epistemology

Philosophy 5300/6300

University of Utah

Spring 2003

 

Lecture Notes

   John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz’s “Foundations Theories”  [PDF]

   John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz’s “Coherence Theories”  [PDF]

   Alvin I. Goldman’s “What is justified belief?”  [PDF]

   Alvin I. Goldman’s “Discrimination and perceptual knowledge”  [PDF]

   Fred Dretske’s “The pragmatic dimension of knowledge”  [PDF]

   David Lewis’s “Elusive knowledge”  [PDF]

   Laurence BonJour’s “Externalist theories of empirical knowledge”  [PDF]

   William P. Alston’s “Internalism and externalism in epistemology”  [PDF]

   Alvin I. Goldman’s “Internalism exposed”  [PDF]

   Ernest Sosa’s “Philosophical scepticism and epistemic circularity”  [PDF]

   Christopher S. Hill, “Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticism”  [PDF]

 

Instructor:

Tim Black

Class meets:

Tuesdays and Thursdays; 10:45 a.m.-12:05 p.m. in OSH 336

Office hours:

Tuesdays and Thursdays; 1:30 p.m.-2:45 p.m.; other hours by appointment

Office:

OSH 341K

Office phone:

585.5810

Instructor’s email:

tim.black@philosophy.utah.edu

 

I invite you to visit me during my office hours and to talk with me via telephone and e-mail. I always welcome your comments and questions, and I am exceptionally happy to talk with you about the course material or about other philosophical or administrative matters.

 

Department office:

OSH 341

Department phone:

581.8161

 

Aims of the Course:  This course will focus on epistemological theories, emphasizing in particular the debate between internalism and externalism in epistemology, and on the ways in which these theories are employed in addressing the issue of skepticism about the external world.  Our consideration of these topics will move at a fairly rapid pace.  I hope, however, to avoid sacrificing a consideration of the details, which means that the schedule of readings will be challenging in several ways.  We’ll read and discuss a number of papers, each of which will be philosophically demanding.  This is designed to sharpen both your ability to read and understand philosophical texts and your ability to discuss the issues addressed in those texts.  We will also write about a number of epistemological topics.  This is designed to sharpen both your ability to write about philosophical issues and your ability to write in general.

 

Required Text:  Keith DeRose and Ted A. Warfield, editors. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford: New York and London, 1999).

 

Attendance and Participation:  Since you are responsible for any and all material presented in class, regular attendance is essential to doing well in this course.  Furthermore, philosophy is akin to, say, chemistry in that it’s an activity and not merely a set of purported facts.  So just as you can’t develop your abilities as a chemist without doing some work in the lab, you can’t develop your philosophical abilities without practice.  This means, among other things, that you should be discussing philosophical issues and arguments both in class and outside of class.

 

Students with Disabilities: If you have a disability, please identify yourself to me and to the University so that we can reasonably accommodate your learning and the preparation and evaluation of the work that you must do for this course. Please contact the Center for Disability Services, Olpin Union, Room 162, 581.5020.

 

Evaluation:  Your final grade in the course will be based on the following:

 

Shorter Paper 1

Due January 28

15%

Shorter Paper 2

Due February 13

15%

Shorter Paper 3

Due April 8

16%

Longer Paper

Proposal, due February 27

First version, due March 13     

Second version, due April 17

 

 

30%

Other

8 one-page weekly argument summaries

24%

 

                                                                                                           

Grades: Letter grades are assigned according to the following system: 100-92% = A; 91-90% = A-; 89-87% = B+; 86-83% = B; 82-80% = B-; 79-77% = C+; 76-73% = C; 72-70% = C-; 69-67% = D+; 66-63% = D; 62-60% = D-; 59-0% = E.  If your final grade falls just short of some higher grade, I will consider the quality of your participation as grounds for improving your final grade.  I strongly encourage your participation, which can come in class, in office hours, by phone, or by email.

 

Cheating and Plagiarism:  I consider academic dishonesty to be a very serious issue.  If you are unclear about what constitutes academic dishonesty or about the possible repercussions of and penalties for acts of academic dishonesty, please consult the University of Utah Student Code, online at the University of Utah Student Code.

