UGS-37

The convoy commander, CTF 65, was Captain W. R. Headden, my first skipper on the USS Edison. For this passage, the escorts were designated as Task Force 65. In the ship-train, there were 60 merchantmen and six LSTs. There were eight U.S. destroyer escorts and Headden's flagship was one of them, the U.S. DE Stanton. Five U.S. destroyers, British AA cruiser HMS Delhi (which I had been aboard once at Gibraltar), and three British rescue tugs completed the strong escort contingent. This was a Norfolk, Virginia to Bizerte assignment for Task Force 65. Its entry into the Mediterranean was well publicized by German reconnaissance aircraft and by coast watchers in Spain.

With a clear sky and a calm sea, the Luftwaffe struck the convoy in the evening of April 11, 1944 off Cape Benegut, Algeria. In 12 columns, making just over 7 knots, the convoy was fairly tight in spacing as passage into the Tunisian War Channel would demand. The Destroyer Escorts were on the perimeter, three to port and three to starboard, with Holder and Forster ahead, at 3,000 yards. The U.S. destroyer Lansdale carrying glide bomb jamming equipment was on the port side. AA cruiser Delhi was on the port quarter between the escorts and the convoy. The destroyer contingent, less Lansdale, were astern, with the descending moon.

An enemy aircraft was reported overhead just before 2300. It was joined by up to ten more by 2315. The white pathfinder flare appeared ahead just minutes later. With that marker, flares began to dot the port flank. Escorts, on command, made smoke beginning at 2330. A beehive of planes were in the immediate vicinity by 2335 as flares now completely illuminated the entire force. Stanton's guns spoke at that point and the Ju-88s and Do-217s commenced a well coordinated attack. DE Holder took a torpedo shortly thereafter. Lansdale detected radio glide bomb control signals at about midnight and Stanton was straddled by a stick of bombs shortly thereafter. The last flare went out about a half hour after midnight. The Task Force had done its job and no convoy ship was damaged at all. But, this trip generated other fireworks related to escort vessel tactics. Though losing 16 men at torpedo impact and transferring 12 wounded men to DE Forster, and without any propulsion of her own, Holder was towed by HMS Mindful to Algiers. Fleet tug Choctaw got her back to the states where her condition was deemed too poor for any repair attempt.

Captain Headden later criticized the USS Lansdale for putting up almost no AA fire. Admiral Hewitt defended Lansdale, stating that she used the AA doctrine her Mediterranean experience taught her. Hewitt then criticized Headden for ordering smoke 15 minutes later than he could have (seems to me now to have been a justifiable criticism) and for using it in the wrong sectors. With respect to sector use, Hewitt opined that the aircraft were on instruments and did not need the horizon that Headden's smoke obscured. From my later aviator experience, my own view is that any horizon is most helpful to an attacking aircraft. Probably both Headden's criticism of Lansdale and Hewitt's second criticism of Headden came a little too readily and were not useful. The questions raised would have better been handled in a discussion. Unfortunately, the pace of World War II did not permit much discussion at the operating level.

UGS-38

The F in these convoy designations meant Fast, and the S meant Slow. To a destroyer sailor, the F meant Slow, and the S meant Slower. UGS-38 approached Cape Benegut just two weeks after UGS-37. There were 11 U.S. Destroyer Escorts. The flag was in Coast Guard Cutter Taney. The Taney was commanded H.J. Wuensch, United States Coast Guard. Captain W.H. Duvall USN was CTF 66, escort and convoy commander. In the convoy were 85 merchant vessels, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Duane and two Navy fleet oilers. Destroyer Lansdale was again an AA supplement ship, along with H.N.M.S. Heemskerck. There were two British minesweepers and one British tug.

Heemskerck, an AA cruiser from the Netherlands, joined at Gibraltar and was stationed with Lansdale on the port side of the convoy. Minesweepers Sustain and Speed, along with Lansdale had the glide bomb radio link jamming gear. Minesweeper Speed was ahead of the convoy and Sustain was on the beam to starboard. The convoy approached Cape Benegut on April 20, 1944.

Captain Duvall had re-emphasized gunnery doctrine. According to Theodore Roscoe's "U.S. Destroyer Operations in World War II", sometime just before the Mediterranean transit of this convoy, Duvall stated for the record, "Doctrine this area directs escorts to fire machine guns only at seen targets at night and only when satisfied own ship's position is known to plane. At longer ranges, main-battery controlled fire only will be used." The first phrase is certainly a reiteration of Admiral Hewitt's concept and is the direct result of experience in the Mediterranean. The extra caveat, "only when satisfied own ship's position is known to plane", would mean refraining from shooting at a bomber or glider bomb when they clearly had a bead on another ship in your force. It certainly is a self protection caveat but Edison never received such instructions and I am glad she did not.

Again, with all the convoy search radar, the Luftwaffe got on the convoy at 2100 without early warning. Captain Duvall noted in his action report the complete absence of fighter protection.

The attack came from the east, almost directly from the waters the convoy was about to transit. The attackers came in low, with no flare announcements, using low lying shore as a shrouding background and moonlight to the west as an horizon to outline their targets. Five attackers were first seen by DE Lowe just after 2100. Torpedoes from several leading Ju-88s were dropped and SS Paul Hamilton was hit with deadly effect. SS Samite was also hit. The second wave of aircraft split, some taking the starboard and some the port. Torpedoes hit the SS Stephen T. Austin and SS Royal Star. The next wave went at the port side of the convoy. Although Lansdale was credited with effective AA fire, a torpedo struck her. The Royal Star, along with the Paul Hamilton went to the bottom, as did the USS Lansdale. We will come back to the fight to save Lansdale. In his commentary Admiral Hewitt felt that even with surprise, smoke should have been used and my own inference has to be that he was here in effect agreeing with Captain Headden's denial of horizon to enemy aircraft if at all possible. This attack succeeded because horizon advantage was gained by the Luftwaffe which could choose its attack sector. That advantage was denied to the AA gunners of the escorts who faced the black coastal background now devoid of light. In his report after the attack, Hewitt asked for more firepower, and for more effective use of same, from Destroyer Escorts. But, these were ASW ships in a compromised environment where the Luftwaffe still had an offensive sting.

The airborne torpedo entered Lansdale's forward fire room and broke her keel. With all power lost, Lansdale could do little but let the sea have its way. Her CO ordered the crew to abandon ship about 2130. She broke up and sank shortly after. 235 men survived the initial blast and were picked up by U.S. Destroyer Escorts Menges and Newell. 47 men were not recovered.

Copyright 1997 Franklyn E. Dailey Jr. - dailey@crocker.com