3. Ethnic Conflicts in Transcaucasia in comparison

The Azeri-Armenian confrontation had become the first in the succession of ethnic conflicts in Transcaucasia. It was followed by the conflicts in Georgia where the Abkhazians and Osetins wanted to secede. Without going into the details of the conflicts, we will just outline common features and differences between them in the light of the Soviet break up.

First, all the three conflicts involved non-Russian nations. This constituted a serious challenge to Moscow which faced a difficult task to act impartially. Failure of Gorbachev to take up a solid position, whilst dealing with the crises, caused reproaches from all sides. Neither of them had received anticipated support from the Centre. Disappointment with the uncertain position of Moscow immediately alienated the Transcaucasians and accelerated the rise of independence movements there. The conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Osetia served as the catalysts for the emergence of those movements in all the three republics. The popular forces in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia believed that they would find solutions to the conflicts once they regain independence.[46] They were convinced that the Centre masterminded inter-ethnic clashes to divert the Soviet peoples’ attention from national liberation and to secure the integrity of the Union. They drew parallels between the roles of the tsarist and the Soviet governments in the ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the popular forces in Transcaucasia sought to establish direct contacts. One of the striking examples of this was the meeting in Riga in the early 1990 between the representatives of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) and the Armenian National Movement (ANM) under the mediation of the Baltic Council.[47] Although the parties failed to find a solution to the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, the negotiations revealed the common goals of independence pursued by the two movements.

Second, the conflicts in the Transcaucasus posed a serious challenge to the authority of the local CPs. Violence and ethnic cleansing in the late 1980s stroke a mortal blow on the myth of Soiuz Nerushimyi Respublik Svobodnykh[48] and marked failure of the Leninist nationality policy. Inertia of the local authorities at the beginning of the conflicts and the lack of will to take urgent measures in order to prevent further escalation caused a discontent of people and fostered the emergence of the popular movements. The latter filled in the vacuum of effective power in Transcaucasia and altered the monopoly of the local CPs. Inability of the republican authorities to deal with the problems of refugees and to secure territorial integrity alienated public from the official communist institutions in Azerbaijan and Georgia and led to the growing support of the young popular fronts there.[49] In Armenia, the ANM emerged as a champion of Nagorno-Karabakh’s annexation and shifted the passive CP to the background. Although the fronts in the Transcaucasus were from the very beginning non-communist, at first they did admit co-operation with the republican parties and the membership was open to the communists as well. Moreover, the early programmes of the fronts did not envisage secession from the USSR but advocated rather a renewed federation. However, the communist leaders were not ready to give up the monopoly of power which was guaranteed by the Article 6th of the Soviet Constitution. The aggravation of the conflicts and the lack of will of the CPs to co-operate with the popular movements resulted in the further polarisation of societies and deepened the gulf between the official institutions and the informal groups. Under new conditions, the radicalisation of the fronts in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia was inevitable, and the demand to regain independence appeared on their political agenda. Furthermore, inability of the local authorities to act independently and a customary waiting for the instructions from the Centre associated them in the eyes of public with the pillars of Moscow in the provinces and left them in isolation. Therefore, failure of the republican CPs to respond to the popular demands at the outset of the conflicts was another factor that promoted the independence movements in Transcaucasia and accelerated the Soviet break up.