 

One-Page Weekly Argument Summaries:

 

Ø      You must submit eight one-page weekly argument summaries over the course of the semester.  You’ll have fifteen opportunities to submit a summary, and it’s up to you to choose which eight of those you’ll take.  (You may submit no more than one argument summary per week.  If you submit more than eight summaries, only the best eight scores will count toward your final grade.)

Ø      Each of your eight summaries should be a page or so in length.  In writing them, you’ll be required to do two things.  First, identify one argument from the week’s readings.  Next, state that argument, either in paragraph or outline form, as clearly and as succinctly as you can.

Ø      I will accept no late summary submissions.  Summaries are due at the beginning of each Thursday’s class.

 

Papers: There are two sorts of paper assignment for this course:

 

  • The shorter paper assignments require you to write essays that are 3-4 pages in length each.  I will at some point distribute topics for each of the shorter papers.
  • The longer paper assignment requires you to write an essay that is about 15 pages in length.  Here again, I will at some point suggest a few topics for the longer paper, and you may either write on one of those topics or write on another topic that I approve.  On February 27th, you must submit a paper proposal, which may include a tentative outline of your paper.  The first version of your paper is due on March 13th.  I will take a look at these papers and return them to you.  You will then revise the paper and submit a second version no later than 10:45 a.m., 17 April 2003.  I will accept no paper that is submitted after this time.

 

I will evaluate both the longer and the shorter papers primarily on the basis of the quality of the arguments you provide in favor of your position.  In general, however, your papers must (a) be well organized, clear, and readable, (b) demonstrate your ability to consider a serious philosophical issue, (c) demonstrate your ability clearly and accurately to represent the views of others, (d) demonstrate your ability to evaluate philosophical arguments, and (e) demonstrate your ability to present and defend your own reasonable and persuasive philosophical arguments.

 

 

Schedule

(subject to revision)

Course Introduction

 

January 7

 

Foundationalism

   bibliography

January 9

John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, “Foundations Theories” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

January 14

Pollock and Cruz’s “Foundations Theories” continued

Coherentism

   bibliography

January 16

John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz, “Coherence Theories” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

January 21

Pollock and Cruz’s “Coherence Theories” continued

 

January 23

Class Canceled

Reliable Indicator Theories

 

January 28

D. M. Armstrong, “Non-Inferential Knowledge (1)” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

Process Reliabilism

January 30

Alvin I. Goldman, “What is justified belief?” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

February 4

Goldman’s “What is justified belief?” continued

Non-Contextualized Relevant Alternatives Theories  

   bibliography

February 6

Alvin I. Goldman, “Discrimination and perceptual knowledge” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

February 11

Goldman’s “Discrimination and perceptual knowledge” continued

February 13

Fred Dretske, “The pragmatic dimension of knowledge” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

Contextualized Relevant Alternatives Theories

   bibliography

 

February 18

David Lewis, “Elusive knowledge” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 12)

February 20

Lewis’s “Elusive knowledge” continued

Subjunctive Conditionals Theories

   bibliography

 

February 25

Robert Nozick, “Philosophical Explanations (Selections)” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 10)

Internalism and Externalism

February 27

Laurence BonJour, “Externalist theories of empirical knowledge” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

March 4

William P. Alston, “Internalism and externalism in epistemology” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

March 6

Alvin I. Goldman, “Internalism exposed” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

March 11

Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Internalism defended” (On file in the Philosophy Department)

Introduction to Skepticism

 

March 13

Keith DeRose, “Introduction: responding to skepticism” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 1)

 

March 18

Holiday, Spring Break

 

March 20

Holiday, Spring Break

Skepticism and Externalism

March 25

Ernest Sosa, “Philosophical scepticism and epistemic circularity” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 6)

March 27

Class Canceled

April 1

Christopher S. Hill, “Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticism” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 7)

Skepticism and Relevant Alternatives Theories

 

April 3

Fred Dretske, Epistemic operators” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 8)

