24 October 2000

To: Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (A&T)

Subject: RECOVERING TACAIR's LOST BATTLESPACE--BNOC

Enclosures: (1) Description of the Task

Appendixes:

(a) Samples of Mission Relevant Views collected via email

(b) History of OV-10 Bronco Mission

(c) Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) Document

(d) Surrogate Aircraft Candidates for Experiments

(e) ARES Prototype .

(f) Unducted Fan/Turbo-prop Designs

(g) Massive Standoff Jamming Airship

(h) BNOC Briefing Slides from Workshop

(i) Glossary of Terms

Out of the matrix of concern over the loss of tactical aviation's battlespace beneath the overcast has come an expression of ground forces' critical needs and a possible path to satisfying them. Popular visions of futuristic three dimensional maneuver warfare portray light brigades or smaller-sized units being inserted into hostile territory to attack critical nodes of an enemy war machine. If such forces are at risk, it is axiomatic that they have assurance of immediate fire support as well as instantaneous access to real time information about their surrounding environment, especially with regard to the presence and movements of nearby enemy elements.

Ground combat elements (GCE) performing three dimensional maneuver, STOM or JSF operations need all the external help they can get without incurring additional logistical or manpower burdens. Interviews with scores of combat veterans (retired and active) reveals the need for a continuous overhead "presence" of perceptive air crews working as a integral part of the GCE. The expressed need is for a virtually organic airborne partner who understands the commanders intent, and can provide the following functions with minimum interruption to ground maneuver:

. Local surveillance and reconnaissance

. Communications assistance

. Immediate light fires applied to trouble spots as they occur. Perimeter reconnaissance by fire

. Control of CAS and coordination with artillery and naval fires

In this report, the desired package of services is named Maneuver Air Support (MAS). MAS is provided by combinations of aircraft (manned and unmanned) flown by specially trained crews executing new variations of Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) tactics tailored to exploit the very low altitude region that has been virtually vacated for missions such as close air support and battlefield air interdiction.

Fortunately, it appears that catering to the stated needs of the grunt community can possibly lead to recovery of TACAIR's lost battlespace beneath the overcast. Toward that goal, this report proposes experiments and other MAS mission related actions conceived to create (revive) tactical aviation capabilities which would truly enhance advertised maneuver warfare concepts.

During the spring of 1999, conversations with then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Ralston and other senior JCS/USAF officers confirmed that providing combat air support for ground forces in a "Bosnia like" environment would be especially difficult considering the . virtual prohibition against flying beneath an overcast. The situation was further discussed with the PDUS(A&T) who directed a study effort to explore, theorize and postulate possible action~ which could lead to recovering the lost air battlespace (see encl. 1 for description of the Task).

This Letter Report presents the findings and recommendations from six

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months of study activity directed toward Recovering TacAir's Lost Battlespace Beneath the Overcast (BNOC).

A combination of rough terrain, a high clutter environment and anticipated air defenses aggravates the problem of supporting ground combat elements which may engage enemy forces beneath an overcast sky. The inherent difficulty of providing air support in adverse weather with high performance aircraft is further complicated by a compulsion to conduct air combat operations without losses.¹ These factors have led to restrictive rules of engagement and a virtual prohibition against flying low enough over hostile terrain to actually see friendly forces and discover, identify and directly attack enemy forces and equipment; the result is a loss of important air battlespace.

Less than two decades ago, this low altitude zone was dominated by tactical aircraft. For instance, in the NATO environment where overcast skies are commonplace, all fixed-wing airforces operated well below a thousand feet and many pilots were "qualified" to operate at only a 100 feet, above the ground while preparing for war against the W ARSA W PACT which exhibited a formidable low altitude air defense capability. NATO domination of this low altitude air battlespace was viewed as essential to slowing a PACT attack which was expected to occur during periods of adverse weather. Therefore, appropriate tactics and flight techniques were practiced to prepare NATO pilots to cope with the air defense threat they would face BNOC. Justification for such training activity stems from long experience which has taught that the art of conducting very low altitude operations is quite perishable and not easily restored once lost. Loss of this low altitude air battlespace has serious ramifications relative to execution of proposed combined-arms maneuver warfare concepts involving employment of light forces deep in enemy territory where the military objective is to collapse enemy centers of gravity/cohesion. Forces thus employed would be uncomfortably exposed and often dependant upon timely application of external fires for mission accomplishment and survival.

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1. There is a legitimate concern regarding the political leverage and opportunity for negotiation which accrues to enemy leadership if a downed pilot survives and is captured. Such concerns can be viewed as one of the by-products of "Military-Political-Gymnastics" vice "War".

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Knowledge that the visible presence of supporting tactical aircraft will be curtailed by the mere existence of overcast skies above the battlefield is good news to enemy commanders who can be expected to exploit this factor to their advantage. Additionally, the possibility for overcast skies might constrain plans for bold action by our ground commanders, thinking that they can not count on a full measure of close air support (CAS) should they need it.

The study methodology emphasized discussions with and reviewing papers from the tactical aviation and ground combat communities of the four services, SERVIAC and the JTCG. Historical review, lessons learned from major wars and other more recent events, were given strong consideration in the deliberations. Participation in nineteen joint service workshops, two Joint CAS Symposiums and extensive conversation via email (appendix a) with scores of experienced ground and air warriors broadened the base of information. The most recent workshop was held in August 2000 at a Booze-Allen-Hamilton facility in Arlington, Va. Participants were a mixture of active and retired officers from all services and specialty communities with strong representation from the infantry. Representatives from the JCAS Test and Evaluation Group at Eglin AFB and the Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk, Alabama made major contributions. Civilians from the OSD staff and local "think tanks" assisted in illuminating and exploring relevant issues.

Typical questions addressed during the inquiry included:

1. What functional services or forms of assistance do modern ground maneuver force components, especially the infantry, want from aviation?

2. What are the components of the operational problem of providing the services desired by ground maneuver elements, particularly when they are anticipating or are in contact with enemy forces?

3. What level of weather, in terms of ceiling and visibility, are likely to inhibit or restrict modem tactical combat aircraft from providing air support for troops in contact?

4. Are there any forms of aviation which are expected to support ground forces when they are engaged BNOC? Is there evidence

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that they can fulfill the needs of ground combat elements engaged in maneuver warfare?

5. Does classical CAS satisfy the mission needs as expressed by the infantry? Is there evidence that CAS can be performed effectively above an undercast?

6. What is the nature of an air mission that has in the past or could in the future satisfy the expressed need of a ground maneuver warfare force?

7. What is the character of equipment, air crews qualifications and tactics which could satisfy the needs as expressed by infantry?

8. What evidence exists to support the view that the air defense threat is too formidable for BNOC operations in a dynamic maneuver warfare scenario?

9. What tactics and air deliverable weapons might be employed to better cope with the projected air defenses associated with maneuver warfare scenarios?

10. What is the operational format, employing manned and unmanned aircraft, which could best serve the ground combat element for evolving maneuver warfare concepts, especially those which employ "light" forces?

11. What would be the character of aircraft, weapons and tactics which might combine to restore tactical air dominance in the terrain flight regime for the purpose of supporting ground maneuver?

12. What is the utility for VA V technology relative to the family of tactical air warfare missions?

Observations and Findings:

The view both from three-wars experienced infantry and young officers who have embraced popular combined-arms maneuver warfare concepts expressed the need for an overwatching "presence" of airborne partners who understand the commanders intent and will: (1) help them see and communicate, (2) advise and aid them in attaining their objectives, (3) consult relative to adjusting current plans because of real-time inputs, (4) help avoid ambush and identify newly discovered obstacles (5) by virtue of their presence, erode the confidence of enemy leaders and (6) provide spontaneous suppression fires without interrupting ground maneuver. A

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concern expressed by many infantry veterans was that the process of requesting, waiting for and receiving CAS (a service to be delivered by an outside/unknown agent) can result in delay and a loss of momentum.

The nature and breadth of desired functions extracted from the "grunt" community extends so far beyond the traditional products of CAS that a new term was created for this activity. To provide a distinction from CAS in this report, the mission is referred to as Maneuver Air Support (MAS). It became obvious that this mission must be performed beneath the overcast and by special pilots flying a mixture of aircraft selected to produce a virtual "bubble of support" which moves along with the ground maneuver element for the period required to accomplish its objective? ²

Since Vietnam, CAS has evolved as a highly controlled complement to or substitute for artillery and naval ship to shore fires. Its primary utility lies in providing similar supporting fires within the FSCL (Fire Support Coordination Line) in areas which are sometimes beyond the reach of artillery. CAS fires are commonly requested to eliminate obstacles or to freeze the enemy in their current position or to "save the day" when the enemy has unexpectedly gained a dangerous advantage. Characteristically, air delivered fires are brief but massive and can be provided from strategic bombers, tactical fighter-bombers, CAS mission specialized A-10s or even transport aircraft modified as gunships. With the advent of "smart/brilliant" stand-off weapons, the capability to deliver ordnance to the vicinity of a set of coordinates is nearly independent of the character of the airframe from which it is released. For modern CAS, battlefield interdiction and strategic attack, the planning and C2 network and the character of the ordnance have come to assume greater importance than the type of aircraft and flight crew.

The proximity of friendly and enemy troops demands that the application of CAS be tightly controlled and coordinated. It is preferred that the mission be pre-planned, especially when other external fires are to be employed in the same area. Historically, clearance to release ordnance has required on-the-spot approval from an air liaison officer (ALO) or an

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2. "The decidedly non-linear nature of the Marine Corps STOM concept and the Army Interim Combat Team and Objective Force Concepts is that they stretch the ability of the FSCL to accommodate maneuver. We may want to go to a moving bubble of battlespace through which these forces can maneuver in a nonlinear fashion". Col. Gary W. Anderson, USMC; Dir. of the Marine Corps Battle Lab, Quantico. 07/10/00

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airborne forward air controller (FAC-A) who has both the target area and the delivery airplane in sight. Efforts are underway to alter this traditional rule so as to permit release of ordnance from above an overcast based on "reasonable assurance" that the correct target is being attacked and without danger to friendly troops. Experience with advanced control and guidance technology may someday convince both the airmen and the troops being served that this is a reliable and safe procedure. In this regard, it is worth noting that veteran combat pilots have always worried more about being a party to fratricide among their own troops than they do about their personal safety. Only time and experience will reveal the practicality and value of CAS fires delivered from above an overcast. In any event, unanimous support for CAS through the overcast is yet to come.

Typically, ground commanders prefer to accomplish their objectives utilizing organic firepower. When an obstacle appears which is beyond their capability they can be expected to call for artillery support. Air is regarded as the aid of last resort and their favorite forms are armed helicopters and the C-130 gunships (the helicopters flown by same service pilots assigned to support a unit are viewed as being more organic than the fighters flown by strangers from a distant source). C-130s often worked with a unit for prolonged periods such that they developed valuable report and situational awareness. It is significant that "ninety percent of all the ground clashes in South Vietnam were fought without the benefit of tactical air support.",³ One reason for this is that most contacts lasted less than twenty minutes, which may explains why infantry commanders, anticipating or wishing to avoid contact, desire continuous "air presence". Keep in mind that either side can suffer significant casualties in a brief firefight.

The value of CAS will generally reflect the frequency and quality of training and the mutual experience of the pilots and the ground units receiving it. Among current forces, there is little actual combat experience with CAS. Many combat veteran infantry officers regard CAS as a "last resort" remedy; their preference is to accomplish their objective with their organic weapons. CAS often requires significant planning and communications effort with no assurance as to when the request may be fulfilled. Historically, a significant factor in response time has been the period consumed by the ground commander in making an evaluation and

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3. Ref: The War in South Vietnam by John Schlight, ISBN 0-912799-51-X; Air Force History & Museums Program 1999; pp 216

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decision as to whether or not to request CAS.⁴ And, when "air" arrives, additional time is consumed for the FAC to establish communications, brief the pilots and mark targets. Further, there is a concern that CAS, when it arrives, could interrupt maneuver in a way that breaks the momentum or allows the enemy to disengage thus reducing prospects for mission accomplishment. Except for "last ditch, save the day" situations, in the minds of some, the net value is elusive. In summary, the potential benefits from CAS may not justify the risk of sporadically attempting to perform the mission in a hazardous environment beneath an overcast sky.

In contrast, the proposed MAS mission pilots and aircraft would routinely perform as an integral part of a combined-arms maneuver warfare team. These specially trained pilots (all FAC qualified) must be perceptive aerial observers who are fully informed regarding their assigned ground force commander's intent and would be in constant contact with him. Most important, MAS assigned units become virtually organic and satisfy the expressed need for air presence, as emphasized repeatedly by combat experienced infantry officers. Experience with this mode of operation has proven effective as described by various pilots who flew OV -10s in support of both Marine Corps and U.S. Army ground forces during both Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm. Similar favorable experience was accumulated with A-1 Skyraiders and F-4U Corsairs in both South East Asia and Korea.

Also, variations of this mission were popular and effectively flown by pilots of P-47' s in support of Patton's Third Army as it raced across France in 1944 as recounted by David Spires in Patton and Weyland: A Model for Air Ground Cooperation. There, the mission was sometimes referred to as "column cover".

