THE GALLANT YEARS OF WORLD WAR II

[Up] [Chapter I] [Chapter II] [ChapterIV] [Chapter V] [Chapter VI] [Chapter VII]

Chapter III

The Gallant Years of World War II (1942-1945)

THE PHILIPPINE DEFENSE PLAN

Was the Army prepared for war? The question is now asked in hindsight. Fifty-six years ago, there was no time to answer. There was hardly even time to ask the question. As soon as Japanese bombers swooped down on Pearl Harbor and sank the Arizona and others from the US fleet on December 8, 1941, it took only a matter of hours and the assault on Philippine targets began. Prepared or not, the Filipino soldier had to fight.

But a full year before the war intruded into Philippine shores, the president of the Commonwealth had asked the question several times, and answered "no". It was a painful exercise that Manuel L Quezon had to go through once too many - having reposed his full confidence in General Douglas MacArthur in drafting and setting the defense plan in motion.

NEED FOR A DEFENSE PLAN

Quezon went against the political thought that prevailed from 1930 until the middle of the decade: faith in the strength of world organizations and international treaties renouncing war and in the United States for the defense of her colony in Southeast Asia. Developing the country’s defense capability was perceived then as more of an invitation to external aggression. Not so for Quezon, then the Senate President and the man most likely to win the Presidency of the Commonwealth. He believed that neutrality cannot be a realistic answer to the security needs of the Philippines, at least at that time. An adequate national defense plan was needed. Thus, his consultations with MacArthur in the spring of 1934, capped by an invitation to serve as military adviser of the future Commonwealth president.

Five years later, Quezon would begin having serious doubts about the defense plan designed by the military adviser of his choice.

SETTING THE FRAMEWORK

"I know that the Islands can be protected, provided of course you have the money which will be required," MacArthur told Quezon in 1934. Quezon had asked him if he thinks the Philippines can be defended 10 years after independence from US rule. At that time, the general estimated that an additional P10-M will be needed on top of the current P6-M budget of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) or a total of P16-M a year to finance an army suitable for the Philippines. "If you have a small, regular force as a nucleus to be expanded by employing the citizen army in time of peril, no nation will care to attack you for the cost of conquest will be more than the expected profits."

MacArthur expressed willingness then to return to the Philippines and develop the army he had in mind. His term as chief of staff was to end October, 1935. By then, the Commonwealth presidential elections would have been over and it was already certain that Quezon would win it.

Under the direction of General MacArthur, initial planning began in Washington D.C. on November, 1934. West Point classmates Major Dwight Eisenhower and Major James Ord drafted the basics and detailed out the plan. Eisenhower was then a member of MacArthur’s staff while Ord was connected with the Army War College, knowledgeable in a wide range of military matters.

Both were aware of the strict budgetary constraints. They developed a blueprint for national defense "based on achieving maximum possible strength, considering local population, geographic and climatic conditions."

The plans were revised twice to keep the budget within the P16-M per annum promised by MacArthur to Quezon - which meant cutting down training periods, reducing pay and allowances, trimming down the regular forces, spreading out the acquisition of equipment and achievement of full preparedness over 20 years, instead of the 10-year period of the Commonwealth.

Soon after Quezon was elected president of the Commonwealth, he formally requested US President Franklin D. Roosevelt to detail MacArthur to the Philippines as military adviser.

As Chief of the US Military Mission, MacArthur was to plan and organize the defense system of the Philippines.

In 1935, the urgency of developing the Philippine defense plan became even more pronounced.. Prominent citizens, representatives of the academe included, sounded off the warning signals - citing among others the operations of Japanese spies and reports of arms coming from Japan to support the Sakdals’ uprising. Japan, it seemed, had gone beyond just being the potential security threat sensed by the US when it became a naval power shortly after the turn of the century. The threat was real - a dark cloud that hovered over the Philippines and the rest of the Pacific.

On December 21, 1935, the National Assembly passed the country’s National Defense Act - also known as Commonwealth Act No. 1, being the first piece of legislation approved under the Commonwealth government. It was, of course, the national defense plan drafted by MacArthur and his staff, endorsed by Quezon during the inaugural session of the Assembly. The plan provides, among others: for the establishment of a small regular force, based on the PC, and a large reserve force - the framework for the organization of the Philippine Army that it is the duty of every citizen to defend the state, thereby making registration and training obligatory for 20-year old Filipino males gradual build-up of strength division of the Philippines into five military districts defense of every populated island through the establishment of training camps all over the country - providing forces of trained men throughout the archipelago and developing a sense of defending home and family.

Strategically, it provided for defense at the beaches by infantry, supported by machine guns and artillery; emphasis on smaller units and mobility to allow for divisions to be moved quickly to support divisions under attack; and air corps and offshore patrol to provide early warning and attempt to break up landing forces.

The key tactical concept of the defense plan was the denial of any part of the Philippines to any possible foreign intruder. However, MacArthur ruled out the development of naval forces as impractical. The absence of a naval organization, Quezon had explained to the Assembly, "underlines the defensive character of the plan", aside from the reality of the "need for current and future economy."

The overall plan and objective of General MacArthur in building the Philippine Army can be summed up in his report to President Quezon six months after he took over the job as Military Adviser; "By 1946, I will make of the islands a Pacific Switzerland that would cost any enemy 1,500,000 men, three years, and more than $15,000,000,000 to conquer."

THE THREAT OF WAR

The specter of war loomed over the Pacific basin a decade or so before its savagery unfolded before the eyes of tens of thousands of Filipinos.

It all began, ironically, against a backdrop of serenity that images of Japan convey - clusters of red and pink blossoms lined with golden streaks of sunlight, trees and verdant fields blending with the blue horizon. Amid the splendor and quietude of this panorama of nature, the plan that ravaged countless lives in a number of Asian territories was conceived. In 1928, the Tanaka Memorial was published. It was Japan’s "Monroe Doctrine" for Asia. When World War II broke out in the Pacific, the Tanaka Memorial became the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Program. By 1931, following the "China Incident" where Japanese and Chinese forces clashed, Japan’s military leaders embarked on their conquest of Asia by occupying Manchuria. Its rich mineral resources were "just rewards for the victors" but not the coveted trophy. Manchuria was the first step to the major objective: China.

In mid-1937, Japan invaded North China. In less than a year, the invaders had overrun a large area of the country - seizing all its eastern seaports. Japan realized however that further military action to take the whole of China would strain her national economy. By the end of 1938, the military offensive was suspended. Instead, Japan resorted to a policy of "economic strangulation." China must be reduced to submission.

The strategy was to cut off supply lines to China.

War Breaks Out in Europe

On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Within three days, Britain and France were in the fight against Germany. The Poles fought valiantly but German tanks crushed their men and horses.

Brute force against raw courage. Quezon saw it all too clearly - "it was military strength that mattered: treaties and the balance of power were no guarantees that sovereignty would be respected." The probability of the Polish experience happening in an Asian setting was high. The continuing assault on China, reports of repeated intrusions of Japanese fishing boats in Philippine waters, warnings from respected political and religious leaders on the existence of the so-called Fifth Column of the Japanese army and the involvement of prominent Filipinos, more reports on Japanese espionage activities.

Reassessment of the defense plans became even more urgent.

Not for MacArthur. In a press statement issued June 27, MacArthur assessed the world situation and his own defense plans. Basically, the statement showed that Quezon’s estranged military adviser viewed the situation from only one angle: that "Japan did not covet the Philippines and that his plan was sufficient to deter any form of aggression."

"It has been assumed, in my opinion erroneously, that Japan covets these Islands. Just why has never been satisfactorily explained... No rational reason exists why Japan or any other nation should covet the sovereignty of this country," MacArthur’s statement read.

Shifting to his defense plan, MacArthur expressed confidence that the Philippines could raise enough men to meet the maximum strength of any potential adversary. "It would cost the enemy... at least a half million of men as casualties and upwards of $5-B in money to pursue such an adventure (as the conquest of the Philippines)."

In addition, MacArthur said, the US and other countries would not just sit idly by. For him, the balance of power in the Far East is an insurance of the Philippines’ independence.

THE JAPANESE WAR PLAN

Japan saw in Hitler’s Germany the future master of the world. To strengthen her position in the Far East, Japan aligned herself with the German-led Axis powers in September, 1940. The fall of France further strengthened Germany’s claim to military supremacy and pushed the war closer to the doorsteps of the Philippines, being an ally of the US in the region that Japan wants to dominate.

Meanwhile, the collapse of the Konoge cabinet and the succession to power of the cabinet of "warlords" led by General Hidaki Tojo sent ominous signals.

Tension between the US and Japan escalated in July, 1941. Japanese aggression in China continued unabated as Imperial forces built up in Taiwan, preparatory to another stage of their Asian conquest. On July 22, Japan occupied naval and air bases in southeast Indochina, prompting the US State Department to declare a total embargo on scrap iron and oil shipments to Japan, and to freeze all Japanese assets in the United States and the Philippines.

Allied countries, Great Britain and the Netherlands, joined the US in imposing the trade embargo, putting Japan in a precarious situation with her dire need for war material, especially oil.

At about this time, Japan announced the "Tanaka Memorial" - a grand plan that provided, among others, for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was the ultimate objective of the Japanese imperial government. And it can only be achieved after crushing all the Allied powers with interests at stake in the Far East.

The main target : the much needed oil resources of Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies.

To achieve their objective, the Japanese forces should first insure their line of communications with the mainland. Thus, the need to seize several strategic areas essential to the establishment of a defense perimeter for the target areas and their own country.

The "Central Plan of Operations in the Southern Area", the overall war plan, called for the advance of the Southern Group of Armies in two major columns, one passing through the Philippines and the other through the Malay Peninsula. These columns will then converge on the Netherlands East Indies.

Long before the outbreak of World War II, Japanese military planners have recognized the immense strategic value of the Philippines to any power aspiring to gain control of the Far East and the Western Pacific. Japanese occupation of the islands was necessary for a number of reasons.

First, it will serve as jumping board for their advance to their final objective. At the same time, other belligerent powers that may want to block their moves will be denied use of the country as base of operations. Japan could establish naval and air bases in the Islands from which its forces could operate to protect their lines of communication to the rich southern area.

With the probability of the United States defending the Philippines, Japan saw an opportunity to destroy the American forces in a battle to be fought in the Islands. A decisive victory in the Philippines might put the United States out of the war in the Far East.

The country’s rich natural resources can be a valuable source of some of their much needed war material.

To prepare for an eventual operation in the Philippines, the Imperial General Staff gave priority to intelligence work in the country and building up the force necessary to overcome any resistance to their offensives.

Japan knew that the execution of such a plan will inevitably lead to a clash with the Allied powers.

Towards the latter part of 1941, the possibility of a direct confrontation with the US was no longer a question for Japan. It was a matter of decision.

THE PHILIPPINE ARMY BEFORE THE WAR

At the time that the Philippines was in the course of developing her own army, countries in Europe were actively engaged in war and events in the Far East were moving fast towards an armed conflict between Japan and the United States.

Both Quezon and MacArthur realized the possibility of the Philippines getting involved in the war. However, building up the defense system was slow. The Commonwealth, because of its financial status, was incapable of contributing materially to her own defense. In Washington, a feeling of pacifism and isolationism prevailed - making the US Congress lukewarm and undecided on appropriations needed by MacArthur in fortifying the United States’ own bastion in the Far East.

