THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

Spain, Portugal and Greece emerged from the shadow of right-wing dictatorships during the course of the mid-1970s. Spain and Portugal had been governed by authoritarian regimes since the victory of General Franco in the Spanish civil war in 1939 and the rise to power of the Portuguese dictator Salazar in 1926. In Greece, a military dictatorship which seized power in 1967 had been preceded by almost two decades of quasi-democratic rule during which discrimination against left-wingers (who had been the losers in the civil war of 1946-49) was commonplace.

All three countries embarked upon the transition within a three year period (1974-1977). This has led to Southern Europe being conceptualised as a regional sub-system, with particular characteristics such as relative economic under-development, delayed political modernisation, cultural distinctiveness, and particular exposure to international influences.

Many observers have looked upon the recent history of Southern Europe as offering a successful model of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This success has been achieved despite certain characteristic problems which have made Southern Europe a late-comer to mass democracy. These include inter alia weak civil societies with a relative lack of a participatory culture, the persistence of traditional elites and of pre-modern forms of political organisation, and clientelism as a defining factor of the political systems.

Culturally, Southern Europe has continued to be more influenced by forms of traditional religion, although securalisation has been substantial, particularly in Spain. The importance given to the family has also been a particular characteristic. Although rapid urbanisation in recent decades has disrupted traditional patterns of family life, the family retained its importance as a buffer against unemployment and poverty in societies where the social welfare systems remained relatively under-developed.

Southern Europe has been increasingly vulnerable to economic, cultural and political influences of stronger powers in the latter half of the twentieth century; something which has crucially conditioned the courses of action available to policy makers and political and social forces. This was seen clearly in Spain (after 1953) and Greece where the regimes were considered to be bulwarks against communism, eliciting the help of the USA in keeping the left out of power, despite the fact that the regimes were using undemocratic means. It can also be seen by the influence that prospective membership of the EC had on the bringing about of a transition to democracy.

This essay shall attempt to explain briefly what gave rise to and made possible the transition to democracy in Southern Europe and what helped this transition to be successful. In doing this one must keep in mind that although some circumstances and the time frame in which the transition occurred were similar in the three Southern European countries, each one of them had its own particular characteristics and history.

ACHIEVING THE TRANSITION

None of the democratic transitions in Southern Europe was the outcome of a spontaneous mass revolution. In all cases, the actions and interactions of key elite groups, social political forces (including parties, trade unions and churches), and state institutions, especially the army, significantly determined the nature of the transition.

TRANSITION IN PORTUGAL

The Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown in April 1974. It had been in power since 1926. Antonio Salazar was the regime's strongman until September 1968 when he was succeeded by Marcelo Caetano, whose attempts to preserve power through controlled liberalisation ended in failure. Ideologically the regime was opposed to modernity as represented by liberalism and socialism, favouring instead strong Roman Catholic beliefs and morals and Portuguese nationalism.

At the start of the 1960s, Portugal was still a largely rural society with nearly half its labour force employed in agriculture. Compared to northern Europe, high levels of illiteracy and low standards of health care and provision of basic sanitation prevailed. There was a large amount of political repression with secret police encharged with the containment of dissent. Throughout the 1960s three developments contributed to worsening social tension:- the mounting burden of colonial wars in Africa (Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique), increasing interdependence on the world economy (and a need for foreign investment), and a growing crises of ideology and legitimacy of the ruling elite.

From September 1968 to April 1974, the regime veered shakily between controlled liberalisation and bouts of increased repression. Some exiles, including Mario Soares, the future president, were permitted to return home, and a 1972 trade agreement with the EC encouraged the regime's technocratic advisers to hope for full EC membership. Pressure for a transition to democracy increased with the realisation that this would facilitate Portugal's quest for membership. This coincided with discontent within the military. Younger officers founded the Armed Forces Movement which seized power, ending the wars in Africa.

Between April 1974 and the summer of 1975, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), sought to capture the leadership of the revolution. It supported the appointment of a left-wing army officer, Vasco Goncalves, as Prime Minister in July 1974, and the formation of a Revolutionary Council in early 1975. However many Portuguese feared that the pro-soviet PCP would replace one form of dictatorship with another. This enabled the strengthening of the Portuguese Socialist Party led by Soares. Elections to a constituent assembly were held on 25 April 1975, with the PSP emerging as the only really national party with 37.9 per cent and the PCP winning just 12.5 per cent. In the general elections of April 1976, results again confirmed the PSP as the largest party with 107 out of 263 seats. In Presidential elections General Eanes (who was considered to be mostly neutral) won 61.5 per cent of the votes. The lack of a parliamentary majority meant that Portuguese politics kept moving between centre-left and centre-right until the late 1980s.

