The third factor, effectiveness, is closely interrelated with efficacy. It implies the capacity to actually implement the policies formulated with the desired (or promised) results. Effectiveness directly affects the relation between expectations and satisfactions. The loss of effectiveness, therefore, weakens the authority of the state and is likely to split the regime-building coalition (Linz & Stepan 23). More importantly, ineffectiveness encourages illegitimate resistance to government decisions, leading hence to authoritarian measures and ultimately, military intervention.
The Role of the Military in Politics
Samuel Edward Finer offers an examination of the military as a political actor. He begins by defining the expression “military intervention in politics” as the “Armed Forces substitution of their own policies or persons for those of the recognized civilian authorities” (23). Also, Finer acknowledges different ‘motives’ and ‘moods’ for military intervention in politics. Those motives are classified as:
1). The Manifest Destiny of the Soldier: This refers to the providential mission of the soldier as savior of his country. In this sense, the Armed Force embodies the independence, sovereignty and love for the country that no other entity does. Military training emphasizes patriotism and nationalism as military virtues, so they are called upon for “saving the nation” when these fundamentals are threatened (Finer 28-29). This is very likely in Latin American countries, where the military is usually considered a messianic organism by civil society, especially in difficult times.
2) The National Interest: according to Finer, “all military that have become politicized hold a similar believe; a unique identification with national interest.” They feel that they have the “right” to exercise custodianship when they think that civil authorities threaten the interests of the nation (30). This has been referred elsewhere as poder moderador (moderator power).
3) The Sectional Interests: This motive is composed of four categories. A) Class interests: Military support is guaranteed when power is held by a similar social class, and overthrown when it is held by a hostile class (Finer 35). B) Regional interests: If an officer is drawn from one particular region of the country, it could become a motive for his political involvement. C) Corporate self-interest of the Armed Forces: Anxiety to keep its autonomy is one of the motives for military intervention. Here, nationalism and arrogance play key roles. Military staffs defend their technical autonomies and specialized scope of action. Conflict includes size of the army, military cabinet seats, staff appointing, promotions and budget. D) Individual self-interests: This motive is common in countries where the army provides the means for social and economic progress, and where armies have no real mission to accomplish other than to exist for formal rules and accumulating material gains (39-60).
As for the opportunity to intervene, Finer argues that it could be taken very erratically. The initial popularity that accompanies a coup may disappear quite quickly. It is common that military officers find in civilian mismanagement the perfect excuse, the motive, and therefore the opportunity to intervene. This does not mean that the institution is more capable to manage the state. Moreover, if it proves to be unable to supplant that previous government, popularity becomes against the institution (81).
In the same vein, Samuel Huntington defines the modern officer corp as a professional body, and therefore, the modern officer as a professional man (7). To him, the concept of profession encompasses three distinguishing characteristics of military officership: 1) Expertise: The professional officer is an expert with specialized skills and knowledge in human endeavor. This expertise is obtained through prolonged education and experience (8). The particularities of this education for the Venezuelan military will be revised in Chapter two of this work. 2) Responsibility: For Huntington, this characteristic engenders the essential character of a professional officer. The “social responsibility distinguishes the officer from other experts with only intellectual skills” (9). 3) Corporateness: Members of a professional corp share a sense of “organic unity” and consciousness of themselves as a group apart. The origins of this collective sense lie in the discipline and training necessary for professional competence (10)
As Huntington asserts, the only function that is common to all officers and which distinguishes them from all civilians is the management of violence. In this sense, the duties of a military officer include: 1) the organizing, equipping and training of his force; 2) the planning of its activities; and 3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat (11). The last two duties are those skills peculiar to the officer and not shared with civilians. As we can see, no role of the military officer in politics, nor a role in state or governmental matters are observed in Huntington’s work.
As for the military man and his relation to the state, Huntington notes that this is based on a natural division of labor. Since military members have a specialized competence and expertise, their professional scope is limited, making it impossible for a soldier to qualify for any other field (70).
Furthermore, the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtails their competence and substitutes military professional values for extraneous values. The “military officer must remain politically neutral and his science area must be subordinated to the political area” (71).
There are, nevertheless, some areas where conflict arises between the military and the state. Huntington identifies two sources of such conflicts: military obedience vs. professional competence and military value of obedience vs. nonmilitary values. The first conflict involves the relation of a military subordinate to a military superior and occurs in two senses: operational and doctrinal. The former has to do with the execution of a military order by a subordinate, which in his judgment may result in military disaster. Whether he made his views known to his superior or not, the question of complete obedience is a major issue for the officer who finds himself in a situation of obedience versus rational choice. The latter refers to the utilization of the military hierarchy to suppress uncomfortable developments in tactics and technology. Even though a superior authority is supposed to be superior professionally, the hierarchy of command may be prostituted to nonprofessional purposes when this is not the case (75).
The second source of conflict is that of the responsibility of the officer when he is ordered by the statesman to follow a course which he knows will lead to national disaster, the violation of law of the land, or even a clear transgression of moral standards. In this sense, there is conflict around four issue areas: a) between military obedience and political wisdom. Here the military man is not justified in his disobedience since his competence is far from political; b) between military competence and political threats to this competence. An intrusion of political power into the military realm justifies military disobedience based on professional standards unique to the military; c) between military obedience and illegal orders. A military officer is justified in disobeying if civilian authority places an order at the edge of the constitution; and d) the conflict between military obedience and immoral orders. If a statesman orders such things as genocide or territory occupation, military consciousness must prevail. He must act as a free individual morally responsible for his actions (Huntington 77-78). This source of conflict is fundamental to the analysis of military conflict - or discontent - toward President Chávez’s policies. In Chapter Three of this work, I refer to the issue as “factionalism” to explain the emergence of dissident factions within the Venezuelan military since 2001. Also, these concepts are studied in the analysis of the events of April 11th, 2002, when conflict arose between President Chávez and the military high command. The military withdrew support for the President, who, in turn, resigned from office, but returned to power three days later.
CAUSAL DIAGRAM
The previous literature review reveals several causal paths are suggestive of the militarization of politics under the administration of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. First, according to Alfred Stepan, military prerogatives granted by the government determine the level of military participation in key state areas. Hence, the level of military participation indicates how these areas of the state are being militarized. High military prerogatives in key state areas granted by President Chávez, or independent variable #1, directly affects the dependent variable, militarization of Venezuelan political system. Independent variable #2 derives from the literature provided by James Malloy, Michael Coppedge and Scott Mainwaring regarding party systems and the prevalence of “partidocracia.” The existence of an excluding political system based on a two-party arrangement, or variable #2, directly affects the dependent variable. The analyses offered by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan regarding the breakdown of legitimacy, efficacy and effectiveness of democratic regimes also affects the militarization of the political system in Venezuela. The failure of these three issues is shown as variable #3. Finally, variable #4 is a conditional variable. It is conditioned by variable #3. Political violence is, according to Linz’s arguments, an ultimate outcome of the erosion of legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness of democratic governments. Thus, if there is variable #3, there is the probability that variable #4 exists. In Venezuela, political violence emerged on February 27, 1989, when the Caracazo riots occurred as a consequence of a series of events.
Independent Variables: Dependent Variable
High Military Prerogatives granted by President Hugo Chávez. Militarization of Venezuelan Politics Under President Chávez’s Government (1999-2003)
Excluding Political System/ Partidocracia
Breakdown of Legitimacy, Efficacy, and Effectiveness of previous Regimes
Political Violence
