CS 207 Singapore Society
Term paper

The Pursuit of the Singapore Dream

Introduction
Singapore is one of the most competitive countries in the world today. Much of this "success" has been achieved through the Singapore government's drive towards economy-building policies in the early years of independence.
However, in recent years, the government has started stressing that economic gain alone is insufficient. Increasingly, nation-building policies are implemented, in an effort to keep Singaporean talents from seeking their fortunes and homes elsewhere.
In line with this, we will explain how, as Singapore gains its independence, the government changes its emphasis to the 'intangibles', and how discourses are used to perpetuate myths that justify such re-positioning.
Repeatedly, the government has stated the need for its people to upgrade and keep up with the times. It has been stressed time and again that Singapore is such a small country that to isolate itself would be detrimental to its survival as a sovereign country. Globalization is the key to success. Hence, the drive towards a Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE).
However, globalization also brings about a dilemma to which Singapore's economy may also be threatened. This dilemma comes about in the form of Singaporean talents migrating overseas in search of better prospects, leaving foreign expatriates to support the economy. The question of expatriates' loyalty to Singapore is what worries the government.
The aim of this paper is to highlight the debate of the Singaporean identity, focussing on three aspects - What exactly is it? How did this identity come about? Is this identity apparent in all Singaporeans?

A Brief History of Singapore's Self-Governance Years to Today

Singapore first achieved self-governance in 1955 when the Singapore Labour Force (SLF) party won in the April general election to form a minority coalition government with David Marshall as the Chief Minister. Britain retained control over internal security matters as the SLF government's ability was in doubt. This resulted in Marshall's resignation in 1956 and Lim Yew Hock succeeded him. Lim went on to take repressive action against the communists, leading the Chinese community to support the People's Action Party (PAP) instead as they saw the SLF government as Britain's lackey, and anti Chinese culture.
With the support, the PAP, with Lee Kuan Yew as the secretary-general then, won in the general election in 1959 to form the new government and remained in power till this day. To the PAP, the next logical step was towards independence.
The PAP then went on to advocate independence through merger with the Malayan Federation. Merger detractors initially feared a dominant left-wing Chinese community that might dominate the Malay community and cause communist problems but this gave way to the need to control a potentially communistic Singapore that could be a base where Malay Communists could subvert mainland Malaya.
Eventually, on 16 September 1962, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak joined Malaya to form Malaysia. However, a series of disagreements on Singapore's political and economical climate ensued between the PAP government and the Central Government in Malaysia. Malaysia began to regard the PAP as anti-Malay when Lee Kuan Yew advocated for a "Malaysian-Malaysia" and not a "Malay-Malaysia". As a result, two major racial riots occurred in July and September 1964 in Singapore.
On 9 August 1965, Singapore separated from the Federation to become an independent sovereign state and a republic on 22 December 1965. The PAP leaders now had to face the situation they were convinced would be the fall of Singapore.
The PAP government embarked on industrialization and national defense programs in order to feed the people, provide employment and housing opportunities. Economy-building became their first priority. In a matter of 30 years, Singapore became a Newly Industrialized Economy and one of the most competitive economies in the world.
In recent years, however, the Singapore government has shifted its emphasis to include nation-building policies such as the Singapore 21 (S21) Vision, the 5 Singapore Values. Emphasizing values like "familial piety" and "loyalty to Singapore", the Singapore government has also taken to quoting certain Confucianism values and Asian Values.

What is The Singaporean Identity?
In a recent article in the Straits Times, an NUS student was quoted saying that if he were to leave Singapore to seek his fortune elsewhere, he would be a pragmatic and practical Singaporean.
Similar views of "What is being Singaporean" are held by many today. Be it "kiasu" (afraid of losing out), "kiasi" (cowardly) or money-minded, the axiom is that a Singaporean would first look out for his own self-interest before anything else.
One can infer from past events that this has been brought about by the government's philosophy in early independence years that economic gains are more important than anything else.