IN SPAIN

In power since 1939, "Generalisimo" Franco imposed a highly centralised and authoritarian regime. He shared with Salazar a hatred of socialism, communism and liberalism. Franco was also concerned with repressing every sign of social or ethnic pluralism. Ethnic groups struggling for autonomy such as the Basques and Catalans were particularly singled out for repression. The Spanish dictatorship drew upon the support of rural landowners and the Roman Catholic Church. It also appealed to the army's image of itself as the protector of a unified and centralised Spain. The army was used effectively to repress the supporters of the left during the civil war, something that institutionalised the political divisions even after the war. Franco's regime in reality consisted of a coalition of forces; Monarchists, Fascists (Falange), rural landowners, technocrats, nationalist soldiers, and Catholic clerics were included in the National Movement, the regime's political party.

From 1939 until the mid-1950s, the regime pursued harsh economic and social policies. Trade unions were smashed and replaced by Fascist corporations whilst political repression was employed to keep workers in line. The power of the big landowners was reinforced and agriculture remained inefficient. Marshall aid was not offered in 1947 and Spain remained isolated internationally.

By the early 1950s problems were increasing. Food shortages and obsolete technology necessitated foreign imports. The regime in Spain opted to develop free market capitalism, and economic and military agreements were entered into with the US in 1953. In 1958 Spain joined the International Monetary Fund. However, despite the opening up of the Spanish economy, political repression was retained by the regime.

In the 1960s and early 1970s there were moves, like in Portugal, towards a closer relationship with the EC, although the regime hoped to achieve eventual membership without having to surrender to democratisation. However circumstances were already changing. First, a growing urban working class began to find its voice. The illegal but active trade unions organised strikes from 1962. Second, the balance of forces within the National Movement was shifting away from the landowners and Falange towards an alliance of more internationally inclined forces - technocrats, bankers, and financiers. Third, attempts at limited reform in the mid-1960s encouraged underground opposition forces to organise even more actively against the regime. Finally, as society became more secular, and church attendance rates fell, the Catholic Church began to distance itself from the regime. Moreover, in 1971 the Church eventually apologised to the Spanish people for the support which it had previously given to the Franco regime.

In 1969 the ageing Franco appointed as his successor prince Juan Carlos. Political instability and street protests increased in 1973, when the assassination by Basque gunmen of the regime's second-in-command, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco prompted reformists within the regime to attempt a rapprochement with the (then still illegal) opposition parties. Juan Carlos was crowned King following the death of Franco in November 1975, clearing the way for a transition to democracy. Adolfo Suarez became Prime Minister in 1976 and political parties were legalised in February 1977. It has to be said that the moderate stance taken by the opposition parties, including the Spanish Communists, was instrumental in enabling a smooth transition to democracy, unlike what happened in Portugal. Democratic elections in June 1977 gave victory to the Centre-right UCD with 34 per cent of the vote, while the Socialists led by Felipe González gained 28 per cent. The Communists won 10 per cent.

IN GREECE

The civil war in Greece left deep wounds which caused heavy polarisation between political alignments, the effects of which can still be felt today. In 1945 the Allies had agreed that Greece would belong to the Western sphere of influence which prompted the British military intervention enabling the defeat of the Communists and the imposition of a conservative regime. The left in Greece, (perhaps justifiably) would for a long time view the West with suspicion especially after 1949 when anti-communism was adopted as an instrument of state policy, a policy which included the banning of the Communist Party (KKE). In theory Greece was a parliamentary democracy after the civil war but the influence of the military was heavy, whilst repressive laws made life for suspected left-wingers immensely difficult. The civil service and the teaching professions were purged and passports, driving licenses and public sector jobs withheld from those not sympathetic to the government. This was compounded by the setting up of a huge network of police spies in order to enable the systematic discrimination.

Actual power was exercised by three forces; the Monarchy, army and the parliamentary right controlled all aspects of governing. Any challenge to this order called into question the role of the army as custodian of the status quo. However changing circumstances, especially outside influence due to the Cypriot question, made possible a relative revival of the left. After 1952 British influence made way to US influence after the former could no longer honour its commitments due to economic and military problems. Greece joined NATO in the same year entrenching itself in the Western Sphere.

