Moselle Crossing
The halt at Commercy allowed the enemy the respite we had never given him before. Hinged on the two important cities of Metz and Nancy, the Germans rushed troops to the defense of the Moselle River. On the north, Metz was a fortress considered impregnable. On the south, the Foret of Toul was prepared for a stubborn defense. Tactical airforce continually reported large concentrations of troop and supply trains in the yards of Nancy. Colonel Clarke was imbued with but one idea, — to get a crossing of the Moselle, get on the high ground east of Nancy in the vicinity of Arracourt and cut the exit roads and supply routes to Nancy, thereby bagging this large troop concentration in the city. First, he planned to cross through the bridgehead the Eightieth Division wa's to make at Pont-a-Mousson. Later, as time passed without progress by the Eightieth, he planned to establish our own bridgehead at Pagny, which would be difficult owing to a critical shortage of bridging materials. Finally, on the eleventh of August, the Ninety-Fourth received orders to support Combat Command "A" in a crossing near Pagny. The battalion was in direct support of the First Battalion, 318th Infantry Regiment, Eightieth Division, attached to the combat command which was to make the initial bridgehead. On the twelfth, the day was spent in covering engineers in attempting to get a bridge in with material's available at the bridging site, rather than using the standard bridging equipment which would be needed later. The bridging operation was slower than expected and the plan was abandoned for one to pass through the bridgehead of the Eightieth, that had finally been established at Dieulouard, south of Pont-a-Mousson. On the thirteenth at 0400, we moved out for the bridge. The column was held up as the bridge head had been counter attacked during the night and was reduced to the size of the bridge site.
To the doughboy advice of "You will be back" and the preparation of the bridge for demolition, Colonel Abram's Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion forced their way to the high ground across the river, smashing German armor and infantry in their path and opening the road for the rest of the column. That night, the Ninety-Fourth, after passing through shell fire and burning villages, closed in a position near Fresnes-en-Saulnois. The night was spent in heavy harassing fire of towns on our perimeter in all directions of the compass. The Germans had closed in behind us at the Moselle.
The following day, Combat Command "A" continued on its mission and over-ran Arracourt as planned, capturing and destroying installations believed to be those of a German Corps and the Fifteenth Panzer Grenadier Division. German confusion was complete. A whole division's trains of vehicles were found abandoned in their wooded assembly areas. The Ninety-Fourth took sixty-four prisoners, killed several more, destroyed four trucks and disabled five more in small arms fights.
During the assault on Arracourt, Battery "C" was again the advance guard battery, and went into position just outside and in view of Arracourt. Here it witnessed the armored assault on the town for which Colonel Abrams is so famous. The battery moved through burning Arracourt to a position south of the town, where that ace machine gunner, Private Larry Doyle, on spotting a moving German vehicle, coined his famous phrase, "Should I give 'em a boist, Lootenant?" The battery fired missions on retreating German vehicles from here and then moved back to the remainder of the battalion which was now in position.
The next day, the fifteenth, was outpost activity. Lt Seaman's outpost to the south killed two Germans and captured fifteen. Lt Hoffman's outpost to the west was active; he killed thirty-three with time fire and his outpost, which was in Arracourt, was visited by Generals Patton and Wood who stayed at least an hour. Lt Hoffman informed them of the situation. One gun from "B" Battery, under Sergeant Francis J. Maus, was with Lt Hoffman to serve both as a road block and protection for his post.
The guns were shifted to the southwest the next day to cover Abram's task force on its mission to clean out Athienville, Serres and Doeville, and link up with CCB. As the tanks moved to the high ground south of Valhey, Lieutenant Seaman's tank was hit. Private Robert J. Klenk and Private First Class Norman J. Dugan were killed, Corporal Kenneth W. Cossey died later of his wounds, and Lieutenant Seaman and Sergeant Abram B. Fritts were seriously wounded. Combat Commands "A" and "B" were joined again, after forcing independent crossings of the Moselle both north and south of Nancy.
The arrival at Arracourt began a period of warfare unsuited for the Fourth Armored Division, — a return to the stabilized warfare of Normandy and the last war. The lack of gas and ammunition, as well as reinforcing infantry, caused a considerable drain on the organization. Initially, the defense of the area was an all-around affair. The supply lines were cut by a counter-attack on the Eightieth Infantry Division, making it necessary to send the First Battalion, 318th Infantry Regiment back with a company of tanks from the Thirty-Fifth Tank Battalion, to take back the St Genevieve hill and reopen the supply route.
