A prolific participant on the Van Til Discussion list - and arguably one of the more reasonable and clear-minded participants of the list, is Mr. Eric Smallwood, a believer in Christian theism, and an apologist devoted to establishing the truth of Christianity and its validity as a worldview.

In this critique, I examine Mr. Smallwood's apologetic arguments. I have chosen to analyze Mr. Smallwood's messages to the Van Til Discussion list for two primary reasons. First, they show presuppositionalism in action qua apologetic method. Since in these messages Mr. Smallwood is not simply "preaching to the converted," but actually engaging a non-believing participant of the discussion, we have the opportunity to examine exactly how the presuppositionalist "method" proceeds. Second, Mr. Smallwood's apologetic, from what I have been able to determine, is typically representative of the standard presuppositionalist approach. I do not presume on this, however, should it be determined that I effectively criticize Mr. Smallwood's arguments, that I have successfully dealt with all issues which presuppositionalists bring up in their encounters with non-believers, since there are issues which do not come up or are downplayed in Mr. Smallwood's messages. I leave these other issues for other analyses. However, both of these reasons, I am confident, are confirmed by a comparison of Mr. Smallwood's messages and numerous debates I have examined, such as those involving the "transcendental argument for the existence of God" on the Secular Web.

In order to ease navigation throughout this page and thereby facilitate careful study, I have broken my analysis into three primary sections, which I shall call "trials," which divide the analysis according to the three posts submitted by Mr. Smallwood.

The following critique is offered in response to the following post to the Van Til list, submitted by apologist Eric Smallwood:

In that message, Mr. Smallwood was responding to a post to the Van Til list by Brian of Murfreesboro:

Mr. Smallwood opened his comments with the following:

Mr. Smallwood prefaces his comments by pointing out the importance of actually presenting an argument when prior bristling postured the possession of one. The question of understanding - "comprehends its language" - foreshadows the suspect nature of the presuppositionalist's reasoning. Non-acceptance of the validity or soundness of an argument can easily be explained away as a consequence of failing to grasp fully what is being argued.

Mr. Smallwood points out the obvious: that an argument's conclusion must be distinguished from the argument as a whole. But in doing so, Mr. Smallwood has already tipped his hand and shown his proclivity for stolen concepts. Notice that he believes that "reality is explainable only by the Christian God." Is God part of reality? If yes, then how does God "explain" reality? If something that is part of reality can explain reality as a whole, then why does he need to point to God? If God is not part of reality, then how can the apologist argue that God is real? This is just a taste of the kind of stolen concepts one should be prepared to find in all religious apologetics, presuppositionalism being no exception whatsoever.

Mr. Smallwood also states:

In other words, the explanatory value of appealing to zero-worship is assumed as a matter of course and habit by the apologist.

Mr. Smallwood is still clearing his throat here before addressing the non-believer's "needs" in front of his peers. But what is important here is Mr. Smallwood's implicit recognition of the fact that knowledge is hierarchical in nature - a fact which the religionist cannot keep in consistent focus throughout any comprehensive defense of his god-belief claims, as we shall see in a later section.

Already implicit in Mr. Smallwood's remarks is his awareness of the need for a starting point to one's reasoning. If knowledge is hierarchical in nature - and it is, where does that hierarchy begin? Without a starting point, requiring substantiation for every "presupposition" in one's thinking would result in an infinite regress.

Presuppositionalists famously posture their rhetoric as if they had in mind a specific idea or conception as their starting point. But, from their rhetoric, much of which tends to digress to abstract issues whenever the opportunity avails itself, it is unclear exactly what that starting point may be, and how they achieve awareness of it.

Mr. Smallwood quoted the Bible to emphasize his point:

Oddly enough, we never see such things today. What did this "evil spirit" look like? How did the author know about this event, assuming it was not a later embellishment or a complete invention? Are we to accept the telling of this tale as relating an instance of historical fact unquestioningly? Such primitive beliefs were customary in primitive cultures of primitive times. Causal attribution of disease, mental retardation or dementia to the activity of unseen "spirits" - entities of bodiless consciousness floating about and "infesting" or "corrupting" existence, was quite common among pre-scientific cultures, and bespeak their ignorance of science quite candidly. How modern Christians insist on such mythology as truth is, to say the least, quite embarrassing.

Another member of the Van Til list wrote:

Brian, the non-believer whom Mr. Smallwood challenged, responded:

And to this, Mr. Smallwood offered the following thoughts in rebuttal:

This is good to know. What, then, is Mr. Smallwood's argument to the effect that the "hypothetical atheist has no way to generalize from aparticular" [sic]? Below I will review Mr. Smallwood's apologetic, ostensibly intended to validate his claims against non-believers.

This is the claim which Mr. Smallwood puts before himself as his primary point of debate, the claim he sets out to establish. Will Mr. Smallwood demonstrate why should anyone accept this claim as true? The following analysis will answer this question.

But before we review Mr. Smallwood's arguments, there are a few questions which this claim immediately generates. For instance, where does Christianity teach induction, where does it teach that man should use induction, and why should man use it in the first place? If "the non theist's use of induction is the product of a theistic (meaning Christian) world view," as Mr. Smallwood claims, then obviously we would have to look to the Christian's religious sources for guidance on these pestering questions. But what sources offer answer these questions specifically? The concept induction is not even found in the Bible (in fact, my copy of Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible contains no entry for this term or its closer cousins).

Furthermore, the Bible (speaking of Christianity), actually shows animosity towards reason by its preference that knowledge claims be accepted on faith, and out of fear of eschatological threat. Such "epistemology" does not square with the principles and methods of reason, such as logical induction, which reserves judgment on a conclusion until the relevant facts of a case have been identified and integrated according to objective standards. Faith makes claims to knowledge regardless of what the relevant facts of the case indicate.

Also, in its preference for faith-based 'knowledge' over reason, the Bible subordinates man's comprehension to his feelings as a "means of knowing." For instance, Proverbs 1:7 tells us that fear (an emotion) holds primacy over knowledge, and Proverbs 3:5 says that the believer should not "lean upon [his] own understanding." But man's emotions are not a means of identifying knowledge, but a response to new knowledge, and the goal induction is the achievement of greater understanding. The statement "the non theist's use of induction is the product of a theistic (meaning Christian) world view" cannot be integrated into a worldview which itself downplays man's understanding and commands him to rely instead on faith as a means toward knowledge. Faith and induction are not one and the same, and even more so, the two cannot be integrated for they are fundamentally incompatible. Either one must abandon faith in order to accept the validity and applicability of induction, or, more broadly, reason; or he must dispense with reason and exclaim, "Whatever the Bible tells me, I'll accept as truth." This is not induction.

For instance, when I recently spoke to a young woman I know who is a devout "non-denominational" Christian (why would there be denominations splintering adherents of an allegedly infallible worldview into rival factions anyway?), I asked her how much of the Bible she had read. She told me that she only read a small portion of it, concentrating in Genesis, the Psalms, Proverbs and the New Testament gospels. (This sparse selectivity is typical among the vast majority of Christians I have known.) But, in spite of this, she claimed that the entirety of the Bible is true. How could she make this claim if she had not read the entirety of the Bible? Obviously, a search for truth, if it takes such an irresponsible course as this, is not genuine. Indeed, it is evasion which is sought, not enlightenment. And it is precisely this kind of intellectual default which mysticism, whose 'method' is faith, fosters in the religious mind.

Of course, in order to seal his case for such a claim - since his claim rests on the validity of Christianity, and Christianity is a form of god-belief, Mr. Smallwood would expectedly consider as his ultimate goal the task of proving the existence of God. Proving the dependence of induction on the existence of God is for the apologist, allegedly, sort of an indirect route to proving the existence of God. Thus, if he can prove the dependence of induction on the existence of God, the apologist figures, he's made a great case for the validity of his god-belief. The problem for the apologist should already be apparent to the critic, for presupposing God's existence throughout - even an indirect proof for God's existence - brings the apologist no closer to validating his god-belief, for he simply begs the question.

Clearly, Mr. Smallwood has his work cut out for himself. However, on the face of his primary assertion, the proving of which is the ostensible goal of the "transcendental argument for the existence of God" (TAG), his task appears doomed from the start. But Mr. Smallwood feels otherwise, so let us bear with him, and see what results he can produce. If his arguments fail to produce its declared results, then we are justified in rejecting his god-belief claims.

Mr. Smallwood claims that his primary assertion entails the following:

Above Mr. Smallwood declared his primary claim that "the non theist's use of induction is the product of a theistic (meaning Christian) world view." And here he offers a) and b) as clarification of this claim. At this point there are a few questions:

Does Mr. Smallwood define his terms? How does Mr. Smallwood distinguish between the "valid use of induction" and its invalid use? What is the distinction between "efficient cause" and "instrumental cause"? What is meant by "justification for the observer" and what is Mr. Smallwood's case that "the observer" even requires a "justification"? Justification from what? For what purpose is a "justification" required and what is the real consequence of (a) not having such a justification, and (b) not knowing what constitutes this justification? Indeed, has Mr. Smallwood even discussed whether or not man needs induction, and if so, why he needs it?

Also, we should ask whether these points a) and b) bring Mr. Smallwood any closer to proving his conclusion. Since both of these points obviously assume the validity of the claim that God exists, which is the very point in question, we would be wise to recognize that no progress is yet made toward an explanation or proof.

Mr. Smallwood continues his apology:

Granted, on the face of it, there is no reason why non-Christians should accept either a) or b) above. But let's see if Mr. Smallwood can offer any good reasons why these claims should be accepted.

He writes:

Here Mr. Smallwood merely repeats the very claim which is in question as if it were a proven fact, as if any argument supporting his conclusion that "God is the necessary precondition for the existence and use of induction," etc., had been presented and sustained criticism. Mr. Smallwood has skipped this part, so therefore he begs the question, and does nothing to establish the truth of theism.

Thus, when Mr. Smallwood states that "We can say that, according to [a] [the non-believer] uses induction because the 'existence' of induction is secured by God," what does he add to its support when he states, "In this case, God is the necessary precondition for the existence and use of induction, and therefore induction presupposes God"? Not only does Mr. Smallwood fail to support his assertions, he offers no basis on which his assertions can be tested for their validity. His initial claim and its clarifications a) and b) remain unsupported.

Mr. Smallwood made the following statement:

This non-believer certainly does not agree with either [a] or [b], and the apologist has so far given no reason whatsoever to accept the notion that the "use of induction is the product of Christian or theistic thinking." So far, Mr. Smallwood offers a series of bald assertions. Is there an argument in the making here?

Mr. Smallwood continues:

Who says this? The apologist does not say. Mr. Smallwood's initial claim was that "the non theist's use of induction is a product of theistic" philosophy. Is one's only alternative to accepting the presuppositionalist's claim that induction presupposes the existence of God, that one must take the say-so of theists that inductive reasoning is valid? Why would this be? Can one not discover and recognize this independent of theistic apologetic teachings? Why not?