In the National Assembly, Jose Yulo said the US Congress virtually declared "American isolationism" and urged that "the Philippines ... prepare its own defense and do it quick."

The Philippine Army, like any new organization, had to undergo "birthpains." One major problem it had was basic: its dual character. The Army had to undergo military training for the defense of the country against foreign aggression and simultaneously, maintain the PC Division, stationed throughout the country, for peace and order functions.

To enable the PA to focus on its national defense functions, the law and order duties of the Army were eventually transferred to the newly created state police. The Constabulary Division continued in its peace-keeping functions.

In a memorandum to President Quezon, the general staff noted that the successful defense of the Philippines required a combination of land and sea defenses, with the land defense set-up requiring 300,000 trained men ready for call by 1946 constituting 30 divisions nationwide or three divisions per military district. The state of the Army at that time indicated the frailty of the country’s defense system.

	Actual organization of the reserve divisions was not balanced. The organization and build-up had been based on the availability of weapons rather than the requirements of accomplishing the mission.
	There was acute shortage of weapons and no provision for procurement of armament for the reserve divisions. Arms being used for training were borrowed from the US Army. It was expected that most of these weapons would eventually be donated to the PA but by 1946, they shall be obsolete and insufficient.
	Quality of training was limited - there being no special service schools to develop proficiency in various fields of specialization.
	The naval aspect of the defense plan was "woefully inadequate." The general staff noted "too much reliance … on the adoption of a foreign policy in the Far East by the United States consisting of a naval base in the Philippines."
	There was no Regular Force to speak of. In the First Regular Division, the strength of officers and non-commissioned officers was below authorized levels.
	Under the training system then in force, reservists from the less educated groups forget what they have learned soon after their training ends."

In Quezon’s mind, given these conditions, the Philippines could not be defended against the emerging Asian military power that is Japan. He had realized inadequacies in the defense plan authored by General MacArthur - his doubts validated by the central general staff. He directed them to take the necessary steps. Radical changes have to be made in the army organization and the defense plan, albeit secretly - without MacArthur.

In a secret meeting with his Cabinet, Quezon said that developments in the European war had convinced him of the futility of spending more money to sustain the program of defending the country from foreign aggression. He felt it would be better to cut the army’s expenses and use the savings for public schools.

THE USAFFE

From August to November, officers and men responding to the call of duty swarmed mobilization centers of the 10 military districts. Images of men in combat fatigues rushing to mount the defenses of their country flipped as rapidly as a deck of cards in the hands of an expert dealer. Time was running out. Surely there were those who came because they could not find a way to escape from this obligation. But there were more who knew that it was not just one of those orders. It was a call to arms. War was imminent. There were only two options for them: to live or to die. Still, they came.

Most, if not all of the names you will read here are already etched in the hearts of a grateful nation and the history of their struggle for freedom and democracy. There must be thousands more whose names are unknown to us. To all of them, generations of Filipinos owe their liberty and this glorious life of peace and dignity.

ORGANIZING REGIONAL DEFENSE

As the Japanese Imperial Army implemented the preliminary stages of their war plan in the Far East, the US War Department created a new command: the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). On July 26, 1941, General MacArthur was recalled to active duty and appointed by the President of the United States as Commanding General of the USAFFE with the rank of lieutenant general.

Invoking the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Law, President Roosevelt also called to active service the organized military forces of the Philippine Commonwealth. Filipino and American forces were placed under the USAFFE umbrella.

The USAFFE organization consisted of the Philippine Department, Regular Army (US); the Philippine Division, Regular Army (composed of the Philippine Scouts regiments and the American 31st Infantry); and the Philippine Army reserve divisions.

At the outbreak of the war, the Philippine Constabulary and the rest of the regular force of the Philippine Army, including HPA, were absorbed into the USAFFE. Altogether, the force available for the defense of the Philippines totaled around 110,000 troops of which 85,000 were deployed in Luzon.

As soon as General MacArthur assumed the USAFFE command, he lost no time in organizing his staff and mobilizing the Philippine Army reserve units which would comprise the major part of his force. Equipment for the troops were provided and training conducted as soon as they were mobilized.

With his staff in the Military Adviser’s Office as the nucleus, he organized the USAFFE staff, independent of the Philippine Department Headquarters staff. Having taken over the command of the Philippine Department, he delineated staff responsibilities. Formulation of plans and policies was assigned to the USAFFE staff while operational and logistical functions were given to the Philippine Department staff.

Upon moving to Bataan, however, he transformed the Philippine Department staff into a Service Command staff - adding to its service functions the responsibility of beach defense in the southern portion of Bataan.

Meanwhile, President Quezon set aside whatever misgivings he had over the defense system prepared by MacArthur and pledged the Commonwealth’s full support for the general and the new command. Rightfully so, Quezon knew it was no time for gripes. It was time to work together to defend the country.

CALL TO DUTY

Filipino reservists were alerted by the Philippine Army Chief of Staff within the first month of operation of the USAFFE command.

On August 3, the full complements of the 10 infantry regiments, one from each Military District, were ordered to report to their respective mobilization centers.

The 42d Infantry Regiment, 41st Division, composed of the ten regiments was activated in its mobilization center at Tres Cruces, Cavite. With Lieutenant Colonel Claro B. Lizardo in command, the regiment was inducted into the USAFFE on September 1 by Captain Gaylord Frazer, US Army.

The 41^st, together with the 11^th, 21^st, 31^st, 51^st, 61^st, 71^st and 101^st Divisions, comprised the Luzon-based commands which played a major role in the defense of Bataan.

On August 28, the officers and key personnel of the other regiments and the supporting units of the 10 reserve divisions were called to active duty. The 41st Engineer Battalion was mobilized in Camp Murphy with Captain Rigoberto Atienza as battalion commander.

Lt. Col. Silvino Gallardo took command of the 41st Infantry Regiment upon its mobilization at Lipa, Batangas on August 28.

On November 17, Brigadier General Vicente Lim arrived at Tagaytay City, cantonment area of the 41st Division and immediately announced his assumption of command. He directed the activation of the division headquarters and the service and support units: Headquarters Company Service Troops; 41st Motor Transport Company; 41st Quartermaster Service Company; and the 41st Ordnance Company.

These units were inducted into the USAFFE on November 17 while the 41st Signal Company was inducted on December 1.

Unlike the other regiments, the 43rd Infantry was mobilized at three different places. The Regimental Headquarters and the 2d Battalion were mobilized at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro on August 28. Key officers and men of the 1st Battalion received their reservists-personnel who reported for mobilization at Palico, Batangas. The 3d Battalion was mobilized at Canlubang, Laguna.

A few days later, the 41st Field Artillery Regiment trooped to the same center in response to the mobilization call.

Immediately upon their mobilization, the 41st Medical Battalion underwent refresher courses at the Medical Training cadre at Fort McKinley from September 1 to November 30 and proceeded to Camp Murphy where the bulk of the personnel were being mobilized.

The main bulk of the 41st Division hailed from the provinces of Rizal, Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, Palawan, Mindoro and from the City of Manila. Most of them were reservists of the Philippine Army - having undergone the 5 ½ month training in 1937.

In compliance with the Division orders, the different units began arriving in Tagaytay. On November 22, the 41st Field Artily Regiment moved in from Canlubang where it had been receiving its reservists while guns, accessories and fire control equipment were received on December 8.

The key personnel of the 41st Medical Battalion joined the Division on December 2 and immediately upon arrival in Tagaytay, organized and trained the rest of the men of the battalion.

A flurry of construction activities marked the succeeding weeks as the 41st Engineer Battalion worked on beach defense preparations, bridges and roads. Water and electrical services were installed in the buildings at the Tagaytay cantonment area.

The 42d Infantry Regiment reported to Tagaytay city on November 1. In anticipation of hostilities, the Regiment was ordered to the beaches of Nasugbu, Batangas where the men went on training and exercises.

Meanwhile, the 41st Infantry was still in the process of organization. As its personnel reported for duty, the different elements and service units were organized and simultaneously, training was conducted.

Among the units of the Division, the 43d Infantry was the last to be organized and had to be left behind in Tagaytay to continue training and organization while the 41st Division was deployed to the shorelines of Batangas at the outbreak of hostilities.

Four months later, USAFFE line troops already consisted of:

10 infantry divisions

five (5) coastal artillery units

two (2) field artillery regiments

a cavalry regiment equipped with horses and scout cars

elite troops : the Scouts - highly trained members of the cavalry and the artillery regiments - and the 45th Battalion

In the next four years, Filipino soldiers would march and fight side by side with American troops under the USAFFE banner. But that’s where the union ends. Filipinos were called to the service but not as an official part of the United States Armed Forces. Thus, the difference in pay scales, the difference in uniforms.

Nonetheless, our men fought as if it was a war of their own making. After all, it was the freedom and dignity of their country at stake.

Unfazed by the acute shortage of provisions, many Filipino soldiers took it upon themselves to find ways and means to mount a potent defense against the enemy. Capt. Eugenio Lara took charge of volunteers who signed up at the Far Eastern University. The story of his unit is a classic example of the state of the Philippine Army during the war and the difference between American and Filipino troops fighting under the USAFFE.

Weapons have ran out. Lara was told to equip his own unit. Resourceful and driven by a sense of urgency, he went to Nichols Air Field and dismantled .50 caliber machine guns from abandoned planes destroyed by bombing raids in the first few days of the war. Somewhere in Manila, he chanced upon an old French artillery piece - a 37 mm anti-tank cannon of World War I vintage that was still functional. This museum piece gave Lara’s unit its name: Company A, 2^nd Anti-Tank Battalion, 2^nd Regular Division, USAFFE. At the Ateneo de Manila armory, he found Enfield rifles - the kind used by the Americans in the Mindanao pacification campaign.

As Lara went around scouting for weapons, he came upon soldiers left behind by their units. He took them into his group.

Lara’s unit was deployed to Tagaytay. Having no communications equipment, they did not know that orders have been given to retreat to Bataan. They learned of the directive only from soldiers in a military truck who shouted "To Bataan!"

The next thing that his men saw was their company commander commandeering a bus at gun point. Another member of the unit did the same thing. A mad scramble for the buses followed. Soon, Lara put order back among his troops and off to Bataan - to the real war - they went.

WAR PLAN ORANGE III

As early as 1904, the United States sensed the potential threat Japan posed to the security of her colony in Southeast Asia. Japan had become a naval power then and its aggressive policies spoke eloquently of even higher ambitions.

The Joint Committee of the US Navy and Army evolved a defense strategy for the Philippine Islands. The plan involved the use of the US occupation forces at Fort McKinley, Corregidor, Fort Stotsenberg and the Philippine Constabulary to hold Manila Bay for as long they could until reinforcements came from Hawaii. This was "War Plan Orange."

Finally, the US decides

The decision was made at the 11^th hour.

Even as the Japanese threat hovered over the Philippines like a pendulum hanging from a gutted shoestring, its defense was not in the United States’ priority list. No matter the protestations of Commonwealth leaders and prominent Americans sympathetic to their Filipino allies, Washington stood firm, albeit silent on its decision. Europe first before Asia. War Plan Rainbow 5 was in effect.