In 1958, the left, despite the fear of discrimination, contested the elections and polled 25 per cent of the vote. In 1961 the Centre Union was formed under the leadership of George Papandreou and his son Andreas in order to contest the October elections which confirmed the right wing Karamanlis. Greece was further anchored to the west by an association treaty with the EEC in 1962. However, the 1963 elections gave for the first time a (shaky) mandate to the Centre Union, and Karamanlis went into voluntary exile in Paris. Another election in February 1974 gave a clearer mandate to Papandreou who initiated a series of social reforms including raising the school leaving age (from 12 to 15 years) raising wages, releasing political prisoners and generally moving towards full democratisation. These actions alarmed the military and the powerful capitalist business lobbies, and in 1965 King Constantine II forced the government's resignation (by persuading some of Papandreou's MPs to defect). A right wing Cabinet was installed with the agreement that fresh elections would be held in May 1967.

There was little doubt that Papandreou would win the elections with a large majority. The Military, to forestall the elections, seized power in April and set up a junta led by Colonel George Papadoulos. The military regime immediately suspended human rights, banned political parties and strikes, proclaimed martial law and sent thousands into internal exile. The repressive regime remained in power until 1974. In April and May 1974 the junta attempted an abortive military action in Cyprus to oust Archbishop Makarios hoping that the exercise would earn it political kudos back home and some legitimacy. However this course of action triggered an invasion from Turkey of Northern Cyprus leading to the humiliation of the Greek junta and a crisis of authority in Greece. The junta had to withdraw from power and Karamanlis, went back to Greece as leader of a new centre-right party called New Democracy (ND) to preside over the transition to democracy. Political Parties, including the Communist Party, were once again legalised and full parliamentary democracy under civilian rule was achieved.

MAKING THE TRANSITION POSSIBLE AND SUCCESSFUL

The factors that led directly to change are fairly easy to identify in the three Southern European countries. In Spain sections of the old regime came to embrace the need to enter into dialogue with opposition forces and to abandon repression. By the early 1970s technocratic and business elites were beginning to accept the need for a democratic transition after Franco's death, although they did not agree how far democratisation should go. In Greece, the dictatorship isolated itself from traditional conservative elites, and apart form a few key business backers had a limited support base. In Portugal the loss of military confidence in the dictatorship proved decisive.

But why did the dictatorships prove to be so powerless to stop democratisation in the end, and importantly, what enabled the transition to appear so easy and successful? Economic change since the 1950s involved greater dependence on foreign trade and foreign capital. The suppression of trade unions and opposition parties alienated the workers and the vast majority of the population outside the closed circles of the elite who stood to gain most by the imposition of authoritarianism. Moreover, the absence of channels of communications and negotiation dented support from business groups. The dictatorships did not permit real representation of diverse interests even within the ranks of their own supporters. Conflicts intensified and industrial relations deteriorated. A section of the dominant economic elites began to realise the need for at least a limited pluralism. After all the dictatorships had started to lose their usefulness with the increased economic instability. It began to be understood that economic well-being necessarily needed to be combined with social and political stability. However the regimes realised that reform was a threat to their own existence. The elimination of genuinely representatives parties and interest groups made it impossible to achieve any form of pluralism, limited or otherwise. Thus, it became clear that only a full transition to liberal democracy could secure stability and economic growth in these three countries, which although forming part of the west geographically and by alliance, were in economic, social and political terms more similar to the third world. Thus external pressures were also of importance. The incentive of EC membership seemed to offer a guarantee of greater prosperity, less dependence on US capital and influence, and political stability. It is important also to consider this in the context of the cold war situation. At the height of the cold war the dictatorships had a trump card in the form of their antagonism towards communism. With the onset and acceptance of détente this aversion to all things left could no longer excuse the blocking of the democratic process.

Mass opposition to the regime was probably strongest in Spain where the complex interactions of parties, trade unions, employers' organisations, political elites and the army was of critical importance. The moderate tactics adopted by the left-wing parties helped to reassure dominant groups and to facilitate a smooth transition to democracy. This allayed fears (except for a short while in Portugal see above) that democracy would mean going over to the Soviet camp. The Spanish Communist Party for example found itself electorally and politically weakened by the dynamics of subsequent democratic consolidation, but its moderation and pragmatism were crucial in allowing the reforms of Adolfo Suárez and in reducing military opposition to the transition. In much the same vein, unions were prepared to demand sacrifices of their members and enter into agreement with the employers to guarantee the conditions for democratic stability.

