29. The Gedo region had been relatively peaceful until 14 March 1998, when
the Al-Itihad Islamic Organization engaged the Somali National Front led by
General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale" in a successful bid to control El-Wak
District. About 23 combatants were reportedly killed while many were
injured. By 5 August 1998, however, the Marehan clan appeared to have
settled the rift between Al-Itihad and General Omar Haji Mohamed "Masale".

 

30. On 8 April 1999, at Belet-Hawa in Gedo region, the self-proclaimed
Chairman of the Somali National Front, the Bardere District Commissioner,
and two others were assassinated in what appeared to be a power struggle
within the Somali National Front. Then on 21 April 1999, the militia of
another member of the clan, who claimed to have succeeded the assassinated
Somali National Front Chairman, attacked the militia of General Omar Haji
who had signed the Addis Ababa agreement of 1993 as Chairman of the Somali
National Front at Burdhubo town. Ten people were reportedly killed and 16
wounded before the Burale militia retreated to their bases at Belet-Hawa.
There have been persistent allegations of Ethiopian troop movements within
the region. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia has not been in
a position to establish the veracity of these reports.

 

Merka

 

31. Merka, until recently a place enjoying relative peace, had begun to
attract a number of aid agencies, which established themselves in the town
after relocating from Mogadishu. However, the situation has deteriorated
since April 1999.

 

C. Role of women and minority groups

 

32. Women and minority groups in Somalia have continued to express concern
over the lack of law and order in the country. On 1 June 1999, the
Chairperson of a Somali NGO, Save Somali Women and Children, submitted a
petition on behalf of 120 women to my Representative for transmission to
the Security Council. The petition noted that Somali women have
traditionally been excluded from politics and carry the main burden of the
suffering in Somalia. In particular, because of the situation within IGAD,
they felt that the United Nations may be best placed to help all Somalis to
restore their government, paying particular attention to the role women
should play. At a meeting held in Nairobi from 21 to 25 June 1999, a
delegation of representatives of five women's groups from different regions
of Somalia established a campaign for Somali women's political
participation. Other Somali women have been holding monthly vigils at
Nairobi in support of peace.

 

33. My Representative has also been meeting with several spokespersons for
minority groups in Somalia, including the Chairmen of the Somali African
Muki Organization, and the Somali National Union as well as the Sultan of
the Jiddo, who emphasized the exclusion of minorities from the political
process and the serious discrimination suffered by minorities in different
parts of Somalia.

 

34. On 14 July 1999, Abdulkadir Mohamed Aden "Zoppe", the leader of the
Digil and Mirifle people, issued a statement in which he called for the
establishment of an international war crimes tribunal for Somalia, inter
alia, to investigate and punish Hussein Aidid and his militia, who, he
claimed, had carried out ethnic cleansing on the territory of the Digil and
Mirifle people.

 

D. Allegations of arms flows into Somalia

 

35. In his letter of 31 March 1998, Mr. Egal said that the neighbouring
countries should be told in unmistakable terms to stop giving arms and
ammunition to the warring factions in Somalia. In his second letter of 8
August 1998, he deplored the fact that, at a time when the reservoir of
ammunition left over from the cold war period was drying up and the
warlords were no longer able to terrorize the population, new supplies
appeared to be arriving in Somalia. He called for the arms embargo against
Somalia to be enforced.

 

36. There have been claims by Somalis that Eritrea has been shipping arms
and fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front into Somalia. In January 1999,
at least two flights arrived at Balidogle from Assab, Eritrea, and it was
alleged that the flights carried arms. There were also reports of further
arms deliveries by sea at Merka in mid-February and early May 1999, and at
Faax in mid-June 1999. It was also widely reported that together with the
arms, Oromo Liberation Front fighters disembarked at Merka and Faax. On 31
March 1999, Ali Mahdi accused Ethiopia of providing arms to his opponents,
notably to Hussein Haji Bod. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf wrote to me on 6 May
1999 condemning the troops and arms that were allegedly arriving in Somalia
from Eritrea. In mid-July 1999, officials of the Somali Consultative
Council issued statements in which they condemned the presence of Oromo
Liberation Front fighters in Somalia. They drew attention to what they
considered to be a danger of a degeneration of security in Somalia, warning
that the entire region was likely to be destabilized. On 8 April 1999,
Hussein Aidid, Ali Mahdi and General Omar Haji wrote to me claiming that
Ethiopia had not only exported arms into Gedo region but also continued to
occupy Somali territory. They asked the Security Council to request
Ethiopia to remove its troops from Somalia. UNPOS has neither the mandate
nor the capacity to verify these reports. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have
denied any involvement in arms shipments into Somalia.

