On 28 July 1914, in response to an ultimatum from Austria to his ally Serbia, Tsar Nicholas II ordered a general mobilization of the imperial Russian army. A few days later, armies from across the globe began battling each other in what was to become the bloodiest conflict in human history. It would be a war that would shake the very foundations of Europe. In its wake, three once - great empires stood no more. Russia would be one such victim. Rocked by internal strife and external losses, she would collapse into revolution and civil war. Eventually, a communist dictatorship would come to power, and she would be isolated from European power politics for a number of years. Today, many people have forgotten that imperial Russia was, at one time, a major broker in Eastern Europe. Her strength and influence stretched from the Arctic to the Adriatic.

A key component in Russian policy during the years leading up to the first world war was the concept of "pan - slavism", a desire to unite all Slavs in a common bond. In the Balkans this ideology was especially strong. Although official policy coming out of Saint Petersburg often wavered, many of Russia's decisions regarding the Balkans during the fifty years preceding Archduke Ferdinand's assassination paid at least lip service to the concept of Slav unity. In doing so, the Russians saw themselves as mothers and protectors of all Slavic peoples in the region, and at times were willing to go to war to protect them. In 1876 and 1914, that protectionism brought Russia to war in defense of her children.

Panslavism as an ideology was a natural outgrowth of western Romanticism, coupled with the unification efforts during the mid nineteenth century in Central Europe. The term "panslavism" was first used in the mid 1830s by intellectuals in Russia to describe a cultural, linguistic and religious bond felt by many in eastern Europe, but a general feeling of a slavic unity had permeated Russian and south slavic life since the fifteenth century. When western ideas about nationalism and liberalism spread east during the napoleonic conquests, each of the nations exposed to these subjects simply used them as the basis for individual cases of nationalism.

By the late 1850s, central Europe was beginning its process of unification. Led by the Iron Chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck, Prussia succeeded in unifying most of the German states under one flag. Piedmont did the same on the Italian peninsula. Both new states stood as a stark manifestation to the ideas of ethnic and cultural unity, combined with raw force and stability.

Russian panslavism in Eastern Europe was no different. In seeking to unite all slavs, proponents saw themselves as champions of an ethnic group that had been oppressed for a long time. Slavs in the Balkans were no exception. In the eyes of many Russian intellectuals, these south slavs had simply, "lost their way". Since the Balkan slavs had been forced to live under two foreign empires, Austrian and Ottoman, it was left up to mother Russia to lead the way back to the true faith. With the capture of Constantinople by the non-believers, many Russians saw themselves as charged with, "the obligation to protect and redeem those brothers in Christ who suffered at the rule at the Moslem."

Under the reign of Nicholas I (1796 - 1855) such views were often stymied. Nicolas, after all, had helped beat back the French menace under Napoleon and had become a major force in the concert of Europe. Above all, he believed in stability and the balance of power. After Alexander II came to the throne, however, panslavism came to be seen as the true destiny of Holy Russia. The Ottomans and Austrians, of course, had little use for slavic unity. Russian leaders knew if they were to liberate their brethren, it would mean war with either side, or both. Turkey, Europe's "sick man", was falling apart. She seemed like the easiest choice. If Russia was to liberate their brethren, this was the place to start. Fortunately for proponents of panslavism, a storm was brewing in the Balkans. Serbia, with Russian help and money, was arming for war.

Serbia, nominally independent since 1813, also saw itself as the defender of slavdom. Although one would think that this position would have brought the Serbs into direct competition with Russia, much as Austrian overtures towards a united Germany had unnerved Prussia, eastern slavs welcomed the gesture. Alexander knew that Serbia was still too weak as a world power, and therefore would rely on his power and generosity. National independence would be respected. The inherent problem that arose, whoever, was what exactly constituted independence. In 1869, a memorandum by Russian General R.A. Fadeev attempted to settle that very question. He stated,

The independence of each member of the liberated family in his internal affairs, a separate Ruler and separate political institutions, as may be most convenient to each -- all this is already settled by history. But independence in an international and military point of view is quite a different question … in the present state of Europe, there is no room for a heap of small nations … every Russian, as well as every Slav, should desire to see chiefly the Russian reigning House cover the liberated soil of Eastern Europe with its branches, under the supremacy and lead of the Tsar of Russia.