Speaking from my own experience as a believer in the early 1990's, there was absolutely no discussion of induction or inductive norms among my fellow believers. Indeed, judging by their overall lack of education (many of them even insisted that I abandon my ambitions to earn an accredited degree at the nearby university; good thing I didn't listen), I'd say they'd each be hard-pressed to even explain what induction is, let alone answer many of the other questions brought up in this present discussion.

He continues:

Indeed, this is true. Many people have been caught up, to varying extents, in the psychological throes of god-belief, including the acceptance of a whole host of tangential and remote irrelevancies. This does not make god-belief true, nor does pointing this out further Mr. Smallwood's argument. Many people who have been quite successful at legitimate, human endeavors have been so deluded as to believe in such superstitions. I hold that their successes came in spite of the irrationality of their god-belief, not because of it. Induction is open to man, but this does not guarantee that his results will be sound.

Mr. Smallwood states:

The notion of a "false god" is a redundancy. There is no reason to belabor the point.

Observe the following statement:

By now we should be fully aware of what Mr. Smallwood's claim is. But does repeating his claim over and over, rephrasing it in a whole variety of ways, establish the truth of his claim? Obviously it does not. Mr. Smallwood obviously accepts this claim, but remains quite secretive as to why he accepts it.

Mr. Smallwood offers the following analogy:

Again, Mr. Smallwood stalls in offering an argument to establish the claim he seems so committed to defending. Why should anyone accept it? Blank out.

Mr. Smallwood confesses:

STOP RIGHT THERE: If this is the case, then "the truth of Christianity" is not to be established or demonstrated by reason. One must surrender reason and simply believe - i.e., accept the religionist's god-belief claims as true for no reason. But if it is the case that the Christian "doesn't believe that Christianity is true based on a series of arguments," then why does the apologist argue?

Smallwood continues:

Mr. Smallwood goes from repeating the claim that "God is the ground of induction" to a discussion about a supposed "encounter with the Spirit of God." First he begs the question, then he drags the discussion off course. Which point does Mr. Smallwood want to make: That "God is the ground of induction" or that discovering "the truth of Christianity" requires a mystical "encounter with the Spirit of God"?

Clearly, the tactic being engaged at this point is a classic safety mechanism which the apologist announces before his argument fails. This precaution is necessary at the outset so that a non-believer's rejection of his "argument" can be dismissed as some fault or deficit on the non-believer's part rather than because of an error in the argument's reasoning. But in doing so, the apologist admits that it is not reason which leads individuals like Mr. Smallwood to accepting his god-belief, but their feelings. No god-belief claims have been validated by this.

Mr. Smallwood claims:

Indeed, Mr. Smallwood basically admits that he must abandon rational argument and prefer instead to claim possession of a mystical experience which he is unable to repeat for those to whom he makes the claim that his God exists. What he has "modeled" so far is not objectivity, but a faulty and clumsy attempt to use logic in order to fashion mental pretzels. He seems to be trying to say both sides of a contradiction at the same time without letting the nature of his casuistry out of the bag.

Finally, Mr. Smallwood makes the following admission:

Having become frustrated with the task of establishing his claims by reason, Mr. Smallwood now condemns argument as ultimately impotent in such matters. Thus, the apologist hopes to evade the onus of proof to which his god-belief claims commit him. Mr. Smallwood attempts to dignify this evasion when he claims that such mystical evasions constitute "a personal level of Christianity."

Next, after failing to establish the truth of any of his claims thus far, Mr. Smallwood turns his attention to what a refutation of Christian theism would have to entail:

Then again, even if we did not have Objectivism, this would not make Christianity true.

Mr. Smallwood reasons:

If we agree that begging the question renders an argument invalid (and on this point, I agree that this is the case), then Mr. Smallwood must admit that his entire argument so far is invalid, for he has merely repeated the very claim he's called to establish as if this were sufficient to handle the task of proving it. The presumption in Mr. Smallwood's foregoing quote is that he as a Christian does not share any basic assumptions with non-Christians; or, that if there are any shared basic assumptions between Christians and non-Christians, to the extent that those assumptions are legitimate and sound, they belong to the Christian worldview. But what are those assumptions? So far Mr. Smallwood has yet to make any case that holds water.

The basic assumptions of Objectivism is declared explicitly at its foundation, that existence exists, and its logical corollaries, identity and consciousness. Even Mr. Smallwood must make assume each of these, albeit implicitly, though Christian theism as a whole, from start to finish, is incoherent with the undeniable foundation which Objectivism identifies. And should he attempt to challenge these primary, irreducible facts, or to posit something prior to them - thus denying their order of primacy, he necessarily checkmates himself.

To recap Mr. Smallwood's apologetic thus far, recall that above he opened his argument with the statement: "The non theist's use of induction is the product of a theistic (meaning Christian) world view." He qualified this claim with the following two points:

1. The truth in theism (God) is the efficient cause and ground for the existence of all components of induction (observer and the observed).
2. The truth of theism (the proposition of God) is the instrumental cause and ground for the valid use of induction (a justification for the observer).

In his attempt to support this claim, Mr. Smallwood offered the following key points:

Each of these statements are nothing more than a re-phrasing of his initial claim (by now we should know what Mr. Smallwood claims to be the case), which he is called to establish, and therefore does nothing to move him closer to this goal. Mr. Smallwood begs the question for he clearly assumes the truth of the very assertion he needs to prove. Where is his argument?

Meanwhile, as if to sabotage his own effort, Mr. Smallwood offers non-believers several reasons why his claim need not be accepted:

So, not only does Mr. Smallwood fail to establish his truth claim (indeed, where is his argument?), he also acknowledges (perhaps inadvertently) that there are good reasons not to accept his claim. This is demonstrated upon reviewing the merits of his "reasoning" before any alternative non-theistic solutions, which will come to light in the following sections, are laid out and developed.

Citing the following objection (from non-believing Brian):

Mr. Smallwood countered:

If Mr. Smallwood's critic held the conviction that "gravity would still continue to exist here on earth" if "somehow God 'died' tomorrow" - a position that grants validity to the notion of God, then Mr. Smallwood's response would basically be correct.

However, is the "assumption that the components of the universe exist independently of God" an unjustifiable assumption? This, we will see, is essentially the question which should be addressed, and when Mr. Smallwood states that assuming that "the components of the universe exist independently of God" as a "standard for disproving a Christian view" (see below) begs the question, we have to inquire what basic assumptions are operative in Mr. Smallwood's reasoning to this objection.

I submit that the assumptions underlying Mr. Smallwood's view here are not essentially that the existence of God is required for gravity to exist, but something deeper and more fundamental.

The other operative assumption in Mr. Smallwood's view is that an object and its identity are somehow separate or distinct - that a thing and its nature (e.g., its attributes) are not one and the same. This too is an attack on the law of identity and against objective reality. If the law of identity is intact, and one recognizes that a thing is itself - that an entity and its nature are one and the same, then there would be no justification for the apologist's mysticism and the rôle he attributes to the reality-ruling consciousness of his god-belief.

When one holds that an object behaves as it does simply because it does (e.g., that the sun exerts gravitational force against the earth), the active (yet implicit) assumption is not a form of theism or deism, as Mr. Smallwood reasons, but that existence exists, and that to exist is to have identity (i.e., that a thing is itself, that A is A, that should A exist, it must be A, regardless of any will or desire for the contrary). These are primary metaphysical facts of reality, immutable, irreducible and undeniable. As such, they are not provable; rather they are axiomatic, since any process of proof will require the assumption of these facts, and one must assume them even to deny them.

The recognition "that the components of the universe exist independently of God" (insomuch as the notion 'god' can have any meaning), becomes clear when these primary facts of reality are made explicit. The conclusion "that the components of the universe exist independently of God" is not, as Mr. Smallwood seems to believe, a primary, unargued assumption demonstrating the groundless "atheistic bias" of anti-Christian rebellion, but a consequence of the explicit recognition of the primary facts of reality, available to man's conceptual consciousness through perception. In other words, for Objectivism, atheism is a conclusion of prior reasoning about reality, by reference to what is perceptually self-evident.

In a manner of speaking, just as the fact of existence is the case for Objectivism, the recognition that existence exists independent of the activity of consciousness is the case against theism.

Thus, when Mr. Smallwood states, "If this concept was assumed to be true" - by "concept" it is understood as referring to the "basic assumption that the components of the universe exist independently of God" - "and then used as a standard for disproving a Christian view, this assumption would beg the question." But as we've seen, it is not necessarily the case that this "concept" - as Mr. Smallwood calls it - is the operative assumption supporting a treatment critical of Christianity. Since the bare root assumption is nothing more than the self-evident facts of reality, identified explicitly by axiomatic concepts which necessarily infer a rational hierarchy (e.g., existence is identity, consciousness is identification, etc.), refutation of any form of theism proceeding on such a basis does not beg the question, but follows necessarily.

Mr. Smallwood's characterization of the argument critical of Christian theism:

Note that premise 1) is basically what Mr. Smallwood projects onto non-believing critics as if the idea that "the universe (or 'components' thereof) can exist independently of God" were assumed as an irreducible primary on the non-believer's part. But there are far too many assumptions in such a statement for it to have any feasibility as a fundamental primary, so Mr. Smallwood is purposely stacking the deck, and therein his argument commits a straw man fallacy.

In distinction to the above, an Objectivist argument from objective reality (from the fact of existence), however, may proceed along the following lines:

Premises 1) though 3) are implicit in all perception, but made explicit in objective philosophy through axiomatic concepts. These truths are inescapable and presumed in all cognition.

Premises 4) through 6) logically follow from the Objectivist axioms.

Premises 7) and 8) are only necessary once the notion of a universe-creating, reality-ruling consciousness is posited by the mystic.

One does not "presuppose" anything about the "Christian triune God" - either that God exists or that God does not exist - when he recognizes the fact that existence exists, even when that recognition is completely implicit. To argue otherwise is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept (for such an assertion would fail to recognize objective conceptual priority and the hierarchical nature of knowledge). Asking "Why does existence exist?" - to anticipate the theist - is also invalid, for it would require one to posit something prior to existence, and again commit the fallacy of the stolen concept. We must start somewhere, and this is it: the undeniable, unchanging fact of existence. Furthermore, what we perceive must come before what we conceptualize, for otherwise we would have no content to conceptualize.

The operative assumption lying hidden at the root of virtually all theistic arguments is that a form (i.e., act) of consciousness must be posited as primary to existence and identity, that form of consciousness being responsible for the fact that existence exists and supplying the 'glue' that bridges the invented gap assumed to separate an entity from its identity. (Humean skepticism fares no better than theism, for it also argues - because Hume thought that human cognition begins on the sensory level of consciousness rather than on the perceptual level - that we cannot prove that an entity and its identity are not separate and distinct.)

Even the theist, in attempting either to argue for theism or to refute challenges to his theism, must implicitly assume the fact the primacy of existence for several reasons, which will be articulated below.

