You will hear the message: “Welcome to the Ministry of Community & Social Services, Adoption Unit.” After pressing more numbers you will be asked to provide your name and other information to receive a copy of your adoption order, and then you hear that it will take two weeks to have it mailed to you at a cost of $15.
How could this be? The privacy commissioner says that it is sealed—permanently, out of sight from the public and even from adopted people to whom it applies.
Here’s how: Simply ask one of the thousands of adopted people who have their adoption orders — mailed to them by the government. The privacy commissioner misread the law. The Child and Family Services Act allows adult adopted people to obtain copies of their adoption orders. Read section 165. (1) and (2).
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Why all the fuss? Most adoption orders contain the surnames of birth mothers (all before 1970). This is identifying information. Yet, the commissioner asserts that the law guarantees confidentiality of the mother. It does not.
In a previous press release, she said:“I have a solemn statutory duty as the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario and an Officer of the Legislature to provide public comment on the privacy protection implications of proposed legislative schemes or government programs. This is enshrined in section 59(a) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act [FIPPA}. . . . “
Is it really? Here’s what FIPPA, section 59(a) actually says:
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So where is the “mandate”, the “solemn statutory duty…to provide public comment” that is “enshrined” in the law?
There is no such duty or requirement in the legislation. What the law says is very different. The Commissioner may speak, but it is not her duty or responsibility to do so. The commissioner’s role is not as clearly defined or mandated as she would appear to like it to be.
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Commissioner Cavoukian exaggerates her role and then, uses the misperception generated by the overstatement to provide herself with the privilege and authority to attack Bill 183, the Adoption Disclosure Act.
The OACAS also supports Bill 183, a bill that does not include a disclosure veto.
The commissioner said: “…the Ontario Association of Children’s Aid Societies submitted that from the time of the Adoption Act of 1927 until 1979, “adoption records were sealed” and all parties in the adoption process were “guaranteed secrecy.” As well as not supporting a disclosure veto, the OACAS did not represent adoption history as “all parties in the adoption process were ‘guaranteed secrecy’ from 1927 to 1979.
There were no promises of secrecy in 1927. Only the public could not know the identities of birth parents, adopted children and adoptive parents.
In fact, Bill 183 would restore much of the privacy enabled in the 1927 Adoption Act. Birth parents and adopted people would be able to know their identities – just like in 1927 when there were no disclosure vetoes.
The commissioner misrepresents Alberta when she says: “Some supporters of Bill 183 have pointed to the absence of reports about contact veto violation in Canada as an indication of their effectiveness. However, in provinces with contact vetoes (British Columbia, Alberta and Newfoundland), few contact vetoes have been filed. In fact, the vast majority of concerned individuals opt for the greater protections offered by a disclosure veto.” See “The Canadian experience” in Commissioner Cavoukian’s Fact Sheet on Adoption Information Disclosure.
The commissioner cites an anonymous letter from a social worker: “…a social worker who worked for 35 years with a children’s aid society, confirmed that assurances of confidentiality were routinely given to birth parents. In characterizing these assurances, she stated, “our word was our bond” and said that it was ‘with shock and dismay’ that she was witnessing a change in the adoption disclosure law that would reveal a birth mother’s identity.”
Why would the commissioner quote and cite as an authority an anonymous social worker who knew that she had repeatedly misrepresented the law? Who knew that adoption orders had the surnames of mothers on it? Who knew that there was nothing in the law that guarantees any privacy to the mother whatsoever? Who is next? Are Ontarians now to expect that the opinions of anonymous government employees have force in shaping our laws?
What do contemporary Canadian social workers think about adoption disclosure?
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And what about the mothers?
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In its recent review of Canada’s participation in the Convention, on October 3 2003, the Committee on the Rights of the Child said:
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Yet, in support of her contention that adopted people do not have an unqualified right of access to their identifying information, the commissioner quotes the earlier Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child:
“Some who support Bill 183 contend that they have an unqualified right of access to the identifying information of other individuals.”