The enemy retreating from Nancy were daily captured in small groups by our rear outposts while the front stabilizied.
On the eighteenth, Battery "C" received the mission of accompanying a task force consisting of Company "A" of the Thirty-Seventh, Company "B" of the Fifty-Third and Battery "C" of the Ninety-Fourth, led by Major Hunter of the Thirty-Seventh, to proceed to Luneville, there to assist the Reserve Command which was being counter-attacked by German armor. The battery was tied in by survey to other supporting artillery, but fired direct support missions for Lieutenant Truitt with the infantry company and for Lieutenant Kelly with the tank company. Lieutenant Truitt, from his observation post in a house in town, fired on an anti-tank gun and German vehicles during the street fighting in town. Missions were fired all night long on tank assembly areas, and continuous harassing and interdiction fires were shot. After twenty-four hours of heavy fighting, the mission was accomplished and the battery returned with the task force to the battalion.
Civilian reports began to flood the intelligence officers with news of large enemy armor concentrations approaching us from the southeast. The nineteenth of September dawned a sombre day with fog so thick that vehicles were not visible at a hundred yards. Out of this fog rolled a German tank brigade in battle formation. Due to the reinforcements sent to Luneville and a company attached to the Fifty-Third Infantry on the northern flank, one company alone remained of the Thirty-Seventh on the eastern flank where the attack occured. This company, later reinforced by a platoon of tank destroyers, bore the force of the German attack, which penetrated into the command post area of the combat command, and fought it to a standstill, inflicting frightful losses. More than fifty German tanks were destroyed. The artillery fire of the Ninety-Fourth played no small part in assisting the tankers in their battle. Lieutenant Rupert E. Osborne, a tank observer, accounted for one tank in a tank duel. In the afternoon, Task Force Hunter returned from Luneville and assisted in driving the Germans from the field of battle.
On the twentieth of September, Combat Command "A" issued orders to move northeast in two columns, Abrams-West (37—10—94) on the right and Oden-Jacques (35—53—66) on the left, and secure crossings of the Saar River near Sarre-Union. The Abrams column, whom the Ninety-Fourth supported, had already passed through Dieuze, when it was recalled to face an enemy armored attack forming east of Arracourt again. The battalion returned and went into position west of Lezey and supported attacks first on Ley, then Moncourt. The sun had set when Ley had been cleared in a bitter fight and the Moncourt attack was under way. The town was taken after dark against stiff resistance.
During these attacks, we worked out for the first time the "on call' barrage in preference to the "on time" barrage. All details were worked out in advance on several numbered concentrations in the target area. Fire was brought down by the task force commander through the artillery liaison officer and lifted by the forward observer with the leading element. This type of attack, here and elsewhere, was always highly successful.
It was discovered that night attacks can successfully be carried out against Germans by tanks and infantry. Germans are found either digging in outside of town or in cellars in the town. Artillery fire should be placed outside to force the retirement of the Germans to the cellars. The tanks and infantry move up under cover of the artillery fire, rush the town, fire the houses, and use the confusion and light of the fires to clean up.
A rest period was assigned for the twenty-second ,but a German counterattack was launched from Blanche-Eglise to Juvelize. The Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion with Company "C" of the 704th Tank Destroyers knocked out eighteen Tiger and Panther tanks.
As was always inevitable, everytime we stopped, the Germans reorganized and their build-up of troops began and so it was on the following day. The build-up was initially north of Juvelize, with a gradual attempt to work west around us in the vicinity of Moyenvic, Vic-sur-Seille and Chambrey. We were at this time providing flank protection to the west under command of Lieutenant Sherman R. McGrew, with "B" Battery's fourth section under Sergeant George H. Schano and "C" Battery's fifth section under Sergeant Boyd E. Blair Jr. providing the howitzers. The dismounted personnel were the Assistant Executive section with Staff Sergeant Bernard Stemberg, "C" Battery's supply sergeant, in charge. Shelling from the north and west began and, in view of the tank threat, our left flank position was too exposed.
On the twenty-fifth of September, in rain, mud and darkness, the battalion moved to Juvrecourt, still in support of the Thirty-Seventh Tank and the Tenth Armored Infantry Battalions. A strong German attack had made our position untenable. Colonel Abrams broke contact and moved to a better position, covered by continuous fire from "B" Battery on the salt works near Lezey, which was a real hot spot. The rest of the battalion itself was moving at the time to Arracourt. Lieutenant Kelly and hrs observer tank crew knocked out one tank in action. Technical Sergeants John J. Linell and Howard N. Chipman received battle field commissions the same day and had their bars pinned on by Colonel Bruce C. Clarke, Combat Command "A" Commander.
