This paper attempts to explain why the military
has played a key role in politics in Pakistan and examines the
institutions that helped engender military rule. The prime reason
has been the military itself, specifically the Pakistan Army and
within it the officers corps; three coup d'etats created instability
in the relationships between various institutions of the state.
The military could not have ruled by itself; it needed the civil
bureaucracy's help in day-to-day administration of the country.
Also, the judiciary, media and to some extent, the United States
were instrumental in fostering the continued presence of the military
in Pakistan's politics.
We have divided the paper into five sections
(in addition to the introductory and concluding sections). We
end with a review of the prevalent political situation in Pakistan.
This has always been a very topical subject but it has become
all the more current because of the recent 13th amendment in the
Constitution. We would like to acknowledge the course instructor,
Dr Naveed Hasan, for helping us with research material and reviewing
the complete first draft of the paper. It is our intention to
make this paper publicly available on the Internet via the World
Wide Web.
Armughan Javaid
24 April, 1997
and Noor Zahra Irfan
* Addendum for the Web version: as mentioned above, I have finally gotten around to converting
the Word doc to html, footnotes and all. But some of the content reflects the political situation as on 24
April, 1997. Comments/criticism is welcome via email.
Armughan Javaid, 21st August 1997
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
CDNS Council for Defence and National Security
COAS Chief of the Army Staff
CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator
Col Colonel
Gen General
GHQ General Headquarters
GOC General Officer Commanding
FSF Federal Security Force
IB Intelligence Bureau
IJI Islami Jamhoori Ittehad
ISI Inter Services Intelligence
ISPR Inter Services Public Relations
JAG Judge Advocate General
JCSC Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
Lt Lieutenant
MI Military Intelligence
POW Prisoner of War
PPP Pakistan People's Party
PR Public Relations
VCOAS Vice Chief of the Army Staff
August 14, 1997 will mark the 50th anniversary
of Pakistan's creation [now this should be read as ' has marked' - authors].
Sixteen of these fifty years were spent
under direct martial law regimes and democracy could not flourish.1
India, which gained independence from the British at the same
time, has always been recognised as the world's largest democracy;
with military coups unthinkable2, it can boast of a
strong parliament, free press and an independent judiciary. In
Pakistan these institutions did not, or were not allowed to strengthen
and this remains one of the biggest reasons why the military intervened,
directly or indirectly, in politics and state affairs throughout
Pakistan's half century of history.
This paper looks into the history of Pakistan in
relation to the role played by the military3 in it.
It discusses the ambitious generals' psyche, their arrogance and
a smug belief in their ability to do things better than civilians.
They took it upon themselves to 'sort out' the mess created by
politicians and become the nation's 'saviours'. It is divided
into sections roughly corresponding to military eras in chronological
order - how an image-building process took place and from the
small but fully-disciplined elite of the colonial era, the military
emerged as a 'sacred cow' answerable to none. It also looks into
the various institutions that helped entrench military rule and
concludes with a review of the present situation in light of the
13th amendment in the Constitution and its implications.
The segregation of the British Indian Army
Imran Ali argues that under the British, the military
was a primary recipient of land in canal colonies and this enhanced
the stature of the Army and hence laid a foundation for future
dominance in politics in Pakistan. 4 While this may
be a reason for the involvement of the military in Pakistan's
politics, but it is certainly not the only one since the Indian
Army arose from the same stock too -- the British Indian Army.
Hence we have to search for other reasons.
The Pakistan Army's participation in rescue of migrants
from India and in the rehabilitation of refugees followed by the
Kashmir operations 5 created its image as a saviour
and its officers, being quickly promoted to fill the void created
by the segregation started considering themselves as guardians
of the nation. The first two C-in-Cs of the Pakistan Army were
British: Generals Frank Messervy and Douglas Gracey. 6
Right after partition, General Frank Messervy told Major General
(then Brigadier) Sher Ali, a senior Pakistani officer, that it
is of the utmost importance that correct selection and promotion
of officers be done at that time so that the right man would be
selected for the top slot when the British left -- therefore people
free from political ambitions should head the Army. 7
But when the time came, Ayub Khan, who had risen from the rank
of Lt Col to General in 4 years, was appointed C-in-C. Sher Ali
maintains that the history of Pakistan would have been different
had the other person in consideration -Lt General Iftikhar Khan-
become C-in-C because he would never have allowed the Army to
be used for political purposes and he would never have used his
position as C-in-C as a doorway to political power. 8
Hence this initial choice of the commander-in-chief and the precedents
he set can be judged as one of the reasons why the military went
on to play such a major role in politics in Pakistan.
