26 July 1998 Sunday
Encounter with an Islamist
By Eqbal Ahmad
INSIDE the Imam al-Mehdi school in Ouzai, a Lebanese village near the
Israel-Lebanon border, seven coffins lay in a row. Outside, men were
preparing for their burial when a small convoy of cars arrived
bearing, among others, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, the largest
among the armed parties which have for fifteen years resisted Israel's
occupation of southern Lebanon. The coffins held the Hezbollah
fighters who had fallen in past battles. They were among the forty
Lebanese 'prisoners', dead and alive, who came home on that day, June
26, 1998 in exchange for the remains of an Israeli soldier.
Sayyad Hasan Nasrullah entered the hall in solemn dignity accompanied
by Jawad, his teenage son. He stopped before each coffin and offered
the Fatiha until he reached the one marked number 13. He beckoned an
aide and spoke to him whispering. The aide summoned two workers of the
Islamic Health Association, a Hezbollah outfit. They opened the
coffin, exposing a body wrapped in a white shroud.
Sheikh Hasan Nasrullah closed his eyes, his lips trembled as he
offered the Fatiha. Slowly he bent over and tenderly stroked the head
of Hadi Nasrullah, his eldest son who was 18 years old when he died in
battle on the 13th day of last September. Jawad, the younger son,
stood still and pale next to his father. A deep silence fell in the
room while his right hand rested on his son's chest. It was broken by
the clicking of the reporters' camera, but was promptly restored when
Sheikh Hasan looked up in cold surprise.
I witnessed the event on television and also read a sensitive account
of the awesome scene in the Daily Star, Beirut's English daily. So
when Eric Rouleau, Le Monde's eminent Middle East reporter until he
became France's ambassador to Tunisia then Turkey, suggested that we
meet Sheikh Hasan Nasrullah I readily agreed. Colleagues from the
daily al-Safir arranged the meeting and took us into the well-guarded
Shia neighbourhood in Beirut which serves as the Hezbollah's
head-quarters.
Our first surprise: women modestly dressed but without hijab moved
about their business even inside the Hezbollah compound. Another
notable observation: unlike the erstwhile PLO compounds and offices in
Beirut, there were but few uniformed and armed men visibly around. The
stronghold of this most effective armed organization in the Middle
East had a completely civilian look, a fact that normally implies
intelligent and efficient security arrangement.
Sheikh Nasrullah met us in an adequately furnished apartment which
apparently serves as the leadership's meeting place. At the entrance,
we were met by a large, framed photograph of Ayatullah Ruhullah
Khomeini. A rough large rug of Qum design covered the sitting area of
the meeting room. A clock and two framed Quranic verses hung on the
wall. The fresh flowers on the side table were tastefully arranged
next to a framed photograph of his son Hadi, in parachuter's uniform,
his sparse beard sprouting green.
The Sheikh is 38 years old, of medium height, round white face framed
in black beard, clear brown eyes behind glasses suggest a shrewd and
good humoured man. He wore the black turban and tunic of the Shia
cleric. A bit of forelock defiantly protruded out the turban, hinting
that the Sheikh does not quite conform to the commonly held notion of
the proper Islamic hair-cut. An aide, austere looking man of about 35,
also sat in the room and occasionally joined in the discussion.
"I understand you studied in Qum?" I asked at one point. "Not quite",
he said, "I was there only two months. I went to school right here in
Beirut where my family lived. My father was a vegetable vendor, poor
migrants from Southern Lebanon, large family. No one from my family
had been a cleric before; I am one of those few who have no family
claim to this profession. After the madrasa in Beirut, I was selected
to study in Najaf Sharif where I spent two years, then returned to
finish my studies in Baalbek."
When did you become involved in politics? "I joined Amal (Shia party
led by Nabih Barri) at age 14 and was elected head of the party in my
town at age 18. When I left Amal I was a member of the party's Central
Committee. I left Amal, rather I was expelled from it, in 1982 after
the Israeli invasion because I was among those who wanted armed
resistance against the Israeli occupation."