The next day the Germans again closed in on our lines west of Bezange-la-Petite. They were now definitely identified as the Eleventh Panzer Division. Lieutenant John H. Merriam and Lieutenant Norman L. Krupicka were both wounuded while observing in support of the Tenth. Meanwhile, Combat Command "B", which was relieved by the Thirty-Fifth Division to our north, took over the right sector of what had now become a Division Zone, which stretched from Chambrey on the north to Einville on the Marne-Rhine Canal to the south. The lines formed a salient of which the Tenth Armored Infantry Battalion, whom we supported throughout the action, held the nose. The Fifty-Third and Thirty-Fifth were to their left, the Fifty-First Armored Infantry and the Eighth Tank Battalions to their right. The Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion was withdrawn as division reserve.
In the early morning of the twenty-ninth, stragglers from various outfits indicated a serious enemy attack, and by daylight the enemy had hill 318, a few hundred yards to the south of the Ninety-Fourth, which was vital to the defense of our right flank. The Eighth Tank Battalion moved down the ridge to flank the enemy and drove them into the woods. The Twenty-Fifth Cavalry, supported by the 704th Tank Destroyers, moved around the woods to surround the enemy group. P-47's and P-51's strafed and bombed all day, which was largely responsible for the success of the day. Two enemy artillery concentrations hit Battery "C", which caused a few men to be wounded but not evacuated, but Technician Fifth Grade Steve Basco, Private John R. Chuppka and Private Harry Woodoff were later more seriously wounded and were evacuated. Able Battery received counter-battery fire on three consecutive days, forcing them to move each time (29, 30 September and 1 October). There were only a few minor casualties because of dispersion and dug-in positions.
The next morning sorties were made by the Thirty-Fifth Tank Battalion. These were successful in Xanrey. A short distance away near Bezange-la-Petite, however, two tanks slipped through the lines and knocked out several half-tracks of the Tenth Infantry. The same day over one thousand rounds were fired on defensive concentrations. We were daily taking a terrific toll of German infantry.
For several days the front lines remained unchanged and, in order to reach some of the farther targets, Battery "B" moved well forward with the infantry in front of Rechicourt. Lieutenant Ellsworth B. Chamberlin picked up the mortars that were causing trouble to the battery. He placed accurate artillery fire on them and they were not heard from again. The krauts then started throwing artillery, but because the guns were up against a high bank, the fire was ineffective. Corporal Henry E. Smith, of the Medics, was wounded a second time, late in the afternoon as well as five other men. The battery had to run through a continuous stream of artillery fire when going back to Arracourt. No vehicles were hit. They fired 1,010 rounds to cover the target areas. By day, the Ninety-Fourth pounded enemy mortar and artillery positions and dismounted infantry; by night, the enemy was confused by interdiction and harassing missions which we carried out.
During the stabilized warfare at Arracourt, Private Samuel Davidovitch, a "C" Battery radio operator, was killed in action by machine gun and mortar fire, while crawling over exposed ground to repair a telephone line to an OP manned by Sergeant Theodore R. Yuriga and Lieutenant Marvi'n L, Jones. Sergeant Yuriga also tried to re-establish communications but was pinned down with Lieutenant Jones by enemy fire for several hours until he rejoined the infantry lines under cover of darkness. For these actions, Private Davidovitch received a posthumous award of the Silver Star Medal and Sergeant Yuriga received a Bronze Star Medal.
On the fourth of October, Lt Colonel Powers went to Nancy for medical treatment and Major Parker was acting battalion commander. On the sixth, Major Robert M. Parker Jr. took command of the battalion and position vacancies were filled as follows: Captain Robert D. Franks, battalion executive officer; Captain Charles H. Gillens Jr., S-3; First Lieutenant William E. Walsh took command of Battery "B".
The morning of the fifth was very quiet, but suddenly at 1300 hours the Germans began heavy artillery concentrations. Most of the rounds fell on "B" Battery and six men were wounded: Technician Fourth Grade William H. Walraven, Corporal Mila-n Kantar, Corporal Keith H. McBride, Private First Class Stewart R. Ladd, Private John J. Pitonack and Private Tobie E. Shadic. Technician Fourth Grade Walraven died the following day. Several rounds hit Battery "C" and one round made a direct hit on an SP howitzer, completely destroying it. After the shelling, "B" & "C" displaced to the rear just southeast of Arracourt and "A" covered their displacement. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Harley Merrick, our air observer, fired some counterbattery mission's by adjusting "A", and Division Artillery brought in several other battalions on these targets. Several fires were started in the vicinity of Moncourt. Technician Fifth Grade Joseph P. Detuzzi was wounded in action and evacuated while supporting the Tenth Armored Infantry Battalion as a member of the Battery "C" reconnaissance section at Arracourt.
