The Rhineland
(14th—25th March)
— KOBLENZ TO HANAU —
Perhaps the most artful strategy and the most detailed and careful execution of any campaign of the European War was Third Army's crossing of the Moselle, Rhine and Main Rivers a period of twelve days. At this time, First Army was on the Rhine expanding the Remagen bridgehead. The Third Army was on First Army's right bounded by the Rhine and Moselle Rivers although XX Corps of the Third Army was across the Moselle to the south in the vicinity of Trier. The Seventh Army, farther to the right, was progressing slowly through the Siegfried Line. The mass of Allied troops were weighted behind the First, Ninth and British Armies in the north. The move of XII Corps, spearheaded by the 4th Armored Division, from the vicinity of Koblenz to Worms on the Rhine would completely cut off and anihilate the German armies facing the Seventh Army in the Siegfried Line. The weather was sunny, the ground firm and the spirits of the troops were at a peak with the knowledge that there was about one more punch to be delivered before they went in for the kill.
On the 14th of March, the 94th moved with Combat Command "A", still with the 8th Tank Battalion, 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, 276th Armored Field Artillery and the 179th Field Artillery Battalions to assembly areas behind the 90th Infantry Division which was to make a bridgehead, while Combat Command "B" was in readiness to the south behind the 5th Infantry Division's crossing. Both columns were to proceed parallel toward Bad Kreuznach, cross the Nahe River, and head for Mainz or Worms depending on which still had bridges in across the Rhine. The next day we crossed the Moselle over a pontoon bridge through clouds of chemically generated smoke going into position near Gondershausen. Just before dark Lt. Bothwell, cub pilot observer, adjusted fire on two 88 guns destroying them both while Lt. Billy Wood, also in a plane, harassed retreating enemy columns with artillery fire. The next day, the column streaked forward on paved roads until it was halted by road blocks and the loss of a light tank on the outskirts of Rheinbollen. As the point could not force its way any farther, it withdrew and the 94th went into position at Liebshausen and fired a preparation on Rheinbollen. One company of tanks and one of infantry assaulted the town and mopped it up while the rest of the column bypassed cross-country to the south, striking for Ellern. Again the 94th fired a preparation before our troops attacked the town. Driving on, the column was slowed up by fallen trees in the woods the east of that town. The battalion commander's and battery commanders' parties near the point of the column organized pick-up crews from tanks and infantry to cut up the trees and drag them off the road. Tanks dragged other logs out of the way. Delayed only a few minutes, the column raced on through the woods and through the open country beyond, smashing the German defenses before they were fully manned and then on to the banks of the Nahe River near Ginsingen. As darkness fell, the battalion was in position at Winasshein.
The following day, the 17th, the 94th made a short displacement to within a few hundred yards of the river to support our crossing. A ford had been found at Heddesheim which had been taken in the morning by the 8th and 53rd. The German air force thought the combat command was using the light bridge near the ford and repeatedly bombed it all day. We knew Jerry was hurting, because he never used his planes u-nless he was desperate. The next morning the battalion crossed, went into position north of Pfaffen Schwabenhehn, fired a few missions in support of the attack on Sprendlingen, and then moved to new positions northeast of Sprendlingen. Our tanks were in position a bare hundred yards to the front of the battalion, preparing to attack east up the steep slope towards St. Johann, 500 yards away. St. Johann, a small town, was expected to be an easy mark and no artillery preparation was called for. As the tanks moved out, they met a withering fire of 88 armor-piercing and air bursts and twenty millimeter fiac from guns dug in around St. Johann. Mr. Wathen was wounded as the 88 and 20 millimeter burst in the batallion positions. The tanks backed off and called for artillery. "B" and "C" Batteries were too close to depress their guns to hit the town but "A" Battery was adjusted by cub pilot observer Bothwell in spite of the 88 and 20 millimeter now directed at him. The 276th and 179th Field Artillery Battalion were now also in position to our rear and fired on the enemy gun positions. Under this artillery preparation the tanks and infantry again attacked, carried St. Johann and went on to Bendesheim and Wolfsheim on the ridge that dominated all ground to the east and south. The Jerries were still hurting. Their plane's were up all day attacking injudicially armored artillery and tanks who were taking their toll of the Luftwaffe.