 

III. WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS

 

37. Since my last report to the Security Council, the
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, has
convened on four occasions ambassadorial meetings of external actors on
Somalia, on 7 October 1997, 16 June 1998, 15 December 1998 and 13 April
1999. They were attended by members of the Council, countries that have
undertaken peacemaking initiatives, and relevant regional and subregional
organizations. The meetings offered an opportunity for an informal exchange
of views and coordination of initiatives on Somalia. It was suggested that
such meetings take place more frequently than in the past, and the
Under-Secretary-General has undertaken to convene them three times a year,
or more frequently if need be.

 

38. I visited the Horn of Africa region between 29 April and 10 May 1998,
and consulted on Somalia with the leaders of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and
Eritrea. The then President of Djibouti, Hassan Guled Aptidon, expressed
the views of most of the leaders when he called for a halt to what he
described as "political tourism" of Somali leaders, in which they go to
various capitals to sign documents which are not honoured. He said he would
like all future reconciliation efforts to take place inside Somalia. At
Nairobi, I had a meeting with external actors involved with Somalia,
including the ambassadors of Member States and representatives of
international organizations and non-governmental organizations. At my
request, Mohamed Sahnoun, my Special Envoy in Africa, met a wide range of
Somali leaders at Nairobi.

 

39. I asked Under-Secretary-General Prendergast to visit Nairobi in
November 1998 to assess the prospects for peace in Sudan and Somalia. On
Somalia, he exchanged views with President Daniel Arap Moi and Foreign
Minister Bonaya Godana at Nairobi and met the Italian Special Envoy for
Somalia, a delegation of the European Commission and a wide range of Somali
faction leaders or their representatives, as well as leaders of Somali
civil society, including women. In addition, he exchanged views with other
external actors on Somalia, including heads of United Nations agencies and
programmes, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.
Under-Secretary-General Prendergast reported that the Kenyan authorities
were supportive of the IGAD "building-block" approach as the way forward in
Somalia, and that they were optimistic that the Standing Committee could
assist the international community in speaking with one voice on the Somali
peace process.

 

40. A common strand in Under-Secretary-General Prendergast's discussions
with his Somali interlocutors was a strong feeling that the days of the
"warlords" were over. Most of them called for a renewed United Nations
effort to disarm militia members in the country. However, there was less
disagreement on the way forward in the peace process. While many supported
the "building-block" approach, some expressed the fear that it could lead
to unsustainable "emirates" and/or to many "presidents" in an absurd
fragmentation of the country, ultimately reaching as far down as the
district if not the village level. Under-Secretary-General Prendergast
emphasized my continued interest and that of the Security Council in
finding a solution to the Somali problem, and assured the Somali leaders of
continuing commitment of the United Nations to a political solution. At the
same time, he stressed to them that the onus for peace rested with Somalis
themselves, and that members of the international community could only
assist them in those efforts.

 

41. As the Council is aware, following submission of my report dated 16
September 1997 (S/1997/715), I appointed David Stephen as my Representative
for Somalia as well as head of UNPOS. With the approval of the Security
Council, a professional staff member has been added to UNPOS, which
continues to be based at Nairobi. This has enabled UNPOS to enhance its
briefing and reporting role, and in particular to improve its contacts with
Somali leaders in Somalia. UNPOS staff have, during the period covered by
the present report, made visits to all parts of the country, ensuring
regular contacts and dialogue with all sectors of opinion inside Somalia.
My Representative has also paid several consultation visits both to the
capitals of Governments and to the headquarters of regional organizations
that are involved in the peace process in Somalia. These efforts have
helped to improve the flow of information among external actors, and have
also enhanced understanding of the need for a uniformity of approach in
fostering peace in Somalia, in an environment previously characterized by a
multiplicity of approaches and initiatives.