Emphasis has to be placed on the importance of the military (which determined to a large extent what was possible). The Spanish military had been part and parcel of the Franco dictatorship, enjoying a privileged position since the civil war. In Portugal, the military's involvement in colonial wars was to prove to be the catalyst of the dictatorship's downfall. Greece was closest at being a pure military dictatorship, which with the discrediting of the military following the Cyprus debacle, could no longer control the country. In many ways the military itself had become an arena for internal conflict. In Portugal, internal divisions rendered the post-1974 army an unstable political instrument which couldn't act cohesively. In Spain, many younger and better educated officers perceived their role as a force of modernisation rather than repression, whilst in Greece the increasing divisions within the military forced the dictatorship to withdraw from the political stage. Thus whilst the military when strong was able to provide support in keeping the dictatorships in power, when the military weakened, the dictatorships became untenable.

CONCLUSION: FROM TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATION

It is not easy to state where transition ends and consolidation begins. It is however axiomatic that a transition is successful if the consolidation process is allowed to proceed peacefully and in an orderly manner, after which case results can then be measured. The establishment of the ground rules of democracy and the acceptance of democracy as a modus vivendi is part and parcel of the success or otherwise of a transition. For democracy to be consolidated the powers and role of the state must be delineated, allowing an autonomous civil society to flourish. The constitution must be accepted by the majority of citizens and political actors. Parties and groups, autonomous from the state and accountable to the citizens, have to be allowed to represent different views and interests. Civilian control has to be established over the military. Importantly governments must be formed on the basis of a majority and power is allowed to alternate peacefully between government and opposition.

Portugal, Spain and Greece have on the large part achieved this consolidation and are now regarded as democracies. The consolidation process was not the same in all three however. In Greece civilian dominance over the military was achieved very early on, and an attempted plot against the new government in 1975 foundered immediately when a large majority of the officer corps remained loyal to the elected authorities. In Portugal the military continued to play a significant role in politics into the 1980s mainly due to the fragmentation of the political parties and the failure of the establishment of a stable non-coalition based government. Nonetheless, the Revolutionary Council was disbanded in 1982 and in February 1986 Mário Soares became head of state. In Spain the civilian authorities had to make considerable concessions to secure the military's withdrawal form politics. These included increased defence spending and moving slowly in implementing regional reforms. An attempted military coup in February 1981 failed dismally following the personal intervention of the King. Since then, the military has mainly stayed out of politics.

Some problems, characteristically, still persist. The leadership of the parties and the three countries is still seemingly based upon personal charisma which can prove to be a handicap. Some Parties can find problems to survive the death or retirement of their leaders, whilst the personalisation of politics can also accentuate rivalries and encourage demagogic and authoritarian tendencies. There also remain weaknesses within the institutions that represent civil society. In the large part Parties are not mass organisations, despite the use of state patronage. Trade Unions are still relatively weak with, for example, only 10 to 15 per cent of the labour force in Spain and Portugal belonging to them. Another problem remains the weak communications link between centre and periphery and between state and main interest groups. However this in the large part (although many might think it debatable) is off-set by patron-client ties and the use of political brokerage. On the other hand, allegations and accusations of corruption which arise from time to time tend to increase distrust in the political institutions.

These above problems are real, but the aforementioned achievements can also be considered as an emphasis of the success of the transition. An important factor in the development of all three of the involved countries has been accession to the EC. This has ensured that Southern Europe remains democratic. Initial fears that new governments might reverse the decision to join the EC, as had happened with the coming into power of PASOK in Greece, proved to be unfounded. The three Southern European countries still have the weakest economies within the EU (although this will change if the Central and Eastern European countries are admitted). They are also the largest beneficiaries, enjoying a large percentage of the EU's regional funds (this also would probably change). Thus it is clear that democracy has now become a necessity which enables them to continue enjoying the fruit of EU membership. Transition, in this context has meant not only a transition from authoritarian to democratic states. For Portugal, Spain, and Greece, transition has also meant becoming part of the bigger political, and economic entity called "Europe".

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AUTHOR: Joe J. Grech