In a grand show of unity and brotherhood, the tsar opened his state to his brothers during the Moscow Slav Congress in the fall of 1867. Slavic representatives from all over the Balkans attended, including tiny Montenegro, well known as a steadfast ally of the Russian empire. Slavic unity was slowly becoming a reality. All that remained now was a call for help from one of the daughters. The cry would come in 1875.

The Summer of 1875 brought a peasant revolt in Herzegovina against the Ottomans which quickly threatened to engulf the region. Within a year, Serbian and Montenegrin troops were marching off to war in a fight to free their "brother slavs" from the oppressive Turks. Although Russia officially declared neutrality in the conflict, many of her citizens fought gallantly in private armies and many more supported the war from home. By the spring of 1876, thousands of Russian rubles were pouring into Montenegro and Serbia, ostensibly to help with a growing refugee problem, but it was generally suspected that most of the money was going to support the war. When the Bulgarians rebelled against their Turkish oppressors as well, Russia broke with international trend and threatened to intervene.

In April of the following year, Russia joined the cause herself. On the 24^th, Tsar Alexander II issued a war manifesto outlining Russia's reasons for entering the war. She had moved against Turkey for purely ideological reasons. No one in Europe would stand up in defense of the south slavs. The Ottoman empire's rule in the Balkans had been oppressive and cruel. Russia had tried for years to secure better treatment for her brothers, but to no avail. Now she would secure that remedy by force.

Issuing the manifesto turned out to be a great political move. Russians from across the empire got behind the move. Speaking regarding Russian excitement for the war, novelist Fyodor Dostoyevsky wrote,

Ask the people; ask the soldier; Why are they arising? Why are they going to war and what do they expect from it? They will tell you, as one man, that they are going to serve Christ and to liberate the oppressed brethren … We shall watch over their mutual harmony and protect their liberty and independence, be it even against all Europe.

In Belgrade, news of the manifesto led to a general rejoicing. Across the Balkans, slavs echoed the sentiments of the panslavic newspaper Istok. Its lead story on 27 April proclaimed that the day of redemption was upon them. Tsar Alexander, with the help the Slav God, would free Christian slaves oppressed by the infidels. The paper called on slaves across Serbia to thank God for the advance of the, "holy and powerful mother of Slavdom, Russia."

By early winter, Russian Troops were within miles of Constantinople. The Ottomans were on the verge of collapse, and the rest of Europe's major powers started to get a little nervous. It had been common knowledge that the old Moslem empire had been on the verge of collapse for many decades, but the major powers could never come up with a solution for distributing the spoils. Now Russia's actions threatened to upset the balance by conquering all of the Balkan provinces, and Asia minor as well. Vienna was especially concerned, as she had designs on the area. Russian panslavism had triumphed, but not everyone was happy.

The treaty signed between the Russian and Ottoman empires at San Stephano called for the formal recognition of Montenegro's independence by the Sultan. Greater Bulgaria was created, and the new province was to be policed by Russian troops and run by a Christian government. Serbia's independence was formally recognized, and she was given small amounts of territory. Finally, Turkey was instructed to pay reparations to Russia. If she could not pay in currency, land would be exchanged. Eventually, much of the treaty would be modified by the Congress of Berlin in June 1878, including the reestablishment of Turkey as rulers over Bulgaria, but one thing remained clear. Russia had set a precedent. No longer would she simply sit and let her slavic brothers be mistreated. Many of these siblings still resided in foreign held lands. It remained to be seen if Mother Russia would come to their rescue as well.

