Source : The Indian Defence Review, © 1995 by Lancer Publishers & Distributors.

Introduction

With the budget just having been presented there is cheering news for the three Services. Though not as good as expected, yet for the first time in three years there has been such a thing as the Revised Estimates (RE) for the financial year ending 31 Mar 1994, and over and above that there is a marginally enhanced outlay for the next year, Although Navy's share at 11.9% is much of the less than anticipated, at least it can plan for some of the priority schemes as well as modernisation which it has not been able to do during the last three years. It appears that Navy's compelling requirements have at least been taken note of, and hopefully this trend with enhanced outlay will continue to take it to 14% and then to 16% of the cake for it to make good the leeway and stabilise.

There are various ways in which one can approach the question of force structuring. Quite obviously, ideally the Defence allocation must be related to the threat assessment, both short-term and long-time, and finding the most cost effective way of countering that threat. Threat assessment and what we need to defend, from whom, and the type of force required were broadly dealt with in my earlier article titled "Why the Navy? Its Role and Responsibilities" published in the Jul 1993 issue of . In this article, it would be my intention to be more specific and give numbers to the type of forces.

As is well known, upto the early 60s we were heavily dependent on the Royal Navy for all our naval requirements but by the late 70s this link had more or less vanished. The yoke of Soviet dependency has lain heavy on our shoulders since the late 60s when we went in for the submarine programme.

Although we started building the Leander class frigates in the MDL in early 70s and followed the path of indigenisation, the break-up of the Soviet Union has more than re-established the need for self-reliance. The Indian Navy has very wisely followed the path of indigenisation and the day is not very far when the Navy of India will be truly Indian. In the earlier days we took what came, but today we endeavour to make what we want. We are now in a position to write our own agenda-our own staff requirements. From a Buyer's Navy, we are fast becoming a Builder's Navy. It is my case here to show that the Indian Navy's ship requirements can be met indigenously, provided we place orders on our shipyards in time and with conviction, and also make the money-flow available. Some specialist equipment may of course have to be imported.

Rationale

At the outset, it needs to be made clear that India does not need a Navy designed to project power. A power projection Navy is for nations which have defence commitments outside their shores. What India needs is a medium sized blue water Navy which will deter aggression and safeguard our maritime interests in our region, and since we do not belong to any alliance, whatever we wish to defend has to be done all alone and by ourselves, This naturally calls for a different kind of preparedness where costs necessarily escalate.

The shape and size of our country and the location of our island territories compels us to deploy our naval units in two or three distinct groups/tasks forces but there is no doubt that for sometime to come North Arabian Sea will continue to be the area of focus for us. This does not mean that vast areas of the sea in the rest of the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Andaman Sea are any less important and can be neglected. They are very much our responsibility and adequate forces will have to be assigned to safeguard our interests therein.

We next come to the element of reach - this has been defined as the distance from home port at which operations will need to be carried out. This presupposes that for any naval force, the reach for some operations may be different from that of others. For convenience, we can broadly divide this into two zones. An outer zone extending to 1000 nautical miles from base, where the main threat will be from submarines, missile fitted surface combatants and shore-based multipurpose aircraft. and an inner zone extending to 200 nautical miles (within EEZ) from our shores where the operation will be of a different nature which will include clandestine activity, mining, submarine operations and attack by shore-based aircraft.

In our case sea conditions on both seaboards are far from comfortable for much of the year and, therefore units operating in the outer zone will have to have the capability to operate in all weather conditions and for sufficiently long periods. With this background, let us now look at our requirements and how best we can meet them.

Air Defence Ship

The most vital unit for our fleet is the aircraft carrier or Air Defence Ship(ADS). At present we have two aircraft carriers Viraat and Vikrant, both of which will need replacement, Vikrant by 1996/97 and Viraat six years or so later. It should be our aim to replace both these capital ships with somewhat smaller, yet equally potent Air Defence Ships whose primary role would be to safeguard our fleet assets from an attack. Since we have two fleets at present, we need to have two ADSs on station, one on either seaboard. In order to achieve this and making allowance for refit and maintenance we will need at least three ADSs in our inventory. If at a later date we are able to afford a third fleet or at least a flotilla in the south for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) commitments we may need to add one more ADS to our strength.

There has been much debate whether India does need this class of ship and whether shore-based aircraft would not provide the security that the fleet at sea needs. Surveillance and firepower are twin concepts of modern warfare and to detect and destroy the enemy before it can get to you is what determines whether you are a victor or vanquished. With high precision, lethal missilery and related smart bombs in the inventory of our neighbour, it is imperative that the fleet detects the 'source' before it can get into a firing or launch mode and then engage the platform itself rather than the missile or bomb that it may fire.

The ADS which is literally a mobile air-field can move 400 nautical miles in a day providing continuous air cover to the fleet and ensuring air superiority in the battlefield area which cannot be obtained otherwise. Much has been made out of its own vulnerability - it is but a small speck at sea and not easy to find. Its own fighter aircraft provide the defence it needs and A/S Helicopter the anti-submarine cover. The advantages that the ADS offers are overwhelming. In our region it marks the crucial difference between India which possesses this capability and others who do not.

Surface Heat

We next look at the surface combatant element of the fleet. These are the main workhorses of the Navy called the Frigate/Destroyers. They have to have all-purpose capability and excellent sea-keeping qualities and should have weapons and sensors to be able to perform anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft role. They must also carry their own integral air in the form of a helicopter. Bearing in mind the sea conditions around us a frigate or a destroyer of 3000 tons plus is the smallest platform capable of fitting into this role. They form the primary units of the carrier task force. A minimum of 5 for each task force/fleet is absolutely necessary. With allowance for refit and maintenance, a force of 15 Frigate/Destroyers with afloat support would be required to maintain ten on station.

