Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2000 16:21:52 -0400
From: bobhunt@erols.com
Subject: [lpaz-repost] (fwd) CAS: Kosovo Bombing Need Not Have Happened - US Air Attache
To: rlroot@prodigy.net, amonath@speakeasy.org, GoobGrover@aol.com, deanahmad@yahoo.com, LPDC-C@onelist.com, MDLP-NEWS@onelist.com, lpaz-repost@egroups.com, libertyworks@epostoffice.com, news@SierraTimes.com, TnLP@egroups.com, citizen@mindspring.com ("J.J. Johnson"), rush@eibnet.com
On Sat, 21 Oct 2000 15:44:19 -0400, "Toni Howard" <antonia@erols.com> wrote:
Kosovo Bombing Need Not Have Happened - US Air
Attache
By Alan J. Parrington
The Colorado Springs Gazette (10-12-00) 10-20-00
Now that Slobodan Milosevic has been voted out of
office, many in the Clinton Administration will be
celebrating the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia as a
completed moral victory. We were told after all,
that the war was fought for humanitarian reasons -
to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing - and that
it was started only after all diplomatic efforts
had failed. With Kosovo free and Milosevic
vanquished, the war is finally won. It was a good
war.
As the U.S. Air Attach in London at the time, I
saw a different war, one not so flattering or
altruistic. I saw a war of underlying motives,
missed diplomatic opportunities, misguided
military strategies and questionable outcomes.
Worst of all, the war never need happened:
Milosevic conceded major U.S. demands two weeks
before the war began.
On the evening of March 11, 1999, I was confronted
by the Yugoslavian Defence Attach to the Court of
St. James at a British diplomatic reception and
told, "Milosevic has decided to accept
international, even NATO, troops in Kosovo, but he
must first have (a) letter from Clinton explaining
the benefits Yugoslavia will receive (in
exchange)." I stood there silent, somewhat
dumbfounded, as the deployment of foreign troops
had been the sticking point in negotiations. The
Serb colonel repeated his statement verbatim,
questioning if I had understood the import of his
message.
"Yes," I assured him, "I understand perfectly, but
what benefits are you talking about?"
"I myself do not know," he answered, "But
Holbrooke knows!"
Richard Holbrooke, author of the Dayton Accord on
Bosnia, had been shuttling back and forth to
Belgrade trying to find a peaceful solution to the
Kosovo crisis. He had left Belgrade the day before
to consult with Washington and was due back in
Yugoslavia that weekend. He apparently carried
with him a detailed brief of the Milosevic offer.
The timing, place and presence of other diplomats
cut short my discussion with the Serb, but by
coincidence I had dinner with him at the home of a
fellow attach a few days later. I asked if he had
learned any more about the benefits he had spoken
of during our last encounter. "I can only speak
for myself," he answered, "but there are only
three things Yugoslavia must have: Yugoslavia must
keep sovereignty over Kosovo, the terrorists (i.e.
the Kosovo Liberation Army) must be disarmed, and
the referendum (on independence for Kosovo) must
be removed." It was apparently too much for the
Clinton Administration to accept as Holbrooke's
shuttle diplomacy failed and the bombing began
March 24.
The war that was supposed to last three days ran
into weeks, then months, and had all the
appearances of lasting well into the future when,
ironically, Russia stepped in and brokered a
peace. The war ended June 10 with the United
Nations accepting responsibility for Kosovo. When
I read the agreement, I was not surprised to see
the three Yugoslavian demands had been met or that
each side had spun the agreement into a victory
for their side. Such is the nature of 20th-century
politics. But I began to wonder why it had the
taken so much blood to come back to the same
starting point as before the war began. There were
lots of explanations I reasoned, but none that fit
the scenario comfortably, save one.
I came to the conclusion - hypothesis really -
that the war had not been about humanitarian
issues at all. Like most wars it had been about
politics. In this case, the objective all along
had been to get rid of Milosevic, Europe's last
reigning communist, and whose virulent nationalism
had set the region ablaze, sending millions of
refugees fleeing to the West where they were not
wanted or welcomed.
It was difficult to gauge when Milosevic became
the target of the administration's Balkan policy,
perhaps as early as 1995 following the debacle in
Bosnia. State appointments and initiatives from
that time seem to support that theory. In any
case, it all hinged on cornering the Serb leader
in a war he could not win and for whom
capitulation or defeat would spell disaster.
Milosevic's Waterloo was thought to be Kosovo, his
Achilles heel to be bombing. This is where the
strategy went awry.
It is one of the enduring myths of the 20th
century that strategic bombing will compel a weak
power to throw in the towel and dump an unpopular
leader. In practice, the opposite has always been
true and even the most unpopular dictators have
been made into national heroes by the symbiotic
logic that befalls strategic bombardment. Most
American administrations, captured by the
omnipotence of their own polls, have been slow to
grasp this reality and have repeatedly reached for
the strategic bomber or missile as an easy way to
avoid hard choices.
The Clinton administration was no different. Three
days at most, it was claimed, and Milosevic will
be history. But in Yugoslavia, as in Iraq and
elsewhere, the bombing backfired and rallied
disparate Serbian political parties around a
common foreign enemy. After 11 weeks of bombing,
the administration, running short of precision
weapons and faced with the prospect of a bloody
ground war, abandoned the bombing strategy and
asked the Russians to broker a deal based upon
Milosevic's antebellum offer. The war achieved no
more than was offered by Milosevic at the
beginning and only inflamed ethnic passions for
generations to come.
It is a Pyrrhic victory to now claim that the
bombing served its purpose. Kosovo remains a part
of Yugoslavia, the independence referendum has
been cancelled, ethnic cleansing continues (albeit
reversed in terms of nationalities), and NATO has
been stuck with the impossible task of disarming
the KLA. As one KLA leader told me, "One day the
Serbs will be selling us guns to shoot at NATO!"
Even new Yugoslavian President Vojislav Kostunica
has been quoted as saying, "We cannot forget what
some countries did to us last year during the NATO
bombing."
Benjamin Franklin believed that there is no such
thing as a good war, nor is there a bad peace.
Democratic forces brought about Milosevic's
demise, not bombs or bullets. Milosevic was widely
hated before the war ever began. Advocates of the
Clinton doctrine might think on these dilemmas and
well consider the old sage's advice before
launching any new moralistic adventures. War is at
best a necessary evil that should be invoked only
in the most extreme of situations. Getting rid of
Milosevic was not one of them.
Alan J. Parrington, of Monument, Colorado, served
as U.S. air attach to the Court of St. James in
London during the Kosovo campaign. He retired from
the Air Force with the rank of colonel at the
beginning of this year.
Copyright 1999-2000, The Gazette, a Freedom
Communications, Inc. Company
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