In spite of its obvious enhancement to air-ground cooperation and maneuver warfare efficiency, the mission capability as demonstrated by OV-10 flight crews was eliminated as part of broad cost reduction measures implemented during the mid-nineties. During the preceding decade, the dwindling OV -10 force, from a resource conservation and training perspective, was clearly neglected. Evidence of its value, the saga of its struggle for survival and eventual demise are delineated in appendix (b). A

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4. In the fierce battle of Ia Drang which began late on the morning of 14 November 1965, in retrospect, it was clear by 12:15 that help would be needed to survive the NVA attacks being mounted against the "invading" Seventh Cavalry air/ground combat element. The commander, however, did not call for external fires until 13:45. Fortunately, previously alerted A-1s arrived by 14:00. Ref: We Were Soldiers Once ...and Young. Chapter Six: The Battle Begins by Lt. Gen Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway

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review of the testimony of OV-10 crews and ground officers who were recipients of their services provides a valuable perspective of the operational potential of MAS.

MAS pilots employing adaptive-cooperative command &control (C2) techniques would provide immediate response to the menu of needs of a ground combat element (GCE). They could also serve as an informed airborne relay to expedite the response and enhance the performance of other units providing CAS whether i! is to be delivered from above or below the overcast. Of major importance is that MAS pilots would be proficient at providing spontaneous light fires to erase small problems which otherwise could escalate to an emergency status requiring artillery and massive CAS fires to save the day. An applicable bit of wisdom here is: "a stitch in time saves nine".

The scene of grunts cheering-on maneuvering air support pilots as they strafe and bomb enemy positions may be a fading anachronism. Standoff or remote CAS, as practiced today from medium to high altitudes, may someday be performed about as well from above an overcast with near equal benefits to ground combat elements.⁵ In the interim, it appears that overcast skies will continue to inhibit the presence of tactical fighters beneath the overcast. The response of infantry to those aviators who declare: "we'll come down and help you when you are in trouble" is twofold: (1) if we have your continuous presence we are less likely to get into serious trouble and (2) if you work down here only sporadically, you probably won't be very effective and, for sure, you will be more at risk. Although great for "out-of-sight" CAS, even the most optimistic view of emerging technology does not suggest a possibility for performing MAS from above an overcast. Ergo, if the circumstances, which discourage flying combat beneath an overcast, are immutable, the air support functions identified as most desired and needed by ground maneuver elements cannot be provided. The result would be a loss of advantage that full exploitation of low-level airspace could give U.S.

5 "Leveraging technology can relieve pilots from having to venture below cloud level thus putting them in greater danger from anti-aircraft and small caliber gunfire. The United States is capable of producing the technologies to see through the clouds and there are lots of techniques you can use to do that. Pilots should not have to venture below the clouds unless our troops are in jeopardy --- when our troops are in jeopardy, we will ..." General John Jumper, USAF, Commander ACC as quoted by Defense Week 17 April 2000 following a presentation on Capital Hill regarding the need for the F-22.

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forces vis-a-vis their enemies. At the same time, directing pilots to try to perform the MAS mission employing current and/or programmed aircraft, weapons, tactics and C2 doctrine would yield, at best, marginal effectiveness with very high risk.⁶ The potential benefit to evolving light ground forces pleads for restoration and enhancement of an abandoned tactical air mission wrapped in new technology~

The popular perspective of the air defense apparition as a "death dot" which an enemy soldier can easily superimpose upon any airplane with catastrophic consequence for the pilot has its roots in the latter phase of the war against North Vietnam. During the NVA Easter Offensive of 1972, USAF and South Vietnamese A-1, A-37 and OV-10 pilots were providing effective CAS beneath the low ceilings covering General Giap' s attacking forces. Air losses from anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) were relatively light as pilots were pressing attacks below overcasts of less than 500 feet. Suddenly, and without warning, there appeared the shoulder fired Russian Grail IR missile. Lacking counter-measures or SEAD tactics the reaction to increased losses was, quite naturally, to retreat to higher altitudes (a loss of battlespace BNOC). That "significant" aircraft attrition which caused such concern was on the order of 0.5% (or five losses/thousand sorties) which, in retrospect, is about equal to the average overall loss rate for total air action against North Vietnam between 1962-1973. It is interesting to consider that loss rates of ten times that level seldom caused a change in air attack plans during WWII where the loss rate for the entire conflict was nearly twenty five times the loss rate for SEA? Such observations leave the analyst with nagging questions as to the relevance of losses and what might be considered tolerable for a wide range of possible future political-military circumstances.

Should the advertised specter of future air defenses be permitted to eliminate a valuable military capability? Might it be worth reviewing what

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6. It is pertinent that aircraft losses from operational causes, such as impacting trees, hills or other aircraft during sporadic low altitude combat flying, has on occasion, exceeded losses from enemy air defenses.

Source: Personal testimony by a number of combat veteran aviators during workshops.

7. Perspective of three major conflicts: SEA (5.2 million sorties/2257 ac lost) Loss Rate= 0.4%, Korea (711,000 sorties/1466 ac lost) Loss Rate=2.0%, WWII (2.36 million sorties 123,000 ac lost) Loss Rate= 9.7% (9.7/thousand sorties). Source: SEADAB USAF Statistical Digest, ref: page 219 The War in South Vietnam by John Schlight

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measures were planned to deal with the advertised low altitude air defenses of the WARSAW PACT? Cannot similar measures (SEAD/DEAD tactics), enhanced by new technology, yield a tolerable flight environment for pursuing the MAS mission? What is the reaction of air defense units when faced with aggressive aerial counterforce attacks? Does it seem reasonable to abandon the valuable BNOC flight regime without trying to neutralize the projected low altitude air defense systems and erase the "death dot"? Is it time to become realistic about the illusion of "zero attrition" warfare? Is there a quantifiable difference in the value of lives of MAS pilots and the ground soldiers they are supporting? Should an aircraft hit by ground fire or a MANPADS missile necessarily equate to an aircraft lost? It was not so in Desert Storm. Should an aircraft downed equate to a pilot lost? Usually it has not. What is so different that helicopter pilots believe they can operate BNOC whereas fixed wing cannot? Can available technology, design innovation and JAAT tactics alter the balance in favor of the presence of manned aircraft? These questions and related considerations were thrashed about during the workshops and email discussions with the conclusion that the described MAS mission may be feasible even in the face of the imagined/proclaimed air defense threat. Philosophically, it is appropriate to remember that the antidote to despair is possibility. Further, the demonstration of MAS mission capability in various air defense environments is a necessary milestone along the path to recovering lost air battlespace BNOC.

The armed helicopter is a candidate for the MAS mission and various versions have done a creditable job of "filling the gap" but they are clearly not optimum. From a pilot's perspective, the inability to eject from a badly damaged aircraft is an unattractive feature, especially when the mission involves operations at low altitude near and over a hostile force. The advantages of helicopters include the ability to establish a base of operations close to the scene of battle thus affording an opportunity for face to face contact with those being supported. On the other hand, rotary wing aircraft exhibit a higher maintenance burden and lower reliability than fixed wing aircraft. Also, they are not as easily deployed. The low transit speed of the helicopter is not a problem unless you have a need to hurry. Fixed wing aircraft, properly designed, should exhibit a lower vulnerability to ground fire. At the same time, helicopters and fixed wing can operate as an effective team (JAAT) to the advantage of both.

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During the past decade, we have witnessed a surge of interest in the utility of UAVs for a wide array of missions. In fact, there is a virtual mania to promote the UAVs a substitute for every mission imaginable. A suggested criteria for screening UAV applications begins by listing all the tactical and strategic combat and support missions and then asking for which missions does man seem most and least essential for mission success. It seems obvious that man is least essential for missions that are methodical and predictable and easily simulated such as strategic attack or "going downtown" where the targets are prominent and fixed and the route has been carefully established. Much of battlefield interdiction, especially well beyond the FSCL, is compatible with emerging UAV technology. The most natural missions for UAVs are surveillance and reconnaissance and early warning. In some cases, area and point air defense might be better accomplished by UAVs and SAMs than manned interceptors. Man-on-the scene appears to be most essential when the end game of the mission and the combat situation are undergoing constant change. Two such missions which come to mind are (1) air-to-air combat over the contested zone, especially when the action involves many-on-many and (2) the MAS mission as described in this report. In any event, it may be that UAVs can make an important contribution as a part of a JAAT conceived to perform MAS.

It is obvious that we are witnessing a transition in perceived functions and form of ground combat elements for accomplishing a wide spectrum of military objectives. It is not surprising that a concise format for future GCEs and the wherewithal for supporting them do not yet exist. Designing an effective and viable arrangement invites application of the Architect's Creed which states: Form Shall Follow Function. How to provide future ground commanders pertinent real-time information and serve their other stated needs conjures a plethora of possible solutions. The situation is ripe for experimentation to clarify and sort out the possibilities and in the process, to discover what we don't know we don't know.

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1. Concept Utility Experiment (CUE) of the MAS mission using surrogate aircraft (manned and unmanned) beneath overcast skies with variations in terrain, air defense deployments and enemy/friendly situations. Precede exercises with extensive pilot/ground element team training and refinement of adaptive C2 doctrine/techniques. Employ former OV-1O and Cobra crews and current A-10 pilots to assist in developing doctrine and flight techniques. Consult with JCAS Office and JRTC training personnel re procedures and ALO/F AC training. Strive for synergistic employment of manned and unmanned aircraft, extracting the best use of each for SEAD and "reconnaissance-by-fire" applications of Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) techniques. Aircraft with capabilities to serve as mission capable surrogates (appendix d) for MAS experiments include the retired OV-10 Bronco, the Argentine Pucara, the A-37 and the T-6 Texan II (JPATS). A unique prototype, the ARES, see Fig. 1 , was flown by Burt Rutan of Scaled Composites in the Mojave Desert circa 1989. The agility and reduced signature (IR, RCS and visual) of ARES make it useful for exploring the possibilities for countering air defenses at very low altitude (appendix e).

Fig.1 ARES

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2. ATLAS Development: The primary product of the CUE will be MAS mission relevant data. If the results suggest high military utility, the DoD should consider funding a design and development effort leading to procurement of a tactically significant batch of manned and unmanned aircraft to demonstrate the ability tq execute MAS in the face of enemy air defenses. Characteristics for a MAS mission capable aircraft which can exploit the Terrain Flight Environment (an Army term for the region between the mud and 300 feet), to be called the ATLAS (Air/Terrain Light Attack System), see Fig.2, would include:

. High agility (accel or decel quickly as well as generating desired turning "g")

. Can attack in a nearly vertical flight path (large speed brakes or neutralizing/reversing thrust to create instant high drag)

. STOL under 1500 feet dirt strips (UDF/Turbo Prop possibilities (see appendix f)

. Exceptional cockpit visibility with TV cameras for relaying imagery to ground

. Low "A" kill vulnerability to ground fire through 23mm (emphasis on projectile entry from forward and below)

. Turbo-prop or UDF pusher configuration (explore both one and two engines)

. Minimum IR and Visual signatures (size & power source considerations)

. Camouflage paint scheme to blend into sky/foliage. Redundant flight controls like A-10/AH-64

. Recovery Parachute for entire plane (option for both manned and unmanned)

. Tree Top Altitude Snatch Escape for Crew

. Message Drop Capability ala OV-10

. EO/IRCM with SEAD/DEAD and smokescreen capability

. 30 or 25mm cannon/.50 caliber guns, quick rockets and low-alt sub- munitions . Fixed-wing: long loiter/high reliability/minimum maintenance/crew escape

. Low-cost (goal < $15M ea. for 500 units in FYOO dollars); explore "throwaway" concepts

. Manned and unmanned versions and dual tandem crew options

. Supportable under austere conditions via five ton trucks

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. Self Start Capability

. Fuelable and Maintainable from ground standing position

. Enlisted pilot/technicians for operating unmanned versions

. WO/Officer pilots from AH-1/UH-1/A-10 communities for manned versions

. Self-deploy from CONUS using external fuel tanks (3,000 mile range)

. USAF C-17 can internally carry a half dozen per load . Option of operating from a CV without arresting gear/catapult (thrust reverse)

Fig.2 A Sample ATLAS Design

3. Operational Mission Exploration (OME): While CUE is underway, form a "Cactus Air Force" (CAF) capable of operating from forward austere bases with experimental adaptive C2 techniques in support of an Army Brigade tailored for maneuver warfare. The unit might be formed about 8 to 12 OA-10s staffed with selected pilots to receive appropriate training to include becoming FAC (A) qualified and expert at flying within the Terrain Flight Environment (between the Mud and 300 feet). Co-locate with a dozen Army Apache and newly remanufactured Marine Cobra

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helicopters and a "Spooky" AC-130U gunship. This composite unit will expand/refine JAAT (Joint Air Attack Team) tactics with emphasis on SEAD/DEAD exploiting the synergistic capabilities of armed helicopters when linked with the OA-10s and visiting F-16/F-18 tactical fighters.

Explore the utility of selected UAVs to contribute to the MAS mission as part of Cactus Air Force operations. Detachments from the CAF would be sent to exercise with Army units and with other tactical fighters at JR TC and NTC. Data gathered here to be applied to design/training of eventual MAS mission capable units and companion ground combat elements and for writing preliminary doctrine and tactics manuals. A byproduct of this effort would be a nucleus of combat ready MAS . aircraft/crews of the CAF to accompany any battalion or brigade that might have to be deployed to a contingency operation anywhere the world while ATLAS is being developed. This interim capability would be a boon to overall Joint Forces combat readiness. Not to be overlooked, the effort of orchestrating this operation would constitute a major accomplishment toward evolving a Joint Strike Force with appropriate air support, even on a cloudy day. The OA-10: Suggested changes to the A-10 for the MAS mission would include: Removing at least half of the wing stores racks to improve its T/D ratio, the goal being to improve its acceleration capability (a by-product is an additional 20 kts. of speed). In addition, hang a pair of GECAL .50 Gatling guns (2000 to 8000 spm) to expand the "light fires" capability for suppression and reconnaissance-by-fires. Provide appropriate target marking rockets. Retrieve the CBU low altitude « 100') dispensing capability that was available twenty years ago (the goal is to be able lay down a narrow swath of sub-munitions while flying within the terrain mask).