“In support of this view, some argue that Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (the Convention) provides an unqualified right of access to birth parents’ identifying information. This is incorrect. Upon reading the Convention, it becomes clear that it recognizes that the right of access is a qualified right.” See “There are no absolutes” in Commissioner Cavoukian’s Fact Sheet on Adoption Information Disclosure.
Why does the commissioner not recognize the latest ruling from this committee?
Why does the commissioner fail to recognize the “best interests of the child” as paramount?
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Adoption professionals overwhelmingly support adoption disclosure.
In every jurisdiction with years of experience in adoption disclosure, adoption professionals support the disclosure of identifying information. The commissioner often cites the Australian experience to caution against full adoption disclosure.
“There is also anecdotal evidence from other jurisdictions such as New South Wales and Tennessee to suggest that contact vetoes are sometimes violated and that some individuals who have been found by their biological relatives report suffering harm.” See “Research on adoption disclosure” in Commissioner Cavoukian’s Fact Sheet on Adoption Information Disclosure.
Australia has had many years, in all states, to learn about adoption disclosure. Western Australia recently removed its disclosure veto and New South Wales has no disclosure veto. An Australian social worker, alarmed by the controversy over the disclosure veto in Ontario, recently submitted this letter to the National Post:
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See “Accessibility of anonymized medical information” in Commissioner Cavoukian’s Fact Sheet on Adoption Disclosure.
Madelene Ferguson Allen had been reunited for many years with her family of birth. Ferg was having a seemingly unremarkable conversation with her mother who casually mentioned that glaucoma runs in the family. Ferg, she said, should get her eyes checked. Ferg took the advice and was quickly diagnosed with a rare form of eye cancer. The prognosis was good because of the early diagnosis. Sadly, despite the prediction of a likely cure, the cancer spread and Ferg passed away on August 13, 2003.
Before she died, Ferg said that she was very pleased, though, that her entire first family — including several siblings and their offspring — were on the alert for this potentially inheritable disease.
For years before she died, Ferg was a passionate advocate for open records. She had seen the joy and healing that had resulted from her own reunion. Her mother who had suffered from the loss of her child welcomed Ferg back into her life, and Ferg filled the gaping hole in her own identity. Her own children had learned their roots and all of the diseases and conditions that they might inherit. Ferg felt whole again.
Madelene Ferguson Allen is the author of Reunion, The Search for My Birth Family, Stoddart, 1992.
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Bottom line, there are about 3000 inheritable diseases, many of which are fatal if not detected early. Secrecy kills.
ommissioner Cavoukian opens this section of her fact sheet with a statement critical of the state of adoption research. Citing anonymous researchers, she states: “...many researchers have noted the methodological shortcomings of the research in the area and the limitations that may be drawn.” What the IPC does not say is that all research in the social sciences may be criticized for methodological shortcomings and furthermore, it is in the nature of the social sciences to start any investigation with a methodological critique of past work. What this means is that research conclusions are stated in conditional terms, as competent researchers know full well that few studies are robust enough to support absolute conclusions. With that being said, if across studies, settings, researchers, social contexts and time, trends emerge, then there is some justification for drawing conclusions, albeit with the understanding that future research, conducted in different contexts might yield different results.
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The IPC then goes on to state that there has been “no comprehensive, systematic, longitudinal research on the impact of the disclosure of adoption information, contact vetoes, or disclosure vetoes, using representative samples of adopted persons, birth parents and adoptive parents.” (Exactly why adopted parents are part of her critique is not made clear as the issue under discussion relates to adopted adults and their birth kin.)
In this respect, Commissioner Cavoukian is correct. There has been no one definitive study assessing the effects of disclosure of information. However, there are 40 years of research, demonstrating the psychological need to know one’s kin, the emotional costs of being denied the opportunity to resolve issues of grief and loss, and the positive benefits of openness in adoption. Furthermore, because it is not always possible to conduct conventional research studies on the effects of openness, it is necessary to look at multiple sources of information, knowing full well that while one study proves nothing, trends add support to a conclusion. Thus, when one looks to all of the jurisdictions that have allowed unrestricted access to identifying information, including Scotland in 1935 and England in 1979, it is remarkable how minuscule is the number of individuals who have come forward stating that others’ access to identifying information has had a deleterious effect on their lives. Commissioner Cavoukian tells us that there has been one formal complaint in New South Wales. Is zero tolerance her standard for the negative effects of access to information? Setting the bar so low might help her to make a case, but it is not a standard that reflects the lives of those in adoption.
