we discuss the consolidation of the French monarchy, the notion of
sovereignty is essential. We cannot talk of Richelieu1s increasing the
effective power of the administrative system and institutions of government
without mentioning his strive for fulfillment of the concept that every
Frenchman was equally subject to the Crown regardless of his position in
the hierarchy and ensuring that all elements of the population were in
every sense the king1s loyal subjects (Church, 174). Although the Cardinal
had some religious constraints because of the mediaeval ideas of Christian
morality which was still present to date, he nevertheless regarded public
interest as of primary importance. The idea of sovereignty was introduced
as the keystone and major factor of French political thinking without which
Richelieu would have undoubtedly found it hard to realize his policy of
centralizing authority. Richelieu had to reestablish the balance between
fundamental law and royal sovereignty which had been seriously disturbed.
The work of Cardinal Le Bret in 1632 demonstrates this. Sovereignty, he
said "is a supreme power bestowed on an individual, which gives him
the right to command absolutely, and which has for its end the repose and
advantage of the public"(De la souveraineté du roy, 1). The
reasoning of Le Bret makes it clear that the change of institutions and
customs by the royal authority is possible, "for all persons being
equally subjects of the same King, are equally subject to the same law".
Le Bret also criticizes the anarchic character of the feudal rights and
privileges whose belittlement will become one Richelieu1s main objectives.
Probably the strongest impediment to the policies of Richelieu, aimed at
intensifying the royal power throughout France, were the traditional privileges,
liberties and feudal rights of the nobility. Some of the higher nobles
were constantly involved in conspiracy against the crown and at times their
personal armies were outnumbering that of the crown. Thus in the beginning
of his rule as a Premier Minister, Richelieu1s major problems on the domestic
front consisted of counterattacking the noble conspiracies and reducing
the political power of the Huguenots. On the pretext of combating the heresy,
Richelieu embarked upon hostilities against the Huguenots. His major concern,
however, in both reducing La Rochelle and restricting the activities of
the nobles was the elimination of all resistance within the monarchy which
hampered the expansion and exercise of state power and to demonstrate that
all French citizens, Catholic or Huguenot, noble or peasant, must be loyal
subjects to the Crown (Church, 175). The fact which proves the Cardinal1s
desire was to submit all elements of French society to the power of the
state was the Peace of Allais (1629). Richelieu succeeded in reducing the
Huguenots to the position of unquestionable obedience. It was clear to
the Cardinal that it was not the heresy that limited royal absolutism but
rebellion and war. The bitter experience of religious strife that meant
undesirable chaos which inevitably would weaken the power of the ruler
was another factor for the peaceful settlement of the problem with the
Huguenots. The words of Louis XIII at the capitulation of the rebellious
La Rochelle are indicative of this: "I well know that you have done
everything in your power to throw off the burden of obedience to me. I
forgive your rebellions. If you are my good and faithful subjects, I shall
be a good prince to you" (Church, 196).
Before the Peace of Allais, the reasons for the rebellions of the Huguenots
were very similar to the pretensions of the nobles in general. They maintained
that they were loyal subjects but the privileges that had been conceded
them by earlier royal edicts had been continually violated. The position
of Richelieu, however was indisputable. As seen from his work Advis designated
for the king, the primary duty of the king is to wield his power for the
benefit of his state without regard to personal or humanitarian considerations.
By winning the king entirely on his side, Richelieu was ready to pursue
his goal of controlling the great nobles and limiting their seditious activity.
Richelieu who "gloried in the majesty of Louis XIII" persisted
in explaining the continuing danger from the nobility and stated the according
measures that need to be taken (Church, 198). Here, it is imperative to
mention that the self-effacement of Louis XIII must be counted as not the
least of the causes which contributed to the consolidation of the French
state, for the achievement of the Cardinal was made possible only by the
conduct of the King (Wedgwood, 37). Richelieu insisted that the King should
exert greater effort to enforce his laws, especially those that touched
the nobles, and he specifically mentioned the edict against dueling. The
laws must be applied with extraordinary severity, for otherwise the state
cannot survive. The Cardinal emphasized to the King that he had to rigorously
punish all crimes so as to forestall greater ones. Through such kind of
reasoning, Richelieu sought to provide to his sovereign a rationale for
the harsh rule and occasionally immoral policies that both knew to be requisite
to strengthening the French State.
