Adam Granicz
Hist 120
Book Review #2 - 04/24/97

1.
Author: Spencer, Samuel R.

Title: Decision for war, 1917 ; the Laconia sinking and the Zimmermann        telegram as key factors in the public reaction against Germany

Published: Peterborough, NH : Noone House, 1968.

Description: 109 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.

Subjects: Zimmermann, Alfred, 1859-1925.
          Laconia (Steamship)
          World War, 1914-1918--Causes.

2.
      SAMUEL R. SPENCER, JR., historian and educator, is the author of a biography of Booker T. Washington and a contributor to the Saturday Review and other periodicals. Dr. Spencer received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from Harvard, and has been a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Munich, Germany. In 1968 he was elected president of Davidson College, Davidson, N. C., his undergraduate alma mater.

3.
      As the war was approaching in 1914, there were not very many Americans who would believe that it could happen. Leading magazines of opinion assured their readers a little before war that the world "was moving away from military ideals," and that "a period of peace, industry and world-wide friendship" was dawning.
     When darkening headlines finally forced Americans to believe the unbelievable, they seized almost instinctively upon the isolationism to which they had traditionally clung. Actually, no decision was called for because practically no one even suggested the alternative of intervention.      Two and a half years later the American people surrendered their role as spectators to become active participants. It proved increasingly difficult to avoid entanglements with either of the belligerents, and to force a negotiated peace which would remove any possibility for American intervention.
     Both the Allies and the Axis powers faced a dilemma regarding neutral countries, such as the United States. The British declared that the object of Allied diplomacy was "to secure the maximum of blocade that could be enforced without a rupture with the United States." The blocade that would prevent the Central Powers from drawing upon the outside world for municion was essential to Allied victory. The same idea led Germany to declare the waters around the British Isles a war zone which mercant ships could enter at their own risk.
     The sinking of Lusitania and another liner, the Arabic did not help matters. President Wilson persisted in his effort to obtain from Germany a disavowal of the sinkings, and the reaffirmation that Germany would not sink ships without warning. In this, he was aided by Count Joachim von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States. Finally, the German Foreign Office authorized a formal disavowal of the Arabic sinking.
     The sinking of the Sussex stirred up the relations between the US and Germany again. Lansing, the Secretary of State, called for immediate rupture of diplomatic relations, but his note was never sent to Germany. Instead, Wilson won a diplomatic victory by obtaining the agreement from Germany not to sink any more ships without warning or without due regard to passenger lives.
     Meanwhile, the Anglo-American relations rose near boiling point. Violations of international law, or annoyances like British blacklist policy against the US and interference with US mail shifted the American opinion to favour Germany. This was also supported by the Allies' seeming unwillingness to consider any peace without a crushing defeat of the Central Powers. While Wilson was campaigning for a second term seeking an agreement for peace with the Germans, he learnt that the Imperial Government announced its intention to renew unrestricted submarine warfare. This immediately led the US to break diplomatic relations with Germany, even though still hoping that the war was eviatable also reflecting the major public opinion.
     The hopes that the diplomatic break with Germany would not automaticly mean war ran high until the liner Laconia was sunk without warning. Many people tend to underestimate the importance of this event. Even though Laconia was not given a warning before the torpedo attack, the Germans made sure that no civilian life was lost. The submarine came up from the ocean, and assured the passengers who were in boats by then that they would be picked up by the British. As a matter of fact, they fulfilled their promise to give due regard to passenger lives. It turned out though, that while unloading the passengers to boats from the sinking Laconia, boat no. 8. was hit and badly damaged. Despite the passengers' shouts, in the hurry their voice was not heard. Due to the damage on the boat, it shortly got separated from the rest of the boats, and sunk half way in the cold night. By the time it was found seven people died out of the twenty-three on the boat, among them three Americans.
     The news would not get to the US until the next day, when newspaper headlines were announcing the catastrophe, and along with the angry family members' letters it created a high anti-German wave, not seeing several details about the event. This divided the American public, and made them certain that Germany meant the continuation of unrestricted submarine warfare. Several people got carried away by Wilson's previous statement, that the US would intervene in case of another sinking, even though Wilson did not mean the declaration of war on Germany.
     The final event that contributed to American intervention was the Zimmermann Telegram. By then, it was obvious for the Germans that the US would have to get into war on the Allies' side, because of the restored unlimited sinkings. To act accordingly, Alfred Zimmermann, the German Foreign Secretary sent a message to von Bernstorff in Washington to forward it to Mexico, to von Eckhardt, the German Minister in Mexico City. The message was sent in three ways. Prior to the message Allies ships managed to cut the German wire that ran across the Atlantic. This left the Germans with sending their messages through either neutral cable, or wireless transmitting. Zimmermann sent his message through neutral cable, the pro-German Swedish diplomatic service, and suprisingly the United States State Department. It happened that Wilson in his vision for final peace let von Bernstorff use the State Department's facilities to communicate with his nation in order to maintain secrecy. All three messages were intercepted by the British Naval Intelligence, and successfully deciphered by using the code-books that they acquired in the beginning of the war. But the British did not immediately inform the US about the telegramm. In fact, it was more than a month later when it officially was acknowledged. Many historian see this as waiting for the right moment in which the US would not hinder joining the war. Also telling the US about the telegram immediately would mean Germany to suspect that its messages had been intercepted for quite a while. Obviously, the Allies wanted to make sure that the US enters the war, balancing it to their side, but also hitting Germany the hardest they could.
      In the US, many people thought that the telegram was fake, and made by the British. Not until four other ships were sunk did this illusion disappear. This practically turned the entire nation against Germany, and the nation whole-heartily supported Wilson as he declared war on Germany, and it was also approved by a huge majority in both Houses.
      The alliance that Germany offered for Mexico in the Zimmermann telegraph changed the US opinion about entering the war. It was quite obvious that entering the war was hardly evitable, but Wilson tried everything to avoid intervention. The continuing sinkings along with the Zimmermann telegraph left no other option for the US.