On the 19th of March, word had been received that the bridges were blown at Mainz but one was still intact at Worms. The 4th Armored directed both columns, which were about parallel, for this bridge. The 94th went into position about 1000 yards north of Worrstadt, supporting the assault of Worrstadt, Spiesheim, Ensheim, Biebelsheim and Rommersheim. The Krauts were persistently defending each town savagely. They had besides their infantry, anti-aircraft 88's and 20 millimeter outfits, considerable selfpropelled artillery and armor which had been causing both combat commands trouble. The division was now ready to take Alzey, Combat Command "B" was a short distance west of the town and Combat Command "A" was about the same distance 'northeast. The next day Combat Command "B" attacked and took Alzey, while Combat Command "A" pushed south, then east of Alzey through Albis, Dauten'sheim, Gau Heppenheim, Frannersheim and other towns which were bitterly defended. The 94th kept displacing aggressively, immediately behind the leading tank and infantry companies. At Gau Heppenheim, reconnaissance parties entered the town before tank and infantry mop-up forces who later took out two hundred prisoners. The 276th Armored Field Artillery was firing at German personnel and vehicles a thousand yards to our rear. "A" Battery took a 75 millimeter self-propelled gun intact and fifty-one prisoners; "B" took four prisoner's, "C" seven and Headquarters three, a total of sixty-four for the day. That night the battalion went into position at Westhof within range of Worms. Combat Command "B" was racing to our south, in the twilight, into the city; all bridges had been blown.
On the twenty-first, the 94th moved out in support of Combat Command "A" with a mission to clear out the west bank of the Rhine from Worms to Oppenheim. The Battalion went into position at Ulversheim near Oppenheim and fired at German batteries across the Rhine. The next day we withdrew to Gensingen for much needed vehicular maintenance and to vacate the area for the troops who were to make the Rhine bridgehead. As we retired, going up in the opposite direction were the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions and masses of special enginieers bridging equipment. While the 4th Armored Division was servicing its fighting vehicles the following day, the 23rd, the 5th Infantry Division crossed three infantry regiment's in assault boats.
At 1000 hours on the 24th, when Combat Command "A" crossed the Rhine, two heavy pontoon bridges were already constructed. The 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions were both across as well as the corps artillery. The 4th Armored Division had the use of the bridge fon twenty-four hours. In the next twenty-four hours the 6th Armored, 26th Infantry and 80th Infantry were to cross. On the approaches, bridges and exit roads, columns were rolling almost bumper to bumper at 15 miles per hour, military police and staff officers urging them on. On both sides of the road there were companies of reserve infantry encamped, artillery of all calibers in position firing in support of the expanding bridgehead, and masses of anti-aircraft batteries that dared the Luftwaffe to attack. The division plan was to by-pass the city of Darmstadt to the southeast and strike north for the Main River. Combat Command "A" was to obtai'n a main crossing at Hanau, — Combat Command "B" at Aschaffenburg.