The apologist himself implicitly assumes that existence exists independently of consciousness when he asserts any statement as fact. When one states something as fact, he asserts it as something that is objectively true, i.e., as something in reality independent of his own consciousness, independent of his or anyone else's acceptance or rejection of the claim. Thus, in two respects, personally and socially, the apologist implicitly rejects the primacy of consciousness when he asserts a claim as true of objective reality, a truth that is thought to be true independent of consciousness. This is the implicit recognition of the primacy of existence, the fact that existence holds primacy over consciousness.

Similarly, when the theist asserts the claim "God exists," he asserts this claim as true of reality, as a fact that is dependent neither upon his own mind's integrity (or disintegration) and cognitive functions, nor upon the minds of others. He does not assert that "God exists" only in his own mind or in the minds of others, for this would certainly not be compelling and it would defeat his apologetic ambitions. Because the apologist asserts the claim "God exists" as a genuine identification of fact, he necessarily implies the validity of the primacy of existence. Essentially, the theist claims "God [or whatever] exists outside my mind, independent of my conscious functions." By doing so, the theist implicitly affirms the fact that existence as such exists independent of consciousness and that the task of consciousness is not to create or invent reality, but to identify it. And thus he affirms the validity and pertinence of the primacy of existence.

Furthermore, the theist asserts the supposed truth of his claim "God exists" as true independent even of God's own (alleged) mind itself (even if we do not grant that God could deny Himself), otherwise theism would admittedly reduce to divine solipsism. So even with respect to the primacy of supernatural consciousness, the theist's very act of claiming that God exists still affirms implicitly the primacy of existence.

In any case, thus, we see that the theist implicitly affirms the primacy of existence simply by asserting the claim that God exists.

But the claim itself that "God exists" is a claim that is diametrically contrary to the primacy of existence, for it is the assertion of its opposite, the primacy of consciousness. The primacy of consciousness holds that existence (reality) is the product of an act or form of consciousness, thus consciousness has the upper hand over existence. As corollaries to this view, the primacy of consciousness holds that the identity of entities (i.e., of objects which exist) is subject to conscious revision at will, and that consciousness is metaphysically causal (i.e., that consciousness creates its own objects; cf. "divine creation"). In this way, we see that the theist wants to have his cake (i.e., the certainty of the primacy of existence as a basis for asserting truths and identifying reality), and to eat it, too (i.e., the fantasy of the primacy of consciousness and the evasion of the law of identity).

In Christianity, for instance, we find the doctrine of creation, which states that God, a "bodiless, unextended Spirit and Will" (i.e., a form of consciousness "beyond existence") created the universe (i.e., the realm of existence, including the galaxies, the stars, the planets, the solar system, and life on earth) through an exclusively conscious process (i.e., by his will God commanded the universe to "come into" existence). This is an explicit expression of the view that consciousness holds metaphysical primacy over existence.

In epistemology, Christianity asserts the doctrine of 'faith' as the believer's means of acquiring knowledge of the supernatural. Since Reason will neither lead to nor validate god-belief, the believer must assert a non-rational means of acquiring the "knowledge" (a term used most loosely here, for obvious reasons) he claims to possess of the supernatural. According to Objectivism, this is mysticism, which Ayn Rand defined as

Here we have an explicit admission, by a Christian apologist, that one's feelings are thought to be a means of perception, and therefore of gathering and validating knowledge. Not only does this openly embrace the subjective view of knowledge by assuming the primacy of emotions over knowledge, it also undermines any attempt to argue objectively for one's conclusions, even if that conclusion is the claim that God exists.

To deflate a doomed balloon, you need only one arrow. And in the case of showing the invalidity of god-belief, you need nothing more than the believer's own unwitting and implicit affirmation of the primacy of existence.

Mr. Smallwood cautions us that, "If this concept was assumed to be true and then used as a standard for disproving a Christian view, this assumption would beg the question." But, as Mr. Smallwood's own statements acknowledge, this particular assumption (that "the components of the universe exist independently of God"), is not assumed to be basic, in the case of a critique stemming from Objectivist fundamentals. The recognition that existence exists independently of consciousness is implicit in perception as well as in any truth claim (as we saw above); but the implicit nature of this recognition is identified explicitly by Objectivism. And once Objectivism is achieved, we recognize in principle by corollary that existence is not a creation of consciousness. Even the theist's own actions affirm this.

Smallwood wrote:

That's fine. I would hazard that the point which the critic of presuppositionalism was trying to make above, was that there is no inconsistency in affirming the self-sufficiency of the universe and the non-existence of the Christian God. The part about "if God died tomorrow" was, in my reading of it, simply rhetorical and contextually generous to the theist's position. I do not think that the straw man charge which Mr. Smallwood mounts here is compellingly plausible.

But notice what Mr. Smallwood states next:

Why does Mr. Smallwood assume that the search for a valid world view "turns to a theological evaluation of competing theistic world views" after one looks "for a basic atheistic view" in his effort to find "a valid non Christian view"? If the discovery and/or validation of a non-Christian view is one's goal, what is the relevance of theology? Which theology governs the "evaluation competing theistic world views"? Must an "evaluation of competing theistic world views" find its basis in some assumed theology, or can the evaluation of theism stem from an objective basis (such as Objectivist Atheology)?

Mr. Smallwood asserts that a search for "a valid non Christian view," which (apparently by necessity) "turns to a theological evaluation of competing theistic world views," "argues for theism over non theism, and then Christian theism over other theisms" [sic]. But why is that? Mr. Smallwood does not say. He merely asserts it as if it were an obvious fact.

Of course, theists of a color different from Christianity (and even some Christians as well) may contest Mr. Smallwood's apparently hasty remark that "[f]inding a valid non Christian view begins by looking for a basic atheistic view," by pointing out that a theistic competitor to Christianity may be "a valid non Christian view." Certainly, non-Christian theists probably think that their worldviews are valid, Mr. Smallwood's disapproval of such assessments notwithstanding. Of course, Objectivism would not agree with this, but Mr. Smallwood, who as a theist himself obviously grants theism validity to begin with, overlooks this potential problem, which is completely coherent with his own broadly defined premises (i.e., given his general commitment to the primacy of consciousness). In the final analysis, this is Mr. Smallwood's problem to tackle and resolve, since granting theism validity necessarily invites such conflict and rivalry.

For the Rational Man, as rare as he may be, the search for a valid view of reality begins by looking at the facts of reality as his starting point - especially those facts which he normally takes completely for granted, and by identifying them in the broadest and most explicit terms. How can a view of reality, whose purpose is to identify reality in a manner coherent to Man's needs qua Man, be valid if it should fail to isolate the primary, essential facts of reality as its starting point? What can be more primary than the facts of reality? The whims of an alleged supernatural form of consciousness, whose existence must be accepted on faith, but can never be established by Reason?

Certainly, Mr. Smallwood - along with those who would agree with his reasoning here - has some explaining to do.

He states:

Which "non theistic world view is foundationally logically invalid"? And which non-theistic worldview "cannot within itself account for its own truth claim"? Which truth claim is under dispute here?

Certainly, there are many invalid philosophical views which are not theistic in nature. But their invalidity (or, more accurately, their unsuitability to Man) as philosophical systems is not due essentially to their dissociation with or rejection of god-belief; and their list of errors goes far beyond their inability to avoid contradiction or fall into the same pitfalls as religion. What should concern an individual surveying various philosophical viewpoints is not only the solidity of its foundations, but also its consequences when put into practice. Whether or not a particular viewpoint or philosophical doctrine is suitable for Man should be a primary factor in determining its value, and the resistance to examining this criterion seriously (since, for instance, one may reject Man as irrelevant to the standards of a worldview), should tell us something at the start.

It is not the Objectivist position that non-theism alone guarantees philosophical soundness. This would only cheapen its principles. Instead, Objectivism begins by willingly and delightfully embracing the challenge it puts before itself to name its starting point, a starting point which assumes nothing prior to itself, either implicitly or explicitly. For the Objectivist, this initial truth claim, existence exists, is undeniable and essentially primary. How can even a theist, regardless of his embrace of the arbitrary or regardless of his rejection of Reason, argue against the constantly and readily perceivable fact that existence exists?

Naturally, anticipating the theist's own automatized dependence on stolen concepts, we can expect the apologist to insist that the Objectivist "account for" the very fact of existence, as if existence could be explained by something prior to existence. The assumption that existence itself is neither fundamental nor primary, is so taken for granted by the theist that he does not recognize the conceptual breach of this all-too frequent and devastating philosophical error. It is so habitual for the theist that he implicitly (yea, even psychologically) assumes that all persons, theistic and atheistic, naturally grant stolen concepts the same validity he does. Objectivism, however, does not. And here the theist sets up his own checkmate.

Mr. Smallwood makes the following qualified concession:

If this were the case for every non-theistic system, that by nature non-theistic philosophy "can offer no justification for [the use of logic] apart from appealing to its use," this could indeed be a problem. But how does Mr. Smallwood (or any other apologist so persuaded) establish that all non-theistic systems commit this blunder, and how does he demonstrate his contention that a non-theistic philosophy defaults on this matter by virtue of its nature as being non-theistic? Either he has some homework which demonstrates his review of every possible non-theistic system, or he is parroting another source which claims to have done such research. Where is that research?

Objectivism does not offer a justification for the use of reason or logic simply by "appealing to its use." Objectivism appeals to the perceptible facts of reality. Again, existence exists. By now this should become clear.

Mr. Smallwood continues:

Mr. Smallwood states that "the argument is often made that Christianity is substantiated, in part, by the 'impossibility of the contrary' (I personally would rather say the implausibility of the contrary)." Presuppositionalists are fond of parroting this claim, and of boasting that their particular apologetic approach is to "argue for Christian theism from the impossibility of the contrary." From what I have seen, this alleged "impossibility of the contrary" seems often to be taken for granted by most presuppositionalists, such as the well-known apologist Greg Bahnsen, as if the bulk of their homework were already completed, documented and readily comprehended by non-believers. Though this is far from the case, many non-believers may be deceived by this presumptuousness on the apologist's part, and grant credence where no credence is due. If this is the intention behind repeating the claim that "the truth of Christian theism follows from the impossibility of the contrary" (and I suspect it is), then clearly the apologist is seeking the unearned so far as his ambition in debate is concerned. This would hardly come as a surprise.

Objectivism is, to say the least, quite contrary to the Christian worldview. Does Mr. Smallwood therefore hold that Objectivism is impossible or implausible? If this is his view, it would be very hard to discern it from his statements, for he demonstrates no awareness of Objectivism anywhere in his apologetic. If Mr. Smallwood is of the opinion that Objectivism is either impossible or implausible, can he show why he believes this? Or, does he simply expect his readers to accept his assertion on faith, without putting any effort into proving his own claim?

