THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
INTRODUCTION
Spain, Portugal and Greece emerged from the shadow of right-wing
dictatorships during the course of the mid-1970s. Spain and Portugal
had been governed by authoritarian regimes since the victory of
General Franco in the Spanish civil war in 1939 and the rise to
power of the Portuguese dictator Salazar in 1926. In Greece, a
military dictatorship which seized power in 1967 had been preceded
by almost two decades of quasi-democratic rule during which discrimination
against left-wingers (who had been the losers in the civil war
of 1946-49) was commonplace.
All three countries embarked upon the transition within a
three year period (1974-1977). This has led to Southern Europe
being conceptualised as a regional sub-system, with particular
characteristics such as relative economic under-development, delayed
political modernisation, cultural distinctiveness, and particular
exposure to international influences.
Many observers have looked upon the recent history of Southern
Europe as offering a successful model of transition from authoritarianism
to democracy. This success has been achieved despite certain characteristic
problems which have made Southern Europe a late-comer to mass
democracy. These include inter alia weak civil societies
with a relative lack of a participatory culture, the persistence
of traditional elites and of pre-modern forms of political organisation,
and clientelism as a defining factor of the political systems.
Culturally, Southern Europe has continued to be more influenced
by forms of traditional religion, although securalisation has
been substantial, particularly in Spain. The importance given
to the family has also been a particular characteristic. Although
rapid urbanisation in recent decades has disrupted traditional
patterns of family life, the family retained its importance as
a buffer against unemployment and poverty in societies where the
social welfare systems remained relatively under-developed.
Southern Europe has been increasingly vulnerable to economic,
cultural and political influences of stronger powers in the latter
half of the twentieth century; something which has crucially conditioned
the courses of action available to policy makers and political
and social forces. This was seen clearly in Spain (after 1953)
and Greece where the regimes were considered to be bulwarks against
communism, eliciting the help of the USA in keeping the left out
of power, despite the fact that the regimes were using undemocratic
means. It can also be seen by the influence that prospective membership
of the EC had on the bringing about of a transition to democracy.
This essay shall attempt to explain briefly what gave rise
to and made possible the transition to democracy in Southern Europe
and what helped this transition to be successful. In doing this
one must keep in mind that although some circumstances and the
time frame in which the transition occurred were similar in the
three Southern European countries, each one of them had its own
particular characteristics and history.
ACHIEVING THE TRANSITION
None of the democratic transitions in Southern Europe was
the outcome of a spontaneous mass revolution. In all cases, the
actions and interactions of key elite groups, social political
forces (including parties, trade unions and churches), and state
institutions, especially the army, significantly determined the
nature of the transition.
TRANSITION IN PORTUGAL
The Portuguese dictatorship was overthrown in April 1974.
It had been in power since 1926. Antonio Salazar was the regime's
strongman until September 1968 when he was succeeded by Marcelo
Caetano, whose attempts to preserve power through controlled liberalisation
ended in failure. Ideologically the regime was opposed to modernity
as represented by liberalism and socialism, favouring instead
strong Roman Catholic beliefs and morals and Portuguese nationalism.
At the start of the 1960s, Portugal was still a largely rural
society with nearly half its labour force employed in agriculture.
Compared to northern Europe, high levels of illiteracy and low
standards of health care and provision of basic sanitation prevailed.
There was a large amount of political repression with secret police
encharged with the containment of dissent. Throughout the 1960s
three developments contributed to worsening social tension:- the
mounting burden of colonial wars in Africa (Angola, Guinea-Bissau
and Mozambique), increasing interdependence on the world economy
(and a need for foreign investment), and a growing crises of ideology
and legitimacy of the ruling elite.
From September 1968 to April 1974, the regime veered shakily
between controlled liberalisation and bouts of increased repression.
Some exiles, including Mario Soares, the future president, were
permitted to return home, and a 1972 trade agreement with the
EC encouraged the regime's technocratic advisers to hope for full
EC membership. Pressure for a transition to democracy increased
with the realisation that this would facilitate Portugal's quest
for membership. This coincided with discontent within the military.
Younger officers founded the Armed Forces Movement which seized
power, ending the wars in Africa.