Since mid-1939, the War Plans Division had recommended clarification of the US military policy regarding the Philippines, identifying three possible lines of action: to maintain the status quo; withdraw all forces from the Philippines and set the US defense line along the 180th meridian; or "maintain a dominant position in the Western Pacific and be prepared to enforce our policies."

The War Plans Division recommended withdrawal to the 180th meridian. It was considered the better option of the three, even if it "may be in direct opposition to national policy."

The first option - maintaining the status quo - would have no effect on the trend of events since the US forces in the Philippines were too weak. The third option - while seen as consistent with US pollicy - was subject to availability of funds, men, materiel and time.

In October, 1940, word came in from Washington that the US has apparently decided to defend the Philippines as fully as any other state of the Union. A semblance of military build-up followed.

Ten light bombers bound for Thailand were held in Manila. On November 1, the army transport Grant brought 108 officers to Manila. Among them were Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright and Brig Gen. Edward P. King, Jr.

The USS Houston relieved the Augusta, flagship of the Asiatic Fleet for seven years. The transport Washington arrived later that month with 177 US Army aviators. On December 5, the Seventh Pursuit Squadron arrived from Michigan, with word that the 20th Pursuit Squadron was to follow shortly. In mid-December, the navy in Cavite received 12 PBYs, bringing up to 26 the total number of patrol bombers in the country.

The Philippine Department under Major General George J. Grunert began revising the war plans for the Philippines. Earlier revisions of War Plan Orange called for "the withdrawal of US military forces to Bataan and the island forts guarding the mouth of Manila Bay" due to strength limitations.

However, with 12 reserve divisions from the PA, allowance could be made for changes. Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the PA could be called to service with the US and studies on a joint US-Philippine defense within the missions of the Orange Plan were conducted.

Grunert evaluated the PA reserves as "capable only of defensive operations involving little or no maneuver, and then only in units not larger than a battalion when closely supervised by experienced officers of the United States Army." He intended to use Philippine Army elements in defense operations. Grunert recommended that the War Department send 500 American officers to the Philippines and requested for authority to mobilize the PA. Grunert’s plans covered only Luzon but he recommended that the plans be expanded, depending on men and materiel, to cover the entire country.

The War Department considered Grunert’s proposals. In October, drafts of an executive order and proclamation of emergency were written by the secretaries of war and of the navy "for possible emergency use." However, the War Plans Division decided against calling the PA to US service for diplomatic, financial, strategic and practical reasons, to wit:

	possible strain on diplomatic relations with Japan
	no cost estimates have been prepared
	the War Plans Division was against any action that may commit the US to war in two oceans
	the US Army could not spare ammunitions or regular officers

Garment and equipment could be made available on a limited basis. In response to the request for 500 qualified officers, the War Department could only send 75 reserve officers.

The 1940 Revision

It was not until April, 1941 that the 1940 revision of War Plan Orange was issued. The plan considered a war exclusively between Japan and the US. Apparently, the objective of a major Japanese attack against the Philippines would be to deny the US a base. It will be a surprise attack - with less than 48 hours warning - to be done by combined naval, air and amphibious operations involving around 100,000 men.

For the first time, the US considered using the Philippine Army units in the US Army defense plan.

Under WPO-3, the primary mission of the combined US and Philippine Army forces was to prevent enemy landings. If the landings are not prevented, the defense objective is to defeat the landed enemy. Failing that, they were to hold the entrance to Manila Bay. Units were allotted to defense sectors. Possible defense points were identified. Drafts of proclamations and executive orders to be issued by the president of the Commonwealth were included, providing for mobilization of the Philippine Army for US service.

The Philippine Department, after evaluating the Philippine Army and the character of the Filipino soldier - both in the Scouts and in the PA - recommended immediate mobilization.

The Department’s evaluation was a salute to the Filipino soldier: "The military capacity of the individual Filipino soldier in the Regular Army of the United States is satisfactory. He is well equipped and well trained. On his own soil and under American leadership, he is believed to be capable of rendering effective combat service against any foreign invader. The soldiers of the Commonwealth Government will be young, partially trained, and if called into our service, will come to us equipped for service in their particular arm."

For War Plan Orange to succeed, two factors are considered vital: sufficient time for mobilization, training and stockpiling of supplies and equipment the role of the US Navy in the immediate relief of the Philippines.

The Philippine Department believed it was time to mobilize. Intelligence estimates in late April assessed that the morale of the command was high "in spite of the fact that every officer knows that no assistance can be expected from the Philippine Army for many weeks after its mobilization."

Col. J. T. H. O’Rear recommended immediate mobilization of five PA divisions. "This office concurs... that M-Day is past," he wrote.

There was one vital flow in the plan - it was dependent on US support. With the Japanese in control of the sea lanes and the skies, the fate of the Philippines was sealed. Quezon’s classic emotional outbursts: "Que Demonio! Americans helping a distant cousin (i.e. Europe) while her daughter (the Philippines) is being raped in the backdoor!"

THE JAPANESE INVASION

"Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." The radio message was brief, received at the US Navy Headquarters in Manila at about 2:30 in the morning of December 8, 1941. . In a matter of hours, the war would reach Philippine shores.

The Air Attacks

Records from the Philippine Department show that US Army intelligence placed the strength of the Japanese invasion forces at 100,000 men. Their immediate target would be the harbor defenses of Manila Bay. They would capitalize on surprise - moving before or as soon as war is declared. December and January were estimated to be the months most favored for land operations, based on climatic considerations alone.

The Japanese objectives would be to suppress naval and air forces, strategically occupy the country and deny the US a naval base in the Philippines. Japanese air and naval forces would then move to "cripple or contain" the Asiatic Fleet. Simultaneous major landings in various areas of the country would follow.

The intelligence analysis notwithstanding, the enemy took the Pacific force by surprise, as planned.

On December 1, 1941, in Formosa, General Homma, commander of the Japanese XIV Army, received final instructions from the Southern Army Headquarters: operations would be launched in the morning of December 8 (Tokyo time) - an air attack on the US fleet at Pearl Harbor and immediately thereafter, air forces would begin the assault on the Philippines simultaneously with the offensive against Malaya. The Japanese Navy’s III Fleet under Admiral Takahashi formed special task forces consisting of transport and amphibious units backed up by cruisers and destroyers - with a close cover force of three cruisers supporting the main landings.

As the first few days of war in the Philippines would show, the Japanese strategy was to destroy air and naval power at the onset, in a bid to deny the US a base in the country.

On the eve of the target date, it appeared the odds were against the mission. Japan’s V Air Group in Formosa was ready - its experienced and highly skilled aircrews, with their Betty bombers and Zero fighters, poised to attack. But a heavy fog clouded the airfields by midnight, aborting the take-offs scheduled at dawn. The Japanese commanders were apprehensive. News of the air raid on Pearl Harbor may reach the Americans in Luzon fast enough to enable them to deploy the Far East Air Force’s B-17s for an assault on the Japanese planes lined up in Formosan airfields.

Nonetheless, the offensive had to be launched.

The Pacific War: Day 1

A radio message was tapped out of Hawaii at 0800H - their time: "Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." It was 0230H in Manila. A Marine officer at the US Navy Headquarters received the message and passed it on to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Asiatic fleet.

General MacArthur monitored news of the attack from a commercial broadcast shortly before four in the morning. He ordered the troops to battle stations.

In Clark Field, General Lewis M. Brereton, being the commander of the Far East Air Force, was described as "the man most able to do something about an outbreak of war." But he too, only heard the news from a commercial broadcast. It was 0500 hours before he could reach MacArthur’s office to seek permission to attack Formosa.

Word reached the Clark operations office at 0800H that Japanese planes were approaching. Having been forewarned by a Washington-based colleague "not to be caught with his aircraft grounded and suffer the same fate as the anchored ships in Pearl Harbor", Brereton dispatched his heavy bombers - without bombs - on patrol.

Eighteen P-40s of the 30th Pursuit Squadron based in Clark and 18 P-40s of the 17th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Air Field were dispatched to intercept the enemy planes. Brereton ordered a fighter cover over Clark and Nichols. At that time, a total of 54 US aircraft hovered over parts of Luzon, while 36 were in reserve.

No sooner had Brereton received the final count of aircrafts, 25 Japanese army bombers swarmed over Northern Luzon and immediately bombarded barracks and other installations at Tuguegarao and Baguio.

In Formosa, the fog dispersed further, allowing the naval aircraft of the Japanese XI Air Fleet to take off.

Over at Clark Air Field, two squadrons of B-17s received orders to attack airfields at Southern Formosa as soon as visibility permits. The patrolling bombers were flown back to Clark to bomb-up and refuel. Lined up on the runway, with their tanks full of fuel, the US bombers and fighters became perfect strafing targets for the 108 bombers and 84 fighters of Japan’s V Air Group.

"While anti-aircraft shells exploded 2,000 to 4,000 feet below them, two flights of 27 bombers accurately hit aircraft, hangars, barracks and warehouses, starting fires that spread to the trees and the cogon grass around the field. The place became a mass of flame, smoke and destruction, and for more than an hour, the Zero fighters sprayed the grounded B-17s and P-40s with bullets."

Farther north, in Zambales province, another US installation virtually burst into flames. Barracks, warehouses and the radar at the Iba Field fighter base were easy targets for another group of 54 Betty bombers escorted by 50 Zero fighters. "Zero pilots (spotted) P-40s of the US 3rd Pursuit Squadron circling to land at Iba: all but two were shot down."

In those first few hours of war in the Philippines, "the US Far East Air Force ceased to be a serious threat to the invaders." The Japanese lost seven Zeros - almost a speck compared to the Americans’ loss - 17 B-17s, 56 fighters and 30 various aircraft destroyed; important installations "blasted or burned and 230 men killed or wounded."

In the days that followed, the Japanese invaders repeatedly bombarded air and naval stations in Luzon. Nielson and Nichols airfields. the 16th naval base in Cavite and Sangley Point; Clark Field in Pampanga and other major installations were virtually "bombed out of existence." It was a disaster to the US Navy and the USAFFE Air Force. Admiral Thomas Hart, commander of the US Asiatic Fleet, was forced to withdraw the fleet from the Philippines and proceeded to Dutch East Indies.

As planned, the air attacks shattered the USAFFE’s air and naval capability, diverting attention to the devastation and its impact on the American defense strategy in the Philippines as Japanese advance forces landed at various points in Luzon.

On December 12, 1941, over 100 Japanese bombers and fighters attacked whatever suitable target there was in Luzon without fear of retaliation. By this time, the Americans had less than 30 serviceable aircraft. Seven PBYs were cased and shot down as they returned from patrol. The following day, the raiders numbered almost 200.

Two days later, Admiral Hart sent the remaining PBYs south for sanctuary. Intact B-17s were also sent to Darwin, northern Australia - some 1500 miles away.

By this time, the US Far East Air Force has "ceased to exist as a fighting force." The army had no more air cover. The navy had no choice but to depend mainly on submarines in protecting thousands of miles of beaches against "hostile landings."

But the landings had already begun in the northern coast of Luzon.

ADVANCED LANDINGS

A day before the assault on Pearl Harbor, three Japanese task forces sailed south from Formosa. Their destination: the Philippines. Two task forces were to land in northern Luzon while the third headed for a small island in Batanes.

