History of the USS Grayson DD435
The Exploits of the "G" from 1941-1947
As told by Captain W.V. Pratt, USN
Commanding Officer of Grayson November 1943- January 1945
Grayson DD435-- laid down 17 July 1939 by the Charleston Navy Yard, South Carolina. Launched 7 August 1940 with sponsor, Mrs. Grayson Harrison, widow of Rear Admiral Grayson. Commissioned St. Valentine's Day 14 February 1941. LCDR T. Murray Stokes in command. After shakedown along the New England coast and in Chesapeake Bay, Grayson joined Destroyer Division 22 of the Atlantic fleet. On 28 August the new destroyer became flagship of DesRon 11, Capt. Deyo, operating in the Caribbean out of Guantanamo Bay. She reported for neutrality patrol in North Atlantic waters on 26 October. After ten months patrolling and protecting convoys in the icy North Atlantic in the "Secret War", Grayson was ordered to the Pacific to join an American fleet battered but resolute. On 2 April 1942 Hornet (Capt. Marc Mitscher) sailed from San Francisco on a highly secret mission. She was carrying sixteen of the Army Air Force's medium bombers (Mitchell B-25's) and flight crews trained by the Navy and led by LCOL. Jimmy Doolittle. Hornet was escorted into the Central Pacific by cruisers Vincennes and Nashville and DesDiv 22 comprising Gwin, Grayson, Meredith, and Monssen. Fleet oiler Cimarron sailed with the group. Eleven days later, the Hornet group was met by the Enterprise group at a point about halfway between Kamchatka and Pearl Harbor. The combined force, Task Force 16, was under command of Admiral William F. (Bull) Halsey. During the next five days, Adm. Halsey led this fast moving carrier Task Force to a launch point within 700 miles of Tokyo. On 18 April 1942, the raid on Tokyo was launched bringing the war to the enemy's own land. A week later, 25 April, the carrier Task Group returned safely to Pearl Harbor. Grayson departed for repairs in California but soon returned to the Pacific War, this time with a new captain, LCDR Frederick Jackson Bell. On 30 May 1942, Capt. Bell assumed command of the "G" in Navy Yard Mare Island. This cruise of the "G" that followed is an eloquent saga that is told so well in Capt. Bell's "Condition Red" written before the colors had a chance to fade. Some highlights of Capt. Bell's cruise:: Capt. Bell was the OTC in the "G" with four small New Zealand coal fired corvettes escorting more than twenty ships from the west coast of Uncle Sugar to the Hawaiian Islands. The G sorties with Enterprise from Pearl Harbor on 15 July 1942 for the first real offensive of the war. In the assault on D-DAY, 7 August 1942, the Marines under General Vandergrift are lodged and the land battle for Guadalcanal commences. The Battle of the Eastern Solomons in late August 1942, the "G" draws blood. The sinking of the IJN submarine on 25 August by the "G" almost empty of fuel, 46 depth charges in five attacks. The loss of Meredith DD434 by air attack from enemy carrier Zuikaku on 1 October 1942. Rescue of remnant of ship's company by "G" three days later. The salvage of Vireo. Visits to Brisbane, Australia and Wellington, N.Z. for Christmas 1942. Enter Cobb, Liebert, Prager. Candy- Guadalcanal The Coconut Shoot on Guadalcanal-- 569 rounds of 5-inch expended usefully on Japanese positions on the northwest coast. The "G" returns to Pearl Harbor after nine rugged months. A change of captains, LCDR Henry Otto Hansen for Frederick Jackson Bell on 22 April 1943 at 1000 at Pearl Harbor. The G returns to the States for repairs. Sailing westward again to New Caledonia and arriving 24 September. The G accounts for at least four and possibly two more Japanese barges loaded with evacuees from Kolombangara in the Central Solomons during three nights of action with three other ships of DesRon 21 under Commodore Chandler. Grayson suffers enginieering damage suffiecient to require return to Puget Sound Navy Yard. Before sailing from Espiritu Santo, there is a change of captains on 14 November 1943, LCDR W.V. Pratt for LCDR H.O. Hansen. There follows an itinerary of the "G" during my memorable fourteen months on board. Follow me as I name each port od call and see what images are conjured up in the minds of those of you who sailed with me. Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides--14 November 1943 Pearl Harbor--November 1943 Hawaii--The Big Island--Apra Harbor San Diego Harbor Bremerton, Washington--December 1943-January 1944 Pearl Harbor--January 1944 Majuro I. Marshalls -- February Kwajalein I. --Marshalls Tarawa I.-- Gilberts Makin I. --Gilberts Funafuti I.--Ellice Islands Tarawa I.--Gilberts Espiritu Santo--March 1944 Brisbane, Australia--March 1944 Milne Bay, New Guinea Sudest and Lae, New Guinea Manus Island, Admiralty Islands--30 March Oro Bay, New Guinea Tanamerah Bay, New Guinea--22 April Hollandia, (Humboldt Bay) New Guinea Wakde--Sarmi--May Biak I.--New Guinea Mios Woendi, New Guinea --June Noemfoor Island, New Guinea--4 July 1944 Sansapor, New Guinea Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands--August Manus Island (Seeadler Harbor)--30 September After refueling, Task Force 58 positions herself off Formosa athwart Japanese lines of Communication. Here a excerpt from the "G's" war diary for the month of October is inserted:: 1 October 1944. 2 October 1944 During the early afternoon, very satisfactory anti-aircraft practices were held, during which Grayson expended 114 rounds 5"/38 caliber, 336 rounds 40mm and 597 rounds of 20mm ammunition. Runs were frequent, well executed and carried out with dispatch. Exercise 4-C from U.S.F. 10-A was also held at this time and SC-2 radar gave a good account for itself, tracking the plane out to 96 miles and picking it up returning at 75 miles. FD radar was put on target at 47,000 yards. In late afternoon, the task group formed up and Grayson took her place in the basic screen. 3 October 1944 4 October 1944 7 October 1944 9 October 1944 10 October 1944 11 October 1944 The task group launched fighter sweeps against Appari in the Philippines during the day. On completion of fueling, course was set for a position southeast of Formosa at a speed of 25 knots. 12 October 1944 During the morning Grayson completed her mail deliveries. Just at sunset, many bogies appeared on the screens and there appeared to be many separate raids. Dusk saw the commencement of a prolonged period of harassment by single and small groups of enemy planes. The raids which occured, however, seemed to involve the other groups of the task force more often than 38.1. Although several groups of bogies approached to within ten miles of the group, none of them attacked until after 1900. Several "flamers" were observed near the task groups to the north shortly after 1900 and intensive anti-aircraft indicated that they were under heavy attack. It is possible that the attacks were timed for dusk and were a little behind schedule. Because of the darkness the first group attacked was the one most likely to draw the subsequent attacks as the anti-aircraft fire positioned them for attacking planes. The remainder of the night was spent at Condition One and One-Easy and was a night of much activity. The task group was almost continuously skillfully maneuvered with simultaneous turn signals at speeds ranging from fifteen to twenty-five knots. Because of the high sea, running flank speeds were very wet and hard on the ship. Many bogies remained in the area ,and at almost any time up until 0200, AA fire could be seen somewhere in the distance. Smoke was utilized several times by the task group commander during the night when bogies approached in numbers. Almost every bogie that approached the formation dropped "window". It is believed that in several instances that use of "window" by the enemy cause over-estimation of his number on our part. The radar operators were quick to detect the window contacts, however, and it is believed that their alertness did much to counteract the effectiveness of the window. The pips given off by the typw window used are easily distinguished by an alert SC-2 operator and do not lead to much confusion in tracking. Window does make it a bit more difficult to be certain that FD is "on target" and the ocsasion will most certainly arise unless care is taken that when there are fast closing targets, FD will lose valuable seconds by reporting "on target" only to find a target speed of some thirty knots and a fairly steady bearing. The only way in which this can be avoided when window is used is through a constant check of ranges by SC-2 on the FD and buzzers after "on target". At 2314 just after recovery of night fighters , a bogie was picked up by SC-2 radar at eighteen miles, bearing 090 degres t. The bogie closed and FD was put on target at 30,000 yards and tracking was commenced as soon as the range closed sufficiently. The bogie closed and was taken under fire by Grayson, the action being covered in the enclosed action report for 2317 of 12 October 1944. Grayson was the only ship of the task group to fire on this plane. This plane was lost by FD just after fire was opened and contact on the plane was not regained, although for a short time window dropped evidently at about the time of commence fire, gave the impression that the range was opening. This plane was not observed by Grayson and it was a very pleasant surprise when a message was received from ComDesRon 12 after daylight next morning saying that it had crashed fify-five hundred yards off McCalla's starboard bow. McCalla's station was next to Grayson in a clockwise direction. 13 October 1944 At 0300 a raid was picked up at 060 degrees t, distance 56 miles. This bogey was tracked and a course of 240 degrees t and a speed of 110 knots obtained. A steady straight approach was made by the target and a perfect radar solution obtained. The action is covered in the enclosed anti-aircraft action report for 0315, 13 October 1944. This target was really expected to burst into flames because a perfect solution had been obtained and the ship was cocked and ready for him. It was disappointing when no results of the fire were evident and the target slowly opened. If the objective of the enemy snoopers during the night was tracking and continual harassment until about 0200, this was achieved. It is difficult to see where they accomplished anything else. At 0920 the formation of the group was changed to 5-R which put Grayson in station No. 1 (6000) on the formation axis. The usual bogey reports were received during the day but all were handled by the interceptors. In the late afternoon, large groups of bpgies were reported approaching the area and many were destroyed, although there was evidence that the combat air patrol did not get all of them. At 1824 a report was received that a large group of bogies had passed 38.4 to the south and was approaching 38.1. Shortly afterward, at least four low-flying planes attacked the formation from the south-east (1644 5V #3). Because of the direction from which the attack came, Grayson was not able to fire without endangering other ships. Several flamers were observed shot down, one of which crashed alongside the starboard bow of the Wasp, burning some paintwork. Shortly after this attack, firing broke out in the northwest sector of the formation which indicated a similar attack from that direction. Canberra shortly thereafter reported that she had been hit. The torpedo had hit her starboard side amidships and she reported she had lost control. It was observed in all of the actions in which there was much firing that the camouflaged ships show up much more clearly in the light of the firing than do the darker ships. Wichita, Brown, and Conner stood by Canberra, and Wichita took Canberra in tow. The task group cleared the immediate vicinity of the towing group but remained in the general area. There was not a repetition of the harassment of th eprevious night as there were only a few scattered bogies during the night and no more attacks were made on the group. The general opinion was that of 10-12 planes had made a skillful attack on the group from two directions and that seven were shot down. The Grayson was not in a position to observe the attack from the west, but of the four planes which approached from the southeast, it is believed all four were shot down before they reached the center of the formation. 