The British had developed a procedure called "aid
to the civil power" in which authority was passed to a local
military commander for the duration of the law and order disturbance
in an area. 9 Such practices were continued after the
creation of Pakistan; it was not realized that if the army was
called out on regular basis, either the population will conclude
that the government was incompetent or the army itself will rebel
against the government. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case10
showed that there were officers in the Pakistan Army who wanted
to overthrow the government due to their differences with it.
Some officers in the GHQ would just hang around having discussions
about their roles as 'Guardians of the Country'.
Lahore martial law
In March 1953, riots against the Ahmadi sect erupted
in Lahore demanding their declaration as a non-muslim majority.
The GOC Lahore, Major General Azam Khan, recommended to the GHQ
imposition of martial law in the city. This incident perhaps is
the turning point in the history of military-politics relations
in Pakistan. For the first time the Army found itself in direct
control of civil affairs. A PR exercise was initiated with full
force through the ISPR. 11 Surprisingly, the army did
not go back to barracks after restoring law and order - but launched
a "cleaner Lahore campaign" and improved the streets,
health and sanitation facilities. 12 The message it
was sending to the people was clear: we are better rulers than
the civilians.
So while the military's image continued to improve,
politically the country was in a mess. A long delay in formulation
of the first constitution followed by quick changes of government
paved way for the army. Major General Fazl Muqeem writes that
in the annual division commanders meeting at the GHQ in April
1957, several general officers demanded that Ayub Khan take over
the affairs of the country. 13 Ayub Khan himself writes
that politicians kept coming to him and saying that he could save
the situation. 14
Iskandar Mirza (who was the President from 1956-58)
had a military background and had good relations with General
Ayub. But massive political unrest and public demonstrations
led Ayub Khan to ask Iskandar Mirza to abrogate the constitution
and declare martial law on October 7, 1958. 15 Iskandar
Mirza was asked to tender his resignation by the army high command.
Throughout his tenure, Ayub Khan relied heavily on PR and image
build-up to ensure the continuation of his rule. He got himself
elevated to the rank of Field Marshal and appointed General Musa
as the C-in-C. His PR was not limited to projecting the President
on media alone but culminated in the formation of the Pakistan
Writer's Guild and curtailing freedom of speech of the press by
the 'Press and Publications Ordinance'. One ploy used by Ayub
Khan to entrench his rule was to give state largesse to businesses
and hence obtain their favours: a give and take relationship.
16 His son Gohar Ayub (presently the Foreign Minister of
Pakistan) was helped by the Dawood group to start an automobile
plant; Ahmad Dawood was elected to the National Assembly in 1964.
17 The Basic Democracy system18 prevented the
emergence of political parties and a democratic political culture,
hence strengthening Ayub Khan's rule.
The most massive PR exercise during the Ayub Khan
regime was the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Contrary to what is taught in
school text books, Pakistan did not win the war; neither was it
India who started it. 19 The 23-day war can at best
be called a stalemate (Pakistan can, however, claim to have won
the air battle) but it was projected as a major victory. In fact,
the Tashkent agreement marked the start of the downfall of Ayub
Khan as the people believed what the army had won on the battleground,
Ayub lost on the negotiations table. Nevertheless, the image of
the military reigned supreme on 6 September 1966 which was declared
a national holiday; no one knew that 5 years later it would hit
its lowest ebb under another military dictator.
With the rapid decline in the popularity of Ayub
Khan's rule, General Yahya, who had become the C-in-C in September
1966, declared martial law on March 25, 1969. 20 After
the December 7, 1970 elections, which are regarded as free and
fair, East Pakistan was embroiled in political unrest. General
Yahya saw no political solution to the problem and a military
action was launched in East Pakistan. Severe press censorship
was introduced and the public were fed incorrect information.
India overtly started helping the uprising and went into war with
Pakistan. The "defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan"
doctrine failed and East Pakistan became Bangladesh. The morale
of the nation was at an all-time low. The army and the generals
were being openly criticized. Yahya had no choice but to relinquish
control to Mr Z A Bhutto. Ironically, Bhutto initially took over
as a civilian CMLA.