From December 8 to 22, the Japanese made six advance landings - in Batan island, halfway across the strait between Luzon and Formosa; at Aparri and Vigan, both along the northern coast of Luzon; at Legaspi, near the southern tip of Luzon; at two points in Mindanao: Davao and Jolo, an island that lies between Mindanao and Borneo. Their mission: to provide advance bases from which short range fighter planes could take off to support the landing operations of the main invasion forces.These moves were a "calculated risk, for only relatively small units - the largest was a regiment - were used" to make the advanced landings.

December 8, 1941

At daybreak, a Japanese task force of 490 vessels and air force personnel - part of three task forces that sailed south from Formosa ports - landed on Batan Island in Batanes, midway between Formosa and Luzon. The landing was timed with the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

The 71^st Division was fielded to the right of the 11^th Division covering Damortis to Baler. To the troops in Lingayen beaches, the initial directive was to defend their position to the end - without withdrawal.

December 10, 1941

Two task forces of the 14th Army of the Japanese Imperial Army - each with 2,000 men - landed at Vigan, Ilocos Sur and Aparri and Gonzaga in Cagayan.

The Tanaka Detachment consisted of the Regimental Headquarters of the 2d Formosa Infantry Regiment, the 2d Battalion and half of the 1st Battalion. Their mission was to secure the town. Only two companies were able to land successfully at Aparri. Strong winds and rough seas forced the convoy commander to land the rest of his troops near Camp Engano in Gonzaga, Cagayan. Both landings met no opposition.

The Kanno Detachment had to grapple with inclement weather as the troops landed at Barrio Pandan in Vigan before dawn of December 10. Before the Kanno Detachment could land all its personnel, four officers and 50 men of the Ilocos Sur PC Command under Major Sergio Laurente were deployed. They put up a stubborn defense and, although outnumbered, held their ground for more than 12 hours.Army historian Colonel Ambrosio Peña recalled the valiant defense put up by Laurente and his men:

"It was about 3 in the morning when 200 Japanese troops reached the PC positions. The Constabulary men fired at the enemy as soon as the advancing troops came within firing range. The Japanese attempted an enveloping movement. The Constabulary men held on to their battle positions and prevented the enemy from identifying accurately the blanks of the constabulary. The enemy withdrew to their beachhead, bringing all their casualties.

"By that time, Major Laurente had only two officers and 18 men left. The best he could do under the circumstances was to order his men to hold their positions and fight back should the enemy resume their attacks.

"After dawn, the enemy resumed their landings on the north side of the mouth of Abra River, south of Barrio Mindoro. US air force planes attacked the Japanese transports, as in Aparri,. It was futile. The landing continued.

"At about 10 in the morning, the Japanese attacked the Constabulary positions again. Though outnumbered, the defenders fought stubbornly. They temporarily held back the enemy. However, it did not take long before the invaders completely overpowered the small PC detachment. They were already short of ammunition, overtaken by physical exhaustion. At about 2:30 in the afternoon, the Constabulary men fired their last shot. They were surrounded and taken by the enemy as prisoners of war."

December 12, 1941

The Kimura detachment with 2,500 men landed with no opposition at Legazpi, Albay

The Kanno detachment split into two columns: one moved north to capture Laoag, Ilocos Norte while the other moved southward ²

Upon landing, the Japanese forces immediately secured the airfield and the train station at Legaspi. On the same day, General Kimura sent some of his troops to the northwest and southwest areas of the region. In Naga, Japanese troops encountered the 51st Engineering Battalion of the 51st, which was then working on a bridge near Ragay. Holding on to their positions, the engineer-soldiers fired at the enemy, forcing them to withdraw. However, the following day, the Kimura Detachment entered town without further resistance. The engineers withdrew during the night.³

Meanwhile, in the north, the 1^st Division, composed of Philippine Military Academy personnel and troops in Camp Murphy, were mobilized under the command of General Fidel Segundo.

The PMA was transferred from Baguio to the University of Santo Tomas compound. Class ’42 and ’43 were disbanded.

The 2^nd Division under the command of General Guillermo B. Francisco was organized and mobilized from the Constabulary troops.

December 18, 1941

General Brougher sent a patrol to meet the Kanno detachment at Tagudin, Ilocos Sur. There was a light skirmish. Thereafter the patrol rejoined the 12th and 13th Infantry Regiments of the 11th Division which had dug in and formed a defense line along the south bank of Baroro River north of San Fernando La Union. ²

December 22, 1941

The Japanese attacked the defense line along Baroro. Intense fighting took place but the badly beaten 11^th Division had to withdraw. General Wainwright threw the 71st into action to reinforce the battered 11th. He sent the Philippine Scouts 26th Cavalry to La Union to protect the beaches and support the 11th. Only the 71st Infantry regiment of the 71st, now bivouacked at Urdaneta, Pangasinan, could be moved on time. Side by side, the 71st Infantry and the 11th engaged the enemy. ²

The main Japanese invasion force, the 48th Division minus the Kanno and Tanaka Detachments, under the command of Lt. Gen. Yuichi Tsuchibashi, landed on three points along the coast of Lingayen Gulf and at Agoo, Sto. Tomas and Bauang, La Union.

The 11th and the 71st Infantry Regiment, caught flat-footed, had to redeploy, reforming their defense line from Bauang to San Fernando, La Union.²

The Imperial Army’s 48^th division was assisted by the powerful Japanese Navy. The USAFFE had no navy. By that time, the Asiatic Fleet, battered by aerial bombardments, had withdrawn to the south in Java Sea

The Japanese Imperial Staff planned their offensive with a "detailed knowledge" of the capability of the American and Filipino defenders - from their training standards and equipment to their fighting ability and deployment. Their battle plan, to be carried out by General Homma’s XIV Army, charted the fall of Luzon within 50 days and the conquest of the Philippines within three months.

The Japanese military leadership was confident that the Philippines would be an easy target. Only two divisions of the XIV Army was allotted for the campaign. Its support units consisted of two tank regiments, two infantry regiments and a battalion of medium artillery, five anti-aircraft battalions and various service units. The Japanese V Air Group (army) and the XI Air Group (navy) provided 500 bomber and fighter aircraft.

But the size of the Japanese army division is, at the very least, twice as much as that of a USAFFE division. As estimated by the Office of the Chief of History of the US War Department, 15,000 to 18,000 men comprised one division in the Imperial Army. The USAFFE division was, at most, 7,500. The Japanese support groups included two tank regiments and one battalion of medium artillery, three engineer regiments, five anti-craft battalions and a large number of service units.

As soon as the main Japanese force landed, the advance to Manila from north and south began. It was a rapid and powerful drive that left MacArthur no choice but to order the withdrawal to Bataan. Manila was declared an "open city", hoping that this could spare the capital from massive destruction.

THE DEFENSE

The aroma of charcoal-baked bibingka, church bells that roused sleepy heads at dawn for the misa de gallo... Voices - young, old, some cracking at high notes but still to the tune of Christmas carols - filled the air as dusk set in..

The typical December scenario in the Philippines… suddenly wiped off in many areas north to south of Luzon by smoke that smelled of death, by guns and machines that roared violently while blasting away lives and limbs…

Some accounts tend to underscore the inability of the Philippine Army to stand up to the Japanese invaders. Indeed, there were inadequacies in the country’s defense establishment - the effort by he President Quezon and his general staff to correct the basic deficiencies in the system overtaken by the war and the belated move of the US government to mount an effective defense of its closest Asian ally churning out a force composed mostly of cubs who have not known war. In the first three months of the war, cubs were pitted against lions raised and reared in battlefronts.

From Day 1 of the war, Philippine Army units - albeit half-trained - fought for dear country and dear life as a soldier is expected to. Within the first few weeks of fighting, they were deployed to beach defenses, delay points, withdrawal lines … wherever there was a need for officers and men to prevent the invasion forces from gaining more ground.

At the outbreak of war, there were 9 PA divisions assigned to Luzon and 1 US Division named Philippine Army Division consisting of the 45^th Infantry, Philippine Scouts and the 31^st Infantry - all Americans, 24^th Field Arty, Medical Battalion, Anti Tank Battalion and other division units.

Three PA Divisions - 61^st, 81^st and the 101^st - were assigned to the Visayas and Minndanao.

On the evening of December 23, 1941 (December 22 in some accounts), General Wainwright, commander of the North Luzon Force, received a call from USAFFE Headquarters. The instruction, relayed to all field commanders, was clear. War Plan Orange 3 was "in effect". The plan called for the retreat to Bataan of all USAFFE forces in Luzon.

"In the event of successful enemy landing on the main island of Luzon, the Philippine Division and the Philippine Army, if unable to beat the landing and subsequent advances of a theoretical enemy, were to fight delaying actions and withdraw into Bataan by which time aid from the United States would arrive."

Bataan

Bataan Defense Force

The defense of Bataan was organized as soon as it became clear that WPO-3 had to be executed. USAFFE activated the Bataan Defense Force under Major General Parker to prepare the ground for the withdrawing force. As units arrived, they were immediately placed under the control of the Bataan Defense Force.

The Bataan Defense Force consisted initially of the 31^st Division, which was detached from the North Luzon Force, and the service elements that were already preparing the defense positions in the area. As days passed and units arrived, its composition expanded to include the 41^stDivision, the 2d PC Regiment, the Philippine Division, the 200^th Coast Artillery, the 57^th Infantry, the 45^th Infantry and the Provisional Air Corps Regiment.

Its mission was to put up the defense positions and the necessary installations in Bataan before the arrival of the North and South Luzon Forces. The BDF hurriedly constructed field fortifications, gun emplacements, ammunition supply depots and hospitals.

The Headquarters, Philippine Department, was ordered to Bataan to take care of putting up service installations. Thereafter, it was designated as Service Command under Brig Gen. Allen McBride. USAFFE Headquarters sent an advance echelon under Brig Gen. Richard Marshall to supervise the defense preparations and the occupation of Bataan by the withdrawing forces.

The BDF did not remain active for long but its contribution to the defense of Bataan was no less significant - having put in place the defense structures and other installations that the withdrawing USAFFE troops needed for the epic struggle against an enemy superior in arms and number in Bataan.

The Road to Bataan

Soon after General Wainwright received the call from USAFFE Headquarters on December 23, the North Luzon Force implemented the withdrawal plan.

The plan had two objectives: to cover the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force to Bataan and to give the Bataan Defense Force enough time to prepare and develop the defense positions to be occupied by the North and South Luzon forces.

As the North Luzon units retreated to Bataan, they had to hold a series of lines of defense or delay points.

The first delay point (D-1) called for withdrawal to a line along Urdaneta, San Carlos and Aguilar in Pangasinan, midway between the Lingayen Gulf and the Agno River. D-1 was to be established in the evening of December 23 to 24.

This new line would run parallel to the Urdaneta-Santa Barbara section of the National Highway No. 3, cutting all possible southbound routes leading to Manila.

The succeeding delay points were to be established in accordance with WPO-3, the schedules set to be followed strictly. The enemy should be disengaged at night and the new position held at day.