4.
      The Decision for war, 1917 is an excellent book, essential to a clear understanding of the factors that brought the United States into the first World War. The author does not attempt to analyze various factors which, through accident or the force of events, were brought into combination and compelled American intervention, he rather focuses attention upon two events of importance which, coming in juxtaposition, exercised powerful effect upon American opinion. These events were the sinking by a German submarine of the Cunard liner Laconia on February 25, 1917, and the publication of the Zimmermann telegram proposing a German alliance with Mexico and Japan and the conquest of United States territory for the benefit of Mexico. Neither of these events of itself would have precipitated war with Germany, but together they served to consolidate American opinion in the conviction that Germany was indeed an enemy.

5.
      The author used both primary and secondary sources for his work. There are several contemporary newspaper articles illustrating the events, and also a great number of other, subject-related books are cited at several points in the text. When describing the changes in the relationship between the US and Germany, or Great Britain, government documents are used, such as the Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The author often cites President Woodrow Wilson, from the Public Papers.

6.
      While reading the book, it is easy to observe that the presentation of the events is excellently put together. It not only follows the cronological order, but also allows the reader to have insight into parallel events that together influenced public opinion. Another great feature of the book is that it examines not only one of viewpoints, but more, creating a complete discussion about the importance of each event.       The author presents events as a narrator, often illustrated by contemporary newspaper articles, reflecting Washington's and the majority of the people's opinion. There are also some cartoons, newspaper images, and charts reflecting the contemporary opinion. There was no maps included in the text.

7.
      I think it was a great book. It helped me understand the factors in the intervention of the United States in World War I better. I learned several new things that I did not know before, such as what were the underlying reason for the British to delay the turning of the Zimmermann Telegram to the Americans, that the Germans did want to sink US ships, that the Germans gave a warning to some ships before sinking them until the US joined the war, the details of how a ship was sunk, and what factors influenced public opinion about the sinkings. I would definetely advise others to read this fascinating book that would be a great complement to our history studies about the US intervention in World War I. I might be overwhelmed by my strong interest in wars, but I think it is a must for all of us to know what the conditions in World War I were that led to US intervention, turning the war to the Allies' side.