Armor in World War II

American Armored Doctrine

On 3 July, 1944, General Eisnhower wrote a letter to the War Department complaining that his tanks were incapable of dealing with either a Panther or a Tiger. Too late then, the Americans should have known that since the Invasion of Sicily a year earlier. The U.S. Army had a captured German 88 to play with in the summer of 1942, and that should have told them something as well.
       Instead, the United States sent their tankers off to war in arguably the poorest main battle tank in Europe in 1944. The Sherman's armor was too thin and poorly sloped. Its main armament lacked the punch to penetrate German opponents, and the things had an alarming tendency to burn when hit earning them the nickname "The Ronson Lighter." That this occurred is largely rooted in American tank doctrine.
       In the American army, tanks were infantry support vehicles. They were not intended to engage in tank-to-tank combat. The American army contained separate tank destroyers for that purpose. These too proved to be woefully inadequate. Their armor was even thinner than the Sherman's. This was mitigated somewhat by the mounting of heavier ordinance that was more likely to do some damage to a German tank than was the weak 75mm gun mounted on the Sherman (see related sidebar).
       American Tank Destroyer doctrine was as faulty in its own way as was American tank doctrine. Relying on their superior mobility, tank destroyers were to actively engage in seeking out and destroy enemy tanks⁶. The vehicles were simply too thin-skinned for this type of active role and unit commanders began to improvise. By the end of 1944, tank destroyers were unofficially emulating German tactics: scurry out in front of the tanks, find some good cover, hunker down and wait for the German tanks to appear. This tactical change improved the situation somewhat and tank destroyers began to score some hits before they were knocked out by German return fire.
       No change in tactical usage could overcome the Sherman's shortcomings, though the mounting of the 76.2mm M62 gun starting in the 2^nd half of 1944 did help even the score a bit.

It's only a silly millimeter but it made a big difference.
75mm M3 gun 76.2mm M62 gun

Muzzle velocity 2,300 ft/sec 2,600 ft/sec(APC)
3,400(HVAP)

Armor penetration 70mm at 500 yards 88mm at 1000 yards(APC)
133mm at 1000 yards(HVAP)

       It wasn't enough for the U.S. Army to go to war with a faulty tank doctrine, their organizational doctrine was also bad. The American Army utilized the "pool" concept. All units were "slender," that is they contained nothing that they would not always need. As a result, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, engineers, etc., were assigned to Corps level to be parcelled out as needed.
       The pooling concept was a disaster from the get go. Rifle companies were not experienced, or trained, to support an anti-tank battery, and infantry officers were largely untrained in the capabilities and limitations of tanks and tank destroyers. Many infantry officers were unaware that there was a phone box on the back of the Sherman for the express use of men accompanying the tank, and instead resorted to pounding on a hatch until it opened up and shouting their orders or requests.
       Pooling extended upwards from battalions to divisions. Infantry divisions were comprised of three Regimental Combat Teams, armored divisions three Combat Commands, none of which had an official composition. Divisional commanders

Knocked out does not necessarily mean destroyed. Instead it simply means taken out of action for the moment. Consider the following statistics concerning AFV losses of the U.S. Army in World War II.

Cause	Kills	Repaired
AP	39%	40%
Mine	20%	80%
Infantry (rocket launcher)	14%
HEAT	9%
HE	7%
Air	6%
Misc./Abandoned	5%

Nearly a third of tanks knocked out by AP and mines were recovered and used again. A substantial number of tanks knocked out by other causes were recovered and repaired. Additionally, crew losses averaged 1.3 men per tank knocked out.

were theoretically able to shuffle the deck around, moving whole battalions or individual companies around as necessary to fit the needs of the moment. This didn't work, and divisional commanders soon froze the makeup of their regiments^{7.

Like their British counterparts, the American Army was fully
motorized, at least on paper. A fully equipped infantry division
required 110,000 tons of shipping to cross 4,000 miles of ocean.
If the division's organic transport was left behind, the shipping
requirement dropped to 95,000 tons saving the equivalent of an
entire Liberty ship. So American infantry divisions arrived in
Europe without all of their trucks. Their heavy equipment was
provided with motorized transport, unlike the Germans and the
Russians who relied on horse transport for their infantry divisions
throughout the war.}

       So, if the American Army went to war with such faulty doctrine, how come it seemed to work for them?
       First of all the Sherman was an excellent infantry support vehicle. It was big enough, and mean enough to punch through infantry defenses. It fulfilled its intended mission well, and was possibly the most reliable tank in service in World War II.
       Second, the Americans made an awful lot of tanks and were able to replenish their losses quickly, and they had more to begin with. An American armored division had twice the number of armored fighting vehicles as did an SS Panzer division. Ultimately, the inavailablity of replacements told more heavily on the Germans than did the capabilities of the Allied armor.
       Thirdly, the Allies enjoyed almost complete air supremacy in their drive across France and on into Germany. This negated an important aspect of German tactics and caused havoc in German rear areas. The majority of Tiger losses inflicted on the Germans in western Europe were caused by airborne rockets.
       Finally, the Americans learned as they went along. When it became obvious that it was wrong, they threw away the book and began to emulate the successful tactics of the enemy. By the end of the war they had transformed themselves from a bunch of rank amateurs into the world's premier fighting force.

Finally, the Russians.

____________________
6. The Americans ultimately recognized the shortcomings of the Tank Destroyer Command and after the war relegated it to a well-earned oblivion.
7. To some extent both 82 and 101 airborne divisions continued the Regimental Combat Team approach throughout the war, using a different collection of regiments in their various engagements.

Image of Sherman tank from "British and American Tanks of World War II. Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis.

Page Last Updated 04/30/99

Cardboard Heroes | E-mail Dave

This page has been visited times since April, 30, 1999.