Delay Point No. 2 (D-2), behind the Agno River, spanned Mangatarem on the left flank through the towns of Bayambang, Santo Tomas, Rosales and Tayug. The D-2 line was longer than the D-1 line as the Central Plain of Luzon widened in this part of the valley. Target date of occupation was December 24-25.

Delay Point No. 3 (D-3) extended from Santa Ignacia, Tarlac through the towns of Gerona and the Nueva Ecija towns of Guimba, Muñoz and San Jose. The D-2 line was to be established December 25 to 26.

Delay Point No. 4 (D-4) ran from Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija through Zaragosa, La Paz and Tarlac to the high ground west of Tarlac - much shorter than any of the previous defense lines.

Designated as the main delay point was D-5, as the road network to Manila converges into only four big roads. D-5 stretched across the broad valley from Bamban, Tarlac to Sibul Springs at the foot of the mountains in the east.

The plan was to halt the enemy forces along this line until the South Luzon Force had funneled through the Calumpit Bridge and cleared San Fernando, Pampanga enroute to Bataan.

Acts of heroism lined the road to Bataan.

The 71^st Regiment of the 71^st Division took the Naguillan-Baguio-Kennon Road to rejoin their Division. A couple of battalions failed to link up with their Division. One of them was under the command of Captain Guillermo Nakar. Unable to rejoin their Division, Nakar’s battalion engaged in guerrilla warfare. Captain Manuel Enriquez was a classmate of Nakar at the academy - PMA Class ’24. He was G-2 of the 11^th but joined Nakar’s battalion. The soldiers-turned-guerillas fought until they were finally wiped out in 1943. Nakar and Enriquez did not have the chance to see freedom dawn once more in the country they defended to the last drop of their blood.

The first line of withdrawal of the North Luzon Force was Sta. Barbara-Urdaneta, south of Agoo River, going to the Tarlac-Zaragosa line. The last line was Bamban-Arayat - which was to be held not later than January 2, 1942 to enable the South Luzon Force under General Parker to withdraw towards Bataan.

To cover the troops’ withdrawal, the 11^th and 21^st Divisions were ordered to fight and delay the enemy until all forces are already near the highway towards Bataan. With Gen. William Brougher and Gen. Mateo Capinpin in command, the two divisions delayed the Japanese advance all the way from Arayat to the Guagua-Porac line, on to the entrance of Bataan-Dinalupihan-Layac Junction-Hermosa lines. These two rear guard divisions arrived in Bataan on January 6. Soon after, the battle for Bataan began.

The first line of defense was the Layac Junction-Hermosa line. The 71^st under General Selleck held the line on January 7, assisted by two MS Tank Battalions and the 31^st Infantry, US. The defense collapsed after a day of fighting. The troops withdrew to the next line.

On 29 December, the 31^st was detached from the BDF and became part of General Wainwright’s I Corps, USAFFE. Its new mission: to protect the left flank main line of resistance along the Abucay-Moron line.

During the withdrawal, the 1^st Battalion, 31^st Infantry was ordered to hold - at all costs - the zigzag road on the hilly terrain about six kilometers above the US Naval Station in Olongapo. For six days, the battalion held its ground against overwhelming odds. It was a mission that required much more than the number of fighting men that comprised the battalion. Nonetheless, officers and men tenaciously stood their ground and repelled enemy attempts to cut off the retreating USAFFE troops. The gallant defense put up by the 1^st Battalion kept the withdrawal line from Zambales to Bataan open for the 31^st Division; the Coast Artillery Corps from Fort Wint, Subic Bay and all component elements of the US Navy and the US Marine Corps based at the US Naval Station in Olongapo.

On 31 December, the 31^st Infantry Regiment, US took over the Abucay defense line. The Regiment commander, Colonel John W. Nevin, commended the officers and men of the 1^st Battalion, 31^st Infantry for their gallant and heroic stand. Their next mission: the defense of the Paysawan Bay-Saysain Sector.

The Defense of Bataan

When the South Luzon Force units had all withdrawn into the Peninsula, they were redesignated as the II Philippine Corps. Their mission - to take control of the eastern sector which was nearest the enemy.

After executing their rear guard action, the North Luzon Force was likewise redesignated as the I Philippine Corps. Their mission - to safeguard the western sector.

As soon as all units had occupied their new positions, the USAFFE Headquarters established its advance Command Post at Signal Hill near Mount Samat.

Assigned to command the II Philippine Corps was Major General Parker while Major General Wainwright took command of the I Philippine Corps.

The defense of Bataan required dividing the peninsula into lateral areas: the main battle position in the north, the reserve battle position in the center and the service command area on the south. The battle position was divided longitudinally into two sectors, with the mountain range for their boundary.

Both I and II Philippine Corps were tasked with the defense of the beaches in their respective areas while the Service Command was assigned the beach defense in the area south of the combat zone.

The main line of resistance ran a 20 mile distance through Abucay, Mount Natib and Mauban. The rugged terrain around Mount Natib offers a formidable natural obstacle to enemy attack. However, it also made contact between the units on both sides almost impossible.

The critical area was the eastern sector, with the probability of an enemy attack first coming from the east.

General Parker deployed two of his divisions and the 57^th Infantry in the main line of resistance - the 57^th tasked to guard the vital road network, the 41^st Division in the center and the 51^st Division on the left - with its left flank anchored on the eastern slopes of Mount Natib.

Assigned to man the beach defense was the 11^th Division while the 21^st Division was placed in corps reserve near Pilar.

General Wainwright’s main concern were the beaches and that part of the main line of resistance facing Moron. He reinforced the 1^st Division and assigned the unit to the main line.

The 321^st Division was given the mission of beach defense and the 91^st Division, with the 71^st attached, and the 26^th Cavalry were constituted as corps reserve.

The air corps was tasked to prepare the air field at Mariveles, Cabcaben, Bataan Air Field and Pilar Air Field on the Pilar-Bagc Road. A few planes of the Far East Air Force remained and there were hopes of aircrafts flying in from the US.

By the first week of the new year, 1942, Filipino and American troops that withdrew from both ends of Luzon linked up and began the last lap of their journey to Bataan. The Allied forces were estimated to number about 80,000 at that time. More than 20,000 civilians had also fled to the peninsula.

Food and motor fuel stocks were enough to cover the requirements of 43,000 men for six months. Food would last only a few weeks. There was hardly any protection from mosquitoes, not even nettings. Malaria and other diseases stalked the defenders - with quinine stocks running short.

On January 9, artillery barrage opened the Japanese assault on the II Corps. The defenders fired back ferociously. Savage fighting ensued, with the Japanese suffering heavy casualties in the effort to force back the defenders. Disease and lack of food had begun to take its toll on the Allied troops. The general withdrawal began on January 23.

Two Japanese battalions landed at two points near Mariveles at the tip of Bataan - in what was described as a bold move to open up a front behind the main defense lines and pull away infantry and artillery. A motley force of airmen, sailors and service troops held them back. After three weeks of bitter fighting, the two battalions were crushed.

Artillery fire held back General Homma’s troops as they tried to penetrate the last barricade - the Orion-Bagac line. Two groups of Japanese invaders managed to break through the thinly defended line at certain points and consolidated. The strong pockets were gradually eroded by the long arduous fighting.

By the end of February, it was Homma’s turn to withdraw - close to 3,000 of his men dead and no less than 10,000 down with dysentery, beri-beri and other tropical ailments.

A stalemate - for the moment.

But earlier that month, President Quezon sent a message that startled the US War Department. He proposed the immediate grant of independence to the Philippines, that the war-ravaged country declare neutrality, that Japanese and American forces withdraw and the Philippine Army be disbanded. A supporting message from MacArthur to the Chief of Staff explained that the Philippine garrison had sustained a casualty rate of 50%. "There’s no denying the fact that we are near done." From the commander of the defending forces himself, an admission of defeat.

Quezon’s proposal, it is said, illustrates the disillusion and despair among Commonwealth officials over what was perceived to be "abandonment" and "sell-out" by Washington. Having withdrawn to Corregidor with the USAFFE high command, they had heard Roosevelt’s radio announcements about thousands of aircraft flying to Europe. National Artist Nick Joaquin describes how President Quezon, in a fit of anger and frustration, exploded: "For 30 years I have worked and hoped for my people. Now they burn and die for a flag that could not protect them. Por dios y todos los santos. I cannot stand all this constant reference to England, to Europe. Where are the planes this sin verguenza is boasting of?… How American to write in anguish at the fate of a distant cousin while a daughter is being raped at the back room!"

President Roosevelt rejected the neutrality scheme and insisted that the fight continue. Nothing changed thereafter - that is - not for the better.

On March 12, MacArthur, under orders from Roosevelt, left for Darwin, Australia to take on the command of the new Allied headquarters in the southwest Pacific.

"I came through and I shall return," MacArthur said in his first public statement in Australia.

General Wainwright took over as commander of the Philippine forces. He named General King to command the Luzon force in Bataan.

Time was running out on the defenders - saddled with the outbreak of every imaginable tropical disease, with food and medicine bins nearly empty, not to mention the waning stock of materiel.

Not all of the young men who went off to war were driven by patriotic feelings. Some were obliged by the draft, others inspired by a sense of adventure and romantic images of knight errantry - as in the case of Edmundo F. Nolasco, an A.B. student preparing for law studies at the Ateneo de Manila when the war began. With the disbanding of the ROTC on December 23, 1943, Ed volunteered and enlisted with the 2^nd Anti-Tank Battalion, 2^nd Regular Division, USAFFE. "Anak, mahirap ang giyera," his father told him before his company left for their first assignment in Tagaytay.

Ed indeed went thru untold hardships from that first assignment until their retreat to Bataan - their unit armed with either remnants from destroyed aircrafts and World War I vintage guns and rifles, their food stock rapidly depleting.

"We stayed in Limay for more than two months, There were 30 of us sharing a can of sardines and a pot of lugao," Ed recalled. "Hungry, sick, exhausted - we felt abandoned."

News of 95 American convoys steaming across the Pacific repeated over and over again kept their morale high and they waited. Nothing came. Only once did they see Americans - five who wandered into their line but quickly took off when they heard that the Japanese were about to land.

And yet, Ed set aside the frustration and disillusion - fighting as fiercely as his comrades were up to the last moment.

April 3, the anniversary of the legendary Emperor Jimmu of Japan… It was Good Friday, a solemn day for this predominantly Christian nation. The crucifixion of the Bataan defenders began. General Homma’s guns, howitzers and mortars nailed Filipino and American soldiers to the cross.

The main attack was directed at the II Corps front. The order was issued at San Fernando, Pampanga a week before. The Japanese objective was Mount Samat, a key terrain feature. Its capture would make the defenders’ position untenable.

From 0800H, Japanese artillery fire concentrated heavily on the 41^st Division. Air strikes followed; then, infantry assault. The 41^st withdrew from the main line of resistance but managed to hold its reserve line with fire support from the defenders’ artillery units after the enemy planes left.

Early the next day, wave after wave of Japanese war planes bombed and strafed the 41^st Division. The day after, Japanese tanks broke through the southeast defense line - isolating the 21^st Division which retreated in disarray. Some units reassembled in the western slopes of Mt. Samat, only to be subjected anew to a barrage of artillery fire.

With Mt. Samat secure in his hands earlier than he estimated, Homma threw away his timetable and drove further into the second defense line, continuing the attack without let-up.

