"VENEZUELAN PARTY SYSTEM AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS"
By Barbra Bastidas
December 2003
Numerous theorists have explained party systems in Latin America, and most of them have paid especial attention to Venezuela due to the particular formation of its own political system. This research revisits crucial analyses regarding party systems in theory, and particularly the functioning of Venezuelan party system (Brian Crisp, Scott Mainwaring, Michael Coppedge, Daniel Levine, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan).
Parties and Party Systems
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully first define the political party as "any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office," they are the main agents of political representation and are virtually the only actors with access to elected positions in democratic politics (Mainwaring, Scully, 1995: 2). Party system is the set of patterned interactions in the competition among parties. In this sense, some rules and regularities are widely observed, and respected (pp. 4). Two parties at least must exist to form a party system.
Michael Coppedge refers, among other things, to the pre-conditions necessary for a party system to evolve. He speaks of two main conditions: embryonic organizations, and political order (Mainwaring, Valenzuela, 1998). The former is compounded by elites before electoral participation; it recruits candidates, distributes patronage, and organizes the work of congress. The latter is a must prior to the expansion of electoral participation to the middle and lower classes. If there is no any type of political order, the environment becomes too unsettled to make political parties organization worthwhile (pp. 199).
Michael Coppedge analyzes the Venezuelan party system and argues, "democratic regimes are more likely to survive where there are guarantees that the fundamental interests of economic elites will be protected (Middlebrook, 2000: 110). He points Venezuelan system as the best illustration of the crucial role played by accommodation of elite interests after the country's transition to democracy in 1958. The protection of elite interests is guaranteed by conservative parties (Acción Democrática, COPEI) through an agreement by which business leaders accorded to intervene against the military, and on behalf of democracy in order to exchange the right to rule for the right to make money (Middlebrook, 2000: 111).
Therefore, Venezuela developed its own effective ways of representing elite interests informally, based upon clientelistic relationships between politicians and economic groups (pp. 111). Moreover, this arrangement made possible political stability for many decades. But it also engendered corruption and inefficiency, which contributed to a long period of political crises when economic decline began in 1979 (pp. 111).
Coppedge points out that one of the main causes of political crisis in Venezuela - and in the long run, of military intervention in politics - is the so-called "Reverse Clientelism." This is a process where influence peddling is the main channel of access to policy making. It is a "voluntary face-to-face relationship between two people, but unlike the usual clientelism where patrons exchange material favors for political support, politicians exchange political favors for material support" (Middlebrook, 2000: 118). Clientelism, as an informal representation, assures
In this state of affairs, and after four decades of reverse clientelism, Venezuelans opted for supporting a "reversal to past models," as Coppedge calls it. This reversal meant wide support for nationalist/populist leaders, or military coups, such as the one attempted in 1992 by actual president Hugo Chávez, through which he grounded on political domains (Middlebrook, 2000: 132). Thus, the military as a poder moderador emerged when there was a crisis threatening the country's national interests (as was at the time President Carlos Andrés Pérez with the implementation of economic emergency packages).
Brian Crisp, on his side, grasps on the regime characteristics that were so important to the original consolidation of democracy, and which are also essential for understanding its recent difficulties. He argues that multiple parties may complicate democratic consolidation, while few highly disciplined parties may make it easier (Mainwaring et al, 1997: 161). Crisp finds three characteristics embodied in the formal and informal sources of party strength in Venezuela:
1) Penetration of Other Groups: Incorporation or infiltration of students groups, peasants, business groups, professional associations, neighborhoods associations, interests groups leaders, etc.
2) Electoral System: Highly centralized internal party politics (closed list of candidates), dominant two-party system, fixed term for presidents and congress members, and proportional representation which enhances representation and participation, but dimi nishes effectiveness (Payne, 2003: 95). People in this type of system vote for the arty, not for the candidate.
3) Disciplined Members of Congress: Internal party regulations mandate strict party discipline by members of the congressional delegation. There is high control exerted by national elites, which encourages congressmen to promote party lines, instead of promoting citizens interests. Politicians are constrained by party discipline; therefore respond only to party interests. This practice has been called partidocracia (Mainwaring et al, 1997: 172), also considered one of the main causes of military intervention. The author cites the example of the overthrow of Rómulo Gallegos in 1948 for being so strictly bound by party discipline, and denying political participation to other groups (pp. 172) . To Crisp, electoral systems, policy-making institutions, and institutionalization of political parties, which allowed transition to democracy, became the main obstacles to its further deepening (pp. 193).
Legitimacy, Efficacy, Effectiveness, and Partidocracia.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that political violence is an important cause of democratic breakdown (Linz & Stepan, 1978: 14). But political violence is caused by the failure of three crucial factors: legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness of democratic governments. According to the authors, democratic regimes are based on these prime factors, and when they start to collapse, military intervention is likely to occur. Moreover, in crises situations, when the authority of the government is challenged by any group in the society, those in authority make use of force, asking others to risk their lives - and take the lives of fellow citizens - in defense of the political order (Linz & Stepan, 1978: 16).
Linz and Stepan define legitimacy as "the belief that, in spite of failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience. It means that when rulers who hold power constitutionally demand obedience, citizens voluntarily compliance with this demand. In short, the legitimacy of a democratic regime rests on the belief in the right of those legally elevated to power to issue certain types of command, to expect obedience, and to enforce them" (Linz & Stepan, 1978: 17). The loss of this belief in, and support for all political actors in a democratic regime leads to an erosion of legitimacy. I hypothesize this phenomenon occurred in Venezuela since 1989; peoples of all social classes came into a broad disbelief in all political actors, bringing about an accorded support and sympathy for military intervention.
Efficacy is the second factor characterizing the political system. It refers to the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any political system that are perceived as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens (Linz & Stepan, 1978: 21). In short, efficacy is measured by the extend to which certain government gets to deliver the most basic needs to its population, and if it does it well or not. In Venezuela, it was more a problem of a series of governments who failed to deliver efficient policies, joined to the economic crisis of liberal economic reforms, what caused the breakdown of Carlos Andrés Pérez regime (1992), and as a salient feature, military intervention. The fact that this breakdown did not occurred before may be due to what Linz calls the "tunnel effect." This phenomenon suggests that the satisfaction of the expectations of some sectors of the society gives hope to others who do not see immediate outputs to satisfy their demands.
The third factor, effectiveness, implies the capacity to actually implement the policies formulated, with the desired (or promised) results. Effectiveness affects directly the relation between expectations and satisfactions. It therefore weakens the authority of the state, and is likely to split the regime building coalition (Linz & Stepan, 1978: 23). More important, ineffectiveness encourages illegitimate resistance to government decisions, leading thus to authoritarian measures, and finally military intervention. Consecutive ineffectiveness of Venezuelan governments has been a major issue claimed by the population during the last three decades, and it has become a reason for advocating military politics.