However, not all advocates of presuppositionalism are completely square with the proclivity to take "the impossibility of the contrary" for granted. In considering whether or not Bahnsen has or can clearly demonstrate the truth of this apologetic mantra, apologist Greg Welty, a former member of the Van Til Discussion list, offers frank criticism in the following (citing famous debates between Bahnsen and atheist scholars):

Or, as apologist S. Joel Garver remarks:

Indeed, citing problems within or refuting a worldview does not simultaneously accomplish the task of establishing a potential rival to that worldview. Just because, for instance, a presuppositionalist can demonstrate problems with a materialist view of reality (assuming he is not straw-manning his subject matter), does not mean that the "reformed faith" is true. Since he claims that his god-belief is true, he bears the onus to argue for the supposed merits of his doctrines, not simply assume them to be sound.

For these reasons, the presuppositionalist appeal to "the impossibility of the contrary" is incomplete and invidiously suspicious. Therefore, I cannot consider it to be a valid maneuver.

In anticipation of plausible criticism for fleeing behind the skirt of "the impossibility of the contrary," Mr. Smallwood explains that "This doesn't mean that presuppositional approach is a completely 'negative' apologetic, relying only on the negation of other views, rather this is a 'part' of the apologetic." To be honest, that's good to hear, for so far, the only real 'meat' of any apologetic attempt I've seen to date among presuppositionalists has consisted in nitpicking the non-believer to "account for" all kinds of items under the sun, as if the average non-believer fashioned himself as a Rhodes Scholar, or perhaps the creator of the universe himself! Is such practice, amounting to "if you cannot provide an account for X, you must believe Y," appropriate to the validation of one's claims?

So far as I have seen "applied presuppositionalism" practiced as an approach to Christian apologetics, the primary aim has not been to establish the truth of the apologist's god-belief claims at all, but to attack the unsuspecting (and usually philosophically unprepared) non-believer's confidence in his own ability to reason. The alleged "truth" of Christian theism is thus assumed to "win" by default, as the apologist will insist that his assertion of "God" is sufficient to "explain" all issues brought up during such an encounter. If the apologist is successful, the non-believer, now convinced that there's cause for doubting his own view of things, begins to grant validity the apologist's hidden, unexpressed premises, which remain undefended yet (sometimes) subtly camouflaged throughout his jargon and convolutions. From this point forward, the process of apologetics becomes more a matter of psychological dismantling, with the non-believer's views of reality becoming choked with the apologist's own confusions, contradictions and reversals.

If the presuppositional approach has a positive means of establishing its truth claims (as if a truth claim could be established simply by negating competing truth claims), several questions should be addressed by those advocating such an approach. For instance, what is the presuppositionalist's starting point? How does the presuppositionalist gain awareness of this starting point? Does this starting point, or the means by which he gains awareness of this supposed starting point, presuppose any prior knowledge or means which the apologist ignores, denies or rejects outright?

Mr. Smallwood states that the "presuppositional approach is not a completely 'negative' apologetic," thus suggesting the promise that there is some positive aspect to its argumentative ambitions. But if the presuppositionalist has a positive argument for the existence of God, an argument which does not beg the question by assuming God's existence in one of its premises (thereby disqualifying it as an instance of invalid reasoning), what is that argument? What is his first premise? What is his second premise? Are there more premises? If so, what are they? Are these premises perceptually undeniable, or do they require the support of sub-arguments themselves? If so, what are those sub-arguments, and are they sound? What connects these premises? A process of reason?

"In conclusion," Mr. Smallwood recommends, "I would encourage you to be patient with the posts on this forum, recognizing that there is a history behind them and continued dialogue can bring that history to light."

I have been patient. And I've watched for a long time. And still, I have seen nothing to convince me of any of your god-belief claims. So far, Mr. Smallwood has failed to establish the truth of his theistic claims.

The following critique is offered in response to the following post to the Van Til list, submitted by apologist Eric Smallwood:

In that message, Mr. Smallwood was responding to a post to the Van Til list by Brian of Murfreesboro:

Mr. Smallwood continues his attempts to convince the non-believer of the "truth" of Christian theism, beginning with his response to the following remark made by Brian the unconvinced:

Mr. Smallwood responded:

Actually, the essential point of contention between advocates of god-belief and those who do not accept god-belief claims is not how "a given world view explains induction," but whether or not the apologist's god-belief claims are true. The whole issue with induction tends to be a sideshow intended to drag the specious nature of the apologist's claims out of the direct attention of his non-believing audience. This needs to be borne in mind if one chooses to address the matter of inductive principles and the justification of their foundation.

Instead, the Bible clearly takes induction for granted - a luxury which the apologists do not want non-believers to enjoy, then gives all induction the slip by attacking the laws of identity and causality which anchor a rational view of induction (e.g., faith, supernaturalism, 'revelation', miracles, double orientation, psychological dissociation, confusing emotion with knowledge, etc.). A rational, healthy-minded view of induction is certainly not compatible with such superstition and fantasy, and the apologist's hand-waving about the Christian God, contrary to his claims, explains nothing.

This is the attempt to cohere a view of knowledge (epistemology) with the view one accepts of the nature of reality (metaphysics). In this sense, and only in this context, can it be recognized that a legitimate issue lies at the root of the apologist's intellectual meandering. Unfortunately, since the issue of metaphysical primacy is never explicitly (or honestly) addressed, the apologist fails to check his premises thoroughly, and consequently perpetuates the error. As Ayn Rand herself noted in reflecting on the philosophical impact of religion,

But remember also that earlier Mr. Smallwood stated (see above):

The important point to note here is Mr. Smallwood's notion that the non-believer's "pragmatic use of induction is the product of Christian or theistic thinking." This notion is not supported by the facts of the case, and nowhere does Mr. Smallwood prove this. Then, when Brian mentioned that induction in some form was in practice among members of non-Christian societies, even before the first century of the Current Era (i.e., before the genesis and spread of Christian ideas), Mr. Smallwood responded that his argument is being misunderstood.

First of all, such characterizations are asserted in order to slander atheism as such. If one accepts the premises of such a characterization, no one would want to be caught endorsing such an obviously problematic notion that the universe is governed by chance, randomness, accidents, etc. It is the attempt to link atheism as such with disorder at the metaphysical level of non-believing philosophy. No good reason is given for accepting this.

Second, arguments which attempt to show that atheists must ultimately be committed to a random universe always stem from the primacy of consciousness, since the only alternative to this randomness, we are told, is "design," which means, the activity of a supernatural form of consciousness. Such arguments accept the premise that "design" versus "chance" as exhaustive metaphysically, even though apologists can give no good reason for accepting this dichotomy. Since the metaphysical basis of this dichotomy is invalid (existence does not find its source in a form of consciousness), there is good reason to reject it.

Third, such characterizations are made in gross ignorance of rational philosophy, such as Objectivism. Objectivism neither asserts nor sanctions the false dichotomy "design" or "chance" in its metaphysics. Objectivism recognizes that the concept which such dichotomies ignore and/or reject is causality, which is defined by Miss Rand in her novel Atlas Shrugged:

The point made here is that there is no causality without existence, that causality necessarily presupposes existence and the identity of those entities engaged in the action in question. If we have the law of identity, then the law of causality is necessarily valid, since causality is the law of identity applied to action. And if existence exists, then that which exists is that which exists, or A is A, which means: the law of identity is valid. Man has no need to jump beyond existence, beyond nature, beyond the universe, beyond reality, in order to recognize the validity of these self-evident facts of reality. Jumping beyond existence and identity only renders one's own mind philosophically impotent. Or, as Miss Rand states,

Here we see eloquently how broad are the philosophical implications of rejecting the fundamental facts of reality in one's metaphysical premises. This is what primitive philosophy would have us do, and history has shown exactly these results. Existence is the result of a conscious act, they tell us - which is causeless in matter; man's "ultimate knowledge" is not the result of his own efforts and discoveries, but a "gift of revelation" - which is unearned in epistemology. Man's moral nature is predetermined by his inheritance, not by his own choices, actions and values - which is the unearned in ethics. His salvation from his depravity, which he did not choose, cannot be achieved by his own actions, but must be given to him in an act of mercy, which they call "grace" - which is the unearned in spirit. In each case, the fundamental in operation is the rejection of the law of identity.

Apologists who are committed to their god-beliefs will likely continue trying to establish the validity of such false dichotomies, since they are unwilling to question the fundamentals of their view of reality. So long as they accept the notion that existence finds its source in a form of consciousness (the doctrine of metaphysical subjectivism), there will be a need for them to defend the idea that the only alternative to supernatural "design" is "stupid, blind Luck" or action without identity. Both alternatives reduce to a false metaphysics.

When Brian pointed out:

Mr. Smallwood responded:

Is the description of a worldview as "atheistic" sufficient to generate this allegedly "rational conclusion about [an atheist's] worldview"? If this is what the apologist believes, he is sorely naïve and intellectually inconsiderate. Such an assumption indicates that the apologist has fallen prey to a very common misunderstanding about the nature of atheism as such. That misunderstanding is that atheism per se is a unified, systematic worldview in its own right, and that those who are threatened by the fact that some people do not accept the religionist's god-belief claims, can assume what it is that atheists do accept as truth in regard to a view of reality, knowledge, morality, etc. This misunderstanding is just one of the unchecked premises lingering in the apologist's repertoire of arbitrary ideas.

Atheism is here defined as absence of god-belief, and is negative in nature. Atheism is not a positive and says nothing about what an individual does believe about the world, reality and Man. The assumption that one's non-theism per se is a primary indicator of one's philosophical view, however implicit that view may be, is also a hasty error. On the contrary, the issue fundamental to all philosophy is the issue of metaphysical primacy, as identified by Ayn Rand:

Mr. Smallwood wrote:

That the focus of discussion should be the validity of a world view, rather than the "moral or intellectual standing" of its representatives and advocates, is agreed. However, caution is in order on this point that we not overlook the fact that a worldview may yet be consistent within itself, but still not be properly rooted in an objective view of reality (cf. the issue of metaphysical primacy). If the primacy of consciousness is the metaphysical anchor of a system of thought, virtually any means one can imagine to make that system appear internally consistent with itself can be said to be "valid" by its apologists.

In a most eloquent passage, Thomas Paine wrote,

Principally, this suggests to me that the consistency of a set of doctrines within themselves is not a guarantee of those doctrines' truth. Where Paine speaks of the consistency of various relevant stories with one another, the same principle he identifies is surely applied - and most importantly so - to the issue of the inter-doctrinal coherence of a particular philosophy. It is not enough, in other words, that the doctrines of Mr. Smallwood's preferred worldview be consistent with each other (even if he professes the conviction that they are rationally consistent with each other). What is at issue, and what should be emphasized by Mr. Smallwood were this his concern, is whether or not those doctrines are consistent with the general, perceptually self-evident facts of reality. And if Mr. Smallwood objects to an appeal to the perceptually self-evident facts of reality as pertinent to the matter of first philosophy, he is certainly invited to state his objection for the record.

It is not a false dichotomy to expect both internal consistency and consistency with reality in the formation of a philosophy. And it is a compromise to settle for one, in the name of upholding the other, or denying it. There can be no call to sacrifice philosophical consistency for the sake of adherence to reality, for reality is singular and self-sufficient, not a dependent or derivative. Indeed, a consistency which discards contextually-relevant facts offers man no more value than a reality in chaos or constantly subject to revision from without or above.

