In the weeks after the death of Stonewall Jackson, in May of 1863, Robert E. Lee was convinced that even though the Confederacy had been winning the battles, they were on a path to lose the War. Since it did not have the resources to continue the war on both fronts, the Confederate government had to choose between maintaining the war in the west and maintaining the war in the east. Lee believed the independence of the Confederate States of America could still be won if the citizens of the North were to push for peace with the South. Contact with the realities of war might increase support for the peace movement in the north and with sufficient troops, Lee could lure Federal General Joseph Hooker away from the Rappahannock and out of Virginia by going on the offensive with an invasion of Pennsylvania.

Lee believed the best way to defend Richmond was to distance himself from it. One reason for Lee's feelings was that his army could not survive in Virginia, where the landscape had been picked clean by both sides. By his crossing the Potomac, the Federal army would be drawn northward. If the campaign were successful, some of the Federal forces might be recalled from other areas to help defend against Lee's army.

Lee had to prepare for the defensive while hoping to be able to take the offensive. He was willing to take other risks if he could be reasonably sure of Richmond's safety and being able to reinforce his army when needed. Lee's plan of advance called for the cooperation of the cavalry in preparing the way for Ewell's march to Winchester. If Ewell was unmolested, he was to take Winchester and continue over the Potomac, through Maryland and into Pennsylvania. Longstreet was then to advance northward, east of the Blue Ridge, so as to cover A.P. Hill's advance. When Hill was in the Shenandoah Valley; Longstreet was to follow him. The cavalry was to hold the mountain gaps until their advance into Pennsylvania had called all the Federals north of the Potomac.

On June 15, A.P. Hill started for Culpeper full of confidence. Ewell was preparing to attack Winchester. Longstreet was to march to Markham and was to stand against any Federal forces he might encounter. His trains could move by Chester Gap into the Valley, where they were safe from Federal raiders. Two brigades of cavalry were left behind to guard the fords of the Rappahannock. By this action, Lee hoped to confuse the enemy as to his plan and also to facilitate the advance of Hill.

On the evening of the day Longstreet left Culpeper, Lee received news that Ewell had driven Milroy from Winchester the previous night. Ewell was now free to advance to the Potomac. Two of Hill's divisions were on the road to Culpeper, and the third was ready to leave Fredericksburg.

By the 17th, Lee had broken up his headquarters and had ridden to Markham. Upon arrival he found that Stuart had been engaged that day at Aldie and Middleburg, but had not established contact with Federal infantry. From this, Lee assumed that his adversary was moving toward the Potomac. Reports from scouts on the 18th and 19th confirmed this to be true.

On the 19th, Lee advanced through Ashby's Gap to Millwood, and the next day established headquarters near Berryville. Longstreet was put on alert to start or the Potomac. Through a misunderstanding of his orders, Longstreet withdrew from the mountain gaps and established himself west of the Shenandoah River. By sheer coincidence, the Federals selected this same day to general cavalry advance on Stuart and drove him back into Ashby's Gap. As they had infantry support, there was danger that they might take the pass and pour into the Valley on Longstreet's rear. McLaws division had to be sent back to prevent this. By the next morning the Federal infantry had withdrawn and was retiring eastward.

It was safest to move across the Potomac as soon as possible. Once the army advanced across the Potomac, Ewell could continue his march toward the Susquehanna, because the rest of the army was within supporting distance. Anderson's division was ordered to the river and Ewell was instructed to move on if ready.

After crossing the Potomac himself, Lee received a response from Jefferson Davis, which endorsed his views on the encouragement of the peace movement in the North. In a response to Davis that same day, Lee stated "I have not sufficient troops to maintain my communication, and, therefore, have to abandon them." In the closing remarks of this response Lee said "I think I can throw General Hooker's army across the Potomac and draw troops from the South, embarrassing their plan of campaign in a measure, if I can do nothing more and have to return. I still hope that all things will end well for us at Vicksburg. At any rate, every effort should be made to bring about that result." In a heavy rain on the morning of June 25, the band struck up "Dixie" and the cheering division began its advance behind the general who carried the hope of his nation.

On June 27, Lee set up headquarters in a little grove on the road to Gettysburg. The atmosphere was one of preparation for battle. By this time, Ewell had advanced as far as Carlisle and Early was within six miles of York. Ewell was to take Harrisburg if his force was adequate, while Early was to cut the railroad between Harrisburg and Baltimore and to destroy bridges at Wrightsville and Columbia. The general advance was to be upon Harrisburg in order to draw the enemy out and to cut communications between east and west. The operation was going quite well, but the successful execution of Lee's plan depended upon the arrival of Stuart's cavalry.

The 28th came and there was still no word of the enemy, of Stuart, or of the cavalry that had been left behind to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge. After 10 o'clock there was a rap on Lee's tent pole and it was announced that one of Longstreet's scouts had brought the news that the enemy was north of the Potomac. The scout had left Longstreet at Culpeper and had gone to Washington, where he had picked up much gossip. After hearing that Hooker had crossed the Potomac, he left for Frederick where he found two corps of infantry. Having learned that the Army of Northern Virginia was at Chambersburg, he then procured a horse and hurried northward. On his way into Pennsylvania, Longstreet's scout learned that two more corps were close to South Mountain, and that Lee's old friend, Major General George Gordon Meade, had replaced General Hooker. There now existed the possibility that Lee's army could be cut off from its communications with Virginia. The situation became one of gravity because of Stuart's unexplained absence. The army was essentially blindfolded.

By the morning of the 29th, Lee's revised orders had been dispatched. During his afternoon stroll he announced to the officers accompanying him, "Tomorrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg, as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after."

With still no news from Stuart on the 30th, Lee hurried the march to Gettysburg. So far no enemy forces had been encountered. Late in the evening of the 30th, General Hill, who had ridden on to overtake his troops at Cashtown, sent back word that Pettigrew's brigade had gone on that day from Cashtown to Gettysburg to procure shoes. Near Gettysburg, Pettigrew found Federal cavalry, and his officers reported that they had heard the roll of infantry drums beyond the town. This report found Lee in disbelief and even if true, he could do nothing about it until morning.

Early on the morning of July 1, as Lee and Longstreet headed east from Chambersburg, there came the distant and occasional rumble of artillery. As they moved closer, the sound of firing came insistently from the east. Lee could not restrain himself. He hurried on to Cashtown, where he met A.P. Hill. At about 2 o'clock that afternoon, Lee rode upon the battle, about three miles east of Gettysburg.

So began the greatest military battle in the recorded history of the North and South American continents. J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry did not arrive on the field of battle until July 2 - too late to aid the Confederate cause. Federal victory here on July 3, coupled with the surrender of the besieged Vicksburg on July 4, effectively turned the tide for the Federal forces. Had things in this battle turned out differently, how different would our boundary lines be today?