April 8

Gail Stine, “Skepticism, relevant alternatives, and deductive closure” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 9)

Skepticism and Internalism

April 10

Thomas Nagel, “The View from Nowhere (Selections)” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 14)

April 15

Barry Stroud, “Scepticism, ‘externalism’, and the goal of epistemology” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 15)

Skepticism and Contextualism

April 17

Keith DeRose, “Solving the skeptical problem” (DeRose and Warfield, Chapter 11)

April 22

DeRose’s “Solving the skeptical problem” continued

 

Note: Everything in this syllabus is subject to revision.  I will announce any and all revisions in class and, in general, do my best to make sure that everyone knows about revisions.  You should either make sure that you don’t miss class or find a sure way of becoming aware of any revisions that I make to the Schedule or to the syllabus.

 

 

Supplemental Materials

 

Foundationalism

 

  • Alston, William P.  1976.  “Has foundationalism been refuted?” Philosophical Studies 29: 287-305.
  • Alston, William P.  1976.  “Two types of foundationalism” The Journal of Philosophy 73: 165-185.
    • Available online; click here if you’re using a computer that will allow you to access jstor.
  • Audi, Robert.  2003.  “Contemporary modest foundationalism,” in Louis P. Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 3rd ed.  Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
  • Chisholm, Roderick M.  1977.  Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.C48 1977.
  • Oakley, I. T.  1976.  “An argument for scepticism concerning justified belief” American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 226-237.
    • Oakley criticizes foundationalism, arguing that there are no basic beliefs.
  • Pryor, James.  2000.  “The skeptic and the dogmatist” Noûs 34: 517-549.

 

Coherentism

 

  • Bender, John W., ed.  1989.  The Current Status of the Coherence Theory.  Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer.
  • BonJour, Laurence.  1976.  “The coherence theory of empirical knowledge” Philosophical Studies 30: 281-312.
  • BonJour, Laurence.  1985.  The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.B59 1985.
  • Harman, Gilbert.  1970.  “Induction,” in Marshall Swain, ed., Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief.  Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
  • Harman, Gilbert.  1984.  “Positive versus negative undermining in belief revision” Noûs 18: 39-49.
  • Harman, Gilbert.  1986.  Change in View.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    • Marriott Library, BC177.H37 1986.
  • Lehrer, Keith.  1974.  Knowledge.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    • Marriott Library, BD215 .L4.
  • Lehrer, Keith.  1999.  “Knowledge, skepticism and coherence” Philosophical Perspectives 13, Epistemology.  Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
  • Lehrer, Keith.  2000.  Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed.  Boulder: Westview Press.
    • First edition located in Marriott Library, BD161.L368 1990.

 

The Relevant Alternatives Theory

 

  • Cohen, Stewart. 1991. “Skepticism, relevance, and relativity,” in Brian P. McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
    • Marriott Library, B945.D744 D74 1991.
  • DeRose, Keith. 1996. “Relevant alternatives and the content of knowledge attributions” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 193-197.
    • Available online; click here if you’re using a computer that will allow you to access jstor.
  • Dretske, Fred. 1970. “Epistemic operators” Journal of Philosophy 67: 1007-1023.
    • Available online; click here if you’re using a computer that will allow you to access jstor.
  • Heller, Mark. 1989. “Relevant alternatives” Philosophical Studies 55: 23-40.
  • Heller, Mark. 1995. “The simple solution to the problem of generality” Noûs 29: 501-515.
  • Heller, Mark. 1999. “Relevant alternatives and closure” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77: 196-208.
  • Pryor, James.  Online lecture notes on relevant alternatives theories.  Click here.
  • Shatz, David. 1981. “Reliability and relevant alternatives” Philosophical Studies 39: 393-408.
  • Shuger, Scott. 1983. “Knowledge and its consequences” American Philosophical Quarterly 20: 217-225.
  • Sosa, Ernest. Forthcoming. “Relevant alternatives, contextualism included.”
    • Available online; click here.
  • Vogel, Jonathan. 1999. “The New Relevant Alternatives Theory” Philosophical Perspectives 13, Epistemology: 155-180.
  • Yourgrau, Palle. 1983. “Knowledge and relevant alternatives” Synthese 55: 175-190.

