In a frontpage feature, the Sunday StarTimes
previews "a groundbreaking new report to be released [on
February 13] by the Inland Revenue". The report represents
another nail in the coffin of the 20th century fiscal contract;
a social contract that gave New Zealand (and other economically
developed countries) record growth with diminished inequality
for most of the century.
Leaving aside the issue of whether the maximisation of GDP is
appropriate as an economic goal, let alone as a social goal, this
study (like the many others that form the edifice it is built
on) is flawed by inappropriate assumptions about taxation and
its relationship to longrun economic growth.
It would surprise me very much if the reports author, Patrick
Caragata, has paid more than lip service to the ground breaking
work in "new growth theory" of Paul Romer - an economist
named last year by Time Magazine as one of the 25 top Americans
of the year. Romer has shown the overwhelming importance to the
growth process of "nonrival" public domain inputs
such as knowledge and ideas. Thus new growth theory sees economic
well-being as deriving from a synergy between the public and private
domains of economic society.
By way of contrast, the old growth theory that many neoclassical
and right wing new classical economists subscribe to assumes that
the productive economy has only a private domain. In old growth
theory the public sector serves as a kind of addon, a deadweight
cost of public consumption to be borne by private enterprise;
at best, a necessary evil that provides core public goods such
as legislation, policing and defence. The practitioners of such
theory rightly assume that legislation, policing and defence should
not cost more than 20% of GDP. The problem lies in their limited
vision of the public side of the economy, and in their view that
all taxation constitutes an appropriation of private income.
Ideally, to maximise growth, and certainly to maximise environmentally
sustainable growth, public domain contributions to the economy
should receive a return - a "social profit" or "social
wage" - that is comparable to the private returns that we
call wages, profits, interest and rent. The "public domain"
is not the same as the "public sector" as it is essentially
a resource base rather than a set of activities. It is an expanding
resource base that requires a high and growing amount of nourishment
(ie investment); it is an undernourished public domain that serves
more than anything else as a drag on economic growth.
Taxation represents public domain revenue, just as wages represent
the private revenue of wage workers. Public revenue can be squandered,
just as private revenue can be squandered. Certainly the squandering
of income does inhibit economic growth, but there is nothing particularly
special about the squandering of public revenue. While it is true
that a bloated public sector does represent a form of squandering
that should be eliminated, the existence of a boated public sector
is not an argument for a tax cut, let alone a 40% cut in public
revenue.
New Zealand does indeed have a bloated public sector. That's a
direct result of "the reforms" that began in 1984. The
reformed public sector is less efficient at producing the collective
goods that the public demands of it than was its predecessor,
thanks to the very high level of "transactions costs"
implicit in the reform model. The reforms necessarily required
very high levels of monitoring, managing and policing, because
they devolved strict financial accountability to each school,
hospital, research centre etcetera. The reforms acted like a sponge,
soaking up public revenue that might otherwise have been used
to provide the social wage goods and the social wage tax credits
(ie income support and low income tax concessions) that the public
demand.
Thus, the reforms have denied legitimate revenue to the owners
of the public domain, to the people who (and whose parents, grandparents
etc.) created the new knowledge, ideas and institutions that have
generated economic growth and that continue to generate economic
growth. New Zealand's public domain is becoming impoverished despite
nearrecord levels of taxation.
Public revenue should be equitably allocated to its citizen owners.
Public education and health care are provided most efficiently
from a centrally funded pool - as in the prereform period
that Caragata suggests was characterised by higher ethical standards.
Pooling of public income works best with the ethos that we formerly
subscribed to; that we only take from the pool what we need, that
we recognise that making contributions to the public domain is
in our selfinterest, and that we value the public domain
by paying moderate to high rates of income tax.
While Caragata notes that tax evasion is on the rise, no doubt
tax avoidance is increasing even faster. The fiscal contract we
took for granted took a king hit in 1988 when the top tax rate
was cut from 48% to 33%. This tax cut was an outcome of some peculiar
political posturing in 1987/88 (especially the LangeDouglas
feud), and had nothing to do with sound economics. The important
tax reforms had taken place in 1986 and the 48% upper rate introduced
in 1986 was fully consistent with the countries that we compare
ourselves with.
The 1988 tax cut provided cash windfalls for many of those who
might otherwise have been avoiding tax. But it did not stop tax
avoidance and evasion. Rather it validated the selfish view that
any process, including political lobbying, may be used by producers
to avoid paying for their use of the common resources from which
they derive much of their profit. By himself becoming a part of
the antitax lobbying process, Caragata is implicitly questioning
his own ethical standards.
The Caragata Report - and predecessor reports such as the 1997
Scully Report - serve to undermine an already tottering fiscal
contract. While they may incorporate some very sophisticated mathematical
techniques, the old computer maxim - "garbage in, garbage
out" - still applies. If the assumptions underpinning their
model are inappropriate the results of the analysis will be valueless
no matter how clever the techniques used.
The antitax lobby is disingenuous in another way. By focussing
on the high total tax revenue rather than on the low tax rates
paid by large companies and high income earners, they are actually
using the distress of low income New Zealanders to justify further
tax cuts which will only provide net benefits for high income
New Zealanders. All of the actual post1998 proposals on
offer from the antitax lobby involve a maximum income tax
rate of 25%, and a commensurate cut in company tax.
I have no reason to doubt Caragata's sincerity; the way he does
economics probably reflects the way he was taught economics (which
I assume lacked an adequate exposure to economic history and to
the history of economic thought). The problem is that reports
of this kind are avidly demanded by those who stand to gain from
the implementation of their findings.
Lower taxes will reduce the rate of economic growth because savage
cuts to the social wage lead to reduced incomes to beneficiaries,
wage workers and subcontractors, to reduced demand for most goods
and services, and to increasingly unsocialised behaviour on the
part of the swelling poor. Lower taxes create an impoverished
public environment in which it is very difficult for new firms
to get started. It is wellestablished businesses and propertyholders
that benefit from lower taxes, but, even then, only in the same
way that a person of low ethical standards benefits from finding
and keeping a stash of cash that is really someone else's. The
means by which the selfish become richer are also the means by
which society as a whole becomes less prosperous than it would
otherwise be.
{ This document is: http://www.oocities.org/Athens/Delphi/3142/krf42-caragatanail.html
{ It is also usually available at: http://www.oocities.org/Athens/Academy/1223/rf42-caragatanail.html
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