 

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

 

42. The United Nations agencies distinguish three different operational
environments within Somalia: "zones of crisis", "zones of transition" and
"zones of recovery". Each of these environments requires different
humanitarian and rehabilitation strategy, and distinct types of external
assistance. Integral to the analysis is the need to address five
fundamental issues: (a) chronic food insecurity; (b) population
displacement; (c) collapse of social services and infrastructure; (d) lack
of good governance and associated security; and (e) the recurrence of
natural disasters and lack of emergency preparedness. In zones of crisis,
the emphasis is on ensuring better food security, provision of basic and
life-saving social services, and assistance to community-level
capacity-building. In zones of transition, greater focus is placed on the
latter. In zones of recovery, the emphasis is on providing technical
support for good governance and support to capacity-building in the
economic and social sectors.

 

43. As outlined in the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 1999, the main
objective of the United Nations is to prevent the current situation in the
South from developing into famine and to continue the groundwork for
establishing stability, self-reliance and security in the North. In order
to meet these objectives the United Nations has adopted a number of
sectoral interventions, including in the areas of food security, health and
nutrition, water and sanitation, education and public administration. In
addition, there are a number of cross-cutting interventions to ensure
programme coherence and protection of civilian populations, including the
promotion and protection of human rights, and inter-agency planning and
coordination. It is envisaged that if the programme is fully implemented it
will benefit about two thirds of the population. The 1999 Consolidated
Appeal presents the programme in detail, outlining the priority
requirements: $65.7 million for humanitarian activities, and $29.3 million
for rehabilitation and recovery activities. Emergency relief activities,
targeting over one million persons at risk, have been reasonably well
funded, while rehabilitation and recovery programmes have not.

 

44. The implementation of a humanitarian and rehabilitation strategy for
Somalia requires the efforts of a number of key actors ranging from
international organizations, including eight United Nations agencies (UNDP,
the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations), the International Committee of the Red Cross and the
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and
some 40 NGOs, as well as local communities, administrations and national
NGOs. The implementing partners of the United Nations include the following
international NGOs: Action Contre La Faim, Agency for Cooperation and
Research in Development, African Medical and Research Foundation, European
Committee for Agricultural Training, Coordinating Committee of the
Organization for Voluntary Service, Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo
dei Popoli, International Medical Corps, InterSos Humanitarian Organization
for Emergency, Mediche hulp aan de derde wereld (Health for all in the
third world), Mercy International, Médicins Sans Frontières - Spain,
Netherlands and Belgium, Muslim-Aid-UK, Norwegian Church Aid, Swedish
Church Relief, Trocaire and World Vision. In cooperation with the partners
of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, overall coordination of humanitarian
aid is undertaken by the office of the United Nations resident and
humanitarian coordinator for Somalia.

 

45. Approximately two thirds of the United Nations staff working on Somalia
(international and national) are located inside the country and mainly
concentrated in the northern regions. For the purposes of maintaining a
"cross-border" operation into the unstable South and Central areas and to
provide overall coordination and programme support, the operational
headquarters of most international organizations remain at Nairobi.

 

46. The effects of the continuing internal armed conflict upon the
population have been compounded by extensive flooding in the southern
regions followed by drought in most areas of Somalia. Severe food
insecurity and disease, including cholera, have put one million persons at
risk in the South, while in the North water and pasture shortage has
dramatically depleted livestock, the resource base for most of the
population.

 

47. The 1997-1998 floods in the southern region were the worst in decades
and affected the lives of nearly one million Somalis, killing over 2,000
people in the acute phase of the emergency. In support of community
responses, United Nations agencies and NGOs engaged in a massive relief
operation. In the first phase, flood victims were supplied with basic
survival items, including food rations, blankets, plastic sheeting,
sandbags and cooking utensils. A second phase of the operation was planned
for the rehabilitation of rudimentary services, including safe water and
sanitation, agricultural infrastructure and for strengthening local health
units to address major health problems. The planned follow-up was realized
only marginally, however, due to the paucity of funding - in marked
contrast to funding for the first phase - thereby making these areas of
chronic disaster more vulnerable for the next crisis. A food crisis
accompanied by drought soon followed, beginning in the last quarter of
1998, just one year after the floods.