Tsar Alexander II would never live to see the next challenge. His insistence that Bulgaria be given a constitution and a representative assembly aroused anarchists and socialists at home. On March 1, 1881, after many unsuccessful attempts, revolutionaries succeeded in assassinating the tsar. The violence of his death shook the slavic world. From Belgrade to Saint Petersburg came an outpouring of sympathy. Alexander III, the new tsar, was a conservative, unlike his liberal father. With a new hard-line emperor in Saint Petersburg, it remained to be seen if panslavism would continue to influence Russian policy in the Balkans.

Four years later, Bulgarian revolutionaries declared the Turkish province as an independent state. The resulting crisis put Russia in an awkward position. On the one hand, Alexander II had worked hard for this very point in 1877 - 78. By 1885, however, more than the Russian throne had changed in Europe. A real distrust was developing between Austria and Russia. Under Bismarck's guidance, both monarchies had joined the Three Emperors League, although Russia's commitments to the pact often conflicted with panslavism. The Bulgarian crisis exposed the weaknesses of the League. By 1887, the Russians refused to sign an extension, forcing Austria closer to Germany. Russia did sign a reinsurance treaty, but this too expired ad was not renewed in 1890.

Russia still needed an ally, and looked to Europe's other misfit, France, for security and assistance. In 1891, France and Russia signed a pact pledging mutual diplomatic support. The stage had been set, Russia and Austria now stood on opposite sides of the geopolitical fence. Any movement by either side in the Balkans was sure to lead to conflict. This act was to be Alexander's last major action on the geopolitical stage. On 1 November 1894, surrounded by his advisors and family, Alexander III passed away. His son, Nicholas II, came to the throne. Little did he know that his reign would be the last.

The new Tsar had been raised a soldier, not a diplomat. Although he believed in panslavism theoretically, he refused to let it be a controlling factor in his decisions. Mother Russia had troubles brewing, both at home and abroad. In 1904, war broke out with Japan over land issues in the Far East. Unfortunately for Nicholas, the war went very badly, and Russia was forced to agree to arbitration. In the middle of this international fiasco, revolution broke out in Saint Petersburg. Nicholas survived, but was forced to turn autocratic Russia into a constitutional monarchy. By 1907, Russia's influence and prestige had been badly shaken, and she was again looking to panslavism and the Balkans for a solution. Europe's "sick man" would provide the impetus.

In 1908, a revolution broke out in Turkey. In the ensuing confusion, Bulgaria declared its outright independence and Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only the Turks protested the first move, but the annexation of slav territory by Austria brought violent criticism from both Russia and Serbia. Panslavs from both the Balkans and Mother Russia became incensed at the thought of "German" occupation of Bosnia. Tsar Alexander's government , however, realized that she was too weak to fight a war against Germany. France and England (Russia's other major power ally) were not ready to go to war over the Balkans. In the end, Russia allowed Austria's move to go unchallenged.

Serbia was furious, and accused the Russians of pandering to the West. As a result, the tsar realized that he would have to step up support for his slavic brothers, or they would be forced to look elsewhere for protection. It appeared as though panslavism was back after a lengthy hiatus. The Triple Alliance (Germany, the Hapsburg empire and Italy), had forced Russians to look to their brothers in an increasingly bi - polar world. Many in Germany, however, dismissed Russian involvement in southeastern Europe. Their decision led to a false sense of security. Russia rebuilt, bided her time, and looked to the day when once again she would be able to defend her interests in the Balkans.

By 1913, the balance of power in Europe allowed Russia to flex her muscles once again. Although Nicholas had reconciled himself to the fact of Turkey's control over the straits, the idea of another great power having influence in the area was simply unacceptable. When Germany tried to reform the Turkish military under a German general, Russia demanded that the kaiser back down. Things got so bad that the tsar even counseled with his allies regarding the possibility of a general war against Germany for her actions. In the end, Kaiser William backed down, but all now knew that Russia was ready for war in protection of the Balkan peninsula. Panslavism had finally reached its zenith. All it needed now was an excuse.