By noon of April 6, the 65^th Brigade launched the penultimate assault. General King ordered a withdrawal under cover of darkness on April 7 and 8 - the II Corps to the Alangan River Line and the I Corps to the Binuagan River. The last of the reserves of the Luzon Force - the 14^th Engineers and the 26^th Cavalry - had been released to the II Corps.

The Japanese pursued the withdrawing troops. Before the Lamao River position could be organized, they were subjected to another attack. The troops broke up in disorder. Organized resistance in the II Corps sector ended.

The following day, the 45^th Infantry was directed to withdraw to Corregidor but the unit could not disengage from combat in time to comply with the order.

At 1330H, the commander of the Luzon Force ordered the destruction of all artillery, tanks, ammunition, engineering material, signal equipment and other military supplies in Bataan.

Major General King sent his chief of staff to General Wainwright at Corregidor to report the action he had taken and ask permission to surrender. General Wainwright disapproved. "There would be no surrender."

Wainwright acted on orders of General MacArthur to continue the fight in Bataan and attack northward towards Olongapo with the I Corps.

The order was passed on to I Corps. The physical condition of the troops prevented them from carrying out the directive. The order was countermanded. That night, General Wainwright wired the War Department and General MacArthur of the possibility of disaster in Bataan.

After carefully studying the situation with his field commanders and staff, General King decided it was time to end the resistance. The next morning, he sent two members of his staff to meet with representatives of the Japanese Army and negotiate the surrender of Bataan.

But Homma was adamant. He insisted on unconditional surrender.

Many of the Bataan defenders were not aware that negotiations were already underway for their surrender.

Ed Nolasco, whose unit was ordered to break up and move somewhere near the Alangan River in Cabcaben on April 8, engaged Japanese troops that afternoon and prevented them from going up the mountain. At about 7:00 p.m., he heard the guns of Corregidor come alive again. Then, silence.

The following morning, they reached a forested area above Cabcaben. Hearing enemy planes hovering above, Ed jumped to the ground and shouted at his companions to dock for cover. An elder officer calmed him down. "Hijo, tapos na ang giyera."

It was April 9, 1942. Bataan had fallen. But written in the annals of world history is "the indomitable spirit" of the defenders - Filipinos and Americans unfazed by enemy forces "superior in arms and number," fighting amid conditions "beyond the limits of human endurance": their logistic support at zero level; malaria and dysentery widespread; their strength drained by hunger. And yet, for over three months, Filipino and American soldiers held off the enemy and set back their timetable.

There were many shinining moments amidst the military debacle showing the Philippine Army, badly-armed, redeemed itself. One was Sgt Jose Calugas, a member of the Philippine Scouts who won the Medal of Honor during the Bataan campaign. The other was the fact that the Japanese Imperial Army’s timetable for its conquest of Southeast Asia was derailed by prolonged resistance in Bataan buying valuable time for the Allied powers to reorganize its forces.

Corregidor

"The Rock." Impenetrable, so said the officers and men stationed in the garrison at the time Japanese fighter planes were demolishing Olongapo, the Navy yards at Cavite and Sangley Point, major airfields and other military installations elsewhere in Luzon.

Spain, a naval power during the time that her forces claimed "Las Islas Filipinas" as her own, saw at once the strategic importance of Corregidor and the chain of islands that stretch across the entrance to Manila Bay.

When the Americans took over from our Spanish colonizers, the old Spanish guns at the island fortress were replaced by heavier and modern guns. The United States spent a huge sum of money on the defensive works and installations of the island - making it a truly formidable bastion on which the defense of Manila Bay depended.

From the coast, electric trains whisked the troops to their barracks - where the quarters had rec rooms with pool and billiard tables for sea-weary sailors newly detailed or visiting the central garrison of the command called the Harbor Defenses and the Fortified Islands of Manila Bay. During the war, it was under the command of Major General George F. Moore.

Four forts built on the islands comprised the harbor defenses in Manila Bay. Fort Mills was Corregidor. It was also called the "Gibraltar of the East." The island had, among others, its own power and cold storage plants, airfield and two hospitals - one of them beneath the Malinta Hill, in the infamous Malinta Tunnel. The tunnel measured 1,400 feet long and 30 feet wide, running almost east to west of the island, with entrances at strategic points of the island. South of Fort Mills was Fort Hughes on Caballo island, armed with 17 guns ranging from 14-inch to 3-inch anti-aircraft. To the south is Fort Drum at El Fraile Island - an island battleship with the natural solid rock as foundation, 350 feet long and 144 feet wide with concrete walls up to 36 feet thick. The USS Drum, as sailors called it, was armed with four 14-inch guns and anti-aircraft defense of three 3-inch guns. Fort Drum could withstand any armament of the 1941 era.

Shortly before the outbreak of war, the 4^th Marine Regiment under Colonel Howard was moved from Olongapo to Corregidor, enhancing the strength of its garrison forces. More Philippine Army troops were sent to the island to augment its beach defenders.

The strategic plan of the Japanese High Command for the final operations in the Philippines consisted of simultaneous and coordinated offensives on Bataan and Corregidor by the XIV Army and landing operations in certain areas of the Visayas and Mindanao by elements of the 5^th and 18^th Divisions.

While the main effort was to be directed towards the capture of Bataan, initially through a joint infantry-artillery-air attack against Mount Samat, a coordinated assault on Corregidor will also be carried out through heavy air and artillery bombardment. Blockades on the last two bastions of Philippine defense will be tightened to completely isolate the beleaguered Filipino and American troops.

When Bataan fell, the Allied forces in Corregidor knew that their days were numbered - with Japanese artillery literally pointed at their necks.

The Japanese forces prepared for an amphibious attack. The 4^th Division, reinforced by the 7^th Tank Regiment and the 3^rd Battalion of the 51^st Mountain Artillery Regiment concentrated its main force in the area north of Cabcaben and begin preparations for the Corregidor offensive. The Imperial Army’s field command drew up the final battle plan based on information gathered even before the war and more recent intelligence reports on details of Corregidor’s defense installations.

The plan called for combined operations of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Since the surrender of Bataan on April 9, the Japanese maintained continuous bombing and shellfire on the island fortress - scoring critical hits on the water storage tanks, power plant and the searchlights. The destruction of the water tanks and the water barge worsened the water supply problem. The damage on the power plant made lighting difficult at the Malinta Tunnel. Night observation of hostile approach became an impossible task without searchlights to spot enemy vessels and aircraft.

On April 30, the operation to soften the "Rock" began. Heavy barrage of air and artillery fire pounded the island fortress. But all the batteries and the seacoast guns on the three other islands managed to counter enemy fire and prevent enemy motor columns.

But on May 3, when the US Chief of Staff, General Marshall, requested for a frank estimate of the situation, the commander of the Philippine forces reported that Corregidor had "something less than an even chance to beat off an assault."

By May 5, enemy forces subjected Corregidor to its 300^th bombing attack since war broke out on December 8, 1941. The island’s defenders were already running short of firepower to counter the air attacks.

At 2230H, a report received from the "I-1" station said: "Enemy landing attack indicated. About an hour later, a runner from "H" station reported the enemy landing at North Point.

General Moore immediately ordered the coast artillery personnel manning the damaged seacoast batteries to position in beach defense reserve in accordance with the plans.

Despite the telling effect of the artillery fire, the Japanese began moving towards the hill as wave after wave of troops landed. By 0300H on May 6, the enemy had expanded their beachhead 50 yards inland. Still, the commanders of the defending forces reported that "the situation was under control."

Reports were received that the Japanese had infiltrated the area near Denver Hill, a rise east of Malinta Hill. The defending troops had to withdraw towards Malinta Hill. The Beach Defense Reserve Battalion reinforced with coast artillery personnel counterattacked in the east sector, driving the Japanese back and stopping their advance towards Malinta.

Artillery fire resumed. Dive bombers joined the fray. The defenders’ counterattack suffered a setback, forcing them to retreat again to the Malinta Tunnel and pinning the rest of the troops to the ground in the final defense line east of Malinta Hill.

General Wainwright witnessed the slaughter of his defense forces, their strength cut down to two companies. Information reached the distraught commander that the water supply in Corregidor would only last for three days and only a few mouthfuls left on the other three islands.

General Wainwright decided to end the hostilities before dusk. At 1000H, he relayed his decision to Corregidor’s commanders. The remaining handful of troops were ordered to prepare for surrender and destroy all weapons heavier than a .45 caliber, as well as military supplies and equipment including ships and boats.

Before broadcasting the surrender, General Wainwright sent a radio message to Major General William F. Sharp, commander of the Visayas-Mindanao Task Force placing him directly under the command of General MacArthur.

At 1030H, General Beebe started announcing over the radio the surrender of Corregidor and the fortified islands.

At noon, May 6, the defenders raised the white flag at the Topside flagpole. Still, the Japanese continued the assault.

At the time Corregidor fell, there were about 11,500 surviving Filipino and American troops. Of these, more than 1,500 were sick and wounded. In the last days of fighting, the casualties numbered 2,000 - 800 of them Americans. The enemy suffered some 4,000 casualties.

Finally, it was decided to send one officer to walk with a flag of truce toward the Japanese lines to ask the senior Japanese officer to meet with General Wainwright. The emissary came back with instructions from the Japanese to have General Wainwright himself go to their lines.

Accompanied by General Moore and their respective personal aides, the commander of the Philippine forces was brought to Cabcaben for a meeting with General Homma.

The Fall of the Philippines

The fall of Bataan ended American military supremacy in Asia. Like domino pieces, the rest of the islands crumbled. The Japanese had driven the United States from its stronghold in East Asia, destroying combined Filipino and American forces numbering almost 140,000 and pushing the Americans’ Far East Air Force and Asiatic Fleet back to the Malay boundary.

With this conquest, the Japanese gained the best harbor in East Asia and acquired excellent bases from which to stage their advance to the South and supply their garrisons and the main land. The population likewise provided valuable human resource for Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

But Filipino soldiers who survived the bloody onslaught refused to surrender freedom and national sovereignty to Japan.

The Death March

Some 78,000 men - all starving and mostly sick - survived the fall of Bataan only to witness and suffer man’s inhumanity to man - in its barbaric worst. Many did not live long enough to see the end. The conquerors capped their victory by parading their prisoners from Mariveles, Bataan to Capas, Tarlac. Death stalked the POWs along the way - the strain of walking endlessly under the scorching sun too much for bodies already emaciated from illness and hunger; rifle butts and bayonets pounding mercilessly on prisoners for reasons only their captors know. That harrowing chapter in the annals of World War II - the "Death March" - literally saw the dead and the dying marching together to the prison camp in Tarlac. At the same time, Filipino civilians demonstrated the kind of courage that make heroes out of ordinary men and women - sneaking food and water into the prisoners’ lines and sneaking prisoners out of their lines to safety.

Corban Alabado joined the campaign for the simple reason that he was drafted before the war broke out. His heart was set on becoming a lawyer until that fateful day in December, 1941, when the dean of the University of the Philippines handed him his drafting order to report to Camp Crame.