The Twenty-Sixth Infantry Division began partial relief of the Tenth Infantry on the seventh. We remained in our positions and assumed direct support of the First Battalion, 104th Infantry Regiment. Our liaison officer and two forward observers remained with them up to the morning of the tenth. The S-2 section had issued 11,891 maps to the battalion since arrival in France, the battalion had fired 18,980 rounds of artillery ammunition and the division had captured some 16,039 prisoners.
While still supporting the 104th Infantry, we also were in support of the Second Cavalry Group and assisted them in an attack on Parroy. Also on the eleventh, we assisted the 104th in a temporary retaking of Hill 265 at Bezange-la-Petite, Most of the battery kitchens came up, which relieved the individual cooking that each section in the battalion had been doing since our breakthrough campaign had started. The kitchen trucks had been hauling gas and ammunition up to this time. Early in the morning of the twelfth, Battery "A" moved up to the front lines and adjusted and fired 327 rounds at an enemy battery near Donnelay. The battery had been located primarily by air photos. The direction was established by a shift from the church in Donnelay, and the range and final adjustment were by the cub plane. The guns were large caliber Russian pieces. The battalion also fired in support of a limited attack on Hill 265 again. All batteries moved forward about two miles, under cover of dusk.
The next morning "C" Battery found that they were under enemy observation which resulted in counter-battery fire. During this shelling, Staff Sergeant Fred E. Keyser, Sergeant Richard J. Lane and Technician Fourth Grade Josiah G. Ward were wounded and evacuated. Technician Fourth Grade Lucius Brown was wounded but not evacuated. A request for permission to displace was granted and this was done under continuous enemy fire which resulted in Private First Class Paul Emmett's being wounded and evacuated. We were again the farthest forward (east) artillery battalion in the Third Army, a record we have held almost continuously throughout the war.
In order to reduce counter-battery fire, a roving battery of three guns, "D" Battery, was set up. Each battery took turns providing the guns. The people against us at this time were still mostly the Eleventh Panzer Division, whose artillery pieces consisted, in part at least, of captured 150mm Russian field pieces.
The Twenty-Sixth Infantry Division had completed the relief of the front, replacing our three depleted infantry battalions with three full infantry regiments. We were given the mission to furnish direct support to the Second Cavalry group, on an ammunition ration that was further cut to forty-four rounds per day for the entire battalion. In addition to this, we had to reinforce the fires of the 253rd Field Artillery.
Private First Class Lige Lewis, Battery "C", was killed in action and Private Joe Jones, Battery "C", was wounded near Hill 265 in the vicinity of Bezange-la-Petite. They had been in the previous day's attack, while assisting Lieutenant Jones in the conduct of artillery fire in support of an attack made by the 104th Infantry, and were momentarily expecting relief when hit by an enemy artillery concentration. Private Rudolph Norman, Battery "C", was killed in action, as a member of Lieutenant McGrew's reconnaissance section, while Lieutenant McGrew was conducting artillery fire in support of the 104th Infantry.
The battalion moved about five miles south on the eigtheenth to furnish better support to the cavalry in the vicinity of Bathlemont. The batteries secured some billets by using old barns and buildings. The kitchens were operating well now. During this period, some of the men were allowed to go to Nancy between the hours of 1000 and 1800 each day. This was the first opportunity for the men to get away from the front since landing in France; a few passes were also issued to Paris.
Bathlemont was the home of the battalion for the period from the nineteenth to the thirtieth of October.
At the end of this phase, the 'front had stabilized to a greater extent than before the Moselle crossing. The fifteen days from the arrival at Commercy to our crossing of the Moselle and the forty-five days in the area around Arracourt had given the Germans full opportunity to prepare their winter defenses. Certainly the taking of Nancy gave us a valuable supply and transportation base, but it cannot be compared to the loss of valuable weather and time for chasing the krauts back into Germany. The attack ground to a halt, not from enemy action, but from lack of reinforcing infantry to consolidate our gains and from the shortage of much needed gasoline.