The Discourse of Economy Building
This section will elaborate on how building the economy was justified, and its results. This will help us understand why nation building was put aside in favour of building the economy, national defense and standard of living.
On 27 May 1961, the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, proposed closer political and economic co-operation between the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei in the form of a merger. The main terms of the merger, agreed on by him and Lee Kuan Yew, were to divest the individual states of their responsibility for economic growth, defense, foreign affairs and internal security, but to allow local autonomy in matters relating to education and labour. Support for PAP's plan to go ahead with the merger was evident in a referendum on the terms of the merger held in Singapore on 1 September 1962 in which the people showed overwhelming support. Malaysia was formed on 16 September 1963.
After Singapore broke off from Malaysia in 1965, the areas in which the Malaysian central government was responsible for, particularly economic growth and national defense were sorely lacking and as such Singapore was left particularly vulnerable. (taken from www.sg, 2000)
The expulsion from the Federation came so sudden that there was little time and resources for the PAP government to ponder on what was to be done. Immediate action had to be taken and it was only natural to focus primarily on the economy, as the PAP government believed that one can forget about fulfilling other needs without first filling their stomachs. This was the premise of the government's policies.
The result was the launch of a massive industrialization program with the extension of the Jurong industrial estate, the organization of the Economic Development Board in 1968 and the setting up of the Jurong Town Corporation and the Development Bank of Singapore. In 1970, the Monetary Authority of Singapore was established to formulate and implement Singapore's monetary policies. Furthermore, public housing was given top priority. New towns sprang up and Housing and Development Board apartments were sold at a low cost. To encourage home ownership, Singaporeans were allowed to use their Central Provident Fund savings to pay for these apartments.
With the British Government's sudden decision in 1967 to withdraw its armed forces from Singapore by the end of 1971, Singapore set out to build up its own defense forces. The Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute was established in 1966 and compulsory national service was introduced in 1967.
Rapid economic growth was not without its problems. Singapore had to go international in terms of trade, shipping and financial transactions in order to make up for the expected loss in trade and other business activities due to the strenuous efforts on the part of Malaysia to develop its own economic facilities. People were drilled into thinking that "without a strong economy we will not survive". The government was apparently deploying economic power during the period immediately after independence.
During this timeframe when Singapore first declared its independence, there was little emphasis, if any at all, on the building of a nation in the spiritual sense. Material needs were deemed to be more important and had to be satisfied before moulding the state into a nation.
Singapore managed to recover its economy in 1965 and even had a growth of 8 per cent due to the expansion of the manufacturing and construction sectors. Growth was even greater from 1966 to 1973 when the annual average rate of growth at constant prices was 13 per cent. It was doing well economically, and has proved its independence and sovereignty as a state.
The economy had stabilised and was growing at a stable rate around the 1980s. However, people were still obsessed with the pursuit of material well-being, a notion drilled into their heads by the government during the early years of independence.
The construction of a nation requires the use of power, and this is distinguished in three forms: economic, ideological and political. The PAP government deployed all three elements of power throughout its years in office, only that the emphasis has changed with the progression in time. However, conclusion on the success of the deployment of such powers can yet be done. The intimate connection between nation building and industralization is evident in the early years of independence, but as the state progresses, there is a need to steer the focus to ideological power in attempting to achieve the soul principle.
As we approach the last decade of the century, we suddenly have the 5 Singapore values, S21 Vision, and the National Day Parade become an annual reminder of our "common past" and our shared "vision for tomorrow". The government tells us that we are "one people, one nation, one Singapore", and talents who went abroad to widen their horizons were reminded that Singapore is a "place that we call our home", "our homeland", because "every Singaporean matters". The interplay of ideology is apparent especially in the early 1990s when the need arose to emphasize on nation-building, and the use of ideologies as a form of hegemony was employed.

Globalization as a Dialectic
On the whole, few people would want to argue against the economic benefits of globalization since it brings greater investment into a country, exchange rate stability, trading on comparative advantage etc. The next section explores how this discourse of globalization is legitimated in Singapore.
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal (31st December 1999), Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo's view is that globalization is inevitable, you cannot stop the flow of information, capital nor labour. If this is the case, then Singapore cannot help but gear up for the change and prepare for the new economy
In his recent NDP speech, PM Goh elaborated on how Singaporeans must gear up for the challenge of the new economy.
The elements of the globalization discourse are:
1) Ascension of the new economy
2) We need to position ourselves to take advantage of this new world
3) Therefore change is necessary
Hence, the myth of globalization is this; that unless you catch up with the rest you will stand to lose out. By losing out here, we mean losing out in terms of wealth. As you can see, the entire myth is premised on the notion that economics occupies a very high spot in the hierarchy of values.
Underlying all such discourses of globalization is the primacy of economics and the importance of getting ahead in terms of statistics like the gross domestic product etc.
However, globalization also brings about the loss of Singaporean talents. Practical and pragmatic Singaporeans are increasingly looking for opportunities abroad. It has often been said that being so small and lacking in natural resources, the only resource that Singapore has is its people.
Thus an increasing loss of talent is a worrying trend for the government. After all, without talents, there is nothing Singapore can depend on to continue building its economy and become a media and IT hub.
It comes back to the government having to provide an anchor for its people so that they will stay in Singapore and contribute to the economy. This anchor comes in the form of nation-building policies. Why does the Singapore government feel the need to advocate such policies? Because of the fear that Singapore will become nothing, without its Singaporean talents. Because although foreign talents may perform the same jobs just as well, their loyalty may not be to Singapore, but their home country.
Skeptics may even infer that the Singaporean government's calls for a national identity is simply a means to a more competitive Singapore.

The Switch in Emphasis from Economic Progress to Nation Building
In August 1997, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong launched the Singapore 21 Committee. Its role was to strengthen the "heartware" of Singapore in the 21st century - the intangibles of society like social cohesion, political stability and the collective will, values and attitudes of Singaporeans.
Five dilemmas were introduced:
1. Less Stressful Life vs. Retaining the Drive
2. Needs of Senior Citizens vs. Aspirations of the Young
3. Attracting Talent vs. Looking after Singaporeans
4. Internationalization/Regionalization vs Singapore as Home
5. Consultation and Consensus vs. Decisiveness and Quick Action.
These dilemmas can be said to be the result of Singapore's earlier drive towards economic growth and national development to the extent where intangibles such as national identity and community development becomes lacking.
It would be naïve to assume that the Singapore government would compromise economic and strategic positions for the sake of the intangibles but nevertheless, this initiative can be seen as an attempt to introduce Singaporeans to nation building. The myth now was that in order to integrate this society together, we must focus on the intangibles.
That is why the Singapore government is now shifting its emphasis to include nation-building policies like the S21. The stress is on treating Singapore as our home, to have a national identity, to feel like we belong in Singapore. Such messages serve as the ideological aspect of the government's move towards a Knowledge-Based Economy - they are the tools to help the government fulfil the spiritual aspect of becoming a nation.

Conclusion
If one subscribes to the teleological view of things, one can agree with the S21 Vision and say in conclusion:
Singaporeans are in the process of discovering their roots, including collective experience, even as they make their varied contributions to the welfare and progress of their city, island and country. In weaving past memories with present experiences and future hopes, Singaporeans are fashioning a distinct Singaporean identity for themselves which transcends separate ethnic and cultural affiliations. (Chow, 1996)

References

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