Bhutto saw this as the perfect opportunity to curtail
the powers of the military: several senior officers were retired
from the three services. Lt Gen Gul Hassan was made the C-in-C,
in the same rank. However he soon fell out with Bhutto. 21
The result was that Bhutto virtually forced him and the Air Chief
to tender their resignations. Perhaps this was the only time in
the history of Pakistan when the civilian government imposed its
authority over the military so completely. It would not have been
possible had it not been for the '71 war debacle which had embarrassed
the Army - with some 90,000 men as POWs in India. With General
Tikka Khan as the COAS 22, Bhutto continued to enjoy
tremendous control over the army. In 1976, he promoted Lt Gen
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq over several senior officers and made him
the COAS.
Bhutto's elections of March 1977 were alleged to
be rigged by his political opponents. 23 The Pakistan
National Alliance (PNA) comprising nine political parties took
to the streets. Law and order situation was deteriorating rapidly.
Politicians themselves were demanding martial law - Air Marshal
Asghar Khan (Ret.), one of the prominent opposition politicians,
wrote to the services chiefs and asked them to intervene.
24 On July 5, 1977, the third direct martial law was imposed
in the country under the code-name Operation Fairplay. 25
General Zia took over as CMLA and suspended the constitution and
thus began what was to become the country's longest military rule.
General Zia for the first time introduced the element
of Islamic ideology in the army: as was evident by its new motto
of 'iman, taqwa, jihad fi sabilillah'. 26 This
ideology of 'Islamisation' helped General Zia to elicit the support
of the Islamic ethos among Pakistan's clergy and the middle class.
Bhutto was hanged and the elections postponed. To legitimize his
rule, he conducted a referendum in 1984 which has been labeled
as a farce. A Judge of the Supreme Court received the doctored
results of the referendum from Joint Staff Headquarters and ratified
them. 27 One instrument that was used by General Zia
to maintain hold over the military, his so-called 'constituency',
and hence over the administrative machinery of the state was extensions
in service and pre-mature retirements. His close associates were
granted promotions and extensions beyond the retirement age.
28 On retirement they were given plum posts in the military's
numerous business concerns such as the Fauji Fertilizers, etc.
29 On the other hand, decorated professional officers whom
he considered a threat to his rule either resigned themselves
or were side-lined in promotion boards. 30
In 1985, General Zia lifted Martial law albeit after
introducing the infamous 8th amendment in the '73 constitution
that gave him the power to dismiss governments. Prime Minister
Junejo tried unsuccessfully to exert some control over the military.
For example, he wanted General Akhtar Abdur Rehman and Lt Gen
Hamid Gul to resign in relation to the Ojhri Camp debacle.
31 Zia did not allow this and subsequently dissolved the
National Assembly in the first ever use of the 8th
amendment in May 1988.
The Immediate Post-Zia Period
It goes to the credit of the VCOAS, General Mirza
Aslam Beg, that he did not grab power after General Zia's death
in the C-130 crash. However, later as COAS General Beg's role
was to become controversial. Reportedly, he was successful in
influencing the decision of the Supreme Court regarding the restoration
of the Junejo Government. His intelligence agencies had predicted
that it was likely that the Junejo Government would be restored
by the Court. General Beg supposedly sent a message to the Chief
Justice through the Chairman Senate Mr Wasim Sajjad that the army
would not approve of such a decision. 32 In 1993, with
General Beg out of uniform, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Afzal Zullah initiated contempt of court trial again General Beg
which was aborted. Such remains the influence of a retired General.
Moreover, when President Ishaq dismissed the first
Benazir Bhutto government, she accused the MI of masterminding
the move and claimed that her dismissal order had been prepared
by the JAG branch of the GHQ. 33 The PPP accused newsmen
of linking with IB, MI and ISI; their newspapers paid the price
next time she was in power as their advertisements were cut.
34 Ms Bhutto also claimed that she was kept in the dark
as to the details of Pakistan's nuclear programme, however this
was denied by General Beg. 35 Nevertheless, the fact
that it was General Beg rather than Benazir Bhutto who announced
the testing of Hatf I and Hatf II missiles pointed to the fact
that Beg wanted to keep civilian influence over the military to
a minimum. 36
The 1990 elections are widely believed to be rigged.
