Source : The Indian Defence Review, © 1995 by Lancer Publishers & Distributors.
Since the early days of warfare there has been a quest to find out the enemy's plans and moves well in advance in order to develop one's own operations effectively. In other words, domination of the high ground was sought which gave a commander knowledge of the enemy's strength and disposition. It was this search which drove technology to produce the radar rather than relying on simple observation posts. Radar had the effect of forcing air operations down to lower levels to stay below the radar horizon and thus evade detection. The next logical step was to mount the radar on an airborne platform thereby nullifying the benefits of a low-level approach. This technological leap has been perhaps, the single, greatest force-multiplier in air operations. One must, however, remember that all conflicts have been fought where one side enjoyed the advantage of an AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System). This meant a tremendous differential in air power capabilities of the opposing sides with obvious results. Wars in the future would not necessarily be confined to these set of conditions and one could expect AWACS operating on both sides of the border. It would be interesting to identify the nature of air operations under conditions of AWACS symmetry.
AWACS capabilities and limitations
Before studying the effect of an AWACS on the employment of air power, it could be useful to briefly look at the capabilities and limitations of such a system. Owing to its elevation the AWACS has an advantage of a greater radar horizon compared to ground-based radars, which translates to surveillance of a larger chunk of airspace. A single AWACS of the E-3A class, on patrol at an altitude of 9 km/30,000 ft could have the capability to provide surveillance upto a range of 400 km at low level and detect 600 targets. It incorporates technology sophisticated enough to direct upto 30 interceptions simultaneously. In addition the AWACS is endowed with a data link facility to pass target information to ground-based radars and rest of the air defence network. An AWACS would also possess inherent ECM capability making it a difficult proposition for a hostile air force to electronically interfere with its operations. As far as its endurance is concerned, the AWACS has a patrol time of 8 hours on station.
While the AWACS is highly capable, a major limiting factor is its exorbitant price tag, which could be anything upto $250-300 million. It goes without saying that developing countries can ill afford this luxury and therefore are forced to compromise on the level of capability in order to acquire a system that matches their purses. Secondly, an AWACS is relatively vulnerable especially if hostile aircraft are permitted to close into their missile-firing ranges. This would imply a certain degree of protection required by own fighter aircraft and SAMs (Surface-to-Air Missiles). In spite of this cover the AWACS in times of war would need to fly at least 150 km inside own territory to ensure safety from enemy SAMs and adequate reaction time against enemy fighters. Thirdly, its capability to detect 600 targets and control 30 interceptions would be curtailed by the number of fighter controllers and communication channels on board. The AWACS, therefore, would have to delegate the execution of some interceptions to ground-based radars in case of a large number of intruding enemy aircraft. Fourthly, the AWACS is mainly designed for defection of low level targets and its ability to pick up targets above its own level is limited. To cater for an all-altitude threat therefore, ground-based radars would form an inescapable part of the air defence network.
AWACS missions
The primary mission of any radar, ground-based or airborne, is to provide early warning. The AWACS, however, incorporates advanced technology and its command, control and other capabilities allow various modes of operation. These modes translate into different missions. The AWACS has a 360 degree radar scan and a choice to select more than one mode of operation in sectors during a scan.
The main mission of the AWACS is Air Battle Management. As the name suggests, it administers the airspace in war and thereby controls the air battle. It is most effective in this role when detecting intruding aircraft and directing own interceptors towards the raiders. This ability to 'see' the air battle on a real-time basis is crucial in the campaign for control of the air. The AWACS is most potent if it is employed where a situation of asymmetry exists. The Israeli example in Bekaa Valley is often quoted by students of air power as the classic exploitation of the medium by such a system. Even in other offensive air operations, the AWACS can guide own strike aircraft to enemy targets while steering them clear of their air defences.
A corollary to air battle management is Sea Battle Management. An Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft is highly desirable at sea and when an AEW system offers a degree of control as well, it is invaluable. Not only can the AWACS provide air battle management at sea, but also guide own aircraft to carry out anti-ship strikes. In addition it can make available data for over-the-horizon targeting of ships by missiles.
The AWACS has another mode of operation, albeit a silent one in which surveillance is carried out. The passive detection system (PDS) of an AWACS enables it to pick up and classify electronic emissions providing ELINT (ELectronic INTellegence). In this mode, the detection range of hostile emissions is approximately twice the search range of the hostile emitter's radar. The PDS does not involve any transmission and can be selected as part of the 360 degree scan while its own antenna is illuminating targets elsewhere in the scan zone. During peace time, the PDS along with routine surveillance of an adversary's flying activities can reveal a great deal about his orbat and tactics. The benefits of this knowledge hardly needs emphasis.