14 October 1944 Later in the afternoon, a large group of bogies was intercepted to the northwest by our fighters and was broken up, some eight planes being reported shot down. There was some reason to believe that the destruction of the planes might forestall the usual dusk attack. However at 1810 when the carriers were recovering the daylight combat sir patrol, more bogies were picked up approaching the formation from the northwest and from the east. At 1834 bogies were reported at 125 degrees t, 23 miles, and shortly thereafter Grayson gained contact on a bogie bearing 120 degrees t at 20 miles. FD was coached on the target and tracking was commenced as soon as the range closed sufficiently. The contact closed rapidly and at 1836 some five planes were observed visually approaching low on the water. The ensuing anti-aircraft action is covered in the enclosed anti-aircraft action report for 1837 and 1838, 14 October 1944. The 40mm and 20mm guns were especially effective on this attack and it is believed thay they accounted for one of the five planes observed and assisted McCalla in destroying another. The performance of personnel and material in this attack was excellent. During this attack, Houston was struck by a torpedo in her engine room spaces and lost control. Some of the large ships in the center of the formation experienced difficulty in clearing Houston as at the time she was hit, the task group was on course 135 degrees t, and Houston bore 090 degrees t from the center of the formation. The formation was maneuvered to clear Houston's vicinity and Cowell and Grayson were directed to stand by her. Cowell and Grayson were on either side of Houston in screen but because of th ehigh speed and manuevering of the task group were not able immediately to approach Houston. As soon as the group cleared, Grayson and Cowell closed Houston to render assistance if possible. While approaching Houston at 1925, a bogie was picked up on SC-2 bearing 052 degrees t, distant 10 miles, closing. This bogie closed and was fired on by Grayson with negative results, the action being covered in the enclosed AA action report for 1928, 14 October 1944. Shortly after this, word was received that Houston was abandoning ship. Cowell went alongside Houston and Grayson took position down-wind and as close as practicable to assist in taking survivors from the water and to act as communications link. A number of men had abandoned ships and it was deemed impraticable to risk turning over the crews in water they might be occupying. Houston informed Grayson visually that men were drifting toward her and that rafts were coming down. At 1930 Boyd was directed to assist Grayson and Cowell in assisting Houston and ComDesDiv 92 was directed to take charge of the rescue operations. At 1938, a bogie was picked up on SC-2 radar bearing 240 degrees t at 11 mile. This bogie closed and was taken under fire by Grayson. The action is covered in the enclosed report for 1940, 14 October 1944. At this time there were people from the Houston in the water between Houston and Grayson and although no torpedo wake was observed from the ship, the subsequent reports by many Houston observers who had been in the water established beyond doubt that a torpedo had been dropped by this plane and narrowly missed both Grayson and Houston. All preparations were made to pick up survivors and the starboard rafts were put in the water. At 2015 Houston informed Grayson visually that she desired tow and the message was relayed to CTG 38.1 by TBS. Boston was ordered to proceed to Houston and take her in tow. At 2018 a bogie was picked up on SC-2 bearing 105 degrees t, 10 miles. This bogie closed and was taken under fire. The action is covered in the enclosed anti-aircraft action report for 2022 of 14 October 1944. At 2030 commenced taking survivors aboard. Several rafts drifted alongside and there were numerous single swimmers. The next hour was spent in picking up the survivors who came down to the ship. Whenever the area was clear of survivors, the ship maneuvered back into position as she drifted somewhat faster than the men. During this time, Grayson picked up some eighty-five men. ComCruDiv 10 on the Boston directed that one destroyer circle Boston and Houston while the other two picked up survivors. ComDesDiv 92 instructed Grayson to circle the formation as soon as she had the survivors in her area on board. At 2155 all survivors in the immediate area having benn brought aboard, Grayson proceeded to screen in accordance with instructions. At 2330 Boston passed wire to Houston and at 0004 prepared to commence towing. CTG 38.1 instructed ComCruDiv 10 to have one destroyer pick up survivors and informed him that the task group would make a sweep of the area in the morning. Cowell was first designated to remain and pick up survivors but because of the damage sustained while alongside Houston, it was decided that Grayson should remain instead of Cowell. 