Keith's email contact is:
Reference:
Rankin, Keith (1997) "Demonic Calculations", New
Zealand Political Review 6(3):12-15.
Editor's Introduction:
Keith Rankin, 21 April 1997
In a review of the last book (The Demon Haunted World: Science
as a Candle in the Dark) by Carl Sagan, renowned for his proselytisation
of science to the masses, Richard Lewontin (New York Review
of Books, 9/1/97) describes a debate in Arkansas in the 1960s.
He and Sagan defended Darwinism against creationist opponents,
one of whom had a PhD in evolutionary biology. Perhaps lacking
the rhetorical skills of David Lange in his Oxford triumph over
Jerry Fulwell, the good guys of scientific rationalism lost the
debate, as adjudicated by the Little Rock audience. Fearing for
their lives, they got out of town as quickly as they could. Lewontin
came to understand that non-rational knowledge, mythology, faith
and superstition have important roles in people's lives. And he
came to understand that science cannot answer all our questions.
For Sagan, however, the audience's resistance to scientific truth
and his educated opponent's rejection of evolution were tantamount
to the work of demonic forces. Perhaps economic rationalists of
the 'new right' see their opponents in the same way as Sagan did:
as ignorant, stupid, malicious? If so, it would be natural for
them, enlightened by what they see as the certain truths of economic
science, to believe that the world would be a better place if
it could contain the stupid, bring light to the ignorant, and
suppress if not eliminate the malicious.
I am a fan of science, and I would agree with Sagan's views on
any particular topic more often than not. Yet scientific knowledge
itself rests on unprovable assumptions, and scientific practice
features selective blindness. Lewontin notes that "no serious
student of epistemology any longer takes [seriously] the naive
view of science as a process of Baconian induction from theoretically
unorganised observations.... Before sense experiences become 'observations'
we need a theoretical question, and what counts as a relevant
observation depends upon a theoretical frame into which it is
to be placed. Repeatable observations that do not fit into an
existing frame have a way of disappearing from view." Scientists
and economists should be tolerant of knowledge selected using
frameworks or methodologies different to their own. That is the
essence of liberalism.
The project of western 'Baconian' science is to learn about nature
in order to control, harness or improve it. Man, in lieu of God,
intervenes in constructive - indeed creative - ways because the
world is not perfect, and indeed cannot even be conceived to be
perfect. Every state can be bettered. The science of Francis Bacon
and Isaac Newton falls into this Aristotelian or materialist tradition,
the progressive tradition of science which has dominated most
of the twentieth century, the tradition of unlimited growth. Indeed,
much of Sagan's science falls into this tradition in which our
world can be improved, through positive science, by adding good
things to it.
The alternative Platonic or idealist tradition sees the world
we inhabit as an imperfect copy of a perfect abstract world. Newton's
legacy - an image of an harmonious law-abiding mechanical universe
- did much to raise the profile of this 'nature knows best' idealism.
Demons are the imperfections of our world, arising from human
fallibility. In this tradition, the scientific project is to reveal
the underlying world, not to change it. Knowledge is valued for
its own sake, and the highest form of knowledge is to know not
the 'headline' but the 'underlying' truth. Improvement comes from
convergence with nature's perfect blueprint, and that means ridding
the world of the demons which spoil the picture. The Platonic
project is essentially negative, removing the bad rather than
adding the good.
100 years after Newton (who believed in astrology), Simon Laplace
made God (and astrology) redundant. His astronomy reflected and
reinforced the spirit of natural harmony that pervaded the 'enlightenment'
world of western Europe and its American colonies in the late
eighteenth century. The ideal world, as revealed to us through
our studying the heavens, was fully self-correcting.
Platonism continued to dominate western thought until around 1850,
but in an increasingly pessimistic form. From the 1790s, enlightenment
rationalism and Christian fundamentalism conflated into a Malthusian
fatalism - described by Boyd Hilton in The Age of Atonement.
Modern economics emerged, in Britain, as the 'dismal science'.