Between April 1974 and the summer of 1975, the Portuguese
Communist Party (PCP), sought to capture the leadership of the
revolution. It supported the appointment of a left-wing army officer,
Vasco Goncalves, as Prime Minister in July 1974, and the formation
of a Revolutionary Council in early 1975. However many Portuguese
feared that the pro-soviet PCP would replace one form of dictatorship
with another. This enabled the strengthening of the Portuguese
Socialist Party led by Soares. Elections to a constituent assembly
were held on 25 April 1975, with the PSP emerging as the only
really national party with 37.9 per cent and the PCP winning just
12.5 per cent. In the general elections of April 1976, results
again confirmed the PSP as the largest party with 107 out of 263
seats. In Presidential elections General Eanes (who was considered
to be mostly neutral) won 61.5 per cent of the votes. The lack
of a parliamentary majority meant that Portuguese politics kept
moving between centre-left and centre-right until the late 1980s.
IN SPAIN
In power since 1939, "Generalisimo" Franco imposed
a highly centralised and authoritarian regime. He shared with
Salazar a hatred of socialism, communism and liberalism. Franco
was also concerned with repressing every sign of social or ethnic
pluralism. Ethnic groups struggling for autonomy such as the Basques
and Catalans were particularly singled out for repression. The
Spanish dictatorship drew upon the support of rural landowners
and the Roman Catholic Church. It also appealed to the army's
image of itself as the protector of a unified and centralised
Spain. The army was used effectively to repress the supporters
of the left during the civil war, something that institutionalised
the political divisions even after the war. Franco's regime in
reality consisted of a coalition of forces; Monarchists, Fascists
(Falange), rural landowners, technocrats, nationalist soldiers,
and Catholic clerics were included in the National Movement, the
regime's political party.
From 1939 until the mid-1950s, the regime pursued harsh economic
and social policies. Trade unions were smashed and replaced by
Fascist corporations whilst political repression was employed
to keep workers in line. The power of the big landowners was reinforced
and agriculture remained inefficient. Marshall aid was not offered
in 1947 and Spain remained isolated internationally.
By the early 1950s problems were increasing. Food shortages
and obsolete technology necessitated foreign imports. The regime
in Spain opted to develop free market capitalism, and economic
and military agreements were entered into with the US in 1953.
In 1958 Spain joined the International Monetary Fund. However,
despite the opening up of the Spanish economy, political repression
was retained by the regime.
In the 1960s and early 1970s there were moves, like in Portugal,
towards a closer relationship with the EC, although the regime
hoped to achieve eventual membership without having to surrender
to democratisation. However circumstances were already changing.
First, a growing urban working class began to find its voice.
The illegal but active trade unions organised strikes from 1962.
Second, the balance of forces within the National Movement was
shifting away from the landowners and Falange towards an
alliance of more internationally inclined forces - technocrats,
bankers, and financiers. Third, attempts at limited reform in
the mid-1960s encouraged underground opposition forces to organise
even more actively against the regime. Finally, as society became
more secular, and church attendance rates fell, the Catholic Church
began to distance itself from the regime. Moreover, in 1971 the
Church eventually apologised to the Spanish people for the support
which it had previously given to the Franco regime.
In 1969 the ageing Franco appointed as his successor prince
Juan Carlos. Political instability and street protests increased
in 1973, when the assassination by Basque gunmen of the regime's
second-in-command, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco prompted reformists
within the regime to attempt a rapprochement with the (then
still illegal) opposition parties. Juan Carlos was crowned King
following the death of Franco in November 1975, clearing the way
for a transition to democracy. Adolfo Suarez became Prime Minister
in 1976 and political parties were legalised in February 1977.
It has to be said that the moderate stance taken by the opposition
parties, including the Spanish Communists, was instrumental in
enabling a smooth transition to democracy, unlike what happened
in Portugal. Democratic elections in June 1977 gave victory to
the Centre-right UCD with 34 per cent of the vote, while the Socialists
led by Felipe González gained 28 per cent. The Communists
won 10 per cent.
IN GREECE
The civil war in Greece left deep wounds which caused heavy
polarisation between political alignments, the effects of which
can still be felt today. In 1945 the Allies had agreed that Greece
would belong to the Western sphere of influence which prompted
the British military intervention enabling the defeat of the Communists
and the imposition of a conservative regime. The left in Greece,
(perhaps justifiably) would for a long time view the West with
suspicion especially after 1949 when anti-communism was adopted
as an instrument of state policy, a policy which included the
banning of the Communist Party (KKE). In theory Greece was a parliamentary
democracy after the civil war but the influence of the military
was heavy, whilst repressive laws made life for suspected left-wingers
immensely difficult. The civil service and the teaching professions
were purged and passports, driving licenses and public sector
jobs withheld from those not sympathetic to the government. This
was compounded by the setting up of a huge network of police spies
in order to enable the systematic discrimination.
Actual power was exercised by three forces; the Monarchy,
army and the parliamentary right controlled all aspects of governing.