15 October 1944 One hundred seventy-seven men and seventeen officers from the Houston were recovered during the night. Cowell's boat capsized and her boat crew of four men was also recovered by Grayson. After leaving the survivor area at 0815 Grayson proceeded to the area of the towing group and joined Cowell and Boyd in screening Houston and Boston. At 1130 the towing group joined with Task Group 30.3 and took station in anti-submarine screen, screening the two damaged vessels and their tows. At 1415 the Grayson went alongside USS Santa Fe to take fuel. On the completion of fueling at 1500, a man went overboard. He was thrown a life preserver and was picked up some ten minutes later in good physical condition. Large groups of bogies approached the formation in the afternoon but were intercepted by our fighters and no attack materialized. The screeing units formed a "V" formation, circling the damaged units in a clockwise direction to give anti-aircraft protection and maintained the formation during the night. 16 October 1944 Too much stress cannot be placed on th eimportance of personnal abandoing ship in groups. It is believed that many men were lost in the operations on 14, 15, 16 October but those that were lost were either alone or in twos or threes. Men in a group can be seen much more easily, they sustain one another and the time necessary to pick them up is considerably less. The job of maneuvering a ship alongside a man in almost any sea reuquires some time, and when this is multiplied many times it can easily be seen that with men in groups one destroyer can do the work of several where men are scattered. In almost any operation of this type time is of the essence. 17 October 1944 "UPON LEAVING I WOULD LIKE TO COMMEND ALL HANDS FOR A DIFFICULT JOB WELL DONE X IT HAD LIBERAL POSSIBILITIES X OUR WOUNDED FRIENDS HAVE BEEN WELL TAKEN CARE OF AND ARE ON THEIR WAY TO SAFETY THANKS TO OUR GUNNERS AND UNEXCELLED AND UNTIRING PILOTS NOT FORGETTING THE MUNSEE AND PAWNEE X MY ONLY REGRET IS THAT COM THIRD FLEET FISHING WAS SO POOR CONSIDERING THE QUALITY OF THE BAIT X" 18 October 1944 While alongside Pecos, the boat crew from the Cowell was transferred and Cowell was given orders to follow us at our fueling station to pick them up. At 0840 the ship cleared Pecos' side and returned to station in the screen. At 1700 in accordance with orders from CTG 30.3, Grayson went alongside Boston and delivered the remainder of the Houston survivors, seventeen men and three officers. 19 October 1944 At 0900 Charrette passed US mail and as usual it did much t relieve the tedium of a long patrol. 20 October 1944
21 October 1944 It was a pleasure on rejoining the screen at the completion of fueling to find that a number of destroyers had been augmented in Grayson's absence and that the partial screens of the past had gone by the board. In the afternoon we received mail from the Farenholt, who had the "mailman" job on fueling day. 22 October 1944 23 October 1944 24 October 1944 The task group proceeded toward Ulithi and the next few days were for the most part uneventful. 25 October 1944 26 October 1944 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 October 1944 The following messages were received relative to the operation of our "Stream Lined Bait Group" These were addressed to all hands. "THE EFFICIENT MANNER IN WHICH YOUR UNITS HAVE FUNCTIONED HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO OUR SUCCESS" FROM CANBERRA "MANY THANKS FOR YOUR GOOD WORK" FROM COMTHIRD FLEET "YOUR CHEERFUL COURAGE SKILL AND DETERMINATION IN A TOUGH SPOT HAS BEEN A CREDIT TO YOU AND YOUR COMMAND. WEEL DONE AND KEEP GOING. HALSEY" FROM CINCPAC "THE FLEET IS PROUD OF THE COURAGE AND DETERMINED PROGRESS OF YOUR TASK GROUP" FROM COMTHIRD FLEET "FOR SKILL AND GUTS THE SAFE RETIREMENT OF THE DAMAGED CANBERRA AND HOUSTON FROM THE SHADOW OF THE FORMOSA COAST UNDER HEAVY ATTACK WILL BECOME A NAVY TRADITION. TO ALL HANDS WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE JOB; WELL DONE. HALSEY" Ulithi Saipan--November Related Stories:: List of Actions and Campaigns of DD435 Back to the GraysonThis is the story of the USS Grayson DD435 as seen by her skipper, Captain W.V. Pratt.
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