What is commendable is that Mr. Smallwood's statement suggests that he has respect for the virtue of intellectual consistency. But we are not told whether or not his respect for consistency would still apply when it comes to critiquing the Bible, the source of his preferred god-belief's doctrines. Would Mr. Smallwood be consistent to his apparent respect for intellectual consistency should his commitment to explicitly biblical doctrines be subjected to scrutiny?

Mr. Smallwood states:

Mr. Smallwood continues:

Naturally, this is a question of starting points, what one's starting point identifies, and the means by which he is aware of what his starting point identifies. What specifically is the presuppositionalist's starting point, and how is he aware of it? Is his starting point the facts of reality, the awareness of which he acquires through perception, or is it an alleged consciousness transcending reality which communicates through revelations? If the latter is what he claims as his starting point, how is he aware of it, and how is this starting point epistemologically primary?

Mr. Smallwood made the following comment:

Again, this has to do with one's starting points and the manner in which a given worldview, theistic or not, deals with the issue of metaphysical primacy, as defined above. If existence exists, it has metaphysical primacy, and no religious view can overturn this fact. Since all god-belief reduces to the primacy of consciousness view of reality, it is invalid. This applies to Christianity as well as to Islamic beliefs, or any other form of god-belief, for the same reasons. This is why you will see in apologetic encounters between Christians and believers in opposing religious ideas, such as Islam, debate essentially boils down to a matter of "our god is better than your god for the following reasons…"

Since both the Christian and the non-Christian theistic viewpoints fundamentally endorse the primacy of consciousness error, neither side can deal effectively with fundamental issues and remain philosophically intact at the same time. For to question the fundamental essentials of a rival god-belief, if indeed such a line of interrogation should address the issue of metaphysical primacy, criticism would equally apply to both views, in spite of their apparent opposition, broadly speaking. Like democrat and republican presidential candidates, the two differ only in degree and detail, not in fundamentals.

Brian the skeptic wrote:

And Mr. Smallwood responded:

In a very broad sense, Mr. Smallwood is correct here. But all of this should be reduced to more fundamental essentials in order not to smuggle false premises into the mix.

The Objectivist view of induction will naturally find its validity on the soundness of its primary axioms, existence, identity and consciousness. Objectivism holds that to exist is to have identity, that existence is identity. If A should exist, it must be A. Also, Objectivism rejects the idea that a form of consciousness is metaphysically responsible for A being A. This view, the primacy of consciousness view, is invalidated by the fact that existence exists.

Moreover, where Mr. Smallwood holds that "there has to be events that are observed, events that 'are' similar and do occur on an orderly basis," Objectivism takes this analysis back one step. Rather than beginning with events per se (i.e., as if causality itself held primacy), Objectivism recognizes that there are no events apart from the entities which act in those events. This fact, too, should not be carelessly taken for granted in the development of a thoroughgoing analysis of induction. Thus, if there are events to speak of, there must be entities which are causing those events. And if there are entities which are causing those events under consideration, then we have identity to work with, since to exist is to have identity. And so on.

Induction therefore requires an object to be perceived (existence) and an observer which perceives (consciousness), and a means of reasoning (the conceptual level of consciousness). Existence and consciousness are the rudimentary requirements. What is important is how a particular view answers the question: Which holds metaphysical primacy?

Pay very close attention to Mr. Smallwood's following remark:

Correction: It is the evolution of Man's consciousness to the conceptual level that is the instrumental cause for induction. The facts that existence exists, that existence exists independently of any act of consciousness (objective reality), and the fact that Man's consciousness is capable of conceptual thought, are the rudimentary facts which must lie at the heart of any attempt to solve the "problem" of induction.

By qualifying both human intelligence and the "natural order of the universe" as the product of design, Mr. Smallwood is here caught trying to smuggle in the very assumptions he is called to defend. We know that existence exists, and upon this recognition we can determine that we have consciousness of that existence. The two basic components are self-evident: we have the object of induction right in front of us (existence), and we have the means of induction within us (consciousness). This is not controversial since they must be assumed by both sides of the debate (indeed, Mr. Smallwood acknowledged this in the preceding paragraph).

Mr. Smallwood at no point demonstrates any awareness that he has contaminated his reasoning with unargued assumptions, the basis of which he is called to validate. This is most likely a consequence of his having deceived himself into believing that god-belief is valid by default.

Now, Mr. Smallwood flagrantly interjects his assumption that "intelligent humanity" is a creation (thereby assuming a creator) and that existence is the product of design (thereby assuming a designer). Mr. Smallwood has assumed his way through his "argument," but nowhere does he justify these questionable assumptions. (It is because the "transcendental argument for the existence of God" ["TAG"] relies ultimately on the validity of more traditional theistic arguments - e.g., first cause, design argument, etc. - that we should recognize TAG as such to be little more than a rip-off, posited as concerning itself with more profound epistemological issues - e.g., induction, universals, etc. - when in reality these issues are merely window-dressing.)

Then he remarks that the critic is "assuming that all we need is an observer and we have induction; no God is necessary. That is the very claim that the non theist has to justify." But Mr. Smallwood himself has already acknowledged that the two basic components of induction are the object of observation and the conscious observer! Why would the recognition of the necessity of these two components entail the further necessity to assume either that a God is or is not responsible for the creation of human intelligence and/or that a God is or is not responsible for the design of the universe, unless this is already assumed? And if it already assumed, what justifies it? Mr. Smallwood never tells us.

Does Mr. Smallwood make the assumption, on the par with what he accuses the non theist, that Allah is not necessary for induction? Is the assumption that the existence of Blarko the WonderBeing is not a precondition for induction necessary to the success and justification for induction?

This is the kind of reversal which the apologist uses to grind his axe in order to debate. What the apologist seeks to evade is his onus of proof. Instead of justifying any of his questionable assumptions, he places on his critics the arbitrary onus of justifying their non-assumption of his questionable assumptions. When a critic counters that he has no such onus, he is accused of begging the question. Nowhere does the theist establish any truth to this claim that the supernatural exists, which is the central point of the debate, and he pounds his chest in the meanwhile as if he's scored a major victory.

This is indeed a very dishonest way to parade a supposed argument.

Here, Mr. Smallwood attempts to shirk the onus of proving his claim that "god exists" by committing a reversal to have his critics prove that god does not exist. He disguises his reversal by attaching his negative claim to a would-be positive claim which he expects his critics to defend. After defining the problem as he sees it to be - that the non-theist has "no means of verifying" that the universe does not require a God in order to exist, but must naively assume it to be so by fiat, Mr. Smallwood then asks "How exactly is such a universe proven to exist?"

Mr. Smallwood should recognize that the existence of the universe, whatever its attributes and nature, is not under dispute here. Existence exists. The universe is the sum total of existence. While the theist may object to the definition of 'universe' (he's welcome to supply his own and argue for it, being careful to cite the source of his definition and to explain how his concept was formed), this is not essential to his claim that a God exists. Disguising his claim to appear as an onus belonging to the non-theist (that onus ostensibly being to prove the existence of the universe) is an attempt to smuggle hidden assumptions into the argumentative framework accepted by all sides of the argument. Those hidden assumptions are the inarticulate presupposition of the primacy of consciousness view of reality.

The existence of the universe is not in dispute, nor is it the topic of debate. To endow the universe as being subject to the "influence" of God, is itself specious and untenable. When the apologist demands that the nonbeliever prove that a universe void of the influence of God exists, this is even more specious. Nothing short of assuming that God exists can justify such a demand, yet this is precisely what Mr. Smallwood is called to prove.

In response to this statement, to show how empty it really is, and to show how its line of reasoning can be used against Christian theism to boot, I offer the following rephrasing of the same. To show how Mr. Smallwood's argument resists any kind of rational verification, I have changed a few of the inputs but maintained the basic reasoning of Mr. Smallwood's last paragraph. The words in bold replace Mr. Smallwood's original words:

Thus, if Mr. Smallwood - or anyone else siding with his argument here - denies the existence of Blarko, he commits himself to the same fallacy he accuses the atheist of committing. If the apologist retorts that God does not require Blarko's creative and sustaining activity, he begs the question, for this is precisely what he must prove. If the apologist argues that God's self-sufficiency justifies the assertion that God does not require Blarko's creative and sustaining activity, he still begs the question, for this is essentially what he is called to prove, according to his own line of reasoning. After all, if the non-believer rejects the apologist's theistic presuppositionalism on the basis that existence exists independently of the activity of consciousness (divine or otherwise), the non-believer is accused of begging the question, for it is precisely this, sayeth the apologist, that the non-believer is called to prove.

Naturally, the apologist will insist that the Blarko-believer prove that Blarko exists and that the Christian God cannot exist without Blarko's creative and sustaining activity. But the apologist has already argued against non-theism on the tacit assumption that everything requires an explanation beyond itself (though he makes exception to this 'rule' in order to make room for his god-belief). After all, the apologist holds, the universe cannot exist as a self-sufficient primary, needing no explanation beyond itself (he will likely claim that this is somehow incoherent).

Indeed, Mr. Smallwood himself interjected that, "Simply because the non-theist doesn't 'see' God doesn't argue that he is justified in saying that the universe exists just fine without God." (Does he imply here that the theist does "see" God?) So, if the non-theist is not justified in asserting the universe (which, by the way, is the sum total of existence) as a self-sufficient primary, requiring no "explanation" beyond itself (indeed, appealing to non-existence "explains" nothing), what justifies the theist in his claim that God is a self-sufficient primary, needing no explanation beyond itself? He cannot prove this, he can only beg the question (e.g., repeat the claim in a variety of essentially similar statements, as we've seen above, or appeal to the Bible, etc.; of course, things may be different if a god actually existed.)

If the apologist argues that God is self-sufficient by definition, then his argument has already been checkmated; for the non-theist may simply point out - and rightly so - that the universe, by definition, is a self-sufficient primary (i.e., the universe as defined as the sum total of existence leaves nothing to "explain" it). On every square of the chessboard the theist attempts to position his pieces, he cannot protect his king from its vulnerability. That vulnerability is the apologist's enshrinement of the arbitrary in the place of legitimate knowledge.

Of course, the Blarko-believer will find a ready need here for his Blarko to fill here, claiming that Blarko must be the object of God's consciousness (since consciousness requires an object, and without Blarko, God would not be conscious prior to any creative activity). So, already the Blarko-believer can gain the upper hand over the Christian apologist, playing the same arbitrary game.

The point is that we can multiply the arbitrary all we like, ad nauseum, if first we grant the arbitrary validity. The question, however, is: Why grant the arbitrary any validity at all? If Mr. Smallwood expects his original line of reasoning in the above paragraph to hold argumentative validity, how can he object to my revision of that line of reasoning above?

So far, the "defense" which Mr. Smallwood offers for his faith is nothing short of a catastrophe of reasoning.

Mr. Smallwood asks:

Objective reality "says" this. A fact is a fact, whether or not any of us choose to acknowledge it. To discover the facts of reality, we must acquire awareness of them somehow, and that somehow begins with perception.