It emerged out of conditions of strict intellectual censorship,
a British legacy of the French Revolution. Thomas Paine and many
other libertarians of the left and the right had no real choice
but to leave Britain.
Laplace introduced a second kind of demon, an abstract demon who
knows everything and can fully predict the future. Such a demon
had no pejorative connotations to an atheist such as Laplace,
but would of course be interpreted negatively by both religious
idealists and the opponents of scientific rationalism. The post-Laplacean
project known as 'economic rationalism' or 'new right ideology'
is to realise a world in which we can all become calculating demons
(alias 'economic man'), planning our lives, discounting our pleasures,
mapping our futures, providing for our old age. For such demons,
calculable risk does exist but uncertainty does not.
Laplacean demons are 'knowing' beings. Brian Easton warns of the
dangers of philosophically correct 'knowing' economists within
government, exerting a negative form of control over their profession:
Until the idealist project is realised - and even idealists accept
that it can never be fully realised - the closest real
approximations to Laplacean demons are Easton's "philosopher
kings". Scientists in Laplace's time were indeed known as
'natural philosophers'. Laplace's 'demon' metaphor is particularly
apt, because people who see themselves as more knowing than the
rest of us, and who are placed in positions of influence, easily
become demons to those of us who are discomforted by philosophical
correctness. To the people of Arkansas in 1964, threatened by
scientific rationalism, Carl Sagan was Carl Satan. The demon-hunters
were themselves demonised.
The rise of social science parallels that of natural science.
From the 1850s' heyday of John Stuart Mill's political economy,
through economics' professionalisation phase under the dominant
influence of Alfred Marshall, to the macroeconomics of John Maynard
Keynes, economics conformed with the Aristotelian tradition. It
sought prescriptions to create a better world; a more prosperous
and a more just world. By and large, those prescriptions, while
not unsuccessful - my colleague Tim Hazledine sees the 1960s'
experience as the basis of a blueprint for the twenty-first century
(NZ Herald, 18/3/97) - failed to live up to their promise.
We became disappointed, even disillusioned, as Albert Hirschman
eloquently explains in his 1982 book Shifting Involvements:
Private Interest and Public Action.
The 1970s and 1980s brought change however (as noted by Terence
Hutchison in Changing Aims in Economics), reflecting both
an emergent idealism in academic economics in the 1960s - especially
in the USA which was founded in the enlightenment era, and which
still clings to its Jeffersonian myth - and an increased disquiet
about the potential of Hamiltonian intervention to improve our
lives. (The ideological clash between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander
Hamilton in the 1790s still pervades American intellectual life
in the 1990s.)
Economic science in even its applied forms became idealist, abstract,
virtually reducible to mathematical formulation. Ideals of private
virtues and private acquisitiveness as the foundations of the
public good were reinstated as the core axioms of economics, creating
a utopian picture of an ideal self-regulating economy working
much like Laplace's solar system. The policy agenda came to be
to create an economy without 'distortions'; in short, to create
heaven on earth. Treasury's heaven. Plato's heaven.
Both western economic rationalism - premised on the primacy of
the individual - and Confucian economic thought, premised on the
primacy of the family, reflect an underlying Platonic conservatism.
Mandarins of both West and East tend to be intolerant of dissenters
- stirrers, agitators, whistle blowers and other demonic influences
- who are working towards different visions and ideals. Societies
dominated by such intellectual conservatism become both adversarial
and resigned. Each adversary has a stronger sense of what it is
against than what it is for. Pessimism strengthens on one side
when the demons of the other side become more influential. The
natural urge is to attack the threatening demons rather than to
try to understand them. Rationalism breeds negativity, and worse.
The demons of current New Zealand politics are readily identifiable.
Demons of the right include inflation, protection, benefit dependency,
government debt, fiscal risk, universal pensions, minimum wages,
and the University of Auckland Economics Department.