Any challenge to this order called into question the role of the
army as custodian of the status quo. However changing circumstances,
especially outside influence due to the Cypriot question, made
possible a relative revival of the left. After 1952 British influence
made way to US influence after the former could no longer honour
its commitments due to economic and military problems. Greece
joined NATO in the same year entrenching itself in the Western
Sphere.
In 1958, the left, despite the fear of discrimination, contested
the elections and polled 25 per cent of the vote. In 1961 the
Centre Union was formed under the leadership of George Papandreou
and his son Andreas in order to contest the October elections
which confirmed the right wing Karamanlis. Greece was further
anchored to the west by an association treaty with the EEC in
1962. However, the 1963 elections gave for the first time a (shaky)
mandate to the Centre Union, and Karamanlis went into voluntary
exile in Paris. Another election in February 1974 gave a clearer
mandate to Papandreou who initiated a series of social reforms
including raising the school leaving age (from 12 to 15 years)
raising wages, releasing political prisoners and generally moving
towards full democratisation. These actions alarmed the military
and the powerful capitalist business lobbies, and in 1965 King
Constantine II forced the government's resignation (by persuading
some of Papandreou's MPs to defect). A right wing Cabinet was
installed with the agreement that fresh elections would be held
in May 1967.
There was little doubt that Papandreou would win the elections
with a large majority. The Military, to forestall the elections,
seized power in April and set up a junta led by Colonel George
Papadoulos. The military regime immediately suspended human rights,
banned political parties and strikes, proclaimed martial law and
sent thousands into internal exile. The repressive regime remained
in power until 1974. In April and May 1974 the junta attempted
an abortive military action in Cyprus to oust Archbishop Makarios
hoping that the exercise would earn it political kudos back home
and some legitimacy. However this course of action triggered an
invasion from Turkey of Northern Cyprus leading to the humiliation
of the Greek junta and a crisis of authority in Greece. The junta
had to withdraw from power and Karamanlis, went back to Greece
as leader of a new centre-right party called New Democracy (ND)
to preside over the transition to democracy. Political Parties,
including the Communist Party, were once again legalised and full
parliamentary democracy under civilian rule was achieved.
MAKING THE TRANSITION POSSIBLE AND SUCCESSFUL
The factors that led directly to change are fairly easy to
identify in the three Southern European countries. In Spain sections
of the old regime came to embrace the need to enter into dialogue
with opposition forces and to abandon repression. By the early
1970s technocratic and business elites were beginning to accept
the need for a democratic transition after Franco's death, although
they did not agree how far democratisation should go. In Greece,
the dictatorship isolated itself from traditional conservative
elites, and apart form a few key business backers had a limited
support base. In Portugal the loss of military confidence in the
dictatorship proved decisive.
But why did the dictatorships prove to be so powerless to
stop democratisation in the end, and importantly, what enabled
the transition to appear so easy and successful? Economic
change since the 1950s involved greater dependence on foreign
trade and foreign capital. The suppression of trade unions and
opposition parties alienated the workers and the vast majority
of the population outside the closed circles of the elite who
stood to gain most by the imposition of authoritarianism. Moreover,
the absence of channels of communications and negotiation dented
support from business groups. The dictatorships did not permit
real representation of diverse interests even within the ranks
of their own supporters. Conflicts intensified and industrial
relations deteriorated. A section of the dominant economic elites
began to realise the need for at least a limited pluralism. After
all the dictatorships had started to lose their usefulness with
the increased economic instability. It began to be understood
that economic well-being necessarily needed to be combined with
social and political stability. However the regimes realised that
reform was a threat to their own existence. The elimination of
genuinely representatives parties and interest groups made it
impossible to achieve any form of pluralism, limited or otherwise.
Thus, it became clear that only a full transition to liberal democracy
could secure stability and economic growth in these three countries,
which although forming part of the west geographically and by
alliance, were in economic, social and political terms more similar
to the third world. Thus external pressures were also of importance.
The incentive of EC membership seemed to offer a guarantee of
greater prosperity, less dependence on US capital and influence,
and political stability. It is important also to consider this
in the context of the cold war situation. At the height of the
cold war the dictatorships had a trump card in the form of their
antagonism towards communism. With the onset and acceptance of
détente this aversion to all things left could no
longer excuse the blocking of the democratic process.
Mass opposition to the regime was probably strongest in Spain
where the complex interactions of parties, trade unions, employers'
organisations, political elites and the army was of critical importance.