He then states:

If one wishes to discover how this all "came about," we need look no further than the facts of the case. Existence exists. This fact is both fundamental and primary and must be incorporated into any such explanation. To exist is to be something specific. When we perceive an object, we perceive it - i.e., we become aware of it as a whole, as an entity, as something with a specific nature. Which means: our awareness is valid. This is a completely natural process. Some dogs, for instance, can distinguish perceptually a Frisbee thrown to them by their own master from another Frisbee thrown nearby to another dog from another master. The perceptual level of consciousness is a powerful integrating mechanism. This is the starting point of it all.

Man, as opposed to the dog, has a capacity for integration far beyond that of simply distinguishing one flying object from another. This is because he has evolved beyond the perceptual level of consciousness, and has developed the conceptual level of consciousness. But he still requires the perceptual level of his consciousness, for otherwise he would have no content to conceptualize. Any genuine search for "the fundamental explanation for how this came about," is intellectually naïve if it overlooks or fails to take such facts into account.

Mr. Smallwood reasons:

But perception of an object in action is sufficient for Man to acquire awareness of the primary facts of reality, and to identify them conceptually (since he possesses the conceptual level of consciousness). The axioms identify in explicit terms the facts which we perceive. We are justified in assuming the validity of the axioms if indeed the facts which they identify are perceptually available. The facts which the axioms identify are perceptually available. If the facts of reality are facts of reality, then the law of identity holds. And if the law of identity holds, then the law of causality holds (since causality is the identity of action). Thus, facts are facts by virtue of their existence, not by virtue of an act of consciousness (e.g., intention, whim, fantasy, wish-fulfillment, etc.). So, these things do not occur because one thinks they ought to; rather, one thinks they ought to occur because they do.

The presuppositionalist will likely say, "But that's begging the question!" But this is not the case. If one asks for a rational justification for induction, there is no alternative to looking to the facts of reality and to identifying them for what they are. To object that looking at the facts of reality and/or that identifying them is begging the question, denies the perceptual level of awareness and its nature as metaphysically and epistemologically antecedent to the conceptual level. Where else would the theist have us begin? And by what means of awareness?

Mr. Smallwood asks:

Why must something or someone say "that one observed event should be thought to be connected to another observed event"? Must Man be told this? Or, like an infant playing with a ball or burning his finger on a stove, can Man discover the facts of reality for himself as he interacts with his environment and develops his conscious faculties? How many times must a toddler roll a ball to recognize that his action has an effect in his surroundings, or be burned by an open flame to determine that fire causes him pain? Where Objectivists see the intellectual product from Man's interaction with existence as drawing principle from experience, the non-Objectivist views this very phenomenon as "I get the message," and from this misidentification draws the unnecessary and untenable inference that there is a messenger (i.e., that a form of consciousness is behind causality).

What are the philosophical implications of the view that Man must learn how to operate his consciousness from some cosmic source beyond himself? What are the philosophical implications of the view that Man has no hope of learning how to operate his consciousness without outside guidance? Answers to such questions entail metaphysical assessments of man's nature. Not just about his ability, but even more fundamentally about his capacity to develop ability. The religious view of Man holds essentially that he cannot achieve the good through his own effort; that he must enlist the help of the supernatural, and that enlisting the help of the supernatural requires that he subordinates himself to the supernatural. Ultimately the same end is being served: the individual's own desires. But are those desires legitimate and rationally bound, or, are they the unbounded whims of a reality drop-out?

Of course, I am not speaking about learning from other human beings who have already matured. I am speaking of the notion that Man must learn how to operate his consciousness from some conscious force which has designed existence and is still directing reality.

Mr. Smallwood cautions:

Here Mr. Smallwood repeats the same evasive tactic which so many other apologists have modeled before him. As if to reduce man to a collection of randomly assembled atoms and chemicals, thus denying Man's identity qua Man, the apologist asks "How does matter in motion somehow arrive at rational introspection and the concept of justified thought?" Already the hidden assumptions become apparent: That nature has no rightful propriety in Man's identity, but rather the supernatural can be the only explanation. Does the apologist prove the existence of the supernatural? Not at all. He never even comes close. How can one prove the existence of a 'reality' which contradicts reality? Blank out.

When Mr. Smallwood asks,

We must ask: what ensures us that his interest in finding answers to such questions is genuine? Will he accept the answers of science, which look at the facts of reality and do not attempt to deny the law of identity, or will he insist on the dogma of his preferred theological allegiance, and expect his audience to accept the arbitrary therein enshrined, seeking to conform all facts into supporting the conclusion he has in mind, rather than waiting to discover where the facts of the matter lead?

The following critique is offered in response to the following post to the Van Til list, submitted by apologist Eric Smallwood:

In that message, Mr. Smallwood was responding to a post to the Van Til list by fellow apologist Mr. David Hewins:

In an unusually frank post to the Van Til discussion list on June 21, 2000, apologist Eric Smallwood offered the following thoughtful questions to the group:

Citing Mr. Hewins,

Mr. Smallwood asked:

Rarely has there been a particular argument about which so much ink has been spilt, but which still remains shrouded in mystery. That even seasoned presuppositionalists must debate whether or not their enshrined 'argument to end all arguments' can be expressed as a basic syllogism is quite telling, and indicates that their own understanding of what the argument entails and just how it is supposed to "work", is generally quite weak. What is presupposed is that TAG is sound, even though its sworn defenders struggle amongst themselves to identify why it is sound while tediously busying themselves with threading dozens of needles in their attempts to avoid inner conflict between the various and already over-burdened doctrines of creed-guided Christianity. Finally, for the umpteenth time, the question confronts the presuppositionalist once again: Can TAG be expressed as a simple syllogism? Or, in Objectivist terms: Can this legendary argument be identified explicitly in terms of essentials?

As a result of all this attention to philosophical detail and rigid indoctrination, the apologist has allowed himself to be transformed, so that he is essentially no longer a defender of the faith per se, but a defender of an argument. In this case, however, this argument is intended to prove the existence of a metaphysical zero.

Mr. Hewins writes:

This is true insomuch as the notion of "proving the law of contradiction" can be granted any rhetorical validity for the sake of argument. The fact of the matter is, that the law of contradiction is a corollary of the law of identity, which itself is a corollary of the fact that existence exists. We need the law in order to conduct a proof; therefore it cannot be the conclusion of proof.

By 'corollary' I mean an idea or set of ideas which follows naturally from a basic principle which has been accepted as knowledge of reality. According to Dr. Leonard Peikoff, a 'corollary' is "a self-evident implication of already established knowledge" ("Causality as a Corollary of Identity," Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 15).

Points to keep in mind:

Observe Mr. Smallwood's following argument about proving the existence of a hammer:

The one point which Mr. Smallwood does not articulate explicitly in the context of his example, is: How would he know that the hammer is a hammer?

Mr. Smallwood must assume, in keeping with his chain of reasoning, that those to whom he would "prove" the existence of a hammer by "producing" one, must have awareness of the hammer so produced. By what means is this awareness to be achieved but by perceptual observation? I.e., can one be aware of the existence in the context of Mr. Smallwood's rhetorical exercise through some means other than perception? While this is certainly understood from Mr. Smallwood's argument, he nowhere points it out explicitly, nor does his argument grant the rôle of perception in man's awareness of reality and formation of abstractions any express significance at all. He takes these facts completely for granted.

That Mr. Smallwood recognizes, at least implicitly, but necessarily by inference from his own examples followed by his emphatic "this isn't circular," that reduction of an argument to the perceptual level does not commit itself to fallacious circularity. This implicit recognition on his part will have disastrous implications for the presuppositionalist when he attempts to charge the Objectivist for begging the question when it comes to identifying his starting points and his overall metaphysical doctrines. Even the presuppositionalist must begin with what he perceives in the world as his initial starting point, however this fact is taken completely for granted and given no philosophical importance in the development of his god-belief theories. Indeed, in order to avoid naked fideism and maintain the guise of reason, he cannot grant the role of man's perception in the starting point of cognition. This constitutes a fatal evasion from objectivity, and is the death warrant of presuppositional apologetics.

Man's perception and its rôle in his cognition has been reviled by mystic attacks and rationalistic sabotaging throughout the history of philosophy. "The senses cannot be accurate," they clamor, while expecting their audiences to hear what they're saying. How are they supposed to comprehend what is being said, either verbally or in writing, if one cannot rely on one's senses in order to have the awareness of what is being said? Often the argument takes on a less obvious approach, and insists that senses influence on some level man's perception of existence, thereby tarnishing his view of reality and predisposing his interpretation of what he perceives with some insurmountable bias, tendency or projection, thereby concluding that objectivity is not possible to man. If this were true, then even this assessment of the senses would have to be influenced at some point of such bias, tendency or projection, and therefore it also would not be objective.

One routinely encounters as a summary example of the supposed validity of such attacks on man's ability to perceive reality the famous pencil in a glass of water. When a pencil is stuck into a glass of water, it appears bent. "Aha!" scream the skeptics, mystics, rationalists, or what have you, "you can't trust your senses! For you know the pencil to be straight, but when it's stuck into this glass of water, you clearly see that the pencil appears to be bent." The example necessarily yet implicitly assumes that the pencil is indeed straight, and that both observers are aware of this fact. Thus, the attack is completely dispelled by a simple question, "How did you know the pencil was straight to begin with?" And thus the assault self-destructs under the burden of its own pretenses and evasions.

Incidentally, on 22 June, 2000, a member of the Van Til list who goes by the name of "Jasho", submitted the following response to Mr. Smallwood's argument above:

Note this amazing predilection in favor of the infinite regress at the expense of objectivity. For Jasho writes, "…this analogy assumes we can produce the actual hammer to the satisfaction of the ahammerist." By the term "ahammerist," we can infer that this author intends to mean someone who does not believe that hammers exist - ostensibly even if hammers are presented for perceptual review. Mr. Smallwood's argument clearly recognizes man's reliance on his sense perception as a final means of proving the existence of a hammer. Jasho's counter-remarks, however, evade this by a-contextualizing man's means of awareness from the task of identifying what is real. For, if one should be rightly called an "ahammerist" in the context of Jasho's message, then we must conclude that the "ahammerist" dispenses with the evidence provided by his senses. And if the "ahammerist" dispenses with the evidence of his senses, then presenting "handful of nails" would be equally unproductive.

Most likely, Jasho did not think this through before posting it, but used the opportunity to draw an analogy between the evidence of the hammer and "ahammerist" who rejects the existence of hammers and the supposed "evidence" of the existence of God and the atheist who is not convinced. This is, of course, were this Jasho's true ambition, an absurdly weak analogy. For one thing, atheists in general are not in the habit of rejecting the evidence of their senses, so the "ahammerist" analogue would not fit. Second, Jasho seems to be under the impression that those who reject the existence of a hammer empirically presented to them would suddenly be convinced of the hammer's existence when presented with "a handful of nails." Jasho never explains in his message how "a handful of nails" will be accepted as proof of the hammer's existence when at the same time the hammer's existence is not accepted, even when provided as evidence of the "ahammerist's" senses.