 

48. By the end of 1998, food insecurity and deterioration in health
conditions were rife in central and southern Somalia due to the conflict
and climate. The crisis continued as of mid-1999. Unusual population
displacement, the most obvious sign of severe stress, had begun by November
1998. Sedentary farmer households began to move from the worst areas of Bay
and Bakool (normally the breadbasket of Somalia) to other areas in search
of food, better security and water. Over 40,000 persons moved to Gedo,
Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba and Mogadishu. The communities are particularly
vulnerable to outbreaks of communicable diseases, notably measles, malaria
and diarrhoeal diseases, such as cholera. After the first confirmed cases
of cholera in early December 1998, by the end of February 1999 there were
over 3,000 cases and nearly 200 deaths reported. By May 1999, the situation
had stabilized.

 

49. In the southern and central regions, over one million people are facing
serious food shortages and 300,000 of them are currently in need of food
aid. Their long-term food security situation is alarming and likely to
deteriorate as a result of ongoing insecurity and poor prospects for the
current harvest. The number of people requiring humanitarian assistance is
therefore likely to increase. In response, United Nations agencies and NGOs
have continued the large cross-border operation from Kenya, delivering
urgently needed humanitarian supplies, including food aid, medicines and
shelter. Since January 1999, nearly 13,500 tons of relief food have been
distributed by WFP and CARE, benefiting over 700,000 people at Bay, Bakool,
Gedo, Hiran, Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle regions. UNICEF and its partner
agencies have distributed over 2,600 tons of "supermix" (a nutritious blend
of corn and sugar), benefiting about 200,000 children. Some 80,000 children
received vaccination against measles together with vitamin A
supplementation. Over 27 water sources were rehabilitated, benefiting over
100,000 people at Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Middle Shabelle and Hiran.

 

50. In the effort to support farming communities in the South, United
Nations agencies and NGOs completed a major seed distribution by the end of
March 1999, the beginning of the primary planting season of 1999. On 6 July
1999, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the
Somalia Aid Coordination Body concurrently issued a donor alert for
southern and central Somalia, requesting for US$ 17.5 million and covering
the period from 1 July to 31 December 1999. Over 1,700 tons of seeds were
distributed to farmers of Bay and Bakool regions in southern Somalia. In
the North, successive failures of rains resulted in diminished pasture and
lack of groundwater. Up to 50 per cent of livestock died in hard-hit areas.
An inter-agency response was established by March 1999 to support
communities through targeted food relief, water trucking, and
rehabilitation of water sources. The arrival of rains in May 1999 and the
lifting of the ban on imports of livestock from the Horn by some Gulf
States helped the situation in the North, though there is still a very
large need for rehabilitation work and disaster preparedness in this stable
area.

 

51. Geographically, the areas experiencing recovery are mostly in the
northern part of Somalia, where approximately one third of the total
population lives. The economy in the North has demonstrated surprising
resilience, with expanding interregional and export-oriented trade. The ban
imposed on the importation of Somali livestock from the Horn to some Gulf
countries had a very negative impact on the economy. Consequently, the
emerging local administrations in the North-West ("Somaliland") and
North-East ("Puntland") suffered from lack of export tax revenues.
Nevertheless, trade has continued to develop. The port of Berbera has
become the most active Somali seaport and the second most important seaport
for Ethiopia after Djibouti. Similarly, such airports as those at Hargeisa,
Berbera and Bossaso provide an important source of revenue for local
authorities and also encourage economic development. Nevertheless, the
stability of these areas is fragile. Regions of recovery still need much
support to build their capacities in order to sustain and improve upon
their achievements since the end of the civil war.

 

52. United Nations projects in the North have been designed to give
essential support towards improving administrative capacities and private
economic expansion. Training programmes have been provided for local
administrative structures, assistance given to urban planning and
management as well as to road repair and sanitation. United Nations
agencies, working closely with international NGOs and local partners, have
succeeded with numerous small, self-sustaining projects, particularly in
the urban centres.