The IJI party was formed by the ISI under Lt General Hameed Gul
to ensure PPP's defeat in the polls. 37 Although Hamid
Gul denies this claiming that the ISI's political cell, which
was created by ZA Bhutto, only 'monitored' the elections.
38 Still the role of the ISI is questionable: rather than
engaging in counter-intelligence, which remains its primary role,
it was wasting the country's resources by monitoring the elections.
Later on General Beg infuriated the foreign office and put the
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in an awkward position when he made
his displeasure over the government's Gulf War policy public.
Openly criticizing America and supporting Saddam - he put forward
his so-called doctrine of 'Strategic Defiance'. 39
Commenting on foreign policy in press meetings was not the COAS's
job. This showed that the military was still very much into the
game. Newspapers coined the term 'ruling troika' - comprising
the COAS, President and the Prime Minister, in that order of influence
over the country!
General Asif Nawaz took over from General Beg as
COAS on 18 August, 1991. He was drawn into the clean-up operation
in Sindh and developed differences with the Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif. 40 General Abdul Waheed Kakar succeeded Asif
Nawaz after his death. Right after General Waheed assumed command,
differences between the President and the Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif developed. The National Assembly was dissolved and later
restored by the Supreme Court. This resulted in a political deadlock
between the PM and the President. Speculations of a military take-over
were widespread. But although the military did not intervene directly
by taking over the country, there was shuttle diplomacy between
the President, PM and the services chiefs. The military brokered
a deal where both the President and the PM resigned and new elections
were held in October 1993. 41
The most significant event related to the military-politics
relations during Benazir Bhutto's second tenure was the abortive
bloody coup by some junior officers including a Major General.
42 General Waheed was offered an extension in his tenure
but he refused. There are some reports that there was a tussle
between Ms Bhutto and the President Leghari over the appointment
of the new COAS. However, the President used his discretionary
powers to appoint a respected and professional officer General
Jehangir Karamat as the COAS who is known to be politically unambitious.
43
The government of Benazir Bhutto was dismissed in
November 1996 by President Leghari; this time she did not openly
accuse the army of being behind the move. During the care-taker
government, the President established a Council for Defence and
National Security (CDNS) - a body originally envisaged by General
Zia. It includes the services chiefs and can advise the government
on defence and economic matters. It was seen as many people as
martial-law in civilian clothes. Elections took place on February
3, 1997 and Mr Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister with an
unprecedented mandate. One of his first political moves was to
repeal the sections of the 8th amendment in the constitution
which gave the president discretionary powers to dissolve the
National Assembly, and to appoint services chiefs. 44
It is speculated that the CDNS will now be disbanded. This incident
has revived the supremacy of the Parliament as laid down originally
in the 1973 constitution. The military remained neutral throughout
this exercise, its leadership reaffirming its faith in the Parliament.
From the preceding sections, the military itself
with its senior leadership and their vested interests can be seen
as the prime reason for its continued role in politics in Pakistan.
Even without direct martial law, the military maintained its
influence through its intelligence agencies (ISI's creation of
IJI) and otherwise (e.g. as a mediator in the aforementioned political
tussle between Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Nawaz Sharif). The role
of other institutions that have helped the military with its rule
emerges:
The first and foremost reason was a weak parliament.
Pakistan was without a constitution of its own until 1956. This
weakened the parliamentary system and democratic norms could not
develop (PMs were appointed by the head of the state rather than
people). Zia did not let any institution strengthen that could
serve as a threat to his rule. He weakened the political parties
and the 1985 elections were held on non-party basis. The freedom
of expression of the Press, one of the pre-requisites of
democracy, had always been curtailed during martial laws and
censorship laws were enforced. This control over the press reached
its limit when in 1982 three journalists were flogged by the martial
law regime due to political reasons.
The judiciary was weak during martial law
regimes and otherwise when dealing with generals. Several of its
decisions have had political fallout. For example, the 1953 decision
of Justice Munir upheld the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly
45 and thus weakened the nascent democratic process
in Pakistan. After the 1977 coup, the Supreme Court validated
the martial law on the basis of "doctrine of necessity".
46 Its role during the Presidential referendum and later
during the hearing of the Junejo Government restoration case (decision
influenced by the COAS) marred its reputation significantly. The
civil bureaucracy has essentially felt comfortable with
whomever is in power, provided it was given a security of service.
Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy system was an instrument which made
politicians redundant and gave the bureaucracy an outreach at
the village level and helped ensure continuity of his regime.
In the Yahya Khan marital law, the bureaucracy was given a diminished
role in administration and it was fragmented with the dismissal
of 303 civil servants. However, the Zia-ul-Haq martial law saw
a revival of the bureaucracy's role and several bureaucrats were
given key positions in governance such as Mr Agha Shahi as the
Foreign Minister.
The United States, although not an institute, has
been perceived as the most significant foreign player in Pakistan's
politics. American aid, especially during the Ayub Khan era and
as a result of the Afghan War during Zia-ul-Haq's regime, consolidated
the dictators' rule. With their extensive military aid to Pakistan
in the 50s and commencement of officer training in US military
schools, they gave the Pakistan Army an image of a vibrant and
elite force occupying important place in national affairs. Akmal
Hussain47 and Mushahid Hussain48 claim that
according to now-declassified US State Department reports, General
Ayub Khan was recognised as the 'King-maker' in Pakistan's politics
by the Americans. 49 The Cold War entered a new phase
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Pakistan became
a front-line state. For the United States, dealing with a military
dictator was much easier in such times. US assistance to Pakistan
was resumed in 1983 with a $3.2 billion package. Even though America
was opposed to Zia's continuation of Pakistan's nuclear programme,
it continued to help him because of the Afghan war and hence helped
enormously in the strengthening of his rule.
Today the combined numerical strength of Pakistan's
Armed Forces stands at about 560,000 50 as compared
to 137,000 in 1949. 51 India managed to curtail the
powers of the military right after partition while in Pakistan
it was wooed by politicians from the start - six months after
the creation of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, who was the Prime Minister
and the Defence Minister, defended very high allocation for defence
in the first budget debate in the constituent assembly. 52
Defence budget continues to devour national resources at an alarming
rate. In 1994, Pakistan entered into a deal with France to acquire
3 Agosta Class Submarines at a cost of $1billion53
and the deal is suspect because of several press reports of heavy
kickbacks accrued to politicians and certain naval officers. Even
though the government has more than two thirds majority in the
Parliament, it cannot touch the 'sacred cow' by reducing the defence
budget. The military has always had the final say regarding arms
procurement and retains the veto over security-related decisions.
54 This must change. The defence budget and acquisition
process must be made transparent; reports of kick-backs and commissions
must be investigated and the culprits put to justice, be it Mr
Asif Zardari in the submarine or proposed Mirage-2000 deal or
the sitting Naval Chief Admiral Mansoor-ul-Haque. 55
The initiative rests with the government: accountability must
also include the military.
It would be premature to say whether the 13th
amendment has truly strengthened democracy in Pakistan for all
times to come. However, with the cold war having ended, a free
press and a judiciary separate from the executive and a strong
government in Pakistan, any general will have to think a hundred
times before following in the footsteps of his ambitious predecessors.
And whether the vested interests in the military like it or not,
the government must hold meaningful talks with India and resolve
the disputes: starting with Siachin and eventually Kashmir. Because
otherwise both the countries will keep trying to match each other
tank for tank and plane for plane until both collapse of sheer
exhaustion. Especially prone to this is Pakistan with its economy
in dire straits; the debt-retirement scheme is just a stop-gap
measure, the real solution to the crisis is to reduce the defence
budget (bilaterally with India) and divert resources to
developmental and social sectors.
1. Pakistan was ruled under martial law from 1958-62,
1969-71 and 1977-85.
2. See General S.F. Rodrigues's interview to The
Pioneer in Lucknow, reprinted in The Friday Times,
April 1, 1992. Even though Indian armed forces have been used
in counter insurgency operations (in Kashmir, for example) but
they have always remained under strict civilian control. In this
interview General Rodrigues, the then Indian COAS, states his
apprehensions about internal duties saying that domestic policing
in Assam, Kashmir and Punjab was not the job of his forces.
3. It should be noted that the term military is not
synonymous with Army - it is a general term used for all the three
(or more as in the case of the United States with its Marine
Corps) Armed Services of a country: the Army, Navy and the Air
Force. Although when people talk of military's role in politics
in Pakistan, they are generally referring to the Army since the
other services have never initiated a coup; their officers were
given martial law administration duties but they have remained
somewhat in the background.