Finally, the use of force by Moscow against civilians in the three republics had been a fatal mistake that dramatically estranged the Azeris, Armenians and Georgians from the Centre and radically turned their minds towards independence. In this respect, the strife to secure national interests and the one to regain independence were closely connected in Transcaucasia. The two processes developed in parallel, and sometimes it was rather difficult to draw a dividing line between them and to define where the conflict ends and the liberation movement starts. Moscow was sharply concerned over the growing popularity of the independence slogans in Transcaucasia, particularly as Gorbachev had great difficulties in dealing with the Balts. The historical and ethno-territorial peculiarities in the Caucasus would make spillover of nationalism throughout the region almost imminent. An outbreak of the Osetin-Ingush conflict and secessionist tendencies in Chechnya served as a testimony to those apprehensions. Secession of the three southern republics might have led to the loss of the entire Caucasus, which Moscow would hardly acquiesce in. As perestroika entered into dramatic final stage, the call of the hard-liners to teach a lesson to the separatists became more persistent. The use of force in the Baltics was too delicate a question because of the cultural and historical proximity of the region to the West. Suppression of the Baltic popular fronts would inevitably undermine Gorbachev’s reputation of a reformer in the eyes of the G-7. Contrary to the Balts, the journey of Transcaucasians to independence was tortuous because it was accompanied by the conflicts in the region. The last hesitations of Gorbachev to use a force were removed by the appeals from the local communist leaders to help to restore their declining power in the republics. The introduction of the Soviet Army in Tbilisi on 9th April 1989, in Baku on 20th January 1990 and in Yerevan on 27th May 1990 was presented by the Centre as an extraordinary measure to prevent clashes there. In reality, however, it was a police action targeted at the suppression of the popular fronts in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The ‘ethnic conflict’ card was used as a cause for the bloody operations. Thus, the use of force against civilians and barbaric actions of the army in Transcaucasia profoundly shaped national consciousness of the Azeris, Georgians and Armenians and irrevocably pushed them along the final route toward independence.

Along with the common features, there were differences between the conflicts in Transcaucasia. Firstly, the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh had been strongly backed by the Armenian SSR from the first days of the confrontation. Armenia’s involvement converted the conflict into the inter-republic one. On the contrary, the clashes in Georgia were between the republican government and the national minorities. In contradistinction to the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Abkhazian autonomous republic was the sole national formation of the nation and the overwhelming majority of it lived in Georgia. The Abkhazians were fated to fight for their national interests without essential external support. The Osetins did not enjoy great help from outside either, even despite their fellow natives lived in the adjacent North-Osetian ASSR in Russia. The latter were engaged in a conflict with the Ingushs and, in addition, the autonomy status of both North and South Osetia had limited the possibility of a mutual assistance. Therefore, it would be correct to define the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh as the inter-state conflict and to refer the clashes in Abkhazia and South Osetia to inter-ethnic ones.

Furthermore, since the Abkhazians are concentrated mainly in Georgia, they naturally consider the autonomous republic to be the core of their future nation-state. The historical and geographic factors make the notion of self-determination applicable to the Abkhazian case. In this respect, Abkhazian nationalism closely resembles the Catalonian one in Spain. In contrast, the Osetins have acquired two autonomies - in Russia and Georgia. Consequently, the nature of Osetian nationalism is complex. It is a mixture of movements for the secession from both Russia and Georgia with the subsequent unification and creation of an independent state. Thus, the goals of Osetian nationalism are similar to those of the Kurds in the Middle East. Lastly, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is a typical inter-state territorial dispute. Prior to the Soviet break up, Armenian nationalists pursued two aims: the incorporation of the NKAO and the restoration of independence of Armenia. After the emergence of the independent state, the agenda became limited to the annexation of the Armenian populated territories. Yerevan’s refusal to recognise the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan at the Lisbon summit of the OSCE illustrates this point. Armenia attempts to expand its territory at the neighbour’s expense using the notion of self-determination. However, the notion cannot be applied to the case of Nagorno-Karabakh for the reasons discussed above. Therefore, the parallels can be drawn between Armenia’s policy in Nagorno-Karabakh, the German annexation of Sudet in 1938 and the Hungarian claims on southern Slovakia and Transilvania.

In sum, the conflicts in Transcaucasia accelerated the emergence of the popular fronts there. Failure of Gorbachev to understand the nature of the nationalities problems in the Caucasus, inability of the republican communist leaders to deal with the growing problems generated by the conflicts, and the use of force by Moscow against the civilians alienated the Azeris, Armenians and Georgians from the Centre and promoted the strong independence movement in Transcaucasia.