Saar
To most people, the word Saar means a valley of coal mines, industrial towns and beautiful scenery, but to those of the Fourth Armored Division who fought, lived and died there during the months of November and early December, it will always remain what it was, — a sea of mud that deepened daily with the addition of rain, sleet, fog and, later, snow. The roads were merely channel's in this sea along which the division advanced on a one-tank front. Every hamlet and group of farm buildings was a Stalingrad, and the motive force that made men push onward was a hope that perhaps over the next hill would be some shelter from the elements. Dry clothing, a hot shave, a sheltered place in which to sleep became things which men talked and dreamed about as they cut down trees to build platforms so that they would not have to stand ankle deep in the slimy, sticky terrain. This was the land of frostbite and trench foot, hopelessness, mud and death. This was the Saar.
The overall strategic policy of Supreme Headquarters was to continue the attack on all fronts during the late fall and winter and allow the Germans no let-up for reorganization. The Third Army's mission, was to take the Metz fortress and continue the advance to the Siegfried Line. The XXth Corps was to push to the north and frontally on Metz, while the XIIth Corps was to push east across the Deime ridge to the south of Metz, thus pinching off the German garrison. The plan of the XIIth Corps was to push through the prepared defenses of the German main line of resistance with three infantry divisions abreast; left to right, the Eightieth, the Thirty-Fifth and the Twenty-Sixth. The Sixth Armored Division was to exploit the attack in the 80th—35th sector, and the Fourth Armored in the 35th—26th sector. All artillery was to be massed in position to support the jumpoff. A platoon from each battalion was to be left in the old positions to fire harassing fires to conceal this movement. On the 31st of October, the Ninety-Fourth, less a platoon of "C" which stayed at Bathlemont, moved to participate in the D-day artillery preparation. The initial division plan was for Combat Command "B" to push through the Thirty-Fifth Division as far as possible and for Combat Command "A" to push on from there.
D-day dawned at 0600 on the eighth of November. The infantry moved forward generally along the front and CCB jumped off the following day. The attack failed to carry through as fast as was expected. The Thirty-Fifth Division did not get as far as planned and CCB became embroiled in a slugging match unable to get off the roads for the mud. Combat Command "A", now commanded by Colonel Abrams, was divided into two task forces: Hunter (37-53-66) and Oden-West (35-10-94). On the tenth of November, it was clear that the Twenty-Sixth Division was proceeding faster than CCB and the Thirty-Fifth Division. The plans were changed to pass CCA through the Twenty-Sixth with Task Force Hunter leading.
In the afternoon of the eleventh, the Ninety-Fourth moved through Chambrey, Chateau Salins and went into position east of Hampont. The area was shelled intermittently throughout the night and morning, wounding Private James Riegel and Technician Fifth Grade John E. Spurgin, of "C" Battery. The plans for the following day were for two companies of the Second Battalion, 104th Infantry Regiment, Twenty-Sixth Infantry Division, to clear Chateau-Voue as a jump-off point for Task Force West-Oden to move east on the ground west of Guebling, take Guebling and continue east to the Saar River.
At 0655 in the following morning, we fired a preparation for the 104th, as they cleared Chateau-Voue, and then a second preparation that covered the jump-off of the column. The leading tank and infantry companies made their objective on the high ground without resistance, but they proceeded so fast that they made a large gap in the column, which allowed three German tanks to move in and block effectively the road for the remainder. The rest of the day was lost in finding an alternate route to the objective, and the Ninety-Fourth went into position near the top of Hill 330, a mile east of Kutzeling Farm. The infantry and tanks took positions a few hundred yards to the front waiting for the 'next day to continue the fight at Guebling. This time we had given the Germans time to reorganize. The town of Guebling was situated on a ridge east of the ridge which we were occupying. The only approach to the town was along a road that turned down the western ridge, crossed a small valley over an unfordable stream and railroad embankment and up a slope into Guebling. The Germans considered they had an effective trap when they mined the stream-crossing and the railroad embankment and covered the approaches with hull-defiladed Panther tanks. The attack was launched under cover of direct fire from tanks lining the ridge, artillery fire on Guebling, and the Ninety-Fourth firing all of its smoke shell to blind the enemy ridge while West assaulted the town. The fight progressed slowly on a one-tank front and proved successful, though costly. Meanwhile, another task force under Major McKone of the Thirty-Fifth had proceeded north towards RodaFbe and had bee'n stopped short of the town. Lieutenant Guild, who was with this force, had his tank knocked out in the action and was awarded the Silver Star Medal for gallantry together with his gunner Corporal Charles E. Easter for evacuating wounded members of another tank crew while under fire. As darkness fell, West had Guebling but was hemmed in on three sides. There seemed little chance to move farther forward on this route except at great cost. That night in town the situation was tense. A German patrol slipped into town and bazookaed our forward observer tank, killing Lieutenant John E. Kelly and badly wounding Sergeant William G. Skyrmes, Corporal James C. Tiehl, Technician Fourth Grade Rufus H. Babb and Private Harold M. Smith. The town was under continuous artillery fire from several varied caliber guns and the weather was so wet and raw that one company that had bivouaced without shelter was largely depleted with colds, frostbite and trenchfoot.