4. See Imran Ali, Punjab under Imperialism,
1987, pp. 109-115
5. For details of the Kashmir Operations, see Major
General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of Pakistan Army,
1963, p.75
6. There was greater shortage of Pakistani commissioned
officers in the Pakistan Army than was the case in the Indian
Army. Hence the Pakistan Army took a longer time to be 'nationalized'
than the Indian Army; see Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military
and Politics in Pakistan: 1947 - 86, 1986, p.36
7. Major General Sher Ali Khan, The Story of Soldiering
and Politics in India and Pakistan, 1978, p.116
8. Ibid., p.126
9. See Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army, 1984,
p.49
10. In 1951 several senior army officers including
Major Generals Akbar Khan, Nazir Ahmad, Brigadier Sadiq Khan,etc.
and Mr Faiz Ahmed Faiz (who was the editor of a newspaper) were
arrested on charges of planning to overthrow the state. For details
see Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's Defence Policy: 1947-58,
1990, pp.116-118
11. See Birgadier A R Siddiqi, The Military in
Pakistan: Image and Reality, 1996, pp. 25-29
12. Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics
in Pakistan: 1947 - 86, 1986, p.61
13. Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story
of Pakistan Army, 1963, p.190
14. FM Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, 1967,
p.58
15. See Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: The Continuing
Search for Nationhood, 1991, p.48
16. See Naveed Hasan, Management Practices and
Business Development in Pakistan: 1947-88, p.75
17. Ibid.
18. Ayub Khan established a Basic Democracy system
under which the President was elected indirectly through an electoral
college of individuals who were in turn elected by local bodies.
19. For details of division-level military operations
Gibraltor and Grandslam carried out by Pakistan
before the outbreak of the '65 war, see General Mohammad Musa,
My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, p. 35
20. For details on the power transfer from Ayub Khan
to Yahya Khan , see Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: The Continuing
Search for Nationhood, 1991, p.52
21. Lt Gen Gul Hassan refused to help Mr Bhutto with
the police strikes and opposed his creation of a Federal Security
Force (FSF). The Air Force was asked to fly dummy runs over Faisalabad.
Air Marshal Rahim Khan refused. See Lt Gen Gul Hassan, Memoirs
of Lt Gen Gul Hassan, 1993; for a discussion on the FSF, see
Omar Noman, Political Economy of Pakistan, p.59
22. Bhutto changed the position of C-in-C to Chief
of Staff of the service and introduced the position of Chairman
JCSC. However this was more of a cosmetic change only since the
command of troops rested with the Chiefs and the Chairman JCSC
was a staff appointment only. Gen Gul Hassan writes in his memoirs
that he would have done the same thing [refused to cooperate with
Bhutto] had he been the COAS instead of C-in-C.
23. For election figures, see Shahid Javed Burki,
Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood, 1991, p.65;
24. Ibid., p.62;
25. For details on how the Operation was carried
out, see General K. M. Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power
Politics 1977-88, 1995
26. iman, tqwa, jihad fi sabilillah. Translation:
Faith, Piety and War in the service of Allah
27. Akmal Hussain and Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan:
Problems of Governance, 1993, p.57
28. For exmaple, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman was
promoted to the rank of General even though he had no Corps Command
experience, see Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin,
The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, 1992
29. See "The Army's March to Profit", Asiaweek,
reprinted in The Friday Times, February 13-19, 1992.
30. For example: Air Commodore Sajjad Haider told General Zia that the armed forces were suffering because of their involvement in politics and resigned from the force in 1979. Major-General Shah Rafi Alam, respected in army circles as a strictly professional man was told by General Zia that he was being superseded for further promotion because he was known to strongly oppose the army's hanging on to power. The '65 war ace: Squadron Leader M M Alam (later Air Commodore) was sidelined in the early eighties on similar grounds. For details see:
- Air Commodore Sajjad Haider (PAF, Ret.) interviewed by Anjum Niaz in Dawn Magazine, February 14, 1997
- Major General Rafi Alam (Ret.) interviewed by Moni Mohsin in The Friday Times March 31 - April 6, p.24
- Air Commodore Mohammad Mahmood Alam interviewed by Rina Saeed Khan, The Friday Times, September 15-21, 1994, p.24
31. On April 11, 1988 an ammunitions dump at Ojhri blew up spraying rockets and explosives on Rawalpindi and Islamabas. It was a store for ISI's Afghan effort; for details see Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, 1992, pp.220 - 221
32. Najam Sethi, "Unveiling Gen Beg's grand plan", The Friday Times, April 28-May 4, 1994, p.6
33. Akmal Hussain and Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan: Problems of Governance, 1993, p.99
34. Khaled Ahmed, "The quarrel with journalists",
The Friday Times, August 11-17, 1994, p.9
35. General Mirza Aslam Beg, "Who will press
the button ?", The News, Sept. 1993.