Mr. Smallwood continued:

Mr. Smallwood is basically correct in his considerations here, with the following reservations:

1. "if the subject of what is to be proven is negation…" I think he meant "negative" here…
2. "…arguing that the hammer doesn't exist while at the same time using the hammer would be self-defeating…" Similarly, arguing for the existence of the hammer while using it would be completely superfluous and unnecessary, even unproductive. But, suppose Mr. Smallwood were trying to argue that a hammer did not exist in a certain proximity where in fact one did not exist in that proximity. In such a case, Mr. Smallwood would be arguing in favor of a negative, and he would be arguing for a fact, but he would have no means of proving his case by perceptual evidence, for perceptual evidence presupposes existence, not non-existence (we perceive what does exist; we do not perceive what does not exist).
3. "…Arguing against LC while presupposing LC would be self-defeating…" Indeed, this would commit Mr. Smallwood to the fallacy of the stolen concept. But the same fallacy would be committed all the same if one attempted to affirm LC through a process of proof, since 'proof' would naturally have to presuppose as a necessary pre-condition the fact that existence exists, that A is A, and that A cannot be non-A in the same sense and at the same time. So, either way, one must assume as true without a process of proof the validity and applicability of the LC even to affirm it and/or deny/reject it. This is the nature of the Objectivist axioms: they are perceptually self-evident, irreducibly primary, and undeniable, even in the attempt to deny them. They require no proof.
4. "But I don't see how simply presupposing LC necessarily concludes in a circular argument when the subject is a positive proposal about LC." Does Mr. Smallwood mean by "positive proposal" here a syllogism in which it is hoped to conclude with the validity of the LC as a product of proof? But we already know - and so does Mr. Smallwood by his own admission - that LC is implicitly assumed in any would-be proof of the LC. However, if Mr. Smallwood's "positive proposal" is relegated to a validation of the LC - which can be far broader than a proof per se, then indeed this can be quite productive, if in fact it is presented cogently within the context of a specific, legitimate purpose.

The tendency detectable throughout all of Mr. Smallwood's concerns about proving the validity of the law of contradiction is the implicit assumption that one has no business asserting knowledge which he has not proven to be true. In other words, instead of one's starting point being the recognition that existence exists, a recognition readily available to man simply by opening his eyes and looking at the world around him, one's starting point must be the axiom that "all knowledge must be the conclusion of proofs" regardless of any perceptual reference to reality. In other words, such preoccupation strongly suggests rationalism, which is deduction from "internal axioms" which are not grasped perceptually, but are imported into man's consciousness conceptually apart from his sense experience. This fits quite well with the Christian's claim to divine revelation as the believer's alleged starting point, as Mr. Hewins' intimates when he writes:

In response to this, Mr. Smallwood asked the following, remarkably frank question:

Mr. Smallwood recognizes:

Basically speaking, this is true, and sufficiently so. Existence exists, which may be seen as a contraction of the axiom, that which exists is that which exists. I.e., A is A. This is fundamental. One cannot get "before" existence - just as one cannot get "before" the law of identity, as to do so would eventually end up positing something that "exists" as the solution to whatever is said "to be before existence." In other words, we must bear in mind a starting point of our cognition and an intraversible terminus to our series of foundational inquiries, otherwise we necessarily commit our thoughts to a mercilessly infinite regress by arbitrarily removing a starting point - and a stopping point - to our intellection.

Thus, all thought presupposes the existence of something outside itself, even if what is posited to be outside itself is illegitimate, since to assert a truth is to assert a truth that holds regardless of one's awareness or grasp of it. In essence, to assert knowledge is to assert some mental content which refers to some fact which is assumed to be independent of the one asserting that fact.

Mr. Smallwood asks:

What justifies Mr. Smallwood's unargued assumption that "things could just as well have not existed"? If Mr. Smallwood insists on using this premise, then clearly he begs the question, since to do so is to assume one of the very premises in dispute, namely, that existence is conditional upon something prior to it, and that prior condition is normally assumed to be some act of consciousness. (This is the doctrine of metaphysical subjectivism.)

Furthermore, the idea that "things could just as well have not existed" commits Mr. Smallwood to yet another stolen concept. In this case, he rips off the concept 'possibility' (including its verbal adjuncts) from the context of existence and implies the possibility that there be no existence whatsoever. But the very concept 'possibility' necessarily presupposes existence, and therefore is hierarchically dependent upon this recognition. Besides, it is an undeniable fact that existence exists, that we are part of reality, and that to exist is to have identity, regardless of what possibilities one dreams up, fallacious or otherwise. Neither Mr. Smallwood nor any other religionist can objectively argue otherwise. So, we see in the final analysis, when the theist throws such empty ideas in the face of those who do not accept his god-beliefs, he simply seeks to evade the most fundamental issues of philosophy, not to identify and grasp them. Were the theist honest to himself and reality at this rudimentary level, he would recognize that all the theorizing and debating will never overturn the fact of existence. The fact of existence does not change.

The notions of the "possibility" that existence does not exist and that at one time existence did not exist (thus requiring a creator) will be discussed in greater detail in the section of this website titled "The Argument from Existence" (coming soon).

Exposure of the stolen concept involved in theistic presumptions is easily obtained. For instance, the theist may essentially ask, "why do things exist as opposed to nothing exists?" But an objective approach to this would-be "problem" of the theist's making, would be: if that things exist requires a maker, then we still posit existence in positing the maker, and we get no further along than the point from where we started. For we still posit existence as primary, and thus a starting point copasetic to the Objectivist paradigm, but incongruent with that of the religious since the primacy of consciousness is preferred. The religionist simply wants to begin with a form of consciousness, and this is invalid.

Mr. Smallwood argues:

The nonbeliever is going to be even less compelled by the apologist's god-belief claims if indeed she recognizes that such questions are essentially invalid and only qualify as superfluous debating points at best, not as genuine considerations in the overall scheme of one's life and principles.

The same goes essentially for the Christian. If we ask him, "Why does God exist?" with the expectation that any answer to such a question posits something beyond God to exist, the apologist will retort that God is a self-sufficient primary requiring no such explanation. Usually the apologist will incorporate the analytic-synthetic dichotomy when the non-believer rightly responds that the universe - i.e., existence is a self-sufficient primary. The apologist will claim that the universe is "contingent" - which merely begs the question and assumes the validity of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. On what basis does he assume this validity? Blank out.

We have to start somewhere in our cognition about reality, if we recognize the hierarchical nature of knowledge. But where do we start? And why? As Dr. Peikoff puts it:

And thus, we have it in a nutshell. Shall we begin with consciousness without an object, or with existence which can be the object of our consciousness? This is the burning question which must be answered at the outset of our thinking.

Mr. Smallwood notes:

With all the devastating philosophical errors to which god-belief commits its more consistent defenders, what warrant would one have for believing it? The apologist, like others, have shown no reason to warrant belief.

To answer such a question, I can only speak for myself, however I suspect the points I will articulate here may be broadly representative of many people's mindset, even if only implicitly. According to my view of reality (and according to Objectivism in general), intelligibility does not depend on or derive from the supernatural. On the contrary, Objectivism holds that intelligibility can only be stifled and crippled by appeals to the supernatural, by the enshrinement of the incomprehensible, and/or by the apotheosis of mystery (i.e., scientific ignorance), to which belief in the supernatural leads.

Mr. Smallwood asks "what will the non believer have to believe first in order to arrive at the conclusion that her view is false?" This question is quite pointed towards a certain purpose: that of discovering how to acquire argumentative leverage in the minds of nonbelievers. The answer to Mr. Smallwood's question is quite simple: cease on and play up any notion finding its basis in the primacy of consciousness view of reality to which the non believer may ascribe to, particularly if this ascription is unwitting (i.e., an unchecked premise). While apologists in general possess virtually zero astuteness in the area of defining their principals and goals in terms of essentials, their own primacy of consciousness view of reality is readily attracted to other variants of the primacy of consciousness like a magnet to iron. The more commonality which two false worldviews share, the more opportunity for some cohesion and compromise between the two, the compromise usually greater for the weaker strain, the more consistent of the two providing the standard and direction of that compromise.

For instance, take on the one hand a rigorously tutored apologist for a certain structured religious view, such as some variant of Christianity, a view that has been developed and overdeveloped to the point that it virtually collapses under its own oppressive weight. Take on the other hand a glassy-eyed astrologer, whose only philosophical structure is the mood swings he attributes to the movement of planetary bodies and their conjunction, the influence of which is, in his view, incalculably decisive in the lives of human beings, whether they are aware of this force or not. Put the two together. Both ascribe to the primacy of consciousness view of reality.

On the one hand, in Christian theism, you have an explicit, rarefied elaboration of the primacy of consciousness, embellished with vivid mythology posing as history, the express view that some non-corporeal consciousness is responsible for the existence of the universe, rules the universe, and has a divine plan in which every eventual nuance can be interpreted by theological interpolation. On the other hand, you have a more implicit, hazy elaboration of the primacy of consciousness in astrology, the implicit view that the rôle of the planets' movements and "personal" forces throughout the universe hold some significance in the fulfillment of some intergalactic "plan," a plan that exhibits a design just as mystical as that of Christian theism, and just as contradictory to itself and to reality, only on a more implicit, less philosophically developed basis.

But the problem facing both sides of this issue, be it the zero-worship of theism or star-chasing evasions of astrology, is that they both find their basis in the same flawed view of existence. And this can be identified once the fundamentals of each view have been identified in terms of explicit essentials. In essence, both views of reality share the same unchecked predisposition to the notion that reality either finds its source in a form of consciousness, or is subject to the will of consciousness. The question, when it comes to evaluating their inter-relational competitive stamina, is: which view is more philosophically developed, and, which view is more consistent with its own foundational principles? That view which can legitimately claim that it is more philosophically developed on a basis consistent with its own foundations, will in the end rule the debate. But this does not mean that such a system is either objective or true. For indeed, in the case of both Christian theism and astrology, each are built on the same flawed premise that consciousness - in whatever form, either implicitly or explicitly, either creatively or prescriptively, or both - holds primacy over existence.

Thus, any debate between a Christian theist and an astrologer, depending on their respective ability and knowledge, will intentionally keep the treatment fundamental issues vague, since both sides square evenly on the same radical view of existence: that existence is a pliant product of a cosmic consciousness.

Mr. Smallwood argues:

Note that Mr. Smallwood takes it for granted that all parties in question, both believing and non-believing, will "interpret" something as something other than itself. That Mr. Smallwood has as his premises the ideas that "the Christian interprets X as Z" and that "non theist interprets X as Y," clearly suggests that he generally holds that both Christians and "non theists" do not "interpret" "X" to be "X" (perhaps this does not occur to Mr. Smallwood?), but to interpret "X" to be something other than "X" (e.g., as being or meaning "Y" or "Z" - i.e., X as meaning non-X). If Mr. Smallwood assumes that this is the case for all nonbelievers, he is sorely mistaken. For Objectivism is all about recognizing that A is A, since the fact of existence and its corollary law of identity is recognized to hold primacy over conscious action. Thus, the Objectivist does not "interpret X as Y," as Mr. Smallwood would have it, but X as X, since he understands explicitly at the most rudimentary level of cognition - at his starting points - that to do otherwise would contradict the facts of reality and result in some form of irrationality (e.g., mysticism, rationalism, skepticism, etc.).