The battalion in its position on Hill 330 was experiencing continuous harassing artillery fire, which wounded Staff Sergeant Kenneth R. Lewis of Headquarters Battery and Technician Fifth Grade Earl Kinder of "A". The continual rain, sleet, and snow made slit trenches impossible. The ground was already covered with several inches of water. A kind of platform constructed from ammunition boxes was erected by each section to raise them out of the water and then walls of mud-filled ammunition boxes were made to give some protection from shell fragments. On a check of the local defenses. Captain Franks and Technician Fifth Grade Kurt Wolf killed one German and captured another.
On the fourteenth, the decision was made to withdraw from Guebling. Our liaison officer, who had gone forward to obtain information, stopped off on an observation post and adjusted several missions on enemy mortars. While he stopped there, his driver, Private George L. Watson, was wounded by a shell fragment.
In Guebling, Lieutenant Guild had borrowed a tank and taken Lt Kelly's place. Unable to adjust artillery fire on enemy tanks (they were so close to our defenses) Lieutenant Elesworth B. Chamberlin, our infantry observer, earned the Silver Star Medal while acting alone beyond our outposts for personally reconnoitering enemy tank positions and informing our tanks so that they could take action. In the withdrawal, Lieutenant Guild's was the last vehicle to leave the town, adjusting smoke to cover the withdrawal and mounting on his tank the engineer squad that was left behind to blow the bridge over the stream. So ended the unfortunate action at Guebling. Executed a day earlier it might have been successful.
On the nineteenth of November under a new plan to support the Thirty-Seventh and the Tenth in a move on a more northeasterly route to Sarre-Union, we moved out and at 0800 hours were in a new position east of Conthil and prepared fires in the vicinity of Virming. Lieutenant Guild and his tank crew knocked out a Mark V tank. The battalion moved again through Rodalbe to a position slightly south of Bermering. The next day we fired smoke and high explosive to cover the attack on Frankeltroff which was taken later. Lt Chamberlin and Private James D. Poriotis were wounded. The half-track and peep of this reconnaissance section were both shot up. We moved to Virming on the twenty-first and fired TOT's on Insming and several other towns and artillery positions. Warrant Officer Charles E. Wathen, with his two T-5 recovery vehicles, pulled ten tanks and three half-tracks out of the mud from a forward position by Frankeltroff. He and his crews were commended by Colonel Abrams and later received the Bronze Star Medal for this action. As the situation seemed to indicate that we were on the threshhold of a breakthrough, the plans to move east on Sarre-Union were changed. The 'new plan was to have CCA follow CCB up the Dieuze-Mittersheim road and take Sarre-Union from the south, then move on Bitche.
The initial steps for this were taken on the twenty-third. We moved by battery from Virming, south to Dieuze, then to Vergaville. This was the first time in months that we did not occupy a firing position. Most of the battalion was housed in town; the kitchens were brought up for Thanksgiving dinner and some mail arrived. With the chance to put on dry clothing and shoes, morale was high.
The battalion moved about noon of the following day to the east and north of Mittersheim. We were now putting extension connectors on all M-7's; they gave three or four more inches of floatation to the vehicles. The country hereabout had been well prepared for defense, — trenches were well revetted and road blocks, blown bridges, barbed wire and mines were plentiful along the roads. We fired some interdiction fires near Diedendorf. The next day we fired for an attack by B/35, C/51 and C/10 on the town of Niederstinzel. We also registered from an advance position near Romelfing. On the twenty-sixth, we moved to Romelfing where CCA was assembling. Here we fired for attacks on Postroff and Eschwiller, supporting the Fifty-Third Infantry and the Thirty-Fifth Tank Battalions in CCB.
The situation at this time was that while the Fourth Armored had not been able to effect a breakthrough and exploit it, the Second French Armored Division in Seventh Army had, and was running wild toward the Saverne Gap. Our CCB had moved to Fenetrange on the Saar River, had crossed the Saar and was fighting north along the river toward Sarre-Union. The plan was for CCA to move to CCB's right, protect CCB's right flank and relieve some of the pressure. On the afternoon of the twenty-sixth, CCA marched to Drulingen and the Ninety-Fourth closed early the next morning about two miles south of this town. The CCA plan was to advance in two columns: Task Force West of the Tenth on the left and Task Force Oden of the Thirty-Fifth on the right. Oden was to launch his attack first and when he had made his objective, West was to follow. Oden ran into trouble with enemy armor and West, whom we supported, waited until afternoon to launch his attack on Gungwiller, which was the key to the ridge controlling Sarre-Union. When the attack was launched, in the afternoon, it was completely successful, but it was too late in the day to exploit the ridge, outflank Sarre-Union and pocket the troops facing CCB on our left. During the following day progress was slow. The battalion displaced to Wolsthoff, northwest of Gungwiller and due east of Sarre-Union, on the twenty-ninth of November, and continued to support the slow progress of the division to the north until it arrived at a line on a small stream by Domfes'sel. North of this stream stretched a ridge that passed through the Maginot Line and touched the Siegfried Line. Colonel Abrams, who was now back with the Thirty-Seventh Tank Battalion which had been in Division Reserve for several days, desired to exploit that ridge with a tank attack on what he expected to be firm ground for cross-country action and test the Maginot Line. Lt Colonel Parker, the Ninety-Fourth's commanding officer, had been warned by Colonel Graham that in case Abe's Thirty-Seventh was committed, he should support it. The two battalion commanders worked out planned, numbered concentrations for the attack, and the liaison officer, Captain Thomas E. Cooke, and the tank forward observers, Lieutenants Donald E. Guild, James L. Davis, and Amos S. Griffith, bivouaced in readiness at the Thirty-Seventh assembly area.
