Mandates - Part 2

by Wayne Errington

The assumptions behind mandate theory are usually the same as those that underpin responsible government; that strong, decisive government is desirable and that a working majority in the lower house of parliament should not be hindered by the need to reach consensus on all issues. The idea of limited government, as expressed through bi-cameralism and federalism, respects the fact that voters, on an individual and collective basis, will have reservations (about candidates, parties and policies) that are not able to be expressed in a single vote. A written constitution and judicial review put further limits on what governments and legislatures can do. Indeed, the division of power that characterises limited government in Australia blurs the chain of responsibility that is the main feature of responsible government, thus obscuring the idea of a mandate. Whom, for example, does one blame (or credit) for the condition of public hospitals - the state governments who run them or the federal government which largely funds them? The concept of a mandate assumes a simple answer to that question. This is not to say that limited government is necessarily hostile to mandate theory. While the 'positive' view of a mandate is favoured by reformist governments, a complementary aspect of mandate theory limits government action to its stated policies - a vital but often overlooked aspect of responsible government that incorporates the principle of limited government. Responsible government and limited government are not opposites. Both reformist governments who expound their mandate to justify sweeping change and actors within the political system who use mandate theory to limit government action are pointing to the contract between government and citizens that provides the government with its legitimacy.

The fate of the Whitlam government demonstrated the fragility of the concept of a mandate. The comfortable victory achieved by the Coalition parties in the 1975 election showed that the electorate was less concerned about the moral (or constitutional) legitimacy of the opposition's actions than the perceived competence of the government. The Whitlam government's centralising program and 'crash through or crash' method were an attempt to prove the supremacy of the doctrine of responsible government over federalism, an issue brought to a head but not resolved in 1975. 

There is no room in a responsible government model for an opposition or minor party mandate. That, however, may say more about the limitations of the responsible government model than about the minor party claims. The problem with minor parties claiming some sort of a mandate from the election results is that they play only a small part in the campaign. The campaign for the Senate is barely considered by the media. Further, vowing to block legislation foreshadowed by the new government before the election (such as the part-sale of Telstra) is at odds with the Democrat's 1996 campaign slogan (and long-term image) of 'Keeping the Bastards Honest.' That slogan is consistent with traditional mandate theory but inconsistent with more recent efforts by the Democrats to portray themselves as a significant political force in their own right, rather than as a shelter for those disaffected by other parties. 

After the 1998 election, much was made of the fact that the Coalition received only a minority of the national two-party preffered vote in the House, apparently damaging their claims to a mandate for tax reform. That statistic, though, is meaningless. The government did what they had to do to win the election win a majority of votes in a majority of seats. Along with claims to a mandate, the government is running a propaganda campaign agaist the Senate, through newspaper opinion pieces, quasi-scholarly articles by MPs and the occaissional threat to combine with the opposition to change the Senate voting system in order to neuter the minor parties. The purpose is to intimidate Senators into behaving appropriately - as the government sees it. This campaign though is likely to have little effect, because the major parties share a dislike for the Senate when in government but disagree over what to do about it. Labor would prefer to reduce the power of the upper house rather than fiddle with the voting system. As Labor nears a return to government, the prospect of a weaker Senate must be very enticing, but as long as memories of 1975 persist, agreement on this subect is unlikely. 

In practice though, the government must deal with the Senate to get its legislation passed. The defection of Senator Colston from the ALP in 1996 made life easier for the government in its first term. Senator Harradine will doubtless cut a deal with the government over the tax package. All of this, however, has little to do with mandates and much to do with the normal cut and thrust of parliamentary politics. In Australia, a mandate to govern is not automatically a right to legislate. 

Wayne Errington holds a Bachelor of Arts with first class honours from the University of Western Australia where he is currently a doctoral student in the Department of Political Science.

References 

C. Bean et al., The Politics of Retribution. Sydney: Allen and Unwin (1997). H. Emy, 'The Mandate and Responsible Government,' pp 65-78,Australian Journal of Political Science. Vol 32, No. 1, (1997). 

C. Kernot,'Mandate Rests in the Votes,' The Australian. (March 21, 1996). 

C. Sharman, 'Australia as a Compound Republic', pp 1-5, Politics. Vol 25, No.1, (1990).