1) Proceedings
2) Judgement
DISTRICT COURT
CIVIL JURISDICTION
JUDGE ROBERTSON
No K18 of 2001
MARTIN ESSENBERG Appellant
and
MARK SHIELDS Respondent
KINGAROY
..DATE 31/05/2001
..DAY 1
31/05/2001 D.1 vms Turn 1 (Robertson DCJ)
MR P KELLY (instructed by the Director of Public
Prosecutions (Queensland)) for the respondent
APPELLANT appeared on his own behalf
HIS HONOUR: Mr Essenberg?
APPELLANT: Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Yes. This is your appeal. I've waded through
your outline of argument.
APPELLANT: It's fairly thick, sir.
HIS HONOUR: Which is 421 paragraphs. I can't say I've read
it all, Mr Essenberg, but I've tried.
MR KELLY: Your Honour, Mr Essenberg is asking for an
adjournment of this matter.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Essenberg.
APPELLANT: Your Honour, right through the appeal process
I've complied with the practice directions in the District
Court. I have yet to receive - to be served by the DPP with
the information they gave me in this case.
HIS HONOUR: Have you got their outline?
APPELLANT: I've got their outline only because I collected
it from the Court, your Honour, and according to the
practice directions there's supposed to be a conference to
discuss the issues. There's supposed to be certificates of
readiness and then, of course, I'm supposed to be given 21
days from the notification of-----
HIS HONOUR: I've read your letter.
APPELLANT: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: So it's clear the DPP have not complied with
the practice direction. I'll accept that. You don't have
to convince me of that.
APPELLANT: I would ask your Honour that the DPP be required
to comply with the bits of the practice direction.
HIS HONOUR: But you've got their outline. When did you get
that?
APPELLANT: I got that eight days ago.
HIS HONOUR: So you had time to consider that?
APPELLANT: Well, your Honour, it says in the practice
directions that after the - when I get notified of the Court
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date I should have 21 days beyond that to be prepared.
HIS HONOUR: The issues are straightforward. You're
obviously on top of them from the book like submissions.
I've never had submissions like that on a 222 appeal. I'm
not going to give you an adjournment. I am going to proceed
with the appeal.
APPELLANT: Your Honour, for a start, there was - this was
only applied for mention and a mention is simply to find out
when there is appropriate time for a Court file-----
HIS HONOUR: The whole purpose of the appeal and the fact
that you've complied with the practice direction is that all
the arguments that the appellant wants to advance are put in
writing, so the oral side of it is a very minor thing,
indeed, and litigation like this should be determined. It
shouldn't be allowed to drift on and I'm not blaming you for
the DPP's complete failure to comply with the practice
direction, but the issues are identifiable and very clear.
You're obviously on top of them, on top of them much more
than probably most people and I've read them and I think
your interests are fully protected by your written
submissions. Now, I'm going to proceed with the appeal. So
if you want to add to those by way of oral submissions you
can, if you don't, that's all right by me.
APPELLANT: Your Honour, I will do so if I have to, but I
think this is abusive process.
HIS HONOUR: Well, that's all right, Mr Essenberg, you can
think that and you can complain to the Court of Appeal if
you want to appeal from that aspect in my decision. It's a
matter for you.
APPELLANT: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: So do you want to add to your written
submissions?
APPELLANT: Yes, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: And I don't want a rehash. I've read all your
arguments about the Magna Carta and I think your major
problem, as far as I can see, is overcoming the Court of
Appeal decision which you are appealing, the same issues
which were ventilated and which the decision was against
you. That decision binds the Magistrate, it binds me. I
don't see how we can get beyond it.
APPELLANT: Your Honour, as far as the Essenberg v. Kahns in
the High Court, I believe in other Court cases - I haven't
found it, unfortunately, which one. I've read it somewhere.
When a litigant is unrepresented the case may be legally
prospect. So that's, you know, one issue about the thing.
HIS HONOUR: Sorry, I don't understand that. I thought - do
you want to have legal representation, do you?
31/05/2001 D.1 vms Turn 1 (Robertson DCJ)
APPELLANT: Your Honour, I have had applied for legal
representation with legal aid and it's been refused.