4. CAAG Experiment: Explore the possibility of CAF OA-1Os, UA Vs, FACs, Army AH-64, OH-58D helicopters and combat engineers formed into Composite AF/ Army Air Group (CAAAG) to support the Fort Lewis Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) as part of the Army's "transformation" initiative underway on the west coast. Another CAAAG formed at Pope AFB to support XVIII Airborne Corps on the east coast. The imagery of the UA Vs and CAP's OA-1Os and Apaches to be piped into ALO's terrain-agile FAC ground vehicles, along with reports from Army Scouts (also in their own terrain-agile ground vehicles) to verify and establish "ground truth" and situational awareness (SA) for the maneuver element commander to employ MAS most effectively. In some situations, MAS pilots perform "recce-by-fire" and are ready to respond to the needs

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when the force encounters the enemy in a meeting engagement or aides in avoiding contact when that is the commander's intent. All happening BNOC.

6. ATLAS Employment Experiment: Integrate an operationally tested ATLAS squadron into the U.S. Army to create an organic MAS capability to be combat ready for joint combined arms operations by 2020 thereby fully recovering the lost battlespace BNOC as it pertains to supporting ground maneuver and emerging plans for Joint Strike Force (JSF) or Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concepts.

7. Explore Massive Stand-Off Radar Jamming to aid with SEAD/DEAD for selected high threat battle scenarios. Consider exploiting advanced Lighter than Air technology which permits the inclusion of gigantic sized antennas and ultra high power levels not attainable with more limited volume heavier than air vehicles (appendix g). Reference USAF SAB study on SEAD Alternatives (circa 1990).

8. Expand the current inventory of C-130U Gunships (Spooky) from the current force of approximately 20 by at least 50%. Spooky, albeit operating above the overcast, satisfies two of the primary needs expressed by the infantry: PRESENCE and immediate light fires for suppression. These gunships would be a valuable element of a MAS mission JAAT if afforded an opportunity to deploy and practice with the low flying OA-1Os, armed helicopters and higher flying tactical fighters. A JAAT which includes Spooky could be especially valuable for SEAD/DEAD.

9. ALOs & FACs Career Opportunity: Establish an attractive career path for officer, warrant and enlisted ALOs and FACs and provide the training necessary to produce stability in teams which can extract the best from whatever aircraft are available for ground support. Illuminate the need for intensive training exercises when battalions are in garrison --- this offers a high payoff for relatively small investment opportunity.

10.MAS Pilot Career Opportunity: Establish a career opportunity for officer and enlisted personnel to specialize as ground support pilots for extended unbroken periods to raise the level of excellence and unit cohesion of the squadrons. It appears that there are many young enlisted and officer personnel who are eager to be career pilots if given an opportunity to remain

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at the trade long enough to attain operational excellence vice being career programmed. This could be a force multiplier!

The author of this report became immersed in the struggle to tailor "air" resources for supporting ground forces when, in 1960, he was invited to fly with Army officers experimenting with armed helicopters (.30 cal. machine guns strapped to skids of OH-13s) at Ft. Rucker, Alabama. That band of characters (infantry, armor and artillery officers) had concluded that they would never get the kind of air support they wanted from the USAF and were determined to create their own, albeit, they were prohibited by law (Key West) to go beyond incorporating rotary wing technology for combat tasks. If they had been offered a few hundred Navy ADs (blue A-1s), they would probably have evolved a propeller driven fixed wing Army Air Corps. Unfortunately their dream of an armed helicopter force dedicated to serving a company commander has faded. According to the "grunts", the Army Aviation Branch, not unlike the USAF, has developed an appetite for more "productive" activities in the mission realm of Deep Attack.

There is a strong desire, within the Army and among Marines, for aviation to satisfy the needs as described in the section headed "The Infantry Perspective --- What They Want". Their message is not much different from what was expressed by the troops at Ft. Rucker in 1960 except it is now backed up by experiences in Vietnam ⁸ and subsequent military events. Also, it repeats the views recorded during the 19 government sponsored workshops on the subject of Fire Support for Troops Engaged that were conducted between 1985 and present. The message from the troops during this forty year period reminds one of the repetitious sound of a "gong" which emits only small variations in its tone and volume, mostly as a function of the direction of the wind.

During the war in Vietnam, both the Army and the Marines benefited from the presence of the OV-10 which for years enhanced the function of their CAS related C2 networks. In the early seventies, a chorus of approval,

____________________________________________________________

8. A reference which will convey a lasting picture of the problems which can occur when air support is not present and an equally impressive view of how it can save the day can be had by merely reading chapter 20, "Death in the Tall Grass" of the book We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young by retired Army General. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway, Harper Perennial 1992.

18

with some disbelief, came from the Army when the USAF reluctantly embraced the A-10 Then in the mid-nineties the Marine OV-10 force fell victim to a budget induced decision to disband that capability which had proved so useful in SEA and Desert Storm. In this same time frame, following an enlightening experience relative to the demonstrated broad utility of the "single purpose" A-10 in Desert Storm, the USAF made an intelligent decision to extend the operational life of the Warthog for at least another decade or so. Meanwhile, there is no visible effort to create an A-10 follow-on although the need seems obvious. At the same time, the Navy and Marine Corps lack aircraft that meet well established criteria for operations BNOC where they are obligated to support STOM operations involving GCEs that need assured external fire support. ⁹

The need for dedicated air support for ground combat elements which are destined to become lighter, more mobile and trained to execute three dimensional maneuver warfare concepts, compels the DoD to explore possibilities for fielding an appropriate aircraft. In gross terms, such an aircraft (the ATLAS) might be described as a small, very agile and survivable cross between a Bronco and a Warthog that could fly either from a dirt strip or an aircraft carrier without using catapults or arresting gear (as did the Bronco). But of course, to be effective at MAS, selected pilots of these birds must be specially trained and encouraged to practice beneath an overcast with other components of a joint air attack team (JAAT). They, with specialized equipment, may be the keys to taking back and exploiting the lost battlespace.

MAS tactics and flight techniques can be expected to evolve from the exploratory exercises. A sample of possible aerial activity is offered to aid in visualization of a concept of operations. When in support of a battalion sized ground combat element (GCE), an airborne JAAT might consist of three to five ATLAS (OA-Xs) and two or three Apaches/Cobras linked and working in the terrain flight environment (between fifty and two hundred feet) with Spooky in orbit at 12000 feet. Such a group, while flying in mutual support of each other, is simultaneously seeking, gaming, suppressing and killing enemy air defenses while applying light fires against enemy ground forces as desired by the GCE commander. Also, the OA-Xs assist with calls for artillery and control/coordination of CAS, when either is

________________________________________________________

9. General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Excerpt from interview by Patricia Hollis on "Fixing Marine Artillery" as published in the DoD Early Bird 13 Oct 2000: "We have atrophied our Marine ground fires inventory to a dangerous point. We're out-gunned and out-ranged by just about everyone."

19

needed and available. During three dimensional operations such as STOM, this group will fly "shotgun" escort for insertion elements employing V -22s or helicopters. Pilots, while hunting and performing local "recce-by-fires" in a high threat area, are advised to avoid rising above the terrain mask for periods in excess of 10 or 12 seconds and abstain from steady heading flight in excess of 5 seconds; such tactics minimize susceptibility to air defenses.

The nature of such flying plus the observation and communications burden may well dictate the need for a second crewman, probably a ground combat officer. Night MAS beneath an overcast can feature Spooky coupled with Apache Longbow and CUAVs (including unmanned as well as manned versions of ATLAS). Of course, both night and day tactics will vary with the terrain, weather, threat and the tactical objectives. As in the past, the definitive forms of the equipment and the techniques for effective application are best determined from exercises which afford opportunities to couple innovative combinations of technology with variations in air-ground team tactics. To quote Socrates: "One must learn by doing the thing, for though you think you know it, you have no certainty until you try."

The study of how to recover tactical aviation's lost battlespace beneath the overcast has led to the conclusions that:

. Novel though it would be, dedication of a specialized segment of tactical combat air forces to improve the prospects for success of futuristic maneuver warfare concepts must be viewed as a prudent allocation of resources. 10

. Considering the risk, flying ill-suited high-performance tactical fighters beneath an overcast in order to perform the Close Air Support (CAS) mission can seldom be justified.

________________________________________________________________________

10. Battle of Ia Drang, 1965: "There were about 250 men of my battalion on the ground and still functioning. Casualties were beginning to pile up. . ... I fleetingly thought of a predecessor of mine in the Seventh Cavalry, LtCol George Armstrong Custer and his final stand in the valley of the Little Bighorn, eighty nine years earlier. I was determined that history would not repeat itself in the valley of the Ia Drang. We had one thing George Custer did not have--fire support." We Were Soldiers Once ...and Young by Moore and Galloway. In this situation, external fires, especially from the A-1s, saved the unit from annihilation. The objective of the MAS concept is to avoid having such situations develop to the point where "save the day" actions are necessary.

20

. Maneuver Air Support (MAS), a mission to provide functions most valued by the "grunts" and needed for support of "light" forces, may be performed within the terrain flight environment with reasonable risk; the potential benefit warrants the recommended experimentation.

. Exploring the potential for MAS through execution of the recommended set of experiments, design exercises and personnel adjustments is a low risk, modest investment path to attaining a full spectrum three dimensional maneuver warfare capability by 2020.

. A by-product of the presence of MAS capable units operating as components of a JAAT will probably include improvement in the effectiveness of and reduced risk to high performance fighters performing CAS beneath an overcast.

The momentum associated with the investment proposed to modernize US tactical airforces tends to inhibit the kinds of actions prescribed in this report. At the same time, to attain the level of performance required to reach full spectrum dominance by 2020 may demand extraordinary measures. It is suggested that to discover and verify the possibilities for breakthrough performance in air-ground cooperation will require a special task group with the freedom to act parallel to and possibly outside the sphere of current development and procurement activity.

Very Respectfully,

C.E. Myers Jr.

President

21

IAC. SURVIAC

Task Number: 00-04

Date- 04/18/00

The following factors combine to restrict modern tactical fighters and attack aircraft from attacking enemy

ground forces that are operating BNOC, especially in rolling terrain, "with a high clutter index".

. Improvement in performance and proliferation of enemy EO/IR SAMs.

. Characteristics of many air-to-surface weapons systems which constrain freedom of maneuver and altitude of the attacking aircraft preparatory to weapon launch.

. Limitations on target acquisition/recognition and identification with available sensors

. Observation, Communications and Decision processes that are aggravated by the BNOC environment, line of sight restrictions/reaction time and the "fog of war".

. Survivability of high performance F/A aircraft to small arms fire.

Note: BNOC refers to marginal VFR weather with typically 800-1500 ft overcast ragged ceiling with 2 to 5 miles visibility and scattered light precipitation. This degree of weather, especially when coupled with rough terrain, precludes effective support from tactical aviation; such was not the case thirty to forty years ago.

8. Clearly define parameters of the situations and problems which preclude TACAIR from providing effective air support for troops engaged under conditions of adverse weather, in particular, for operations beneath an overcast sky.

b. Evolve a set of actions which can lead to marked improvement in the capability of TACAIR to provide direct and timely air support to ground forces engaged in close combat beneath overcast skies; actions which will Recover TACAIR's Lost Battle Space.

Enclosure 1

3.0 RATIONALE see attached sole source justification

4.0 TECHNICAL REQUIREIVIENTS/TASKS

The subcontractor will execute the following tasks as directed by the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for (A&T) toward attaining the objectives prescribed above:

Task 1 - Provide a written plan for conducting forums for an unrestricted exchange of information and creation of a data based definition of the operational problems and possible solution paths.

Task 2 - Plans for the forums are to include times, locations, designation of facilities, desired attendees, procedures, agenda etc.

Task 3 - Arrange with the Chairman of the JTCG (AS) and JTCG (ME) and other appropriate technical/operational sources to discuss their possible contributions such as survivability/vulnerability data and wapon effectiveness over a range of weather and terrain conditions.

Task 4 - Arrange contacts with various centers of Tactics Development (MAWTS, Fallon, Nellis, Ft. Rucker, etc.) to reveal their views and plans for employment of tactics, weapons and operational procedures which could afford successful prosecution of air support of troops engaged under a range of threat, weather and terrain conditions. Develop a conversation with combat veteran infantry to develop their view of what they want from TACAIR.

Task 5 - Follow-up with J-S, Joint Staff relative their contribution to assembling appropriate Joint tactical aviation and infantry representatives from JCS and/or outlying commands to participate in the discussions of the problems and solution options.

Task 6 - Make contact with J-9 at JFC relative to their participation with an eye toward possible Joint experiments (planned or proposed) which could reveal the utility of suggested solution options. .

Task 7 - In consultation with the above and the designated OSD staff POC, create the agenda for the first Joint meeting, the target date for which is mid July 2000.

Task 8 - Facilitate, moderate, and conduct discussions and meetings related to restoration of the capability for TACAIR to support ground maneuver under adverse weather. Record the product of the exchanges and present in written and briefing format to the Principle Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (A&T) along with recommendations for follow-on actions.