 

Lewis’ Relevant Alternatives Theory and Related Issues

 

  • Black, Tim. 2003. “The relevant alternatives theory and missed clues” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81: 96-106.
    • Available online; click here.
  • Cohen, Stewart. 1998. “Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 289-306.
  • DeRose, Keith. “Single scoreboard semantics”
    • Available online; click here.
  • Hawthorne, John. 2002. “Lewis, the lottery and the preface” Analysis 62: 242-251.
  • Lewis, David. 1979. “Scorekeeping in a language game” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 339-359.
  • Lewis, David. 1996. “Elusive knowledge” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 549-567.
  • Oakley, I.T. 2001. “A skeptic’s reply to Lewisian contextualism” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31: 309-332.
  • Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001. “Knowledge, relevant alternatives and missed clues” Analysis 61: 202-208

 

Subjunctive Conditionals Theories and Epistemic Closure

 

  • Audi, Robert. 1995. “Deductive closure, defeasibility and scepticism: A reply to Feldman” Philosophical Quarterly 45: 494-499.
  • Bogdan, R.J. 1985. “Cognition and epistemic closure” American Philosophical Quarterly 22: 55-63.
  • Brueckner, Anthony. 1985. “Losing track of the sceptic” Analysis 45: 103-104.
  • Brueckner, Anthony. 1985. “Skepticism and epistemic closure” Philosophical Topics 13: 89-117.
  • Brueckner, Anthony. 1985. “Transmission for knowledge not established” Philosophical Quarterly 35: 193-196.
  • Brueckner, Anthony. 1991. “Unfair to Nozick” Analysis 51: 61-64.
  • Brueckner, Anthony L. 1984. “Why Nozick is a sceptic” Mind 93: 259-264.
  • Brueckner, Anthony L. 1987. “Begging the skeptic’s question” Philosophia 17: 523-529.
  • Cohen, Stewart. 1987. “Knowledge, context, and social standards” Synthese 73: 3-26.
  • Cohen, Stewart. 1988. “How to be a fallibilist,” in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
    • Marriott Library, B1.P485.
  • Cohen, Stewart. 1999. “Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasons,” in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
    • Marriott Library, B1.P485.
  • Craig, Edward. 1989. “Nozick and the sceptic: The thumbnail version” Analysis 49: 161-162.
  • Dretske, Fred. 1971. “Conclusive reasons” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 1-22.
  • Dretske, Fred. 1972. “Contrastive statements” Philosophical Review 81: 411-430.
  • Feldman, Richard. 1995. “In defense of closure” Philosophical Quarterly 45: 487-494.
  • Forbes, Graeme. 1984. “Nozick on skepticism” The Philosophical Quarterly 34: 43-52.
  • Fumerton, Richard. 1987. “Nozick’s epistemology,” in Steven Luper-Foy, ed., The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totawa:  Rowman & Littlefield.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.P728 1987.
  • Garrett, B.J. 1983. “Nozick on knowledge” Analysis 43: 181-184.
  • Garrett, Brian. 1999. “A sceptical tension” Analysis 59: 205-206.
  • Johnsen, Bredo C. 1989. “Nozick on scepticism, II” Philosophia 19: 61-62.
  • Kirkham, Robert L. 1984. “Does the Gettier problem rest on a mistake?” Mind 93: 501-513.
  • Klein, Peter. 1981. Certainty: A Refutation of Skepticism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
    • Marriott Library, BD171.K55.
  • Klein, Peter. 1987. “On behalf of the skeptic,” in Steven Luper-Foy, ed., The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totawa: Rowman & Littlefield.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.P728 1987.
  • Klein, Peter. 1995. “Skepticism and closure: Why the evil genius argument fails” Philosophical Topics 23: 213-236.
  • Kroon, Frederick W. 1986. “Philosophical explanations and sceptical intuitions” The Philosophical Quarterly 36: 391-395.
  • Luper-Foy, Steven. 1984. “The epistemic predicament: Knowledge, Nozickian tracking, and skepticism” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 26-49.
  • Luper-Foy, Steven (ed.) 1987. The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.P728 1987.
    • This entire volume is devoted to Nozick’s epistemology.  The volume also contains a very helpful bibliography.
  • Luper-Foy, Steven. 1987. “The causal indicator analysis of knowledge” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47: 563-587.
  • Luper-Foy, Steven. 2003. “Indiscernability skepticism,” in Steven Luper-Foy, ed., The Skeptics. Hampshire: Ashgate.
  • Martin, Raymond. 1983. “Tracking Nozick’s sceptic: A better method” Analysis 43: 28-33.
  • McGinn, Colin. 1999. “The concept of knowledge,” in Colin McGinn, Knowledge and Reality: Selected Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.M384 1999.  (The library’s website claims that this volume is missing.)
  • Nozick, Robert. 2000. “Knowledge and skepticism,” in Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim, eds., Epistemology: An Anthology. Malden: Blackwell.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.E615 2000.
  • Over, D.E. 1986. “Knowledge and non-constructive reasoning” The Philosophical Quarterly 36: 29-36.
  • Shope, Robert K. 1984. “Cognitive abilities, conditionals, and knowledge: A response to Nozick” Journal of Philosophy 81: 29-48.
  • Sosa, Ernest. 1999. “How to defeat opposition to Moore,” in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell.
    • Marriott Library, B1.P485.
  • Sosa, Ernest. 2003. “Neither contextualism nor skepticism,” in Steven Luper-Foy, ed., The Skeptics. Hampshire: Ashgate.
  • Stine, Gail C. 1971. “Dretske on knowing the logical consequences” Journal of Philosophy 68: 296-299.
  • Vogel, Jonathan. 1990. “Are there counterexamples to the closure principle?” in Michael David Roth and Glenn Ross, eds., Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    • Marriott Library, BD201.D68 1989.
  • Wright, Crispin. 1983. “Keeping track of Nozick” Analysis 43: 134-140.