This was a fair profile of the average Hezbollah leaders and cadres.
Most come from poor Shia families from the South of Lebanon, most have
served their political probation in Amal or the Palestinian Fatah. For
most of them Islamic and Shia politics has been a vehicle of communal
as well as individual mobility. Sheikh Hasan Nasrullah rose to become
the Hezbollah Chief of Military Operations, then its General
Secretary, and remains a prize quarry of Israel's military and
intelligence services.
We began by asking how his party reconciles the demands of
contemporary life with religious laws and traditions which date back
to the Middle Ages? How does Hezbollah propose to negotiate the often
large gaps between tradition and modernity? Notably absent from his
reply were the stock assertions of the eternal and universal nature of
Shariah.
"We should begin by noting a significant difference in the doctrinal
development of Sunni and Shia schools of thought," he said. Among the
Sunnis, the doors of ijtihad were closed some centuries ago, and
despite the advocacy of several Sunni scholars they have not been
re-opened. In the Shia tradition the doors of ijtihad were never
closed, and the mujtahid has remained a figure of great importance and
influence."
The Sheikh proceeded to explain that the "consequences of this
openness are far-reaching. It can affect in profound ways the
relationship between state and religion, law and society, the
community and its traditions. Ijtihad makes permissible adaptations to
the requirements of time and place, permits one to respond to new
demands, be they specific or general, upon the individual and
community, state and society. It allows a Muslim society to dispense
with traditional forms and practices when they are not any more
appropriate to its needs, and encourages the evolution of new forms.
There is a need to expand the scope of ijtihad in all schools of
Islamic thought".
Fair enough, but how do you reconcile the existence of an Islamic
party in Lebanon, a multi-religious, multi-denominational country in
which no one party can impose its ideological agenda on all others? In
other words, why an Islamic party in a country which can not
accommodate an Islamic statehood?
Sheikh Nasrullah's reply: "Your question assumes the uniformity of
mission and political agenda among Islamic parties. Between Hezbollah
and the Taliban there is a large gap of objective and outlook (smile
and the cast of an ironic eye at his Pakistani guest!); yet both are
Islamic. Our primary objective has been resistance to Israeli
occupations. The year I993 was a watershed of sorts as Israel's
invasion then and our resistance to it brought us national legitimacy
so that even Christians accept Hezbollah as an authentic national
force. As for our ideological mission, to be Islamic in Lebanon
entails the Islamization of the Muslim individual and community, its
values and way of life."
Given the centrality of resistance against Israel to Hezbollah's
programme and party structure, we raised a question about the scope
and future of armed resistance. What will happen to it when Israel
withdraws from Lebanon which, in view of its recent demarche, may in
fact occur? "We shall not accept a withdrawal based on conditions on
which Israel insists. Liberation can not be conditional. Israel
committed aggression, it occupies our land, it is our sacred right to
resist, and this resistance shall continue until it withdraws."
Does this principle apply to Palestine also, and to the Golan Heights?
"The strategies of Syria and Lebanon are linked. As for the
Palestinians, if their leaders compromise, there is little we can do.
We can not substitute for their leadership. If they decide to resist
we shall be on their side." What then is his vision of Palestine? "We
wish the liberation of Palestinian people among whom we count Jews,
Muslims and Christians."
By then I am impressed by how closely Sheikh Nasrullah's views
parallel those of Iran's President Mohammed Khatami and his
associates. To confirm this suspicion we raise an issue which defines
the divide between reformists and conservatives in contemporary Iran -
the powers and role of the Faqih.
Sheikh Nasrullah's carefully worded answer was quite nuanced:
"Vilayet-i-Faqih is an elective office. He is elected by the Assembly
of Experts (Majlis-i-Khabargan). So the source of his power are the
people. Then there is the President who is directly elected by the
people, as is the parliament (Majlis). Together, the three
institutions constitute Iran's democracy. They need to work in a
framework of exchange and collaboration. Of course, the case of Imam
Khomeini was special: he was the revered choice of all the people."
(c) DAWN Group of Newspapers, 1998