What of Commissioner Cavoukian’s challenge that most studies “...have been methodologically flawed using samples of self-selected individuals, often recruited from adoption support groups and websites that advocate search and reunion and lobby for adoption disclosure legislation.” Again, Commissioner Cavoukian is correct to a point. Many studies are flawed by sampling bias. However, when those studies with better sampling yield results similar to ones found in studies using selected groups, there again is justification for drawing conditional conclusions. The fact is that while there is much documented support for access to information, the research record is devoid of evidence to the contrary. It is also disingenuous to imply that those who have been harmed by disclosure of information are simply too frightened to come forward or not knowledgeable enough to make their experiences known. Almost all studies have offered anonymous opportunities to express negative experiences. None report the devastating consequences of open records that Ms Cavoukian implies will follow the passing of Bill 183.
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But perhaps the reason that we see no negative research reports concerning access to information is that “...some of the research has been conducted by adoption disclosure advocates, raising questions of researcher bias.” Again, Commissioner Cavoukian tells us only part of the story. What is missing is that the researchers who have not been known as “disclosure advocates” have generated results that in no substantial way differ from those who have a clear political agenda. Commissioner Cavoukian also fails to note that some researchers became disclosure advocates for the very reason that their data demonstrated that access to information served the overall best interests of the adoption community. Thus, advocacy was a consequence of the research, not a motivator for generating flawed data.
Finally, Commissioner Cavoukian tells us that “...in spite of the potential bias favouring positive outcomes, studies have consistently found a small but significant portion of individuals who were adversely affected by the disclosure of adoption information.” What she fails to mention is that in none of these studies are the effects of prior mental health status removed, before examining the effects of disclosure of information. If troubled individuals remained in a state of distress following disclosure, then the seemingly negative consequences of disclosure are best accounted for by prior mental health status, not disclosure per se. Methodologically, one simply should not be drawing such a conclusion from the data.
Commissioner Cavoukian claims that “the retroactive application of proposed adoption disclosure legislation necessitates the inclusion of a disclosure veto to balance the rights of access and privacy.”
Most adoptees and birth parents who search for each other are hoping that an initial meeting will grow into a relationship. They want to know the name of the other person and they hope to meet and form a relationship. However, some birth parents and adopted adults do not want to build a relationship and would prefer that their names to remain hidden.
A disclosure veto ensures that one person gets everything she wants while the other person gets nothing. The searcher gets neither a name nor a relationship, while the person filing the disclosure veto gets to remain hidden and is able to ensure there can be no relationship.
Balance occurs when both people compromise.
A contact veto, such as the one in Bill 183, does provide balance.
The searcher can find out the name but is forbidden to contact the other person and therefore cannot have the longed-for relationship. The other person’s name is released but her privacy is maintained by ensuring there can be no relationship,
The greatest scientists among us cannot explain this basic human yearning for roots, where one fits into the great—possibly divine—scheme of evolution. Stephen Jay Gould reflected on the quandary in his last essay in Natural History Magazine:
“I do not pretend to know why the documentation of unbroken heredity through generations of forebears brings us so swiftly to tears and to such a secure sense of rightness, definition, membership, and meaning. I simply accept the primal emotional power we feel when we manage to embed ourselves into something so much larger”.
Forbidding knowledge of their roots means shutting people out of their own place in the great scheme of evolution. Forbidding mothers and fathers from knowing the identities of their own children shuts them out of their primal need to know how their children fared and their very descendancy. Both practices are cruel manifestations of bygone values that have no place in this century.
For further information contact the COAR Coordinating Committee
Michael Grand, PhD, C.Psych (519) 823-1738 grand@psy.uoguelph.ca |
Karen Lynn (416) 537-4486 ccnm@rogers.com |
Wendy Rowney (416) 545-0912 wrowney@hotmail.com |