The moderate tactics adopted by the left-wing parties helped to
reassure dominant groups and to facilitate a smooth transition
to democracy. This allayed fears (except for a short while in
Portugal see above) that democracy would mean going over
to the Soviet camp. The Spanish Communist Party for example found
itself electorally and politically weakened by the dynamics of
subsequent democratic consolidation, but its moderation and pragmatism
were crucial in allowing the reforms of Adolfo Suárez and
in reducing military opposition to the transition. In much the
same vein, unions were prepared to demand sacrifices of their
members and enter into agreement with the employers to guarantee
the conditions for democratic stability.
Emphasis has to be placed on the importance of the military
(which determined to a large extent what was possible). The Spanish
military had been part and parcel of the Franco dictatorship,
enjoying a privileged position since the civil war. In Portugal,
the military's involvement in colonial wars was to prove to be
the catalyst of the dictatorship's downfall. Greece was closest
at being a pure military dictatorship, which with the discrediting
of the military following the Cyprus debacle, could no longer
control the country. In many ways the military itself had become
an arena for internal conflict. In Portugal, internal divisions
rendered the post-1974 army an unstable political instrument which
couldn't act cohesively. In Spain, many younger and better educated
officers perceived their role as a force of modernisation rather
than repression, whilst in Greece the increasing divisions within
the military forced the dictatorship to withdraw from the political
stage. Thus whilst the military when strong was able to provide
support in keeping the dictatorships in power, when the military
weakened, the dictatorships became untenable.
CONCLUSION: FROM TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATION
It is not easy to state where transition ends and consolidation
begins. It is however axiomatic that a transition is successful
if the consolidation process is allowed to proceed peacefully
and in an orderly manner, after which case results can then be
measured. The establishment of the ground rules of democracy and
the acceptance of democracy as a modus vivendi is part
and parcel of the success or otherwise of a transition. For democracy
to be consolidated the powers and role of the state must be delineated,
allowing an autonomous civil society to flourish. The constitution
must be accepted by the majority of citizens and political actors.
Parties and groups, autonomous from the state and accountable
to the citizens, have to be allowed to represent different views
and interests. Civilian control has to be established over the
military. Importantly governments must be formed on the basis
of a majority and power is allowed to alternate peacefully between
government and opposition.
Portugal, Spain and Greece have on the large part achieved
this consolidation and are now regarded as democracies. The consolidation
process was not the same in all three however. In Greece civilian
dominance over the military was achieved very early on, and an
attempted plot against the new government in 1975 foundered immediately
when a large majority of the officer corps remained loyal to the
elected authorities. In Portugal the military continued to play
a significant role in politics into the 1980s mainly due to the
fragmentation of the political parties and the failure of the
establishment of a stable non-coalition based government. Nonetheless,
the Revolutionary Council was disbanded in 1982 and in February
1986 Mário Soares became head of state. In Spain the civilian
authorities had to make considerable concessions to secure the
military's withdrawal form politics. These included increased
defence spending and moving slowly in implementing regional reforms.
An attempted military coup in February 1981 failed dismally following
the personal intervention of the King. Since then, the military
has mainly stayed out of politics.
Some problems, characteristically, still persist. The leadership
of the parties and the three countries is still seemingly based
upon personal charisma which can prove to be a handicap. Some
Parties can find problems to survive the death or retirement of
their leaders, whilst the personalisation of politics can also
accentuate rivalries and encourage demagogic and authoritarian
tendencies. There also remain weaknesses within the institutions
that represent civil society. In the large part Parties are not
mass organisations, despite the use of state patronage. Trade
Unions are still relatively weak with, for example, only 10 to
15 per cent of the labour force in Spain and Portugal belonging
to them. Another problem remains the weak communications link
between centre and periphery and between state and main interest
groups. However this in the large part (although many might think
it debatable) is off-set by patron-client ties and the use of
political brokerage. On the other hand, allegations and accusations
of corruption which arise from time to time tend to increase distrust
in the political institutions.
These above problems are real, but the aforementioned achievements
can also be considered as an emphasis of the success of the transition.
An important factor in the development of all three of the involved
countries has been accession to the EC. This has ensured that
Southern Europe remains democratic. Initial fears that new governments
might reverse the decision to join the EC, as had happened with
the coming into power of PASOK in Greece, proved to be unfounded.
The three Southern European countries still have the weakest economies
within the EU (although this will change if the Central and Eastern
European countries are admitted). They are also the largest beneficiaries,
enjoying a large percentage of the EU's regional funds (this also
would probably change). Thus it is clear that democracy has now
become a necessity which enables them to continue enjoying the
fruit of EU membership. Transition, in this context has meant
not only a transition from authoritarian to democratic states.
For Portugal, Spain, and Greece, transition has also meant becoming
part of the bigger political, and economic entity called "Europe".
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AUTHOR: Joe J. Grech