The edict against dueling as well as the royal declaration ordering the
destruction of fortresses that were not on the frontiers were both for
the purpose of increasing royal control over the nobles. There was need
for extensive psychological adjustment before the nobles could view themselves
as mere subjects of the crown. The period was such that for the nobility
the king was but the highest ranking member of the order. The attempt of
Richelieu to exclude the nobles from the government affairs on any level
was within the scope of the royal prerogative but ran counter to many elements
of noble1s traditional way of life, therefore involved the violation not
of legal rights but of social values. The aristocracy had failed to transform
itself into a political oligarchy capable of resisting the intrusion of
absolute monarchy. It consumed itself and the resources of the nation in
senseless pursuit of noble values and honor. In this way it had become
an impediment to the centralization of the state, upon which the grandeur
of France depended. The reasonable policy of Richelieu was to reduce the
great nobility to loyalty and to use their energy for the benefit of the
state (O1Connell, 128).
The explanation for the continuous threat to central authority and more
precisely the secret noble conspiracies against Richelieu, whom many regarded
as a tyrant and a menace to their way of life, can be explained by the
personal concept of service that the nobles used to have, their loyalty
to the order and the clientele system. An effective way of dealing with
the numerous conspiracies and secret revolts of the nobles was the accusation
of lèse-majesté. The crime was considered to consist of overt
and covert acts against the person of the king, members of his family,
or the safety of his realm. Richelieu expanded the definition of lèse-majesté
to include the composition, publication, and distribution of defamatory
libels concerning political matters. Richelieu did not hesitate to accuse
the followers of the Queen Mother and Gaston d'Orleans of lèse-majesté
(Church, 178-79). The idea appeared that in political affairs a special
standard of justice without proofs of guilt was both necessary and justified.
Many opponents of Richelieu, thus, found themselves in the prison or were
sentenced to death because they were plotting against the state, and disrupting
the public peace.
Another device that Richelieu used to diminish the power of the nobles
and respectively aggrandize that of the state was the practice of selling
offices. This was not merely a device to raise revenue from the proprieted
classes but it blocked the formation of grandee clientage systems within
the state. Richelieu stressed in his Testament Politique the critical Œsterilizing1
role of the paulette in putting the whole administrative system beyond
the reach of tentacular aristocratic lineages like that of the House of
Guise (Anderson, 52).
After the Day of Dupes when most of Richelieu1s opponents were neutralized,
the ambitious minister realized that the moment has come for a more serious
foreign policy. War was unavoidable according to Richelieu although he
saw war as a needed process before a all-reaching peace was obtained. War
was also the prime necessity to building state power and prestige of the
monarchy. The emergency of the war also allowed the taking of measures
and the implementation of domestic policies aimed at consolidating the
monarchical state which without this emergency are practically impossible.
Aggressive foreign policy was also the only means of neutralizing threats
from abroad and advancing state interests. It is argued that Richelieu,
following his program of state-building, had been caught in the spiral
in which the survival of the state necessitated armed combat which in turn
caused further rivalry. Others also say that he used the resources of the
nation in vain in order to participate in an useless conflict. Whatever
the sacrifices, the foreign policy of Richelieu presented, it had promoted
and had brought further the consolidation, power, security, prestige, and
discipline to the monarchical state.
Although the system that Richelieu created can be viewed as artificial
because it did not appear as a natural continuation of the past, his idea
of government from above had its enormously beneficial outcome on the historical
development of France. By adapting his policies to changing circumstances,
with great flexibility and exploitation of opportunity, enabled Richelieu
to achieve his goal of the integrity and grandeur of France. Richelieu
had found a country with unrealized potential, vigorous but divided people.
He had found France inefficiently governed and inadequately armed. By involving
every subject in the service of a strong state, Richelieu opened up more
perspectives in front of the people. He saw this tremendous potential for
order, skillful government and military greatness. His whole life he worked
towards this objective and he left contentious nation, a coherent domain,
a political system soon to become the example for the rest of Europe. Richelieu
formed a model upon which the new ideal of Nationalism should frame itself.
He centralized political power and worked towards a more uniform legal
system. Richelieu built for France the stable and powerful monarchy which
gave her a long pre-eminence among nations and contributed to the whole
European development. The only factor that was on his side during his mission
as principle minister of the state was the need and desire in the society
for authority and peace after the prolonged disorder of the past. The energy
and will-power of the Cardinal reconstructed the state and made France
a great power in the face of the most formidable obstruction.
All these merits of Richelieu to his country is the reason why many French
historians consider him as the founder of French unity as well as the person
who released France from its medieval nature.
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