On a cold, rainy, overcast day, the fifth of December, the Thirty-Fifth Tank Battalion under Comb at Command "A" made the bridgehead and Abe received the order to 'go ahead. As the Thirty-Seventh crossed the bridge, the Ninety-Fourth followed, less "A" Battery which had gone into position near Rimsdorf to cover the initial phase of the attack and fire on Schmittwiller. In open formation the Thirty Seventh attacked up the ridge, bypassing Schmittwiller and continuing toward Singling. "A" Battery, from its position in Rimsdorf, covered the attack with W. P. smoke fired at extreme range on the left flank. The Battalion meanwhile went into position where the road "petered out" at Ste Madeleine Farme and fired the planned concentrations. The Thirty-Seventh, as it approached Singling which was situated in a saddle, came under heavy armor piercing fire. Twelve tanks were lost including our tank observer's. Lieutenant Griffith, Sergeant James R. Ritchey and Corporal Esmon S. Chappel miraculously escaped, but Technician Fourth Grade Oscar W. Britt and Private First Class Harmon W. Talley were killed. The attack halted for reinforcements and the arrival of infantry and additional artillery. Meanwhile, Lt. Colonel Parker, with his driver Technician Fifth Grade, Lyie Vick, and scout, Private James E. Mullins, had gone forward in his peep, following the trail of the tanks, searching for a position area, and also a hard-bottomed trail to carry the wheeled vehicles. As no fire was drawn from Schmittwilier, a suitable position area was found and, on back-tracking toward the Battalion, a trail was found. "A" Battery, which had been ordered forward from Rimsdorf, was led forward and went into positions east of Schmittwiller. While the other battery positions were being reconnoitered south of the town, Major Robert D. Franks, the executive officer, and Captain Ralph M. Click of "A" led an "A" Battery reconnaissance in force through the town, which had not been entered before, and continued to Mulhausen, the next town northwest. Schmittwiller was outposted by "Able" and the rest of the Battalion was brought forward. After the position was occupied, the Fifty-First Armored Infantry Battalion, which was sent forward to join the Thirty-Seventh, relieved us and outposted the town. That night much anxiety was felt as we were sitting on Combat Command "B"'s objective for the next day and we feared an American TOT. It took several radio messages to convince them we were correctly located.
On the sixth of December, the Twenty-Sixth Infantry Division helped consolidate the ground won by the Thirty-Seventh, who had taken Singling with heavy tank losses. Lieutenant Davis' tank was knocked out in this action. Lieutenant Davis was slightly wounded, Sergeant Donald L. Clarno was wounded and evacuated. Corporal David Rubinfeld was killed in action but the driver, Technician Fifth Grade William R. Fields, and assistant driver, Private First Class William H. Ford, were safe. In the attack, fire from our artillery forced the enemy to move north of Singling. Our armor proceeded into town covered by marching time fire placed directly over the leading tanks, thus forcing the enemy infantry into ditches and foxholes where they were captured by our infantry who had been riding the tanks. Service Battery took back three truck loads of prisoners acquired from various sources. We were now within two thousand yards of being able to fire into Germany proper and large forts of the Maginot Line were in view.
The Twelfth Armored Division began to take over parts of the line. Our artillery was to stay in position. We fired into Bining and Rohrback in support of D/37 and the 328th Infantry. The next day, 8 December, we aided the Twelfth Armored in it's attack on Bining and Rohrback, setting the barracks on fire. Captain Merriam and Mr. Wathen retrieved Lieutenant David's tank which was in an exposed position.
On the ninth of December, the relief of the Fourth Armored Division was completed and the Battalion moved to the rear to Languimberg, for much needed rest, relaxation, resupply and maintenance, the first relief for us in one hundred forty-six days of continuous combat. The small, partially deserted village of Languimberg gave the men of the 94th Armored Field Artillery Battalion the opportunity to forget.
The bitterness of the past melted away in the warm houses, hot meals, clean shaves, fresh clothes, steaming baths, uninterrupted sleep, radios, movies, passes, letter writting and regular working hours which this rural French village offered. It was a holiday, a real holiday, with nothing to worry or warn us of what was next to come. The Saar campaign had been one of disappointment, hardship and blood, but the morale, good spirits, and aggressiveness of the men were not impaired.
Major General John S. Wood, our great leader and division commander throughout training and combat, was succeeded by Major General Hugh Gaffey at the close of this campaign.