HIS HONOUR: What, on the ground of lack of merit? It
doesn't matter, Mr Essenberg.
APPELLANT: Well, it's actually quite important.
HIS HONOUR: I think you've clearly shown-----
APPELLANT: I've been refused by Criminal Law summary
hearing as, "Legal aid is not provided for Magistrate Court
trials unless you have details of your offence to show you
have a reasonable prospect for success and if you are
convicted you may go to prison." Now, your Honour, although
I wasn't - it was argument to a fine, the potential penalty
was a prison sentence of six months as to the reasonable
prospects of success. If I had - could prove I had
reasonable prospects of success I wouldn't need legal aid,
so it's sort of like - it's basically giving nothing.
HIS HONOUR: But you won't get any argument from me about
applying a merit test to people getting legal aid, but
unfortunately that's just the way it is. I can't do
anything about that. There's a shortage of money for
legal aid. There's an appalling shortage, but people like
you should be lobbying the Attorney-General and people like
that, but there's nothing I can do about it. I think it's
terrible that decisions about legal aid are made about
grounds of merit, in other words, an administrative person
somewhere behind a desk who is not making decisions in
public is deciding cases, exercising judicial function, but
I don't want to give you another idea, but-----
APPELLANT: Your Honour, I believe in the case of
Dietrich v. The Queen - I have a spare copy.
HIS HONOUR: I know Dietrich. I know it well, Mr Essenberg.
APPELLANT: Okay. I believe chapter 12 - it says or
paragraph 12, "The advantages of a representation by counsel
are even more clear today than they were in the 19th
century. It is in the best interests not only of the
accused, but also administration of justice that the accused
be so represented. Indeed, where there is no legal
representation, saving in the exceptional case of the
litigant, the adversary system whether or not it remains in
theory, in practice, breaks down."
HIS HONOUR: The Dietrich authority is for one simple
proposition, that is, in a complex case and an indigent
accused, that is, someone who is without funds should be
entitled to legal representation, but this is not a
complicated case. This is a simple as you get.
APPELLANT: Your Honour, I am indigent. I am unemployed. I
haven't got legal aid. As for it being a complex case it is
31/05/2001 D.1 vms Turn 1 (Robertson DCJ)
not about me having a stock or not having a stock. I had
that stock.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, it is about that.
APPELLANT: It is about the entire validity of the
Weapons Act.
HIS HONOUR: See, Mr Essenberg, the problem for me is that
your arguments before me - I've read what Justice Chesterman
said in Kahns v. Essenberg and, no doubt, you've read it.
APPELLANT: Yes.
HIS HONOUR: The President and Justice McPherson agree with
Justice Chesterman. He rejected those arguments in relation
to the prosecution against you under the Weapons Act, that
binds me, you see. Now, you talk in your outline about
precedence, that's the whole principle. It binds me, it
bound the magistrate. Well, I can't go beyond that.
APPELLANT: Your Honour, I think Chesterman was the one who
talked about the Colonial Laws Validity Act.
HIS HONOUR: He rejected your argument that somehow or other
the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights were applicable more
in Queensland. In effect, your arguments of Weapons Act
wasn't a proper exercise of legislative power by the
Parliament of Queensland. He rejected that and you argued
before him that under the Weapons Act you are under trial by
jury and you rejected that and they're the same issues that
we raise here and I'm bound by it, you see.
APPELLANT: I did introduce in this document - appeal
document additional things about the validity of the
Governor and, therefore, if the Governor is invalid then, of
course, the Weapons Act is invalid too. I introduced the
fact the Australia Act is invalid-----
HIS HONOUR: The Governor is invalid? I actually saw him at
a concert on Sunday, he looked valid.
APPELLANT: Which he might have been. The Governor,
apparently he's only an administrative officer. The basis
of the invalidity of the Governor is the fact that the
Australia Act was passed in 1986.
HIS HONOUR: That goes back to your argument of the
Weapons Act is an illegitimate exercise of - well, the
parliament had no power to pass the Weapons-----
APPELLANT: I'm also saying, your Honour, the Governor had
no power to sign the Weapons Act into law. Not only is
parliament not supreme, but the Governor is currently
illegitimate.