5.0 ITEMS/ DATA TO BE DELIVERED

The subcontractor shall provide the following during the term of the contract:

Monthly status reports that describe work accomplishments and cost performance for the preceding month as well as future plans and recommendations.

A Technical Report on the Activity with Findings and Proposed Solution Options for Tasks 1 through 8.

A Final written Technical Report for this task shall detail the work performed, objectives of the task, methodology used, data collected, analyses conducted, innovative ideas, cogent thoughts, conclusions and recommendations. Technical Reports shall be delivered to Booz Allen & Hamilton.

6.0 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT, PROPERTY AND/OR DATA:

The government will provide the following services:

. Access to government facilities that will be frequently visited

. Visit certification and site coordination for any extended visits to government sites

. Access to all data and technical reports necessary to perform the tasks stated.

7.0 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS:

Access to classified data/information up to and including SECRET will be required in the performance of this SOW.

8.0 Period of Performance:

6 Months after contract award.

Samples of Mission Relevant Views Collected via E-Mail

Appendix (a)

Subj: [Fwd: CAS]

Date: 4/14/007:26:54 AM Eastern Daylight Time

From: xxxxxxxxxx

Reply-to: xxxxxxxxx

To CMyersAero@aol.com (Chuck Myers)

Chuck.

The following information was sent by xxxxxxxx another classmate (and roommate) of mine.

Regards.

xxxxx

____________________________________________

xxxxxxxxx

Give me immediate support. Preplanned support on known targets is great. but once the fit hits the shan you want immediate fire to surpress the unexpexcted enemy/obstacle. This will give you time to manuver to either eliminate the enemy/obstacle or go around it: The momentum of the attack is not lost while you wait for the right mix.

My experience is as CDR C Trp 1/11 Cav in VN

Sure good to see your name again. How is it going? Won't believe where I am. Burlington Vermont: Believe the last time I saw you was when I was ROTC at Dartmouth and your were ROTC at U of Vermont. A lot of water under the bridge since then. Drop a line and fill me in if you are so inclined.

____________________________________________________________________

From: xxxxxxxxxx

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2000 3:52 PM

To: xxxxxxxxxx

Re: [Fwd: The CAS Controversy]

xxxxxx,

Quite an emotional exchange! Question-- in the hypothetical scenario where a squad divests itself of equipment and ammo to rush into an engagement (somewhat reminiscent of Mogadishu) and continues to structure the situation into a hopelessly degraded state --then deplores the absence of TAC Air on call. ---what the hell is that supposed to prove? Why didn't they call for air in advance of moving forward to engage?

It seems there is a lot of agreement in certain quarters that the AF has given up on the CAS mission. The presumption that F-16's can't deliver ordnance on target is nonsense. Gunnery scores at Gila Bend prove otherwise. How much of the force structure should be dedicated to A-10 type special mission bomb and gun platforms for separating warring tribesmen goes beyond my AFSC.

I don't buy the opinion that CAS is/was an extrication mission. in my time on strip alert in Mustangs (Korea). F-5's (Vietnam) we were there to provide support for the troops whether they stumbled into a situation or whether they were on "D". What difference does that make? Interdiction was never 100% in denying the enemy resources to continue activity. To presume it will in the future is a pipe dream.

Seems as though there is more emotion than applied reasoning in the dialogue.

Keep me posted.

xxxxxxxx

_________________________________________________________________

Subj Re: [Fwd: Close fire support]

Date: 4/24/009:33:07 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: CMyersAERO

To: xxxxxxx

xxxxxx:

I have been (more or less) astride of Army and Marine Corps artillery development trends and the erosion of artillery and NGF assets during the past two decades. I have expressed in a number of writings the importance of artillery. A major one being its utility during severe weather conditions which absolutely preclude the employment of air, especially for close fire situations The past two decades have afforded the hi-tech development community ample opportunity to succeed - for a number of reasons, some technical, they have failed to produce. Some of the same solutions have been applied to air delivered munitions development with similar results. The net is a big "capabilities void" for supporting the infantry. If we could produce a portrait of this, it would serve as a good base from which to amplify the need for TACAIR to take up the slack. Of course at this time Washington is awash with uniformed folks who believe that TACAIR has the capability to handle the problem. My assignment is to look at a particular environment: situations wherein there is an overcast sky, rolling terrain, foliage, high clutter etc. This of course, renders today's TACAIR (except for a few A-10s) less than potent. And to remind, I chose to begin with the question: "what does the infantry want", I believe it would be very helpful if in addition to data/historical. etc -there arose a loud cry from the infantry community about the state and future of fire support and lack of air support in particular. Keep in mind. all the popular forward looking concepts are touting "light" forces, dispersed small unit actions etc which even a neophyte like me must understand will accent the need for "on station" air capable of immediate response ordnance delivery.

What's the chance that we could have someone make a presentation to the Infantry

Conference that framed the problem and issued a Manifesto?

xxxxxx

____________________________________________________________________

Subj: Re: You're Invited to Military.com

Date: 4/20/00 10:17:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: xxxxxxxxx

To: xxxxxxxxxxx

CC: CMyersAERO

xxxx and Chuck: You have probably already discussed the most obvious response re: immediate or requested/tailored air strikes. My response is that it would depend on the target and the urgency of the tactical situation. If the bad guys are coming into the wire, anything that gets there quickest is the best. But if time is available, I would prefer munitions or aircraft best suited to the target. So a prudent planner would anticipate target types and have immediate stuff logically armed, etc. I'm sure you have covered the subject in a more sophisticated manner by now! Best wishes, xxxxxx

__________________________________________________________________

Subj: FW (Fwd) [Fwd: Air Support]

Date: 4/16/00 10:17:00:06 PM: Eastern Daylight Time

From: xxxxxxxxx

To: CMyersAERO@aol.com ('CMyersAERO@aol.com')

Chuck,

Why is it, I am inclined to ask, that old acquaintences seem to pop up in the darnest email places. It is delightful to know that you are still keeping the faith, and helping my AF colleagues think with that part of our bodies located above the shoulders. I have been back here in WOC, as a xxxxxxxxxxxx in Tysons Corner, since late 1995. I still serve in the ANG, as the senior ANG Assistant to the Commander of xxxxxxxxxx.

As for the very substantive question posited below, I cannot resist a very personal input to your obviously large scale debate. Almost thirty years ago in the last of the "real" close air support squadrons, our 1st Special Operations SO at NKP (the last prop-driven fighter unit in combat in USAF history, I should add), your question regarding ordnance was sometimes very real.

On a small number of missions, I found myself carrying a 7th AF directed "hard bomb" load, mostly Mk-82's, and then diverted to a troops in contact or emergency infil/exfil or SAR situation. In such cases, CAS ordnance "tailored for the scene" would have been far preferable to my "come as you are" collection of bombs. In one case. I literally jettisoned the Mk-82's for more manueverability in strafe and rocket delivery.

Having said that. and having been able to continue flying operationally in AF and ANG for another 24 years after my first SEA tour in the Skyraider, I would suggest that the basic question is of far less import today given the presence of multiple precision weapons able to be delivered closely" in a TlC or similar situation.

Likewise, we have (in my humble opinion) not let our anti-personnel, CBU-type munitions keep up with the accuracy improvement world. In some very real way, our old "slowmover" CBU canisters which dispersed bomblets out the back, tube by tube, were far more condusive, at any speed, to a proper response to what I heard an uncomfortably large number of times-"they are climbing the concertina just fifty feet North of us-get them offofus!I" Such a CAS laydown "on the wire" is just not feasible with the current clamshell, "widely dispersing" CBU, even with cockpit-selectable canister opening altitude-the pattern is simply too wide. Even the somewhat Rube Goldberg dispersal mechanism in the side-firing dispensers on the UK Tornado seems preferable for high accuracy, TlC situations to our mainline USAF canister style dispensers.

Also gone from the inventory are rockets, for (laudable) low altitude survivability reasons. Having said that, forward firing munitions like Maverick, AGM-130, and SLAM are all key, but each too costly for the kinds of TlC situations you are considering. In my view, the Army's laser-guided Hellfire offers a glimpse of the kind of concept that ought to find its way onto the wings of A-10's and CAS F-16's or future JSP configurations. Or how about a Maverick with a fleshette warhead like the old "nails" 2.75" versions we sometimes borrowed from the Marines?

In the nastiest TlC missions I flew, I killed tanks with both 20mm APT and API rounds (clearly inferior to today's bigger rounds) , and also with 2.75 inch anti-armor rockets. Sure, they were only PT-76's, but tell the good guys on the ground that, and they will tell you that a kill's a kill.... " especially when the enemy is driving that weapon right at you! We need to be sure that CAS birds other than A-10's retain some sort of forward firing or very accurate guided, dropped weapons that will kill modern armor.

Friday, April 16, 2000 America Online: CMyersAERO

Page: 1

______________________________________________________________________

From: xxxxxxxxxx

To: Chuck Myers

(Page 1 missing)

solution to the failure of the Air Force to support. I suppose Chuck's mission or task is to tum around the "institutional Air Force" so it 'rallies up to this responsibility of providing the doctrine, planes, munitions, training, and so on to do what has to be done. So, I'll continue.

CAS means to me (in my mind's eye) not just close to the ground force in range outwards from my unit but also dropping ordnance from close to the ground in altitude ... because my lack of confidence in pilot accuracy increases with their altitude. I used to think I could give some helicopter gunship pilots shifts of fires for their rockets of 20-25 meters or less and expect them to be that accurate; I never used CAS enough to think I could shift their engagement points bv other than multiple hundreds of meters, and even that was FAC-quality dependent. (And how good can a FAC be when he is at 20,000' in a too--fast-mover?)

So, experience working with each other is essential to effective use of CAS. To the extent that marines use their marine air, they have that confidence, but we (or some of us, anyway) have lost it.

Pilot survivability is certainly a factor in ordnance delivery accuracy. If a pilot expects to get blown out of the sky when dropping, he's going to be nervous. So, CAS-effectiveness (particularly at destroying, but also at suppression) is tied to CAS-accuracy is tied to SEAD-effectiveness in the flight region where CAS is operating! I have been told that, since the end of the Cold War, USAF focus has been on Stand-Off from Point Defenses (SAPD). I understand that has spawned the need for JSOW as the only weapon that can operate against moving land combat vehicles from stand-off ranges.

I believe other stand-off systems such as Tomahawk, Slam, JASSM, CALCM, etc. are only capable against fixed targets. But, current point defense capabilities, especially the SA-10, now outrange the JSOW stand-off, so even that is insufficient. More required stand-off exacerbates the problem of attacking moving targets due to targeting and time of flight latency issues.

Something I hadn't thought about before xxxx posed Chuck's question, but which suddenly appears relevant to the discussion: Textron Systems' interests in all this stems from our product line for Sensor-Fuzed Weapons (SFW), although I have not been included in that area. SFW, with 40 sensor-rnunition packages in each, uses passive and active seekers to identify moving targets (tanks, SP arty, etc.) and then attacks them using boresighted explosively-formed penetrators (EFPs) -- one per sensor package, so you can put a whole lot of devastating steel on targets in the area where dropped. It can be delivered as low as 200' altitude from aircraft moving at 650 knots. This means that it can be employed from CAS operating in a low-level penetration corridor below the altitude at which they are vulnerable to all the internetted SAMs, at speeds too fast for even the shoulder-fired systems to get a track on them!

Of course, although that's what they were originally designed to do, that's not where the USAF now wants fly, so they are looking at adding tail-kits to allow them to be dropped from much higher altitudes and still get to the right general area to do their searching. And, because they didn't get used in Kosovo, they don't have a war-fighting track record.

But, Chuck, they are approved for carrying on F-16s (2 per), A-10s (up to 8, I think. but I'm told our discussions with A-10 units says they like to only carry 4 to allow room for other things, too), and are intended for marine

Friday, April 21, 2000 America Online: CMyersAERO

Page 2

___________________________________________________________________

surface to aerospace forces. With common agreement on these terms, the aerospace component then selects the proper type and mix of CAS application.

Both Air Force and Joint doctrine stipulate two types of CAS request:

Preplanned and immediate. Aircraft supporting preplanned CAS mission are scheduled for a particular time or time period, normally coinciding with the anticipated time when close air support will be needed most by the ground component. Preplanned CAS is either scheduled or on-call. Scheduled CAS puts aircraft over the specified battlefield at a preplanned time-on-target.

On-call CAS keeps aircraft on ground-based or airborne alert when the need for CAS is likely.

The second type of request is immediate, which is normally filled by diverting aircraft from low priority, preplanned CAS missions. AFDD 2-1.3 addresses the specific strengths and weakness of each request type.

In an effort to maximize aerospace support of the ground component commander and the JFC's strategic objectives, the Air Force developed the concept of push CAS. Push CAS provides a continuous flow of CAS aircraft to the surface unit(s) identified as the main weight-of-effort. These aircraft fly to a predetermined rendezvous point and will remain on station until the follow-on CAS aircraft arrive. Once the follow-on aircraft arrive, the CAS assets not needed by the ground component will push to their preplanned backup targets. This method of covering CAS apportionment enhances and supports the principle of mass and the tenets of flexibility and versatility.

Doctrine Watches 9, 10, and 11 tie together our current thinking on Killboxes, AI and CAS. This knowledge base should be helpful as the Air Force addresses what is being written and discussed in such new concepts as Joint Strike Force and Rapid Decisive Operations. The next Doctrine Watch II will finish the counterland series with a review of the "Halt" concept.