Though not so versatile, a smaller version of Frigate/Destroyer called the Corvette is built for specific roles and naturally costs much less. They complement the Frigate/Destroyer in their specific role as components of the carrier task force. They also help in the protection of offshore resource platforms and, if required, in escorting merchant ships. A force of 20 would be required to maintain 14 on station. Realistic tasking levels would indicate that 15 of the 35 (20+1 5) combatants should be Destroyers or Frigates.

Bearing in mind the geographic location of our island territories, in particular the Andaman & Nicobar islands which are almost 800 nautical miles away from the mainland, the requirement of sealift capability would become obvious. These ships are required to quickly move a Brigade group with all its paraphemalia-armour, vehicles and guns, at feast for the first assault which may have to be launched in the face of opposition. For them to be of worthwhile use, they should be able to carry a complement of commando helicopters and smaller LCUs and other assault vessels. Any shortfalls can be made up by requisitioning vessels from trade for subsequent build up. We also need fleet auxiliaries to support the fleet at sea-these could be Tankers, Depot & Repair ships and submarine rescue vessels.

We next come to smaller category of ships like the Missile Boats, Patrol vessels and Minesweepers. Missile Boats carry a lot of punch for their size though their seakeeping qualities are limited, so also the range. They are therefore, most suitable in a defensive role and mainly operate in the inner zone or for swift raids on targets not too far away and for effecting a quick getaway. We also need relatively cheap patrol vessels with long endurance to maintain vigil over our large EEZ. Minesweepers are a must to keep our strategic ports open and safe for ship movements, In each of these categories, one can never have enough numbers. One would be lucky if one could have 1 5-20 of each.

Submarines

To complete the three dimensional picture let us look at the deadliest of the class - the submarine. They are vessels of stealth, and visibility or presence is not their hallmark. They play a very crucial role in denying the use of the sea to the enemy. Submarines now run deeper, are more silent, faster and have considerably enhanced endurance. They can take swift evasive action in both horizontal and vertical planes. Their ability to fire precision guided high speed torpedoes and anti-ship missiles make them extremely potent strike platforms. If one can go nuclear, the submarine can become a strategic asset with an ability to remain continuously submerged and move at high speed underwater. Conventional submarines can be deployed on patrol independently and far away from our shores in all kinds of weather or off enemy ports. Looking at areas around us a fleet of 12-15 conventional submarines would be the minimum needed to fulfil these tasks, considering that only 66% of these would be available on task, rest being under refit/maintenance.

Indigenous Capability

As stated earlier, shipbuilding capacity in the country has grown over the years and while some specialised equipment may have to be imported, in-house ship designing and construction ability exists. MDL at Bombay and GRSE at Calcutta can build Frigates/ Destroyers, Corvettes and Missile Boats. Goa Shipyard can take on the construction of minesweepers and other smaller vessels. The Air Defence Ship has so far not been built in the country but the one being contemplated can quite easily be built at Cochin Shipyard. Cochin Shipyard can also take on the task of building tankers and other support vessels. Submarines have been built at MDL and it is unfortunate that this line had to come to a grinding halt because of political sensitivities - HDW connection. This has to be restarted, the sooner the better-otherwise we will fall miles behind in our Submarine replacement programme.

Our shipyards are capable of producing a Frigate/ Destroyer and submarines ever 2 years and one each of Corvette, Patrol vessel/Minesweeper and Missile Boat every year. Amphibious ships of about 5000 tons can be built every 4-5 years and ADS one every 10 years. I am confident that this production rate can be improved upon if firm orders are placed, money supply guaranteed and the work culture in shipyards improved.

Life Span

Having looked at our shipyard capacity let us now look at the useful life that can be attributed to each class of ship with proper maintenance and refits. Given a life span of 30 years or more for ADS at least 3 ships of this class can be sustained. For Frigates/Destroyers and submarines a life span of 25 years is a reasonable period and 12 or 13 such vessels can be maintained on an ongoing basis. For Corvettes, Missile Boats, Minesweepers/Patrol vessels having a life span of 20 years each, a strength of 20 each can be kept going. The Amphibious ships can also be assigned a life of 20 years or so and 4-5 of this class can be sustained without any strain. Thus an Indian Navy of 100 ships is sustainable in material terms without much difficulty. This also has to be perforce translated into money terms for proper perspective. Table below shows the break down:-

Financial Support

We now have to find the financial support to sustain the above building programme. This year's Defence budget of Rs 23,000 crores has only allocated 11.9% share to the Navy amounting to Rs 2738 crores. This figure needs to be taken upto Rs 3000 crores, hopefully this will be made up at the RE stage and taken as the base from here onwards. Only then can the Navy afford to build what it needs. With a little bit of financial push, desirable force levels within the shipyard capacity will become a reality.

I have deliberately not talked of Naval aircraft acquisition programme for which Rs 400 crores is needed every year to sustain the Sea Harrier, Long range MR/ASW, Dornier and ALH aircraft, most of which is in foreign exchange and the indigenous programme is beset with uncertainties.

Conclusion

A time has come for the political leadership to evolve a mechanism which will stipulate realistic and firm force levels for the three Services avoiding ad hoc decisions which sometimes get taken. The Navy's 15 year perspective plan has been with the Government for sometime. This needs to be attended to at the appropriate decision making level at the earliest.

In the foreseeable future, therefore, the Navy that would meet India's national interests will have to have adequate forces to deploy in sea areas around us and in all weather conditions. Our shipyards and associated industries will have to be geared up to produce the ships/submarines and hardware that is needed. Infrastructure support too will have to be provided. This is only possible if clear direction is given and adequate resources made available to ensure a smooth and realistic naval growth.

Back to