Corban was among the thousands of Bataan defenders taken as prisoners by the Japanese and forced into the Death March. He had the chance to break off from the Death March - a chance to escape from the vicious chapters of war that were yet to unfold and the violent fighting he had always dreaded. Between Lubao and San Fernando, civilians along the roadside snatched quite a number of soldiers to safety. Among them was Corban’s father, who had helped many American POWs and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro escape.

When the elder Alabado spotted his son, he immediately sidled up to him and, speaking in Kapampangan, urged him to escape.

"When you reach the bend in the road and the sentry is not looking, fall out and run to our side. The crowd will hide you."

Corban refused. He chose to stay on with his comrades - a sense of honor has taken over this "unwilling" soldier within three months in the company of men ready to risk life and limb to defend their country. Besides, Corban feared for his father’s life - anticipating the worst in case the Japanese discovered his attempt to escape.

At San Fernando, the POWs were herded into box cars at the railroad station that would take them to Capas. After three hours, they got off and walked another six kilometers to Camp O’Donnell.

At this point, Corban felt it was time to contact his father. He scribbled a note and passed it on to one of many civilians crowding the gate. His father got the note - thanks to the courier system set up by the civilians. In his first three days at O’Donnell, Corban estimated that some 500 POWs died each day. When a Japanese officer asked for volunteer drivers, he raised his hand - intent on surviving and leaving the hell in that prison camp.

What could have driven many young men to leave the comforts of home - even if they did not have to - and put their lives on the line alongside older men whose duty it was to fight in the war? Miguel and Benjamin Mills Gaerlan were sons of a prominent politician from the Mountain Province when the war broke out. Benjamin was only 17 then but he lied about his age and enlisted for the service. The two brothers were among the tens of thousands forced to take that fateful journey to death.

Miguel was prodded by some farmers to dive into a cart filled with grass and was subsequently wheeled to safety. The younger Gaerlan managed to reach Capas but soon died of dysentery - "looking like an old man at 17… thrown into a common pit of 40 soldiers."

THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

For a while, a period of uncertainty and confusion followed the surrender of the American and Filipino forces. The Japanese won an important victory. However, Filipinos and Americans who survived the initial onslaught of war refused to let the sacrifice of their comrades pass in vain. They fled to the hills and linked up with bands of civilians who have organized their own defense against the invaders. In the months that followed, they kept the resistance alive in the Philippines, exacting heavy casualties on the enemy and immobilizing their forces. While most of the guerilla fighters during the second half of the Japanese occupation were "alumni" of the Death March and the concentration camps, others were recruits from various professions who were mostly in surveillance and intelligence operations. Some, however, were triggermen.

The leader of each guerilla band - generally a former military man - gave himself a "bamboo commission", usually higher than his official commission. The guerilla forces declared that their primary purpose was to aid the civilian population. They assumed control of various phases of public activities - the allotment of food supplies, the issue of emergency currency and the punishment of criminals. In those dark years - when tales of Japanese atrocities reverberated all over the country - the guerillas have taken on the task of protecting the people from oppressive and barbaric elements of the Japanese Imperial Army.

The resistance movement made far-reaching contributions to the war effort, with guerilla activities compelling the Japanese to maintain comparatively large forces in the Philippines that would have otherwise been deployed southward of the Pacific.

Guerilla operations compounded the transport problem of the Japanese - ambuscades, road blocks, destruction of bridges and demolition of road networks seriously hampering movements of troops and supplies. Military communications equipment and supply dumps were blown up. The Japanese could not dispatch small truck convoys. Their army patrols were frequently attacked.

Some 8,000 to 10,000 Japanese troops are estimated to have died in the hands of guerilla operatives.

Filipino guerillas likewise became valuable assets in intelligence gathering and played a vital role in the psychological warfare. They bolstered the morale, spirit and loyalty of the Filipino people - keeping their hopes alive, their belief that the American forces would return and redeem the Islands.

MARCELO SAN DIEGO, as a guerilla under Alejo Santos, was assigned to observe the Japanese camp in Obando, Bulacan in early 1942. Having been a farmer even before the war, he was able to secure a municipal permit to plow the land inside the Japanese barracks.

"I counted the number of enemy troops and their weapons and their types of supplies and relayed this information to the guerilla GHQ which in turn radioed the data to an American submarine… As part of security procedures, I rendezvoused with my comrades in the cemetery with a guard posted while we talked. Anyone who wandered into the area at that time was surely a Japanese snitch.

"I also discovered the identities of the Makapilis (members of the neighborhood associations organized by the Japanese who wore a bayong on their head and pointed to "guerillas" or sympathizers of the Allied forces for Japanese soldiers to arrest). After the enemy conducted raids, I tailed these ‘stool pigeons’ when they returned to their bivouac with their ‘masters’. The moment these bastards left their encampment, we, the Trigger Squad, killed them."

San Diego, dubbed in those days as a "great fighter", recalled that everytime his unit needed supplies, they attacked the Japanese forts in Meycauayan which were usually guarded by only about 15 to 20 Japanese soldiers. "Our firefights with the enemy covered a distance of only 20 meters and they often ended in hand-to-hand combat."

When the Japanese presence in Bulacan had weakened, San Diego gave up farming and went on active duty, joining the Fil-Am camps in Northern Luzon in 1944-45. Liberation found him in Sto. Domingo, Mt. Province where Yamashita surrendered.

GERVACIO T. MAGNO, SR., a PC sergeant during the war who also fought with the resistance movement, did not know that he was under the USAFFE until he linked up with the liberation forces in Leyte.

"We were in Sorsogon when the war broke out since Itay was a sergeant of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to the camp there," recalled sisters Feliciana and Patria Magno, children of war who are both grandmothers now. Barely do they remember the activities of then PC Sgt. Gervacio T. Magno, Sr. - except for the fact that they saw less and less of him. They do remember vividly the times when all of them - from their grandparents down to their brothers who were just toddlers then - had to pack all their clothes and food stocks, cross rivers and mountains, join their father and his men and then settle in a different neighborhood.

In one of their operations, Sgt. Magno was separated from his group. His family lost contact with him for quite some time.

"One day, a woman pleaded to Inay to spare her some medicine from the PC stock for her baby. Inay did not admit having the PC medicine stock and told the woman that even if she did have some, she would not be able to give what she needs since she does not know how to prescribe medicine," Feliciana recounted. "After that, a Japanese officer and some soldiers came to our house and we were made to transfer to the mayor’s residence. That did not pass without an incident. One of the soldiers hit my grandfather when he moved a bit. What saved us was my father’s Junior - who was about three years old then and, with his chinky eyes, looked very much like a Japanese boy. The Japanese officer - who must have had a son his age - took a fancy on him and has been very nice to us since then. (Gervacio Jr. eventually joined the Army reserve officers corps and is now a lieutenant colonel assigned as deputy administrator of the AFP Housing Administration.)

News of his family’s "capture" prompted Sgt. Magno to surrender at Malacañang. In a few weeks, he was back in Sorsogon with his family.

"We thought he was engaged in some sort of buy and sell. But we found it strange that he kept bringing in some things and bringing them out, and meeting with different people here and there," Feliciana said. "Then all of a sudden, he said he was going to Leyte."

"Later, he would tell us that he went to Leyte for his group to link up with the liberation froces of General MacArthur. All the while, my father and some of his former men had been operating as a guerilla unit. He was recognized by the USAFFE."

In some areas like Leyte, various guerilla bands for sometime, operated separately, with little or no cooperation among them. If there was any force that united them, it was their hatred for the Japanese.

Considered the most prominent among the Leyte guerilla leaders were Colonel Ruperto F. Kangleon and Brig Gen. Blas E. Miranda. Colonel Kangleon served in the Philippine Army for 27 years and was a graduate of the Philippine Constabulary Academy and General Services School. General Miranda himself was a former member of the PC.

On October 21, 1943, General MacArthur recognized Colonel Kangleon as the Leyte Area Commander and directed him to establish and maintain direct communications with his headquarters.

Even while Bataan was under siege, patriotic citizens had already began preparing for partisan warfare. They anticipated the fall of Bataan and knew that that would mean victory for the occupation forces.

The militant Civil Liberties Union went underground, converting itself into the "Free Philippines". In Central Luzon, socialist leader Pedro Abad Santos’ lieutenants began preparing the peasants for guerilla warfare. Among those who spearheaded the organization of the peasant resistance movement were Agapito del Rosario, Luis M. Taruc. Francisco Sampang, Carlo Alejandrino, Lino Dizon and Eusebio Aquino. Their plight - having been victims of feudalism from the Spanish era and other abuses by landlords - have transformed otherwise submissive peasants into fiery fighters. Their freedom and homeland threatened by the new wave of conquerors, the peasants braced themselves to face this different breed of oppressors as the "Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon" or HUKBALAHAP (People’s Army Against the Japanese).

Even among the ranks of prominent political leaders and activists, there were many who rose to the call of duty, among them: Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, Roque Ablan, Salvador Escudero, Marcelo Addures, Alfredo Montelibano, Tomas Confesor, Datu Salipada Pendatun, Tomas Cabili, Bado Dangwa and Carlos P. Garcia.

They had their own men and took to the hills. But they had no "contact" with the outside world - neither with each other.

Among the most active resistance fighters were the Filipino-Chinese guerillas who operated in Manila, driven to take up arms perhaps by the savagery of the atrocities committed by the Japanese against their race. The animosity may have a historical antecedent but some prominent Filipino-Chinese businessmen in later years say it is because they were perceived to be generally better off than the average Malay Filipino. Forty students of Chiang Kai Shek School in Manila were killed in a raid at Juan Luna, Divisoria. In Iloilo, the Hacienda Lungao massacre is considered "the most shocking barbarity" in the history of the province.

Hacienda Lungao, located about two kilometers from the poblacion, was owned by a rich Chinese. All other wealthy Chinese in the city evacuated to that area at the start of the Japanese occupation. The Japanese launched an early dawn penetration operation and roused the residents from their sleep with orders for everyone -men, women, young and old - to go outtdoors and line up. All of them - from babies to grown up men - were killed with bayonets and samurais. The few survivors recounted that babies were thrown into the air and impaled on bayonets, then thrown into the fire which razed the entire barrio.

The need to survive a war perpetrated by a foreign power united the diverse populace scattered all over three main island groupings. It was not a war that Christian Malays should fight alone. Ethnic minorities had as much a stake. It was a war that they all had to face as Filipinos.

Stories abound of how Aetas of Mt. Pinatubo pulled wounded American pilots to safety after their aircrafts were downed by Japanese fighter-bombers. Aeta tribes hid American survivors from the Japanese, nursed their wounds until they were strong enough, and showed them the way out of the mountain jungles to the main roads.

Butocan Langalen remembered how Christian, Muslim and upland communities in Cotabato and Maguindanao united in the struggle against the Japanese. He was recruited into the guerilla movement by one of his teachers in Cotabato in 1942.

"We were first assigned to the Bukana (mouth of the Rio Grande de Mindanao). Our means of communication was the gong. When we heard the gong in the Bukana, it meant that a Japanese fleet was sighted. Then the gong in the Bukana would be beaten once more, followed by the gong in Cotabato City, then the one in PC Hill, answered by the gong in Pagalamatan. Finally, the gongs in Maragas up to Datu Piang signaled if the Japanese were already anchoring in Cotabato City and it was time for us to move up to the mountains."