36. See chapter related to Pakistan in Leonard Spector,
Nuclear ambitions: the spread of nuclear weapons, 1990
37. Khaled Ahmed, "The folly of ruling through
spies", The Friday Times, Nov 21-27, 1996, p.9
38. See Lt Gen Hamid Gul's interview in The Herald,
February 1995, p.40
39. Najam Sethi, "Unveiling Gen Beg's grand
plan", The Friday Times, April 28-May 4, 1994, p.6
40. Birgadier A R Siddiqi, The Military in Pakistan:
Image and Reality, 1996, p. 240
41. For details on dissolution and restoration of
the Assembly and the role of the services chiefs as mediators,
see national newspapers dated between April 19, 1993 and June
1993. For example, "National Assembly dissolved, Army takes
over PTV, radio stations", cover story in Dawn, 19
April, 1993
42. Major General Zaheer Islam Abbasi, Brigadier
Mustansar (Billa) and some other officers were arrested and Court
Martialed on charges of conspiring against the government. This
shows a trend that no military coup in Pakistan that was planned
by junior officers has been successful (e.g. the Rawalpindi Conspiracy
case). The impetus has to come from the top of the hierarchy.
43. See Ahmad Rashid, "Pakistan: Trouble Ahead,
Trouble Behind", in Current History, April 1996, p.163
44. Tariq Butt and Raja Zulfikar, "Parliament
renders President toothless", headline story in The News,
April 2, 1997
45. For details of the case, see Akmal Hussain and
Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan: Problems of Governance, 1993,
p.54
46. Justice Dorab Patel, "The Historical Role
of Judiciary in Pakistan", The Friday Times, Oct.
24-30, p.7
47. Dr Akmal Hussain specializes in development policy
research. He has lectured at the University of California and
is a member of the adjunct faculty at the Lahore University of
Management Sciences.
48. Mr Mushahid Hussain is a renowned journalist
and columnist and has written extensively on civil-military relations.
He is the Pakistan correspondent of Jane's Defence Weekly.
He is serving as an advisor in the Nawaz Sharif government.
49. Akmal Hussain and Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan:
Problems of Governance, 1993, p.32
50.. Military Technology, Annual Defence Almanac,
Vol. XX issue 1996
51. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's Defence Policy:
1947-58, 1990, p.113
52. For defence budget figures under Liaqat Ali Khan,
see Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan's Defence Policy: 1947-58,
1990, p.94
53. Shakil Shaikh, "Pakistan to get three French
subs", headline story in The News, December 22, 1994
54. Ayesha Jalal, "Mirage deal - changing the
civil-military imbalance", The Friday Times, Aug 29-Sept
4, 1996, p. 3
55. Ardeshir Cowasjee, "The Admirals",
The Friday Times, January 23-29, 1997, p.8
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Hasan, Naveed, Management Practices and Business Development
in Pakistan: 1947-88 (Ashgate 1997)
Hussain, Akmal and Hussain Mushahid, Pakistan: Problems of
Governance (Vanguard 1993).
Jones, Rodney W., "The Military and Security in Pakistan",
in Zia's Pakistan, edited by Craig Baxter (Westview Press
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Khan, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub, Friends not Masters
(Oxford University Press, 1967).
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Ahmed, Khaled, "The quarrel with journalists", The
Friday Times, August 11-17, 1994, p.9
Ahmed, Khaled, "The folly of ruling through spies",
The Friday Times, Nov 21-27, 1996, p.9
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January 23-29, 1997, p.8
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p.40
Jalal, Ayesha, "Mirage deal - changing the civil-military
imbalance", The Friday Times, Aug 29-Sept 4
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Butt, Tariq and Zulfikar, Raja, "Parliament renders President
toothless", The News, April 2, 1997, p.1
Shaikh, Shakil, "Pakistan to get three French subs",
The News, December 22, 1994, p.1
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The News, Sept, 1993.
"National Assembly dissolved, Army takes over PTV, radio
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