The presuppositionalist's untiring preoccupation with the way in which non-believers will interpret certain alleged "evidences" supposedly supporting the theist's god-belief claims, is itself a telling sign of cognitive insecurity and, possibly, the psychological panic that haunts the mind of the zealous believer. Of course, this has much to do with the standards and motivations fostered in a particular view of reality.

For the Christian, the standard of his intellect is the imperceptible, the incomprehensible, the infinite, the imaginary, the non-existent. His standard is essentially a negation of the objective, a standard to which all existence, identity and causality are thought to be metaphysically subordinate, and by which all empirical data must be identified. Truth, for the Christian, is to be shaped by a process he benignly calls 'interpretation' - which is a euphemism for rationalization, not discovered and identified by appealing to the facts of reality.

What is the goal of this interpretation? Philosophically, that goal is to elevate whim above reality by treating the facts of reality as pliant, malleable manifestations of the supernatural, forever subject to divine revision and redefinition. These 'facts' to which the apologist appeals are ultimately assumed to be the product of an act of consciousness; thus reality and knowledge are essentially and inescapably subjective in nature for him. This subjectivity has devastating consequences throughout religious philosophy, resulting in mysticism in epistemology, the ethics of sacrifice, and collectivism and tyranny in government.

Psychologically, the goal cannot be separated from the motivational impulse of religious thought: the elevation of emotion over reason (a result of confusing knowledge and emotion) and the overwhelming emphasis on the acceptance of unearned guilt and the mind-crushing fear of unrelenting punishment for that guilt. For the apologist to deny the strength of these motivating factors, is to deny the essentials of his religion. Introspectively, his goal is to escape the mental torment he experiences as a result of granting these factors validity. In his efforts to engage non-believers, he will pour every effort into steering the course of debate away from uncovering these factors and exposing their genuine nature. Hence the apologist's desperation to focus the thrust of debate onto the non-believer's views.

Mr. Smallwood acknowledges:

It is not necessarily the case that the framework described by Mr. Smallwood is the one "within which [she] offers her claim that the presuppositionalist is begging the question." The framework within which the nonbeliever bases her criticism of presuppositionalism in particular and theism in general, may - and should - be the rational system of Objectivism.

For one thing, Objectivism does not predispose itself to an agenda of interpreting X as something other than X, as implicated by Mr. Smallwood's earlier surmising. For the Objectivist, that which exists is that which exists. The identity of an entity does not depend upon the Objectivist's worldview or upon some preset series of dogmatic conclusions into which that entity must be "interpreted" (cf. "creation science"). On the contrary, Objectivism first and foremost concerns itself with the objective identification of reality, for it is only after reality is identified that evaluative interpretations can have any rational feasibility in the first place.

In this way, Objectivism is completely consistent with its foundations and its recognition of the fact that knowledge is hierarchical in nature. One cannot evaluate the moral meaning of an entity, action or circumstance before the identity of that entity, action or circumstance is known, even if only partially. This may seem to be an obvious point, but it is precisely because it is obvious (and thereby commonly taken for granted) that it requires our focused attention and explicit understanding if our reasoning is to be sound. Preoccupation with how something is "interpreted" without attending to the fact that consciousness is primarily man's means of identifying, and secondarily of evaluating, interpreting and assessing, can easily lead one to a reversal of these priorities.

Mr. Smallwood states:

I think what Mr. Smallwood may want to say here is, "it is self-defeating to maintain that the non theist will interpret information only according to the parameters of his world view, and at the same time argue" with the hope or ambition "that he will agree with the presuppositionalist's assessment of his view." Certainly, Mr. Smallwood is correct in identifying the inconsistency of the wholesale assessment of any non-theistic view as able to "interpret information only according to the parameters of [that] world view" with the belabored activity of apologetics. As Mr. Smallwood indicates, such a view can only sabotage the apologist's own efforts, if this view is to be integrated into his apologetic endeavors.

Mr. Smallwood concludes his message, after offering a well-considered and rightly focused assessment of some general problems which presuppositionalism must ultimately address, with a final question about just how well the apologist of this cloth is equipped to take on those who have no god-belief.

For millennia, it is indisputable that much ink has been spilled in the task to prove that a God or universe-ruling consciousness exists, that the supernatural exists, that "reality is not all that meets the eye," but that there is some deeper, mystical dimension, the territory of spirits, the realm of the immaterial, the domain of the incomprehensible. And each generation of believers seems to act on the conviction that theirs is the generation which will finally solve all riddles and answer all questions of god-belief. The presuppositionalist's hunt for a 'magic bullet' apologia is doomed from the very start, and therefore belongs in the same category of all the other failed argument programs intended to support the belief in the supernatural.

I have reviewed in great detail and depth the apologetic of yet another defender of mystical philosophy. My findings are no different essentially from what I've found in reviewing other apologetic attempts. Nowhere does Mr. Smallwood come even close to proving the existence of God, biblical or otherwise. Instead of even trying to do so, he is true to form as a presuppositionalist, assuming what he is called to prove rather than proving it, focusing his apologetic on issues which are taken "after the fact" as if God's existence were already proven. By claiming that "induction presupposes the existence of the triune God of the Bible," the apologist takes God's existence completely for granted, even though this is precisely what he is called to demonstrate for his non-believing audiences. Nowhere does he justify this maneuver. This is nothing more than an attempt to hijack otherwise legitimate philosophical matters and recruiting them into the mind-negating schemes of religious

Furthermore, he objects to the non-Christian's assumption that God does not exist or that induction does not require the alleged "surety" of the "triune God of the Bible." His "challenges" to non-believers to "account for" their non-belief, for the use of their minds, for their reason and their very existence, do not constitute a genuinely motivated debating point intended to enlighten. His purpose is to divorce man from his capacity to reason, just as he seeks to disable man's capacity to enjoy his life according to his own terms. This is subterfuge intended to bamboozle, not argument intended to establish sound philosophical principles.

For the Christian, the poison (e.g., "total depravity" and damnation) and the antidote (e.g., "salvation" and "redemption") are made in the same kitchen. The Christian thinks this kitchen belongs to God. Quite the contrary, the kitchen is god-belief itself and the cuisine is anti-man, anti-rational, and anti-reality.

In philosophy, just as in reality, you get what you deserve. The self-inflicted misery of Christian mysticism is no exception.

Much literature off the worldwide web has spent some energy focusing on the vulnerability of the Christian God's incoherence. For example, see George H. Smith's "The Concept of God," in his book Atheism: The Case Against God, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989), pp. 29-46; Michael Martin's "Divine Attributes and Incoherence," from his book Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 287-316; see also various assessments of the Christian God in Ludwig Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, trans. By George Eliot, (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989), pp. 197-269, (I encourage readers some caution in considering Feuerbach's psychological assumptions in these assessments); et al.

[3] This assumption, so necessary to all active reasoning, is incompatible with arbitrary religious claims which terminate inquiry with the assertion of the eternally mysterious, which is a dead give away of the impotence of faith. Paul himself made appeal to mystery as his 'explanation' for faith when he wrote:

So here the model of evasion is set in "scripture" so that all these budding, zealous apologists can appeal to what is mysterious in answer to criticism. The basic "you don't understand" ploy is ready to be unpocketed at a moment's notice, should the apologist face an untiring line of questions. Of course, we are told in I Corinthians 2:14 that the "natural man" (as opposed to the "spiritual man") is incapable of reaching this kind of understanding. This is acceptable for those who consider faith a valid means of knowledge; but it is clearly antithetical to reason, and therefore to induction. This epistemological imbroglio is a consequence of the believer's own identity crisis, and not the fault of the non-believer.

[5] In a future paper I will provide a side-by-side comparison of Christianity and Objectivism.

[8] In a future paper I will expose how the notion 'miracle' attempts to assert contradictions in reality and that the notion 'omnipotence' refers to the alleged power to contradict the identity of concretes.

[9] "Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World," Philosophy: Who Needs It, (New York: Signet, 1982), pp. 62-63.

[12] Theistic offshoots of Christianity as well as non-Christian theistic models which posit notions comparable to Christianity's doctrines of creation, miracles, faith, etc., fall by the same arguments respectively.

[14] For instance, see Matt. 7:3-5, which has Jesus saying,

[15] Expanded Second Edition; Edited by Harry Binswanger and Leonard Peikoff [New York: Meridian, 1990], 307 pages.

[18] "Philosophy and Sense of Life," The Romantic Manifesto," 2^nd Ed., (New York: Signet, 1975), p. 25.

[19] For instance, in the case of Hume, we find that the axioms which anchor reasoning are thought to be nothing more than conventional notions or "community norms," accepted as popular indices. Thus a social primacy of consciousness is necessarily inferred - an error imported from religion and never properly identified or challenged. In addition to such default, Hume argued that knowledge begins with sensation rather than with perception, and this had a drastic affect on his view of identity, causality and, consequently, induction. For more details, I refer the inquisitive reader to Dr. Kelley's two-part lecture noted above.

[21] See apologist Mark McConnell's July 7, 2000 post "Re: uniformity of nature as an axiom."

[22] 954.

[23] Ibid.

[25] "The Metaphysically Given Versus the Man-Made," Philosophy: Who Needs It (New York: Signet, 1982), p. 24.

[26] The Age of Reason, (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1995), p. 157; italics in original.

[27] "Introduction to Logic," lecture series (1974), Lecture 9.

[29] Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p. 39.

[30] 2^nd ed., New York: Meridian, 1990.

[31] Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 3 (W. D. Ross translation); quoted in The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z, ed. Harry Binswanger, p. 107.

[32] Atlas Shrugged, p. 934.

[33] David Kelley, The Primacy of Existence.

[34] Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics," The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 19.

[35] Ayn Rand, "Cognition and Measurement," Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, (2^nd Ed.) p. 5.

[36] "Axiomatic Concepts," Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, (2^nd Ed.) p. 57.

[37] Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, pg. 21.

[38] Of course, this would also depend on the definition of reason presumed by both parties, as well as on how rigorous and consistent either party honors that definition.

[39] Indeed, one may even draw a third conflict from Mr. Smallwood's admissions here. For the presuppositionalist should ask himself: If he believes that the non-theist cannot escape his set of presuppositions in order to grasp the presuppositionalist's arguments and see that his system is, according to those arguments, incoherent and invalid, what ensures the presuppositionalist the very presuppositional ambidexterity which he denies to the non-theist? For if the non-theist is basically trapped by his presuppositions - since they are one's least negotiable commitments, it stands to reason that the theist is just as trapped by his presuppositional commitments as well, by his own reasoning.

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