The 94th with Combat Command "A", the leading combat command, moved to the southeast edge of the bridgehead. The point immediately came under intensive artillery and anti-tank fire near Phillips Hospital and was unable to proceed. The slightest movement, a puff of dust was sure to attract a German volley. The cub pilots were unable to find the guns and every time they ventured beyond our front lines they were forced back by machine gun and anti-aircraft fire. Finally Lt. Colonel Parker, with primitive counterbattery methods of taking pocket compass readings to the sound of the enemy guns and inspection of the map for likely positions, gave Billy Wood initial data to the suspected gun positions. Luckily they were all on the nose, cub pilot Wood picked up the guns, took them under fire and silenced them. Colonel Sears led the column on, resistance lessened. The 4th Armored was loose on another end run. The combat command pushed on in the dark until two in the morning when the battalion went into position at Nieder-Ramstadt. The enemy was blowing up ammunition dumps as he retreated. Combat Command "B" pushed on to our south all through the night stopping only to refuel. The next day Combat Command "A" turned north and, smashing the futile Kraut resistance, it roared forward to Hanau. As it approached the objective, the column entered the permanent anti-aircraft zone protecting Hanau and Frankfurt. Lt. Billy Wood flying over the column in the late afternoon discovered the bridge across the Main at Grau Anheim, just east of Hanau, intact. "A", the advance guard battery, was ordered to double the column cross-country. Captain Click had his data figured. As each "A" Battery gun entered the position, it was laid and opened time fire over the bridge to prevent the German engineer party on the bridge from blowing it. In a matter of seconds every "A" Battery gun was firing continuous fire adjusted in on the bridge by Lt. Wood. Driver's, computers, noncoms, officers all were busy assisting the ammunition handlers in preparing and passing ammunition. All the ammunition in the battery was expended, more was borrowed from "B" Battery. Combat Command "A" raced for the bridge, tanks took up positions on the river bank opning direct fire. The 53rd Armored Infantry dismounted and charged across the bridge as Captain Temple, the 94th liaison officer, from a position on the river bank lifted fire at the last possiblesecond. The bridge was taken but it had been so weakened that it would not hold medium tanks. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 94th passed "A" Battery and went into position near Hainstadt. The building picked for the battalion command post proved to be a 2,000,000 dollar hospital dump guarded by 103 Krauts, armed medical personnel, who readily gave up. Earlier during the day while on the march and temporary positions, 87 prisoners had been taken which made 190 for the 94th that day. "A" Battery had also killed several in cleaning out their positions areas.
As darkness closed in, the 53rd was still expanding their bridgehead and mopping up resistance behind them. The Jerries were subjecting both sides of the river around the bridgehead to heavy artillery fire. Lt. Wood in his plane was having a field day. The railroad yards were full of trains with tanks and other military equipment. There were warehouses, Kraut personnel in the open and artillery batteries all of which he took under fire.
Lt. McGrew together with S/Sgt. Richard Lane and Pfc. Richard Daniels crossed with the 53rd and began methodically to adjust defensive fires as a precaution against counterattacks during the night. A few hours after dark, German infantry began infiltrating into the bridgehead. It became a house-to-house fight between individual soldiers. The 53rd ordered their men to withdraw towards the bridge so that they could reform their lines and counterattack. Vehicles were to be abandoned. Lt. McGrew and S/Sgt. Lane remaining by their vehicle, calmly called in over the radio the prepared defensive fires from their position on the machinegun swept streets. As the defensive barrages crashed into the town, the enemy wavered and later withdrew and the bridgehead was consolidated. For this action, Lt. McGrew and S/Sgt. Lane each were awarded the Silver Star for gallantry. Pfc. Francess Price of "B" Battery was wounded that night by machine gun bullets during the counterattack of the bridgehead and was evacuated.
The next day was largely defense of the bridgehead. Combat Command "B" had also secured a bridgehead the previous day at Aschaffenburg. In the afternoon, elements of the 26th Infantry Division began moving across through Combat Command "A"'s bridgehead to expand it. The 94th participated in the preparation for the 26th's attack. The area on the west of the Main, however, was not thoroughly mopped up, as five additional prisoners were picked up on the battalion perimeter.
As one looks back, it seems hardly possible that in a period of twelve days the XII Corps, spearheaded by the 4th Armored Division, had overcome the three main terrain obstacles to entering Central Germany, — the Moselle, Rhine and Main Rivers. The German armies facing the Seventh Army had been trapped and destroyed. There were now no further prepared lines that could hinder for long the American divisions from striking at will in any direction. The end was clearly in sight. All this was accomplished by perfect strategy of Third Army, by perfect coordination, efficiency and training of divisions, and by the guts and teamwork of every man who participated.
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