----Original message----

From:xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Sent: July 26 2000 20:33

To: CMyersAERO@aol.com

Cc: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Subject: Fire support - in the Tall Grass

Chuck

One of the benefits of becoming less-than-fully-gainfully employed is that > when a serious person says you should read a certain book you can find time to do it. "Colonel" Moore's is a hell of a book.

My major take-aways:

1. xxxxxxxxxx has a point when he says, in effect, that the US should keep trying to perfect its own mode of asymmetric warfare such that we never again have to plan to send America's best and brightest into the type of bloody close attrition combat seen in the valley of the la Drang. But we seem to be a ways away from such an ability, when faced with irrational miscalculators who either don't value the lives of their

Page 3

soldiers or citizens. or burn with a fanaticism that justifies any bloody price.

2. So the need for close fire support persists. But what was particularly striking to me in this book was the importance and effectiveness of artillery in close support, when there was time and situation that permitted a lot of ammo stocking, preregistration, thorough networking of the forward observers, and confidence-building personal relationships among alcon. When all that was in place - as it was much of the time at LZ X-ray -close support from the A-1Es seemed much less important. It seems to me that the C4 of providing highly responsive arty support close aboard the fluid locations of friendly forces is comparable in complexity to coordinating air support. What am I missing here?

3. Conversely. as you and others have pointed out, it is when the unexpected happens: the arty is not Iined up; the coordination is not in place: that highly responsive close support from the air becomes most important. Like LZ Albany in the Tall Grass. I wonder how the canonical wargames like Tacwar model such a situation. I don't think the linear programs used by the analytical community have much useful to say about the relative cost-effectiveness of different weapons systems in such situations. Or at least I haven't seen it.

And its too bad that the Powers That Be shut down the CAS line of discussion on this thread. I still don't know the ground truth among the various renditions of how responsive the AF was to such requests in the Gulf. One could infer that the AF believed it was ready to respond when asked (presumably by diverting from other missions, but with what load?), but wasn't asked much: and that the Army thought the request process was too cumbersome and didn't employ it much or maybe wanted to rely more heavily on Army assets. But the Gulf probably isn't as good a model for the future as the early years of SEA anyway.

4. One can't help but be Impressed with the responsiveness under fire of the Huey crews - delivering troops, ammo etc. I wonder if now 35 years later ( can you believe 35 years?) those air crews have been cloned into the AH community and the extent to which attack helos could do what the fixed winq support aircraft did at LZ Albany. I still don't really know why they weren't used in Kosovo, other than fear of losses.

So now that I've read the primer, what and where is this clambake you have arranged in a couple of weeks to talk about this stuff?

xxxxxxxx

_____________________________________________________________________

Subj: RE: CAS

Date: 4/12/00 1 :53:41 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: xxxxxxxxxxxxx

To: CMyersAERO@aol.com ('CMyersAERO@aol.com')

Well, when low ceilings are a problem the obvious answer is Spectre, a cargo plane with radar controlled 20/40/105mm guns loitering above the clouds. These are minimal cost since you already have the air/vehicles.

The supported troops would carry IFF radar reflector/transponders and call in the fire in relation to their signal. Is that considered TAC air?

For short to medium range recce, UAV's are the answer. They're already being improved by all the services. Let's just practice.

Original Message

From: CMyersAERO@aol.com [mailto:CMyersAERO@aol.com]

Sent Wednesday. April 12. 2000 9:29 AM

To: xxxxxxxxxxxx

Subject Re: CAS

xxxxxx:

Thanks for the info --I much appreciate your offer. Am attaching a copy of a paper which explains what we are about. Any suggestions and info will be appreciated One objective is to construct a chart which illustrates the sequence of or anatomy in-time of a "fight." How long after contact is it apparent that you needed help. how long was the negotiation period to obtain confirmation that help was coming and how long before air or arty put ordnance on target. Also, info on other services such as local recce performed by air that was helpful in maneuver to contact or avoiding contact or otherwise aiding in mission accomplishment

Chuck

PS: Perhaps you could forward to others who might have an interest in participating

____________________________________________________________________

TacAir's Battlespace

Its sunday morning and I just came in from feeding the cattle. The weather over the farm reminded me of the unfinished business of restoring the DoD's and the USAF's capability to provide our "troops-in-contact" (TIC) useful aerial fire support --the kind that can save the day or win a battle on the ground. The void in TACAIR capability that our CAS Mafia has pointed to on so many occasions during the past two decades was prominently illustrated by recent operations in Yugoslavia whenever the weather moved in. And of course, any enemy commander with half a brain can be counted upon to exploit our weakness in this mission capability ---- they have in the past.

What kind of weather does it take to shut-off fixed-wing aerial fire support for TIC ?? Howling thunderstorms, blizzards --- no, not at all. Weather like today. 700-1500 it overcast. about 3 miles visibility with light rain shuts us down. It's weather that, in aviation vernacular, we refer to as marginal VFR. The kind of weather that prevented Navy & Air Force TACAIR intervention during the first week of the Easter Offensive of 1972 along the East Coast of Vietnam (the last time we got our butt kicked). It's the weather that sends the planes back to the carrier and airfields with their weapons undelivered. But then, many of those weapons are inappropriate for supporting TIC in the clutter of foliage covered rolling terrain anyway, especially if there is a bit of chaos. How about the future ---- perhaps we can hold on until we get the F-22, JSF and F-18E/F on-line.

We have talked about this in the past and, as you know, AirPac authored a rather clear assessment of the problem in 1995 along with recommendations for experiments directed toward improving their capability ----- their report , signed by a VADM, was brushed aside because it suggested that our programmed force was unlikely to provide the needed capability. The USAF SAB authored a study which came to the same conclusions in the late eighties ---- that report was recalled and destroyed. From this experience, an old lesson was relearned: any assessment or proposed solution that might impact unfavorably on that which has been programmed is DOA. At the same time, our leadership encourages young officers to be innovative and "think outside the box" so we can move toward a RMA. I suggest that if there is to be a Transformation, it must begin with our leadership setting a new example. How can we help?

Chuck

History of the OV-10 Bronco Mission

Appendix (b)

21 November 1993

From: Commanding Officer

Commander, Forward Headquarters Element IG, U.S. CentCom, BGen Frank Libutti

Subj: LOSS OF AIRBORNE FORWARD AIR CONTROL/TACTICAL AIR CONTROL CAPABILITY

Encl: (1) A Farewell To (Combined) Arms - Unless... USNI Edit of Encl (2)

(2) A Farwell To (Combined) Arms, Original Manuscript

Info:

CINC CentCom, Gen Joseph Hoar
CG FMFLant. LtGen William Keys
CG FMFPac, LtGen Henry Stackpole III
CG I MEF, LtGen Robert Johnston
CG MCCDC LtGen Charles Krulak
CG III MEF, MGen Donald Gardner
CG 1st MarDiv, MGen Charles Wilhelm
CG 2nd MarDiv, MGen Richard Neal
CG 3rd MarDiv, MGen Michael Byron
CG 4th MarDiv, MGen Albert Harvey
CG Marine Reserve Forces, MGen James Livingston
CG 1st FSSG, BGen Geoffery Higginbotham
CG 2nd FSSG, BGen M. Williams
CG 3rd FSSG, BGen Carol Mutter
CG 4th FSSG, BGen Bobby Hollingsworth
CG 1st MEB, BGen Coleman Kuhn
CG 2nd MEB, BGen Denis Shortal
CG MCB Camp Lejune, BGen Lawerence Livingston

1. As the Commanding Officer of the only remaining OV-10 squadron I believe that I have a responsibility to address certain issues of airborne C3 to the ground commanders. I realize that it is unorthodox for a Squadron Commander to bypass the normal chain of command to address you; however, the exigencies of the situation mandate such an approach.

2. Enclosure (2) is a copy of a manuscript submitted to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings on the critical need for a dedicated airborne C3 link for combined arms operations.

Enclosure (1) is same article as edited by the U.S. Naval Institute. This version of the article will be published in "Proceedings" this winter. Since this is such a significant issue for ground combat forces, this advance copy is provided for your perusal.

3. In the tumultuous environment of Washington, decisions must be made by HQMC

Page 1

without the benefit of adequate time to thoroughly research the magnitude or extent of the ramifications of these decisions. One such decision is the elimination of the Forward Air Control - Airborne (FAC(A)) and Tactical Air Control - Airborne (TAC(A)) system which has served the Marine Corps well for over 50 years. In its current form, the FAC(A)/TAC(A) system is comprised of the OV-10D aircraft, a specially trained pilot, and an Aerial Observer (AO). The AO is normally an officer with a combat arms MOS who has volunteered to undergo flight training and act as a critical C3 link between the command elements, maneuver elements, and supporting arms.

Undoubtedly, the purpose of this decision to eliminate the FAC(A)/TAC(A) system was to maximize combat power within the constrains of a decreasing budget and force structure. .Although the intent was only to eliminate the OV-10D platform and not the FAC(A)/TAC(A) mission, the net result is equivalent to eliminating the M-60/M-1 platforms with the intent of retaining the mission of the main battle tank.

4. I view with concern the manner in which I believe this decision was made. I acknowledge that my views and concerns are colored by a parochial interest; however, I ask that you consider the following issues.

 

a. Was your command consulted about the decision to eliminate the OV-10 from the inventory and its potential impact on your combat effectiveness?

b. Has an alternative to the OV-10Ds dedicated FAC(A)/TAC(A) capabilities been demonstrated to your satisfaction under realistic conditions?

5. The Marine Aviation community has little concern with the loss of the OV-10D and will take no action to preserve the FAC(A)/TAC(A) system. Marine ground combat forces are the principle beneficiaries of the OV-10D and who will bear the burden if it is eliminated.

Therefore, if your command is not satisfied that the evolving concepts of combined arms coordination have been adequately demonstrated and fielded, it is incumbent upon you to take rapid and decisive action. The last OV-10 squadron in the DoD, VMO-4, is scheduled to be decommissioned in March 1994. Once this squadron is gone, the platform, personnel, and corporate knowledge of airborne battlefield combined arms coordination will be lost to the Marine Corps for a generation. The question which must be addressed by Marine ground combat forces is not, can they survive without a dedicated FAC(A)/TAC(A) system, but how many marines may needlessly die because it wasn't important enough to save.

Page 2

 

"A Farewell to (combined) arms, unless..."

By Major D.H. Fisher, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

OV-10 pic

Keeping Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-4's new OV-10Ds-here over the expeditionary airfield at Twenty-Nine Palms, California-alive and well in the reserves would be a very smart thing to do. It's not too late.

______________________________________________________________________________

During Operation Desert Storm, a single detachment of long-endurance OV-1ODs with integrated forward-looking infrared systems, laser rangefinder-designators and trained air crews provided round-the-clock reconnaissance and served as indispensable communications links with all supporting arms agencies. The ground marines in Desert Storm loved the OV-10D, but the last Marine Corps squadron, Marine Observation Squadron (VMO)-4 in Atlanta, Georgia, is scheduled for decommissioning in March 1994, leaving our marine ground forces without that critical link in the combined arms system-which is not what it used to be, either.

Retaining a squadron of OV-10Ds in the reserves until a suitable replacement platform is fielded would be prudent.

Marines travel light and do not have the heavy artillery assets that support their Army brethren. Naval gunfire used to fill in the gaps, but the big naval guns that served the Corps so well in every major conflict since World War II have been silenced-victims of post-Cold War budget cutting. Most U.S. Navy ships now sport only a single 5-inch/54 caliber gun mount-and some have only a 76-mm mount; neither has the range or destructive power required. Shore-based and anti-ship cruise missiles may force our ships farther off shore, decreasing even more their limited range. Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles are essentially useless in the direct support of marine infantry.

Although there is much talk about new systems, there is no money in the current budget to develop, test, or buy any of them. Scratch naval gunfire from the combined arms team. Marine aviation must take up the slack. Rotary-wing marine air provides the ground commander with mobility, logistics support, and potent attack helicopters that can offer tremendous short-term punch for the ground commander. Their limited range and payload, how-

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ever, cannot replace the massive firepower of fixed-wing aircraft.

Neither can they replace smaller, slower, turboprop, fixed-wing aircraft with long on-station times, besides, their other very important missions would suffer. The answer is what we have-Marine Observation Squadrons, whose legacy of providing ground commanders with command and control, reconnaissance, plus artillery and naval gunfire support-is unequaled. The concept worked in the Korean War, in the Vietnam War. and again in Operation Desert Storm: the need for a dedicated observation aircraft is clear, as are its characteristics, including the ability to operate from unimproved air strips and roads.

All Marine Corps OV-10Ds have been updated with FLIR systems to provide day and night video imagery to the ground commander: advanced solid-state, multi-band VHF/AM, VHF/FM, UHF, and HF radios; and effective countermeasures to protect against infrared (lR)-guided surface-to-air missiles. Most important, the OV-10D pilot and Supporting Arms Coordinator (Airborne) team's primary mission in life is to support marine infantry by providing a dedicated, flexible link between all elements of the combined arms team. Unfortunately. the Marine Corps has chosen to cast this aside in the name of economy.