Deployment of the AWACS
As brought out earlier, an AWACS is credited with a low-level coverage of 400 km and a patrol time of 8 hours on station. The number of AWACS required is a function of its radar coverage, time on station and the area to be covered. As an example, we could take a 1800 km long border and divide the area into three segments, each being 600 km. A single AWACS accredited to one sector would be akin to a theatre-level distribution of assets where these invaluable resources are not frittered away while adequately decentralizing AWACS-linked air operations. With the AWACS flying 150 km inside one's territory, the lateral coverage along the border would be 750 km for each aircraft. Therefore, it could fly a race-course pattern and still cover the 600 km long segment. This means that three aircraft airborne at any one time would suffice for the entire border and since their patrol time is 8 hours, the figure for a 24-hour period would be correspondingly higher. Considering a modest serviceability of 50% with 3 aircraft as reserves, a fleet of 15 would be needed.
Air operations under the AWACS umbrella
The AWACS is a formidable component of the air defence system of any country and can provide the decisive edge in a conflict if exploited fully. This is especially true if a situation of asymmetry exists, which allows the transformation of a small force into a winning force primarily due to the presence of an AWACS. Therefore, with the capability on both sides, there would be a quantum jump in the detection, command and control functions of both air forces which in turn implies that the method and doctrine of fighting an air war could undergo changes.
With the background of a highly competent detection and control system of the AWACS, a major doctrinal shift may be forecast for most air forces (barring USA and Israel), in that there would be an increased emphasis on air-to-air warfare. The ascendance of air-to-air warfare as the main instrument for obtaining air superiority over the prevalent thinking of pounding holes on a runway in order to deny its use to the enemy is the outcome of the ability of an AWACS to manipulate the air battle. With AWACS symmetry, the approach of commanders on both sides has to be positive and aggressive towards controlling the airspace while dominating hostile air power. There will have to be a shift in the thinking from airspace denial to airspace control as a means to achieving one's aim. The battle for dominance, on both sides will be fought in the air. Assuming similarity in AWACS technology, the side which has superior tactics and training would emerge victorious and be in a position to control operations in other dimensions as well. An AWACS increases the pace and intensity of operations because of its capabilities of detection, real-time data links and control. This only reaffirms the basic attributes of air power and therefore, the need to seize the initiative would be high in order to tailor the air operations to suit one's choice of time, space and intensity. Fighter sweeps, once discarded as an aberration of the past could emerge as a major contributor in the air effort to gain air superiority.
If it is accepted that the air battle with AWACS symmetry is likely to be highly intense and in an environment that would not give many second chances, there will be a demand on the men as well as their flying machines. Fighter aircraft capability would need greater attention and there will be a requirement to produce highly manoeuvrable aircraft armed with beyond-visual-range (BVR) weaponry. These air superiority fighters would have to possess abundant stand-alone capability as the battles in the air become denser and more intense. The nature of aerial warfare would imply a return to days of the Red Baron where qualities of men and machines were stretched fully, albeit with overall number of aircraft involved being lesser at a given time.
Another facet of air operations that would witness change is the relative importance of point defence weapons especially Surface-to-Air Missiles. SAMS, primarily meant for airspace denial, would have to play a lesser role in the dense airspace of the future. The need of the hour would be flexible and responsive weapon platforms. The deployment of SAMs could be restricted to the terminal defence of high-value targets and countries will be required to look at their force structure plans in this perspective. The accent would need to be shifted towards a greater reliance on fighter aircraft keeping in mind their positive attributes and employment potential.
With the comprehensive coverage of an AWACS from low to high altitudes, the benefit accruing to strike aircraft routing at low level would diminish. We would definitely see a shift towards medium altitude air operations as was the situation prevailing over fifty years ago. Combat would occur at higher levels and therefore the need for strike missions to be flown at low level will have to be measured against the effect achieved in specific situations and would generally be limited to the objective of defeating terminal defences of a target when other means are not available adequately, especially in terms of Electronic Counter Measures.
Besides its employment in the primary air defence role, an AWACS has the capability to guide own strike aircraft to enemy targets. The need for dedicated, expensive strike aircraft with sophisticated navigation systems may be debated. It would perhaps, from a managerial point of view, be more prudent and cost-effective to employ simpler and cheaper aircraft for the same purpose fitted with weapon aiming computers for accurate weapon delivery having been guided to their target by the AWACS. A re-focus of strike aircraft capability may be in order in this light, especially the ones required for offensive air support. It could be worthwhile packing a greater punch in the glove rather than be influenced by its cosmetic overtones. One must remember that operationally an accurate navigation system would still be required in strike aircraft despite the assistance provided by an AWACS.
The AWACS will invariably downlink a part of its information and therefore the capability to interfere with ground-based radars, airborne interception radars and communication links could be vital. One method to do this is Electronic Warfare (EW). The fourth dimension would acquire greater importance and this single aspect could prove decisive. Besides aircraft equipped to carry out dedicated EW, there would be a need to incorporate airborne self-protection jammers (AS PJs) on every combat aircraft to enhance its effectiveness and survivability. The employment of EW equipment and tactics would facilitate penetration of hostile airspace at medium attitudes. Although it is very difficult to jam an AWACS itself, its affiliated radars and communications could be vulnerable to EW measures.