Langalen, like many underground elements, had to put their resourcefulness to work to fulfill their mission. One of his most dangerous assignments was when he was dispatched to pick up guns from a contact person in Cotabato. For his cover, Langalen pretended to be a KALIBAPI collector and went to Datu Suma Sinsuat, the chairman of the KALIBAPI, to ask for a booklet. KALIBAPI means Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas, purportedly a political party of the officials of the so-called "Second Republic" which was also used by the Japanese to collect taxes and to conscript forced labor among civilians.

"The KALIBAPI issued a residence certificate which everyone should carry unless he wanted to be branded a guerilla. I posed as a seller of this KALIBAPI booklet. By the time I returned with the guns, the Japanese were bombarding Cotabato City. I was sent back to count the holes made by the Japanese bombs. I couldn’t pass through the mountains due to the danger posed by the Talayanans (natives of Talayan) who were watching the mountain passes for guerillas. So I passed by the river… rode a banca with the people traveling to Kabuntalan,. We told the Japanese sentries we came from the Dulawan market and were on our way to Datu Piang because it was a Tuesday and I was due to submit my KALIBAPI collection." That saved Langalen.

Children were not spared from guerilla duties. They were usually fielded as couriers or spies, eluding Japanese suspicion. Severino Sumandal of Dinalupihan, Bataan was six years old when his father made him a spy for their guerilla unit. Who would suspect this boy - who sometimes ran around without pants and only a shirt on - of passing on to the guerillas every bit of information he heard from the Japanese? Araceli Limcaoco Dans was only 12 when she made artworks for the propaganda leaflets of the resistance movement. Raul Locsin, publisher of the Business World, was a guerilla sniper at age 12, assigned as mountain sentry of the civilian-military government at Negros Occidental.

Locsin describes the civilian-military government as "a real operating government, with auditors regularly checking on expenses."

"The military government in Negros was pretty well organized, set up by Major Jesus Villamor," Locsin said, with the operation including transmitters brought by Villamor by submarine from Australia. He also brought in the first carbines and chocolates with "I Shall Return" printed on them.

"Roberto S. Benedicto headed the Allied Intelligence Bureau, its entire Philippine operation based in Negros. His executive officer was Lorenzo Perez who later became a senator."

Filipino guerilla fighters - short of firepower and logistics, the bulk of their forces bolo-men and untrained in combat - stood up to the enemy, clearing the way for the American liberation forces that took all of two years to reach Philippine shores. Some 250,000 guerillas reinforced the Allied strength in October, 1944 - playing a crucial role in the Allied comeback as the military power in the Pacific.

THE PHILIPPINE LIBERATION

On September, 1944, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, in a meeting with President Roosevelt in Honolulu, outlined the strategy for the Allied Forces’ conquest of the Japanese forces in the Pacific. MacArthur had chosen Leyte as the entry point. He explained that this eastern coastal province was the "nearest practicable base" from which to begin the liberation campaign and geographical considerations allow for adequate air cover and support from land-based aircraft.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff set the invasion on October 20, 1944.

MacArthur had already configured the invasion plan since he left the Philippines on March, 1942. The plan basically called for a four-phase campaign, the first being to seize a foothold in the southern islands of Mindanao to establish air bases that would provide support for the next phase. In the second phase, the Allied forces will move into Central Philippines. In Leyte, major air and supply bases will be developed to serve as launching pad for the third phase - the advance to Luzon. The necessary fleet of aircraft and ships, troops and supplies will be dispatched to overcome the enemy and regain control of Luzon. In the fourth and final stage, attacks will be launched to recapture areas in southern Philippines which have been bypassed.

In mid-September of 1944, MacArthur eliminated the first phase, following an assessment that the situation in the Western Pacific would allow a direct advance to Leyte.

Battle for Leyte Gulf

One of the greatest naval battles of World War II unfolded as the US naval fleet made its way to Leyte Gulf with the Leyte invasion force. In early October, the US navy began moving towards its objective. Aircraft borne by powerful carriers bombarded the islands of Okinawa and Formosa - cutting off the main links between Japan and the Philippines. Similar attacks were made in Luzon, inflicting heavy damage on the Japanese air fleet in the Philippines, followed by fierce assaults on ships in the Visayas Sea. Admiral Halsey’s 3^rd Fleet destroyed over 700 war planes - crippling the Japanese air defense capability.

The 3^rd Fleet joined forces with the 7^th Fleet and sailed on to Leyte with the US Sixth Army under General Walter Krueger.

The Japanese Navy, in a daring attempt to stop the Allied forces, dispatched warships from the ports in Singapore, Japan and the Pescadores. The Japanese naval force under Admiral Toyoda divided into three groups - the Northern Force as decoy for the 3^rd Fleet, the diversion serving as signal for the Center Force to attack the unprotected invasion fleet and the Southern Force taking on the Allied fleet from the south.

But even before the Japanese plan can be executed, US submarines sank two Japanese carriers and reported the enemy’s location. Aircraft from Halsey’s fleet sank the main vessel of the Center Force, the super battleship Musashi and destroyed several others. Meanwhile, the Allied forces lost the USS Princeton to land-based dive bombers.

On October 25, the remaining 22 ships of the Center Force entered the Leyte Gulf undetected. The ensuing battle off the island of Samar - one of the most gallant in the history of the US Navy - dealt fatal blows on three Japanese heavy carriers while air attacks damaged many other ships.

The absence of air support proved disastrous for the Japanese naval fleet - its gunfire over10 times more powerful silenced by a humiliating defeat in the hands of the American naval forces.

Meanwhile, Admiral Olendorf’s fleet also defeated the Japanese Southern Force in the Battle of Surigao Strait while bombers and fighter planes downed the Northern Force in the battle off Cape Engano, sinking all of its four carriers.

The victory of the US Navy in the three-part Battle for Leyte Gulf left the Americans in control of Philippine waters.

Leyte Landing

MacArthur’s three-phase campaign began with landings in small islands in Leyte Gulf on October 17, 1944. By October 20, troops from the US Sixth disembarked from navy ships and marched to the Leyte mainland. MacArthhur waded ashore and climbed up a radio truck, declaring the long awaited fulfillment of a promise:

"People of the Philippines, I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil - soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples."

The Japanese reacted swiftly - its air squadrons dispatched to sink the invasion fleet regaining control of the air for a few hours on October 24. Thereafter, Japanese military supremacy started to crumble. Some 45,000 Japanese troops landed on the opposite coast as the battle of Leyte Gulf began. From this point, Japan’s imperialist conquest collapsed, pieces of the shattered dream buried in Leyte.

The Allied forces began to recover lost ground, with Filipino fighters helping clear the way to freedom.

The Luzon Campaign

January 9, 1945

On the first light of day, an impressive armada of Allied vessels glided on the waters of Lingayen Gulf. Crisp orange rays from the rising sun painted bold strokes of light on the otherwise overcast skies. Weather conditions were quite different when the Japanese invasion forces made its thrust to Luzon via Lingayen Gulf in December, 1941.

Naval support vessels fired the first salvo - hitting selected landing beaches. The bombardment shifted to the flanks of the assault area, opening the way for infrantry troops. By the last week of January, the US Sixth Army had completed the first phase of the Luzon Campaign.- tts base secure and its defense shield against counterattacks in place. The land battles began.

Following their defeat in Leyte, the Japanese forces decided to put up a static defense of Luzon. The Japanese military intended to delay the American conquest of Luzon for as long as it could to hold back as many US forces as possible and delay the American advance towards Japan. Their troops were now in the same position as the Filipino and American defenders of Bataan were three years ago - outnumbered, under-equipped, their food supply running out.

The landing in Luzon achieved a tactical surprise - unexpected by the Japanese until about two weeks later.

Suddenly, Japanese positions were battered from all sides - air attacks by allied forces and guerilla sabotage operations preventing the movement of essential supplies to defensive positions.

Soon, the Japanese abandoned the Central Luzon-Manila Bay defense lines and concentrated their forces in three mountainous strongholds.

Reports of "uncommon barbarism by panic-stricken and vengeful Japanese" were widespread.

"Particularly in the last days of their retreat, the Japanese took to more physical torture, arbitrarily killing people," recalls Rosalina Cruz Moncupa, now a drugstore owner in Dinalupihan, Bataan.

Battle for Manila

American troops entered Manila on February 3. MacArthur and the rest of the command had hoped that clearing up operations would be fast and the city spared from damage. It was only a week or so before moving in that the US forces received intelligence information that the Japanese forces are determined to hold the city.

The American forces imposed strict restrictions on artillery operations to protect the city and the civilian population. Soon, it became apparent that the battle for Manila would be difficult and costly. A war of attrition unfolded - with the protagonists fighting over Manila inch by bloody inch, with incessant bombing from the air and man-to-man combat on the ground. Army artillery and tanks had to be used to bring down the defenses in the Walled City.

The battle raged until March 3, with the Japanese losing some 16,000 men. The casualties among Filipino and American forces may not have been as high but still ran up to thousands.

When the smoke of battle had cleared, Manila was in shambles - much of it either beyond repair or reparable only at a cost too high for a country ravaged by three years of war.

The Pacific war formally ended while fighting was still underway in the Philippines. Up to August, 1945, close to 115,000 Japanese were reported to be still at large all over the country. Some 21,000 Filipino guerillas with the US military were still engaged in combat in Luzon while 22,000 other Luzon-based guerillas conducted patrol and mopping-up operations. In the Visayas and Mindanao, about 75,000 more guerillas were operating.

The cost of victory was high. The battle casualties, excluding those from the earlier invasions of Leyte and Samar, run up to 47,000 - 10,380 killed and 36,500 wounded. Families torn apart, women raped, children whose innocence faded away as they witnessed and suffered the horrors of war.

It is Christian to forgive. It is wise not to forget; otherwise, there may be no lessons learned.

But the memories are not all bitter and agonizing. There were beacons that until now light the path that nations take in pursuing their own progress and their relations with one another. The courage and dignity of a people who conquered.

Was the Army prepared for war? Would we have suffered less if it were? Who can answer with certainty? For that matter, by what standard can we measure the preparedness of a country’s military organization for the imperialist obsessions of another, and the vicious means available to pursue its end?

It was a cruel, savage war. It was not just a small country in Asia that was conquered in that war but the entire Pacific force of a world military power. It is tragic of course that this tiny speck of a country had to be pulverized before the ally she had counted on could decide to pull all its forces together to defend her.

And yet, Filipinos stood tall in defeat - refusing to yield to the deprivation and savagery of war. Filipino soldiers - half-trained, half-equipped, some still with milk on their mouth - fought battle after battle with the courage of professional soldiers toughened by years of training and drills, with the valor that only men imbued with patriotism could muster.

Truth is - Filipinos did not need the uniform and the gun to fight the invaders. The underground resistance movement - the freedom fighters of those times - took on the enemy in more ways than one, in not just the combat arena but in battlefields that vary.

For those who saw the horrors of war, young as they may have been then, the memories stare as madly as reality did at that time.

But not all the memories are seething with pain. There were beacons that until now light the path that nations take in building their strengths and pursuing relations with their neighbors. Such as the courage, the fortitude, the dignity and patriotism of a people devastated but never quite conquered by the enemy.

[Back to top]