The two-seat F/A-18D, touted as the OV-10D's replacement, is inappropriate for the mission for various reasons. In fact, it offers everything you do not want in a FAC(A) platform: high speed (try picking out a six-digit grid on a target at 420 knots at 5 G's-just unfolding the 1:50,000 map is tough enough); short endurance (even if a tanker is always available, the F/A-18D must frequently leave the area for 20-30 minutes to refuel); large geographical separation of the aircraft and crew from the ground forces: and a part-time approach to supporting arms coordination (which probably does not rank in the top five training priorities for F/A-18D air crews).

The AH-1W has also been suggested as a replacement and although it resolves many of the F/A-18D's inherent problems from the problem of task saturation and short endurance. Given limited flight time and training opportunities. The AH-1 community cannot be expected to add new missions and retain a reasonable degree of proficiency in the plethora of missions already assigned. The AH-1W also lacks the OV-10D's FLIR and laser designator and there just are not enough attack helicopters to go around.

The OV-10's survivability on the battlefield has been questioned. Granted, it is slower than the F/A-18 and cannot hover in defilade like a Cobra, but its IR-suppression 'system, IR jammer, and decoy flares controlled by a missile-launch detector provide it with an unmatched capability to survive against IR-guided missiles. (The two OV-1Os lost in Desert Storm were OV-1OAs without IR suppressors or advanced countermeasures.) In comparison, the F/A-18, with the largest infrared signature of any aircraft in the Marine Corps inventory lacks a missile-launch detector and an IR jammer-and the threat from IR missiles is increasing.

Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) have their place above the battlefield, but they currently offer no direct link between the ground commander and the RPV control site and their field of view is very limited. As a result, ground commander cannot get an overall picture of the battlefield.

Augmenting VMO-4 reserve flight crews with a limited number of active-duty personnel would ensure continued support for ground forces and preserve the highly perishable skills of the pilots and SAC (A)s. When a suitable replacement platform is obtained, possibly an AH-1W or a smaller V-22., such as the XV-15 modified specifically for the SAC role, the reserve squadron can train the new active-duty air crews.

Some argue that the Marine Corps cannot afford to maintain a small number of special-mission OV-10Ds; Marine Corps ground forces must decide quickly if they can afford not to.

___________________________________________________________________________

Major Fisher, a Supporting Arms Coordinator (Airborne) with VMO-4, is a survivability engineer with Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company. He was an Electronic Countermeasures Officer with YMAQ-2 while on active duty from 1977 to 1984.

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Professional Notes

Death of a Squadron

___________________________________________________________________

By Captain Mark P. Stolzenberg. U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

The OV-10s and the crews that flew them are all but gone, and this is not a plea to retain them. It is rather some observations on a series of personnel decisions made during the 1980s in the Marine Observation Squadron.(VMO) community that led to the loss of the only Marine Corps aviation asset whose sole purpose was to be the eyes of the ground commander.

Almost all of the decisions were reactions to breaches of flight discipline and accidents that resulted from failures in flight leadership-and leadership in a flying squadron relates directly to the tactical proficiency of the flight leaders. If an officer cannot hack it, rank will not save him. Failure to recognize this fundamental concept was-and is-epidemic in the VMO community.

Several of the accidents involved personnel previously identified as marginal-to-incompetent aviators. Leadership moral courage-could have prevented these accidents.

Several institutional factors contributed to the problems, which began in the early 1980s. The biggest was the lack of an OV-10 Fleet Replacement Squadron which left it to the two active Fleet Marine Force (FMF) squadrons to train replacement aircrews. Inevitably, the ever present and higher-priority operational commitments took precedence over training, which was stretched out to the point that some aviators required 11-13 months to complete the 15 flight hours and 10 or so syllabus sorties to qualify in accordance with Naval Air Training and Operational Procedures standards. Becoming proficient enough to make a real contribution to the squadron's mission was pipe dream for many.

Training was so backlogged at one point that VMO-1 had 23 replacement aircrews-but not enough qualified pilots to support of simultaneous detachments.

Nevertheless, the community maintained its reputation for tactical proficiency. Aviators who persevered and qualified as Forward Air Controller (Airborne) and Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) were good at their jobs. Unfortunately, when their leadership potential

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was neither fostered nor nurtured, they began leaving the service. Their resignations, attributable at least in part to actions by short-sighted, unimaginative superiors. were the first trickles in the flood that swept the squadrons away.

One attempt was made to alleviate the replacement aircrew problem in the short term. Some first-tour aviators, with two to two-and-one-half years on station were allowed to return to the Naval Air Training Command for duty as instructors. These aviators, with approximately 300 flight hours of fleet experience, by and large did not enhance the image of the observation community. The successful ones transferred to the Navy; others who were not augmented into the regular Marine Corps left the service. The performance of this group of aviators can only be described as disappointing. Moreover, the leadership potential of the successful ones was never developed in the community, because none of the group returned for a second tour in Broncos.

But there was more to the problem than just too many replacement aircrews-their ability in many cases was suspect. OV-10s were a dumping ground for those who finished at the bottom of the advanced jet training command and the combination of weak first-tour aviators, scarce flight time, and drawn-out training cycles set up squadrons for the initial wave of aircraft mishaps and deaths.

The pilots were only part of the equation, though. Aerial Observers (AOs) drawn from the infantry and the artillery were crucial to mission success; they were the strength of the squadrons. The ground combat-arms experience they brought to the squadrons was an immense advantage on the battlefield, and the aviation knowledge they took back to their units when they left the squadron was the best advertisement that Marine aviation could hope for.

Their two-year "Swing with the Wing" tour was time very well spent. Although it counted as a "B" billet, the AO could stay in the Fleet Marine Force, fly the Bronco, and deploy everywhere. Most important. he learned and practiced every facet of supporting arms coordination.

This sounds great, but there was a catch: it was a one-time tour. After two productive years. the fully trained AO left the community-never to return if he wanted to stay competitive for promotion. The squadrons constantly lost 50% of the pilot-AO team; as individual AOs developed the credibility to provide the flight leadership that was so desperate]y needed. they left.

Field-grade AOs posed a different and significant-problem. First, a field grade, ground-combat-arms officer doinq a flying tour with the wing is suspect, by definition. As the career counselors continually expound, he should have been serving in his primary specialty, developing that all-important "credibility-". Then the issue of individual tactical proficiency reared its head. As commissioned AOs got only one flying tour, most field grade AOs had completed their academic AO training years before being assigned to a squadron. They were out of date, and as a group, they proved that you cannot teach an old dog new tricks.

But they were majors and became department heads: another recipe for disaster was approaching the boiling point. Many of them who should have providing the leadership for the squadron instead, time and again, in every clime and place, demonstrated their tactical incompetence-and leadership in a flying squadron is based on tactical proficiency.

The results were predictable. First, the field-grade AO, or pilot for that matter. because of his marginal tactical proficiency, did not provide flight leadership. Second, as a department head, he denied someone else the opportunity to fill the position and develop as a leader. Incredible frustration set in on the part of tactically proficient aviators who had been in the squadron three and four years; directed to train the senior personnel they, ended up stagnating behind them.

Officers who rose above mediocrity were routinely stifled by their seniors. Displays of leadership and tactical excellence by a junior aviator were perceived and treated as a threat. Many of the young OV-10 pilots resigned after

Proceedings, January 1994

Page 72

years of frustration.

While marines do not desert their post under fire, it is unfortunately true that the only legitimate protest an Officer can make in some cases is to resign. Many promising Officers did just that.

Recent promotion boards have deep-six the few pilots who persevered. How tactically proficient captains, who hold OV-10 qualification possible, can be passed over for promotion, can be understood only in light of the conditions prevailing at the time. Worse, no OV-10 pilot with back-to-back FMF tours has been promoted to Major recently. If Officers of skill and experience and not promoted, where is the leadership to come from?

All this brings us to the summer of 1985, when a Bronco and its crew were lost in an aircraft mishap. One of the corrections actions taken to prevent recurrences, was to increase the number of field-grade officers in the squadrons to provide leadership and instill flight discipline. In practice, the policy opened the OV-10 community to second-tour pilots transitioning from helicopters, and the old Bronco

OV-10 pic

Just flying the aircraft is not hard but flying it at low altitude, turning hard to stay close to the action, monitoring several radios, and sorting out a confused battlefield complicates things considerably.

________________________________________________________________________________

nemesis-its reputation as a marginal aviator dumping ground-surfaced again, In a purely unscientific, undocumented, biased opinion, roughly 25% of all pilots transitioning since 1986 have been successful. Some came to OV-10s to get fixed-wing, multi-engine turbine flight lime to make them more attractive to the airlines; some came to run away from their old communities. The successful ones came to be OV-10 pilots.

While flying the OV-10 is relatively simple, developing the tactical proficiency required to make the air-ground system work can take a lot of time. Unfortunately, many of the transition pilots had difficulty just flying the airplane. Unlearning helicopter habit patterns was a tough nut to crack. And while experience in one aircraft would seem to make it easier to develop leadership in another aircraft, this most emphatically has not been the case in the Bronco community, especially with respect to field-grade officers of whom much is expected, spatial disorientation was commonplace. Transport helicopters rarely engage in violent maneuvering in all three dimensions, Inverted flight is not something that helicopters do well or often, yet this is precisely the OV-10's regime: hard maneuvering in all dimensions, slice turns, and inverted flight. Staying ahead of the airplane while spatially disoriented is almost impossible, for many of the transition pilots this proved too much, once the transition pilot was in the community, however, he stayed. All of the problems of the tactically incompetent field-grade AO came with the tactically incompetent field-grade transition pilots.

One attempt to develop leadership from within and to foster continuity was made: the Supporting Arms Coordinator (Airborne) [SAC(A)] program was initiated to train proved, FMF-experienced AOs as naval flight officers, with a few exceptions this program has worked well. But even the exceptions proved a significant drain on the rapidly diminishing energy reserves of the community.

The marines who made the high-level personnel decisions no doubt had the best of intentions. The marines who made decisions that kept known incompetent aviators in cockpits or sent infantry lieutenants who would not make captain over to the AOs, or decided that marginal helicopter aircraft commanders could be someone else's problems were not being malicious. They were trying to give a good deal to a good guy. Besides, they probably rationalized that it wouldn't hurt anyone.

In any event, the VMO community throughout the 1980s was a magnet for marginally effective officers. The concentration of such mediocrity in one small aviation community represents an institutional failure of leadership, laid squarely at the feet of the Marine Corps.

The individual errors and failures of leadership are heartbreaking-they have contributed to 16 deaths and 25 aircraft losses. What is inexcusable is that many of the victims had been identified to the command as accidents waiting to happen.

The losses occurred in peace and in war and we were fortunate that more were not lost during Operation Desert Storm. The U.S. Marine Corps, and the OV-10 community in particular, allowed this to happen. It was a betrayal of trust.

_______________________________

Captain Stolzenberg, an OV-10 pilot and 1981 Naval Academy graduate, served as a Weapons and Tactics Instructor and Aviation Safety Officer with Marine Observation Squadron (VMO-1) while on active duty. An honor graduate of Amphibious Warfare School, he flew 18 missions in OV-10s during Operation Desert Storm. He resigned from the Marine Corps in 1992 and is an associate engineer with RWD Technologies in Houston, Texas.

 

Page 73

_______________________________________________________________________

 

Subj: RE: OV-10 and DAS

Date: 8/21/00 9:21:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time.

From: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

To: CMyersAERO@aoLcom ('CMyersAERO@aol.com')

I didn't know Stolzenberg. We used the OV-10 primarily as a C3 platform rather than a light CAS platform.

The USMC uses AH-1 Cobras for CIFS (Close In Fire Support) which works well if they can set down in a relatively safe attack position and wait (engines running) for a call. The biggest problem with this tactic is that the position which provide a degree of safety to the Cobras, usually places them out of communications with the ground forces, so without an airborne relay, they are difficult to use. When it works, the ground forces have a highly mobile, quick response "punch." Not the heavy punch of the fixed wing attackers, but often enough to break through a blocking force, or impede the leading elements of an attacking force.

CAS often gets blended with BAI which leads to confusion on missions and positions. The USMC view of CAS is support of troops in contact, hence, the C3 platform will generally be close to their own forces, not deep in the enemy rear where the air defenses are dense. Much of the C3 mission can be performed with quick dashes over the line. We used the OV-10 to Iocate and/or mark targets and then coordinate their means of destruction with other assets such as artillery, CIFS, or fixed-wing attack aircraft. We would typically loft a WP rocket from low altitude to mark the target. We didn't need to hit the target, just put a reference point on the ground that 9 attack aircraft could easily pick out and then talk their eyes on to the target from the mark. (from the smoke, 1000 meters SW in the ravine...)

The ability of a DAS C3 platform to survive on the modem battlefield is a function of both tactics and platform. The platform should be able to utilize terrain (where available) and have IR countermeasures that are overmatched to its signature (i.e. high J/S). It should have adequate RWR capabilities to warn it of a radar threat for those environments that require operation at higher altitudes. Good tactics and training and countermeasures combined will be able to adapt to and overcome advances in air defense.

My personal opinion is that the ideal arrangement would be to have an OV-10 type platform (BA-609?) [EDITOR: tilt-rotor o/a plane] that had the capability to control a UA V for high threat environments. The C3 platform could provide the overall situational awareness (SA) and remain in a relatively safe position while directing the UA V to take a closer look at specific areas of interest. By controlling the UAV from an airborne platform that could (usually) observe the UAV, the loss of SA that comes from viewing the world through the soda straw of the UAV sensors is eliminated. The airborne C3 platform would know exactly where hey needed a closer look, and could immediately interpret the results into militarily significant actions without having to pass the information through the intelligence chain.