HIS HONOUR: What about, you didn't raise before the
Magistrate - you don't raise on your ground of appeal
31/05/2001 D.1 vms Turn 1 (Robertson DCJ)
straight forward argument about whether a stock is a weapon.
The Magistrate seemed to deal with that. You don't seem to
argue against that, I don't know.
APPELLANT: Well, your Honour, I am not concerned whether it
was a stock or a return spring or the entire 105 millimetre
Howitzer.
HIS HONOUR: So you don't raise that as an argument before
me?
APPELLANT: No, your Honour. I base it on the fact that the
Weapons Act is invalid for a variety of reasons including
the Australia Act is invalid because of the lack of a
referendum of the people of Queensland and a further
referendum of the people of Australia and, as such, the
Colonial Laws of Validity Acts comes into play and Sir Joe
in his speech to parliament said the Colonial Laws of
Validity Act was a major impediment to the State passing
laws since the entire opposition argument is that the
Australia Act is valid, therefore, the Weapons Act is
invalid. If the-----
HIS HONOUR: Which opposition is this? Mr Kelly?
APPELLANT: The DPP.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Kelly just says you were properly convicted,
that's all.
APPELLANT: No, he says, "The proposition sought is to be
relied upon by the applicant 32. The proposition relied
upon the applicant floundered totally upon the list
provisions of Australia Act of 1986. Subsection 2 of
section 3 of that Act provides: if the Australia Act is
invalid, therefore, the Colonial Laws of Validity Act dated
65 applies and, therefore, the Weapons Act is also invalid."
Now, that is the basis of their argument. I say the
Australia Act is not valid, they say it is.
Well, I've presented many arguments in this document as to
why it's invalid. The fact that the Governor of Queensland
is invalid the Australia Act had been invalid because it had
a referendum in the federal parliament. So that was a new
argument that wasn't presented in the criminal Court of
Appeal last time.
HIS HONOUR: Right. Thank you, Mr Essenberg. Mr Kelly, I
don't think I need to hear from you.
TAKE IN ORDER
2) Judgement
His Honour: On 25 January 2001 following a summary trial in the Nanango Magistrates Court the appellant was convicted of one charge of a possession of a weapon pursuant to section 50 of the Weapons act 1990. He was convicted and fined $400 in default, 16 days in Prison
At the trial the appellant represented himself. He did not contest any of the evidence led by the prosecution and indeed, in cross examiniation he agreed with the version of facts put to him by the prosecutor. The basic facts of the prosecution case are that during a search of his residence pursuant to the Weapons act on 24 August 2000 the appellant produced to Police a .22 calibre rifle stock. The learned magistrate found that the stock was a weapon and, indeed his finding is not challenged on the appeal.
I invited Mr Essenberg to explore that point before me, but he declined to do so. A stock is not referred to in the definition of major component part in the act, but the definition is an inclusive, not an exclusive definition. There’s no document tendered in terms of section 164 (2)(iii) nor did the magistrate deem it necessary in the interest of Justice to proceed under section 163 (3), rather he acted under section (164 (4) and decided that the stock was a weapon. There is no challenge to that line of reasoning. The magistrate found that all the elements of the offence were made out beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the appellant.
The grounds of the appeal relate to a number of arguments advanced by the appellant before the magistrate to the effect that the Weapons Act was an invalid exercise of the legislative of the Parliament and that he is entitled to a trial by jury. He advances the same arguments on appeal and further arguments, difficult to understand, that effectively comes down to the proposition that the Australia Act 1986 is invalid.
Most if not all of these arguments were ventilated in the Court of Appeal in Kahns V Essenberg and others in 1999. QCA339 (23 August 1999). The learned Magistrate correctly rejected the arguments by reference to that authority which binds him and which binds me and which Mr Essenberg is clearly familiar with because he was a party.
The argument relating to the Australia Act for similar reasons should be rejected. The appeal has no merit. It is dismissed. Because of the respondents complete failure to comply with the practice directions number 4 of 1997 I will make no order as to costs.
© 2000 marsiegen@burcom.com.au