On 28 June 1914, a young radical pro-Serb revolutionary assassinated the heir to the Austro - Hungarian dual throne on a trip to Sarajevo, Bosnia. Austria, after stalling for almost a month, issued an ultimatum to Serbia regarding Hapsburg control over the slavic piedmont. Russia was thus forced into a difficult decision. If she again turned a deaf ear to Serbia, any hope of panslavism would be dead. Tsar Nicholas also realized that Austria was imposing a trail of strength against Russia in which her status as a great power was at stake. This time, Russia refused to back down. On July 28, Nicholas called for full mobilization of the army in defense of his brothers. On August 4, the Russian minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the Duma and spelled out why they had gone to war. After going over the facts of the previous six weeks, he stated,

Though it had to undergo severe trials, the union of the Orthodox Balkan peoples will, so God wills, one day be realized … For that purpose Serbia had to serve, that Serbia with which ties of history, of common descent and faith unite us … An attitude of indifference on our part would have meant the abandonment of our centuries - old role as protector of the Balkan nations.

Negotiations broke out, but to no avail. Within a month, lights were going out over Europe.

The war would go badly for Russia. After limited early success, Germany eventually struck deep into the empire. In the spring of 1917, a revolution would topple the Tsar's government. The new provincial government tried to continue the war, but this decision would only lead to further unrest. In October, Lenin's communists would take control. Russia would pull out of the war and lapse into civil war. Eventually, the communists would take command and Russian influence in the Balkans would suffer dramatically over the next few years.

Panslavism, however, would triumph. In 1918, at the end of the war, a united "Yugoslavia" was set up. The new state included not only Serbia, but Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Montenegro as well. Eventually, a kingdom would be set up, based, in theory, on slavic unity and brotherhood. Yugoslav "panslavism" would continue to maintain a grip on the Balkans until the late 1980s, although at different times the grip was less strong than others. Today, with the Balkans once again in disarray and Russia's role as a world power seriously debated, it is easy to dismiss the link that binds slavs across eastern Europe. That link, however, remains strong today. They are brothers. A few weeks ago, when NATO started bombing Serbia over the Kosovo crisis, reports out of Moscow showed Russians in the streets in support of their slavic brethren. Those men and women were ready to go to war. Reporters all over the west started asking, "Are they serious?". All one has to do is look back into history. Twice, in 1876 and 1914, Russians came to the aid of their Balkan brothers in need. Are we so sure they won't do it again?

Anderson, M.S. The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774 - 1923. New York: St. Martins Press, 1970.

Doystoyevsky, F.M. Unknown title. Reprinted in Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Fadeev, R.A. Opinion on the Eastern Question. Reprinted in The Great Powers and the Near East 1774 - 1923. Edited by M.S. Anderson. New York: St. Martins Press, 1970.

Harris, Davis. A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875 - 1875: The First Year. Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1936.

Hans Kohn. Pan - Slavism: Its History and Ideology. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.

Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Mackenzie, David. The Serbs and Russian Pan - Slavism, 1875 - 1878. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967.

Mouseset, Albert. The World of the Slavs. Translated by Margaret Lavenu. New York: Fredrick A. Praeger Inc., 1950.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856 - 1870. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.

Rice, Tamara Talbot. Czars and Czarinas of Russia. New York: Lothrop, Lee and Shepard Company, 1968.

Speech to the Duma by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 8, 1914. Excerpt reprinted in Panslavism: Its History and Ideology. By Hans Kohn. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.

Sumner, B.H. Russia and the Balkans, 1870 - 1880. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937.

Treaty of San Stephano, 3 March 1878. Reprinted in The Great Powers and the Near East, 1774 - 1923. Edited by M.S. Anderson. New York: St. Martins Press, 1970.