Our recently lost CAS capabilities were built around a relatively robust and long endurance observation platform (OV-10) and a very robust and long endurance bomber (A-6). Having lost both the capability to observe, coordinate and mark targets and the ability to have a bomber with a significant payload waiting for a target, we are in a deep hole. The F-18 must stay tethered to scarce tanker assets or it must have preplanned

__________________________________________________________________________

Tuesday. August 22, 2000 America Online: CMyersAERO

Page 1

targets, it simply wasn't designed to loiter for any significant time. My experiences at 29 Palms were that we often could not work up a 9 line brief coordinate with the ground forces before the F-18s had to return to tanker. Below is a comment from an F-18 pilot at a recent exercise.

Over and over it was reinforced how cumbersome CAS is without the OV-10. For example, on my last hop, I logged a 3 2. (which was fine with me) our F/A-18 section by itself took half the tankers fuel to give, right over the target, took several nine lines, and NEVER dropped a bomb!.

_______________________________________________________________________

Subj: RE: Dedicated Air Support for Ground Maneuver Forces

Date. 3:15/006:14:36 PM Eastern Daylight Time

From: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

To: CMyersAERO@aoLcom ('CMyersAERO@aol.com')

I don't believe I have any formal history on the elimination of the OV-10. On the USMC side, I believe that it involves a great deal of politics and budgetary battles and very little if any honest assessment of requirements vs. capabilities. I have taken the liberty of forwarding your message to some knowledgeable USMC officers that may provide you with some greater insight on this issue.

As far as what the grunts want/need, a few comments.

The terms dedicated and overwatch plead for a system with long times on station (limited more by the crew than the platform) and a system that works from forward bases (helo bases?) rather than main operating bases far to the rear. The closer you live to the grunts, the better you can work with them.

I became a believer in this at 29 Palms.. We hated being out in the desert and had all sorts of rationalizations for why we could do the job just as well from Yuma (or anyplace with air conditioning. But when your airfield is close enough to hear the artillery, and you can meet face-to-face with the ground commanders, you really do develop a much better understanding of what is going on. Relationships are developed through daily contact that allow the DAS crews to anticipate requirements and be prepared to react to them more quickly.

Because the OV-1Cs had a dedicated mission, we were up in the same areas every day and became very familiar with the terrain and the deployment of forces. We knew where our artillery batteries were and could see them when they were on the move (even when the FSCC was unaware). Although we were relatively low flyers, our communications was infinitely better than the ground units and we could talk to everyone and often spent a great deal of time simply relaying (and filtering) information. Because we were there ever/day, we learned quickly which units could respond quickly and which ones needed more time. The message drop door was sometimes handy when a unit couldn't be contacted by radio - we could drop a message to them asking them to come up on a particular frequency or make a particular signal if they had lost all comm capability. (Usually they were just on the wrong frequency for that day).

There were times when the pilot alone could handle all of the workload, and in general, the pilots were better at controlling aircraft. However, with 3-4 radios operating at once, even a 2-man crew could quickly become saturated in some missions. My squadron commander, Col. XXXXXXX, often explained the OV-10 mission as a mini-ABCCC or C3I platform. With our high technology database system (2 human minds and grease pencils to write on the canopy), we were able to keep track of multiple CAS aircraft. tankers, friendly locations. target locations and artillery positions and availability. All this information was available to be applied in support of the grunts on the ground or to fill in information gaps for upper echelon commanders.

Communications is one of the keys - it is not enough to put repeaters in LAVs or on mountain tops since much of the comm traffic is across various nets. Often a particular unit can't be reached on one net, but in the air,

___________________________________________________________________________

Thursday August 17, 2000 America Online CMyersAERO

we can hear them on another net and relay the critical traffic. It seems that whenever a unit passes the line of departure, communications with their associated ground units immediately becomes unreliable. With fewer, more mobile forces, this becomes even more of an issue. Until we make some breakthroughs in SATCOM technology, there will always be hills and buildings in the way or ground-to-ground communications.

The USMC approach to C3I in the days of the OV-10 was to give final authority to the FAC (Ground or Airborne). If the ground FAC could not observe the target adequately, or was indisposed, the airbome FAC in the OV-10 had carte blanche to authorize weapons release or artillery fire. The burden to avoid fratricide and/or collateral damage rested solely on the FAC. Since the OV-10 usually had both the best view of the battlespace and an excellent knowledge of the terrain and unit locations, this was not considered a problem. In our almost paranoid, zero-defect mentality of today's military this may require some time to regain acceptance.

Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) Document

 

Appendix (c)

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication-

(1) Defines multiservice joint air attack team (JAAT) operations and describes the capabilities and responsibilities of the team members.

(2) Describes responsibilities associated with planning, organizing, and executing multiservice JAA T operations.

(3) Provides the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) needed for command and control and employment of multiservice JAAT operations.

(4) Provides standardized briefing guides for multiservice JAAT operations.

2. Purpose

This publication standardizes TTP among the services for planning and executing JAAT operations,

3. Application

This publication applies to the operating forces of all services, It provides multiservice TTP for joint air attack team operations. Although the focus of the publication is at the tactical level. it has application for planning and warfighting personnel at all echelons. Any service/ component may initiate a JAAT. JAAT is merely a method of employing forces. The terms maneuver force commander and maneuver commander are representative of any commander (air, land, or sea),

4. Implementation Plan

Participating service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will review this publication, validate the information, and reference and incorporate it in service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:

Army. The Army will incorporate the procedures in this publication in U.S. Army training and doctrinal publications as directed by the commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Distribution is in accordance with DA Form 12-11E.

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in U.S. Marine Corps training and doctrinal publications as directed by the commanding general. US Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Distribution is in accordance with MCPDS

Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and doctrinal publications as directed by the commander, Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) Distribution is in accordance with MILSTRIP Desk Guide and NA VSOP Pub 409.

Air Force. Air Force units will validate and incorporate appropriate procedures in accordance with applicable governing directives Distribution is in accordance with AFI 37-160

5. User Information

a. The TRADOC-MCCDC-NDC-AFDC Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving service commands, ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary,

b. This publication reflects current joint and service doctrine, command and control organizations, facilities, personnel responsibilities, and procedures, Changes in service protocol. appropriately reflected in joint and service publications. will likewise be incorporated in revisions to this document.

__________________________________________________________________

Marine Corps: PCN 14400004100 i

FM 90-21 *

MCRP 3-23A

NWP 3-01.03

AFTTP(I) 3-2.10

FM 90-21 * U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe, Virginia

MCRP 3.23A Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia

NWP 3-01.03 Naval Doctrine Command Norfolk, Virginia

AFTTP(I) 3-2.10 Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

3 June 1998

JAAT Multiservice Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................vi

CHAPTER I THE JOINT AIR ATTACK TEAM

Background .......................................................................................................I-I

Command Responsibilities .....................................................................................I-I

Rotary-Wing Element.............................................................................................I-I

Fixed-Wing Aircraft ...........................................................................................1-2

Indirect Fire Support .............................................................................................1-2

CHAPTER II PLANNING

Operational Planning Considerations .....................................................................II-I

Battlespace Considerations..................................................................................II-2

Target Marking/Designation..................................................................................II-4

Sources of JAAT Fire Support...............................................................................II-4

JAAT Planning Guideline ......................................................................................II-5

Army/Air Force Component.......................................................................................II-7

Marine Corps Component ...................................................................................II-10

Navy Component ................................................................................................II-14

* This publication supersedes FM 90-21, October 1991

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iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

JAAT Multiservice Procedures

for

Joint Air Attack Team Operations

The Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT)

The multiservice JAA T is a coordinated attack by rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, normally supported by artillery or naval surface fire support Ground or airborne electronic warfare systems may also support the JAAT. JAAT operations support the joint force commander (JFC) in offensive and defensive operations day or night.

Planning

The JAAT offers the commander unique strengths, JAAT operations provide mutual support with an increase in each member's survivability and a capability to mass combat power through diverse ordnance and employment procedures, The maneuver commander has the responsibility for integrating JAAT missions into the battle plan, The requesting commander's staff plans for, organizes, and coordinates JAAT operations to support this plan. Successful JAAT execution depends upon careful mission analysis, coordination, and planning. Historically, difficulties in execution are a result of poorly understood planning requirements.

JAAT Execution

Upon receipt of a JAAT mission, the JAAT mission commander must integrate five components of preplanned or immediate JAAT execution-airspace coordination measures, check in and briefings, firepower timing options, attack methods. shifting targets, and disengagement. The JAAT mission commander must also consider risk management as it applies to identifying hazards and implementing controls during planning, preparation and execution. Night employment of the JAAT is also an option with consideration for tactics requiring more deliberate tempo and strict adherence to basic procedures.

Summary

The key to an effective JAAT operation is a clear understanding of component capabilities and employment options and how they can be synchronized to achieve maximum effectiveness. This publication is intended to aid in this understanding.

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vi

Surrogate Aircraft Candidates for Experiments

 

Appendix (d)

T-6A/B Texan II

A-10 Warthog

IA-58 Pucara

OV-10 Bronco

A-37 Dragonfly

A-4 SkyHawk

ARES Prototype

Appendix (e)

Design News magazine, August 20, 1990

This view of ARES over the Mojave Desert gives little hint of the asymmetry of its fuselage. Its all-composite construction results in an empty weight of just 4000 Ibs.

Mojave, CA-

The name Burt Rutan is synonymous with radically different and highly efficient aircraft designs. Burt is also a champion of efficiency in the design process, holding to the tenet that a lean but inspired staff of competent engineers and technicians will outperform a well-financed but muscle-bound bureaucracy.

The popular VariEze kitplane, the globe-circling Voyager, and the Rutan scale model of the Starship business jet testify to the veracity of his approach.

Now comes ARES (Agile Responsive Effective Support), a Rutan design with a military mission-or more accurately, with the potential to fulfill a number of them, ranging from anti-helicopter gunship to forward air controller to basic trainer. This aircraft boasts ease of handling, stability, outstanding maneuverability. low initial and operating costs and field repairability. As a gunship, it also has tremendous firepower.

Composite construction.

ARES is a single-engine jet with a difference. Canard layout. Asymmetric fuselage, twin tail booms and an all composite structure. Its inner-wing sections carry enough fuel for a 1400 nautical mile range. Or looked at "another way, the ARES can loiter three hours at a station located 200 nautical miles from its base.

A small aircraft by military standards, ARES has a 35-ft wingspan, 28.6-ft overall length, and weighs just 6600 lbs with full tanks and a loaded gun. It's also a lightweight when it comes to cost, which Rutan estimates at $1 million, split evenly between structure and engine.

Avionics, fire control. and other systems, instruments. and payload can easily double or triple this amount. Even at $5 million a copy, the aircraft would cost much less than existing military planes designed to fulfill similar missions. A two-place trainer variant. slightly longer and heavier, could replace existing jets for both basic and tactical training. "No point using a $25 million airplane to maintain flight proficiency," says Rutan.

The GE 25-mm model GAU-12U cannon is nested in a depression on the lower right side of the fuselage. Unarmed versions of the ARES simply have a flush cover on the fuselage instead of the gun.

With its high rate of fire, gases from the gun could seriously impair the combustion process in an engine with conventionally located inlet air ducts, so the inlet for the ARES' engine is positioned on the left of the fuselage, away from the cannon.

Interestingly enough, this asymmetry is not particularly noticeable on the actual aircraft, although it stands out in the top view of an outline drawing. The engine, a Pratt and Whitney of Canada JT 150-5 turbofan, develops 2900 lbs of thrust and is mounted at an 8-deg angle to the aircraft centerline. The tailpipe exit, however, is on the aircraft centerline, so thrust is symmetric.

Agile in the air.

Relatively low wing loading and effective control surfaces provide high maneuverability, including a turn rate of 30 deg per second and a stall speed of 82 knots (top speed is 403 knots).

The forward swept canard design limits the ARES's angle of attack to about 14 deg, thereby effectively preventing stalls and departures. That is very important in an aircraft intended for ground support, helicopter attack, and other low level maneuvering.

Rutan points out that while existing military craft for similar low altitude missions avoid high angles of attack by complex electronics or warning devices, the ARES achieves this via characteristics inherent in its aerodynamic design.

Because the inner-wing sections accommodate so much fuel (internal fuel capacity is over 33% of gross weight), the fuselage is free of fuel tanks. The entire center of the fuselage is an open payload bay 92 inches long. Devoid of aircraft systems as well as fuel and located on the aircraft CG, this large easily accessed volume makes the ARES readily adaptable to payloads for a variety of missions.

Long journey.

Development of the ARES began back in 1981 when an Army research group requested design of a propeller-driven airplane for anti-helicopter combat. Hampered by interservice rivalries and turf wars, the project went through a number of redirections, but never really took off. When Rutan's Scaled Composites parted ways with Beech Aircraft in late 1988, Rutan brought the ARES project along with him. He decided to press forward with the effort on a speculative basis, and in the last 18 months has produced, flown, and performed initial testing on a prototype aircraft constructed at his Mojave facility.

Nearly every part of the ARES, including the flight controls and landing gear, was designed and fabricated at Scaled Composites. Exceptions are specialized items, such as the composite jet's ejection seat.

Rutan contends that ARES has so far met its primary performance objectives, besides providing a very stable platform for air-to-air or air-to-ground gunnery. The next series of tests will assess the craft's detectability and survivability.