At sea, early warning by an airborne radar is highly desirable in the scenario encompassing potent anti-ship missiles, long-range maritime patrol and attack aircraft. With the AWACS enhancing targeting and detection performance on both sides, the hitherto low-key air-to-air warfare environment over the seas is likely to undergo a substantial change. Once again, the battle for airspace control would have to be fought as a step towards sea control and therefore a review of naval force structures to incorporate integral air could be in the offing for most navies if they are to remain credible. For conducting maritime warfare successfully, a capable air arm of the navy, preferably ship-based, would be required for a quick and effective response to the challenges in a situation of AWACS symmetry. The air battle over the sea will be less dense than over land, but will have to be conducted at large distances from the fleet as was witnessed in the later stages of the Second World War between the US and Japanese fleets. The type of aircraft required for air superiority would be similar to the one's employed by shore-based air power, albeit the BVR element in sensors and weapons as well as loiter capability would probably be more crucial.
AWACS busting
The AWACS being very effective and a cornerstone in airspace management, a mission which would receive high priority is neutralization or destruction of the AWACS. While this could be an extremely dangerous proposition with an asymmetric AWACS capability, the feasibility of such missions would be greater when both sides have AWACS. A range of options are available, each with its advantages and disadvantages. As a start, we could consider that an AWACS is not likely to have a standing CAP (Combat Air Patrol) for its close defence as sufficient early warning would be available. At the same time, however, the AWACS would certainly have fighters on call with adequate response time if the situation demands it.
At present, the most suitable tool for the AWACS busting mission is an air superiority fighter of the Mirage 2000 class armed with BVR missiles. These aircraft could be launched in co-ordination with other air-to-ground missions and split at an appropriate time to head for the AWACS. They could penetrate from above the scan zone of the AWACS, threaten it and force a retreat in the patrol pattern. This would reduce the effective coverage in the area of operations of own strike aircraft. Alternatively, these fighters could be guided by their own AWACS to enter hostile airspace at the altitude of the victim AWACS at supersonic speeds and shoot it down or force a withdrawal. A high rate of attrition in these missions may have to be accepted if the AWACS is to be destroyed as subsequent losses would be much lower in other operations when the enemy does not have an AWACS deployed. The timings of such missions is critical and therefore should be launched when the AWACS is about to take up patrol. Even if the AWACS can be forced to abandon its pattern, time-bound air superiority can be achieved with an asymmetry of AWACS, at least for the duration that the enemy AWACS is off station. The number of fighters required for this mission would depend on the enemy capability after identifying the availability of their air defence aircraft and readiness states.
Depending on the AWACS's home base, another option which is extremely lucrative and effective involves a strike on the AWACS at source. Aircraft like the Mirage 2000 which possess multi-role capability can be tasked to neutralize the airfield from where the AWACS operates or destroy the AWACS itself on ground. The AWACS, being a large aircraft, would in all probability be parked in the open or in a soft shelter making it vulnerable to an air attack. In case, the operating base is at a large distance from the border, air-to-air refuelling can lend a helping hand to increase the tactical routing options available. A spin off that might accrue is the relatively thinner air defence infrastructure prevailing at the remote base.
Till such time as air to air anti-radiation missiles are optimized for use against an AWACS, a major problem faced in the AWACS-busting mission is the need of the fighter to close in order to fire its missiles. This increases its own vulnerability and remains a hurdle in the execution of these missions. A relatively cheap but effective alternative to the use of fighters could be remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). RPVs with warheads could be launched to collide with the AWACS and destroy it. More than one would be required and the probability of success can be increased by having them approach from different directions.
Conclusion
The advent of AWACS technology in the battlefield led to a major jump in detection and control capabilities of the side using this platform. Strike aircraft could no longer seek the sanctity of low-level approaches to stay below the radar pick-up zone. So vast was the asymmetry provided by the AWACS in war fighting that no air battle has been lost till now by a side which employed an AWACS. The AWACS is most effectively utilized in the quest for dominance of the skies. It can, however, be employed for a variety of other missions as well.
The AWACS has hitherto been available only to one side in a conflict and therefore, a situation of asymmetry has prevailed leaving little or no chance for the have-nots to stake a claim for airspace control. With the capability existing on both sides, although the system usefulness would not diminish, its potential to shape the air battle by itself may reduce when faced with another AWACS across the border. In such a situation, the methodology of fighting an air war could see a change wherein air-to-air warfare would be the prime instrument of gaining air superiority while air battles would tend to be conducted at medium altitudes. Point defence weapons such as SAMs would be restricted in their effectiveness especially if EW is used. The air battle with both sides having AWACS capability would be highly intense and crucial to the overall outcome for the struggle for airspace control. It is in this context that we must understand that to exploit the AWACS fully, we should aim to create a situation of asymmetry at the earliest by neutralizing or destroying the enemy AWACS. The side which can achieve this would be better placed to gain air superiority and ultimately affect battles in the other dimensions as well.
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