 

Additional Materials

 

  • Armstrong, D. M.  1968.  A Materialist Theory of the Mind.  New York: Humanities.
    • Marriott Library, BF161.A72.  Available online to patrons of or staff affiliated with the University of Utah’s libraries; click here.
  • Armstrong, D. M.  1973.  Belief, Truth and Knowledge.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.A65.
  • Gettier, Edmund L.  1963.  “Is justified true belief knowledge?” Analysis 23: 121-123.
    • Available online; click here.
  • Goldman, Alvin I.  1967.  “A causal theory of knowing”  The Journal of Philosophy 64: 355-372.
    • Available online; click here if you’re using a computer that will allow you to access jstor.
  • Harman, Gilbert.  1973.  Thought.  Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    • Marriott Library, BD161.H28.
  • Klein, Peter.  1971.  “A proposed definition of propositional knowledge” Journal of Philosophy 68: 471-482.
  • Lehrer, Keith and Thomas D. Paxson, Jr.  1969.  “Knowledge: Undefeated justified true belief” The Journal of Philosophy 66: 225-237.
    • Available online; click here if you’re using a computer that will allow you to access jstor.
  • Pryor, James. 2001. “Highlights of Recent Epistemology” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52: 95-124.
  • Russell, Bertrand.  1921.  The Analysis of Mind.  London: Allen & Unwin.
    • Marriott Library, BF121.R8.  Available online to patrons of or staff affiliated with the University of Utah’s libraries; click here.
    • See pages 159-160 for Russell’s five-minute-old-world skeptical hypothesis.
  • Stalnaker, Robert.  1972.  “Pragmatics,” in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language.  Boston: D. Reidel.
    • Marriott Library, P106.S39.
    • Stalnaker provides a framework for linguistic pragmatics that can be used in accounting for the relevance of certain alternatives.
  • Unger, Peter.  1968.  “An analysis of factual knowledge”  Journal of Philosophy 65: 157-170.

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