But certainly one of the most difficult and frustrating missions in Burt Rutan's experience is that of selling ARES to the U.S. Armed Services. Both the aircraft itself and Rutan's approach to design and production differ markedly from what the military and its procurement branches have come to accept and expect of a supplier. Is there a middle ground that will permit the U.S. to employ a low-cost, multimission aircraft? Can Scaled Composites meet the established procurement criteria, while maintaining design flexibility and holding the line on costs?

If the answer is "no," there's a good chance that the ARES could wind up in the arsenals of other countries, which are looking for a reliable but economical alternative to big-ticket military craft.

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Historical throwback?

Rutan's bootstraps ARES project lends itself to a comparison to an aviation story that goes all the way back to the post-WWI era.

The story involves two British airships-the R-100 and R-1o1-which were designed, constructed, and flown in the 1920s on a similar schedule and to identical performance requirements. The big difference was that the R-1OO was the creation of a small, financially-pinched, privately-owned aircraft company, while the R-101 was designed and built by Britain's Air Ministry, a bureaucracy with a bottomless source of not just funds, but scientific and engineering support. The remarkable series of events that unfolded in this classic David and Goliath standoff are delightfully related in Slide Rule, a book authored by Nevil Shute, a noted British novelist.

Shute began his working life as an engineer and was responsible for the structural design of the R-100. His team, short on money and physical resources, but long on individual initiative and commitment, designed and built the R-100. The huge craft (840 ft long) met all its design requirements and successfully made a round trip across the Atlantic, a tremendous feat in those days.

The R-101 design team, meanwhile, found strings attached to the British pounds sterling they received in such abundance. Government civil servants, many with political ambitions, often overruled or blocked the actions dictated by sound engineering principles. To impress the voting public, bureaucrats insisted on press releases concerning design choices made by the engineering team. Once announced, these often premature decisions became cast in concrete.

So, blessed with funds but encumbered with ineptitude, the R-101 reached the end of its construction effort behind schedule, overweight, under-powered, and with alarming structural deficiencies. The more knowledgeable engineers on the project begged for more time to correct the problems, but it was too late. By now, the British Air Minister had staked his political future on a proposed maiden voyage of the R-101 to India for a show of British technical superiority.

And-you guessed it-the grossly overweight, nearly uncontrollable craft (flying without certification because of a bureaucratic loophole) crashed and burned in a French forest a mere 200 miles from its departure point. Of the 54 aboard, 48 were killed, including the Air Minister himself. In the end, the British airship program was canceled, and Nevil Schute's R-100 was scrapped despite its successful performance. If the government team couldn't build an airship, neither could anyone else.

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Asymmetry is obvious in plan view. Tail pipe exit is aligned with aircraft centerline, so thrust is centered.

Unducted Fan/Turbo-Prop Designs

Appendix (f)

A CANDIDATE OBSERVATION/ATTACK A/C
for
MANEUVER AIR SUPPORT

Unducted Fan OAX
CVA Capable w/o Arrestor or Catapult
Spot Factor = .75 Long Range/Loiter
Vmax SL > 450 knots
Internal 25mm Gatling gun
One or Two Place
Low IR Signature
Low Vulnerability to Automatic Weapons
Cost Goal: <$15M

Massive Stand-Off Jamming Airship

Appendix (g)

BNCOC Briefing Slides

Appendix (h)

Slide 1

TacAir's BATTLESPACE BNOC Who says its lost? Why? What's its value? Who cares? What is the path to recovery? What are the tech/oper hurdles?

Slide 2

WORKSHOP FRAMEWORK Think Unconstrained by DoD "Drift" Invited to Probe "Outside the Box" Abandon: "they'll never agree to.."

Slide 3

TacAir's Lost Battlespace BNCOC: General Jumper, USAF Commander ACC: Defense Week, 17 Apr "Leveraging technology will relieve pilots from having to venture below a cloud level which puts them in greater danger from anti-aircraft and small-caliber gunfire. The United States is capable of producing the technologies to see through the clouds and there are lots of techniques you can use to do that", he said. "Pilots should never have to venture below the clouds, unless our troops are in jeopardy--when our troops are in jeopardy we will do whatever it takes.... but we shouldn't be going below the clouds just to demonstrate a nobility that others accuse us of not having...." Jumper said.

Slide 4

TacAir's Lost Battlespace BNCOC A-10 Pilot, Capt., ANG: Given 900 to 2000 ft variable OVCST, 5 mi. visibility: Having been an Air Liaison Officer (ALO) with the Big Red 1 at Fort Riley, Ks., I know that the Bn/CC would be screaming at me to get him Close Air Support. But my response would be, "Sir, we have to suck this up ourselves, because there is no way aircraft will come down here, no matter how many folks are dying." And that's a true statement. USAF Former A-10 Squadron Commander: Asked how he would respond to request for CAS beneath a 1500-3000 ft OVCST: "Truthfully, I could not ask my guys to go down and work beneath the clouds in the face of the probable air defense threat". In Korea, they have a 2000' ovcst with 7 mi visibility about 40% of the time.

Slide 5

OBSERVATION The message from these experienc'ed pilots suggests that the high performance aircraft and weapons of our air forces are inappropriate for flying ground support missions beneath an overcast sky in the envisioned air defense environment.

Slide 6

ENEMY DOCTRINE "Arrange to attack U.S./Coalition ground forces when sky above battlefield will be overcast."

Slide 7

The FALLACY "We'll come down and save you if you get into deep trouble..."

Slide 8

RESPONSE * If you were down there working with them, they wouldn't have gotten into trouble. * If you don't work down there continually, you won't be very effective and you'll probably experience greater losses. * Low altitude operational tactics/techniques are unique and pilot skills are perishable.

Slide 9

FIRE SUPPORT FOR INSERTION FORCES Battle of Ia Drang, 1965: "There were about 250 men of my battalion on the ground and still functioning. Casualties were beginning to pile up. I fleetingly thought of a predecessor of mine in the Seventh Cavalry, LtCol George Armstrong Custer and his final stand in the valley of the Little Bighorn, eighty-nine years earlier. I was determined that history would not repeat itself in the valley of the Ia Drang. We had one thing George Custer did not have: fire support." --We Were Soldiers Once ...and Young by Moore and Galloway. In this situation, external fires, especially from the A-1s, saved the unit from annihilation.

Slide 10

MOVING BATTLESPACE BUBBLE "The decidedly non-linear nature of the marine corps STOM concept and the Army Interim Combat Team and Objective Force Concepts is that they stretch the ability to accommodate needed fire support. We may want to go to a moving bubble of battlespace within which these forces can maneuver in a non-linear fashion". Col. Gary W. Anderson, USMC; Dir. of the Marine Corps Battle Lab, Quantico. 07/10/00

Slide 11

Grunts want the PRESENCE of "Air" to help see, communicate, perform local reece, advise, provide instant suppressive fires and control/coordinate other external fires

Slide 12

QUALIFICATIONS * WITHOUT INTERRUPTING COMMANDER'S MANEUVER PLAN * WITHOUT ADDING TO THE MANPOWER OR LOGISTICS BURDEN OF THE MANEUVER ELEMENT

Slide 13

FRUSTRATION * "Your request for fire is pending..." - INTRODUCES UNCERTAINTY - INHIBITS ACTION - INVITES PARALYSIS

Slide 14

NIGHTMARE RESPONSE "You have reached your Joint Fires Control Center. If your need for fires is immediate, press 1. If your need is for a future date, press 2. If you wish to cancel a previous request, press 3. If they are coming through the wire, God Bless..."

Slide 15

NEED FOR "WHAT" OVER A MANEUVER ELEMENT? * PERCEPTIVE -INTELLIGENT INFORMED EYES-EARS (PIIEE) * INSTANT LIGHT FIREPOWER * VIRTUALLY ORGANIC AIRBORNE PARTNER

Slide 16

INFANTRY PREFERENCE for Air Delivered Supporting Fires QUICK RESPONSE IS SACRED 100# NOW vice 100 T Later message: presence is the key

Slide 17

WISDOM A stitch in time, saves nine... Presence of Attack-Observation Air offers a "stitch in time" application of fires which can satisfy immediate needs and obviate eventual calls for massive attacks to "save the day".

Slide 18

Why a MANNED Aircraft? * Superiority of adaptive trained on-the-scene aviator-observer versus remote technician (T/F?) * Best possibility for providing spontaneous response fire (T/F?)

Slide 19

EXTERNAL FIRES for STOM "We have atrophied our marine ground fires inventory to a dangerous point. We are out-gunned and out-ranged by just about everyone" General Jones, CMC from interview with Pat Hollis on fixing marine corps artillery, Early Bird 13 October 00

Slide 20

What will it take to recover TacAir's BATTLESPACE Beneath the Overcast?

Slide 21

INHIBITORS to AIR SUPPORT of INFANTRY BNOC Restrictive Weapon Delivery Profiles Target Acquisition at High Speed Vulnerability of A/C to Bullets Lack of A/C Persistence Training Restrictions/Cost of Aircraft

Slide 22

SURVIVABILITY COMPONENTS Survivability Susceptibility------Vulnerability

Slide 23

PRESENCE * Persistence is one Requisite for Presence: Low Engine SFC & High Fuel Fraction * Persistence BNOC and Low bpr Jet Engines are incompatible ---- persistence via tanking is uneconomical/operationally cumbersome

Slide 24

PRESENCE * Low Vulnerability to Ground Fire is a Prime Requisite for Presence BNOC Minimizing A/C Vulnerability: Robust Design, Systems Redundancy, Intelligent Layout, Crew Protection, Exploitation of Materials Technology, Live Fire Testing

Slide 25

PRESENCE * Susceptibility Reduction: Signature (size/color/shape/engine cycle), Air Attack Team Tactics, Weapon Delivery Profiles, AGILITY, Ability to Change Speed (accel/decel), Threat Detection, Countermeasures, Target Acquisition Flight Profiles, Pilot Skill/Judgement

Slide 26

WPN EMPLOYMENT CRITERIA to PERMIT PRESENCE BNOC * Pilot does not have to fly above Terrain Mask for Periods in Excess of 12 secs in order to Acquire and Attack Targets * Pilot is not Constrained to Wings Level Flight for Periods in Excess of 3 secs in order to Launch Weapons at Target . Weapons Can Be Effectively Employed Within the Terrain Mask

Slide 27

CAS EXTD RNG ARTY/NGF * OBSTACLE CLEARING, SAVE THE DAY FIRES from> 15000 feet * RESOURCES: TAC FIR STRATEGIC BOMBERS A-10s, GUNSHIPS, APACHE, CUAV, UAV * C2: JFAC, ATO, TACP, PRE-PLANNED,ONCALL or PUSH-CAS

Slide 28

MAS VIRTUALLY ORGANIC * LOCAL RECCE & TID; SUPPRESSIVE FIRES, RECCE-BY-FIRE, SEAD, SELF FAC, CAS FAC and NA V/COM ASSIST * RESOURCES: JAAT: OA-1O, COBRA, OA-X, APACHE, GUNSHIPS, UAV, CUAV * C2: ADAPTIVE LINK to GrndCmd, TACP & JFAC

Slide 29

Impact of Presence "Air support puts new zest and determination in our line in a way no amount of artillery fire before our eyes can do. The men SEE our pilots; they watch them come in low and take terrible chances. It makes them want to go forward again. The effect is as if drawn by a magnet" BC, 1st marine div, 1950 retreat from Chosin Reservoir, Marine Corps Gazette page 79, Nov2000

Slide 30

BUSINESS ANALOGY Land Warfare, Inc. releases RFP for a Combat Air Support contractor to provide dedicated air support to ground combat elements during anticipated hostilities for a ten year period. Location of action is global. Contractor is to provide all aircraft/weapons and support personnel.

Slide 31

MAS, Incorporated * Goal: 30% profit from combat operations * Pilots & ALOs: screen for skill, experience, attitude, stability (all will be stockholders) * Training: heavy investment area * Tactics Department: stress flexibility * Aircraft/Wpns Choice: tactics driven * A Key to Effectiveness/Profit: unit cohesion

Glossary of Terms

Appendix (i)

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AH-64: Apache Armed Helicopter
ALO: Air Liaison Officer
ATLAS: Aircraft Terrain Light Attack System
BNOC: Beneath the Overcast
CAF: Cactus Air Force
CAS: Close Air Support
CONUS: Continental United States
A-10: Warthog Specialized CAS Airplane
ACC: Air Combat Command
CRTC: Combat Replacement Training Center
CUE: Combat Utility Experiment
CV: Aircraft Carrier
DAS: Direct Air Support
DEAD: Destroy Enemy Air Defenses
EO/IRCM: Electro Optical/Infrared Air Defense Missile Counter Measures
FAC: Forward Air Controller
FAC-A: FAC Airborne
FSCL: Fire Support Coordination Line
GCE: Ground Combat Element
JAAT: Joint Air Attack Team
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSF: Joint Strike Force
MAS: Maneuver Air Support
MANPADS: Shoulder-Fired, Surface-to-Air Missile
OME: Operational Mission Exploration
OV-10: Bronco Observation Attack Aircraft
P-47: Thunderbolt Fighter WWII Vintage
PDUS (AT): Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
SEA: South East Asia (Vietnam)
SEAD: Suppress Enemy Air Defenses
SPECTRE: C-130U Gunship, Short Take-Off and Landing
STOM: Ship To Objective Maneuver
TACAIR: Tactical Aviation
UAV: Unmanned Air Vehicle
UDF: Unducted Fan
WO: Warrant Officer