Demons the
right fear include financial transactions taxes, budget deficits,
higher income taxes, and universal basic income. Demons of the
left include economists, GDP statistics, men, Jenny Shipley, anyone
called Roger or Rod or Rodney, the Business Roundtable, Standard
and Poors,
Inflation is a typical example of a demon; an imperfection. It
probably is 'bad', at least some of the time. But getting rid
of it is often worse. In Hirschman's Strategy of Economic Development
it can be good, not simply because it lowers the real interest
rate, but also because it is a problem, and because problems can
be 'good'. We cannot have solutions without problems. Genuine
problems, properly identified, energise an economy. Creative solutions
follow. Imperfection is a source of enrichment:
The world is a better place for creatures of higher intelligence
because they make more mistakes, have unrealistic expectations
and experience disappointments. The real world is a 'second-best'
world, an imperfect world, by any definition. But eliminating
mistakes cannot make it less imperfect, because the human world
is an evolving place, creating new problems, imperfections, demons,
as part of the process of change. The real world is better than
the simple 'first-best' ideal world of economists' core abstractions.
For example, evolution depends on mistakes (mutations). A first-best
world could not have emerged from the primeval slime. Sexual reproduction
makes no sense in a Platonic world, but plenty of sense in a "demon-haunted"
world characterised by diversity, uncertainty and vulnerability.
A world with sexuality is certainly a better world than one without.
For Hirschman - a highly esteemed economist, certainly eccentric
by the conformist standards of the profession as a whole (his
work is the subject of a 1995 book Discovering the Possible;
the Surprising World of Albert O. Hirschman, by Luca Meldolesi)
- a world without mistakes and disappointments might not be bearable.
The "costs" associated with being less than 'ideal'
are less than the "benefits" arising from mistakes.
Hirschman is a playful economist, who shows many ways in which
reality confounds rationality while still remaining amenable to
investigation. His "surprising world" is full of paradoxes,
and all the better for it.
Hirschman is by no means the only believer in the virtues of imperfection.
By and large, economists, especially mathematical economists,
love paradoxes. More academic economists are fascinated by the
nuances of economic behaviour than by the virtues of ideal systems
as political blueprints. Paul Segerstrom, in a 1988 article called
"Demons and Repentance" (Journal of Economic Theory),
quotes pop singer Deborah Harry: "Accidents never happen
in a perfect world…. I never lie. I never cry." Segerstrom
notes that "The presence of demons leads to Pareto superior
… payoffs", meaning that, in the kinds of real world
situations he is contemplating, occasional irrational behaviour
leads to superior outcomes for all parties. Economics should be
a source of fun, not fear.
The achievements of economics are, no doubt, disappointing. That
is both a reflection of our expectations, our attitudes, and the
attitudes of those economists who see the core abstractions of
social science as a blueprint for utopia. As Lewontin says, "Biologists
are not the only scientists who, having made extravagant claims
about their merchandise, deliver the goods in bite-size packages.
Nor are they the only manufacturers of knowledge who cannot be
bothered to pick up a return package when the product turns out
to be faulty."
Neither Laplacean nor Saganic demons need divert us from our search
for well-being. Fear of economics is a problem, not a solution,
for the left. Economic literacy by no means makes a person into
a conservative. Economics does not constitute a single project:
it can both investigate the world for what it is, using a variety
of theoretical and historical approaches, and investigate abstract
systems for what they are - simplifications rather than ideals
- generating new insights.
The right should engage in debate with the left, rather than seeking
to purge it. And people on the left while engaging constructively
with the right, should focus on formulating their own visions
of social progress and devising practical democratic means to
bring their visions to fruition. Econophobia is a barrier to social
progress. Economics is neither as good nor as bad as it is made
out to be.
Keith Rankin
go to Keith Rankin's site
Science, Demons and Econophobia
SCIENCE: A CANDLE IN THE DARK?
ECONOMIC RATIONALISM
In the heaven
of Charles Murray, co-author of The Bell Curve:
and one-eyed nuns* from Chicago.
ECONOPHOBIA
* By the way, the phrase "one-eyed nuns" is a reference to Sister Connie, who was brought out from Chicago to give an anti-welfare address to the March "Beyond Dependency" Conference. She is literally one-eyed - she has an eye-patch over the dead-eye. [return]
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