The WASHINGTON COMMUNIQUE on the Proliferation of SALW:
Elements of an International Action Agenda
Speech by the Honorable Albrecht Gero Muth before the First Continental meeting of African Experts on SALW, Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa, May 17-19, 2000
Thank you for these kind words of introduction. It is indeed a great honor and distinct privilege for me to come before this august gathering of experts to discuss one of the most pressing humanitarian and arms control challenges of our time: the uncontrolled spread of ever expanding quantities of small arms.
The OAU is to be commended for taking the lead in global efforts to curtail small arms proliferation. The emerging global coalition will look to the OAU for continued guidance and leadership. The OAU heads of state and government summit in Lome in July and the Continental Ministerial on Small Arms in Bamako in October, which this experts gathering is charged with preparing, are important milestones on the long road to the 2001 UN conference on combatting small arms trafficking in all its aspects. The OAU may rest assured of my continued support and full cooperation in advancing our shared objectives.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
OAU secretary-general Salim Ahmed Salim, a most distinguished member of the eminent persons group, which I convened and have the distinct honor to serve as executive director, defined the task, ahead, when he said: “In confronting the challenge of ensuring peace and security on ghe Continent, we have come to the inescapable conclusion that there is an urgent need to address the issue of small arms trafficking and light weapons proliferation in Africa, because of the negative effects this development has had on the stability of many of our societies and countries.”
Declaring small arms proliferation one of Africa’s great tragedies Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo, Nigeria’s representative to the UN’s First Committee and a member of the group states: “Africa is bleeding from the humanitarian toll inflicted by small arms.” In his speech before this meeting Dr. Ogunbanwo rightly decries the fact that Africa has become a dumping ground for inexpensive surplus weapons.
In addressing himself on the root causes of small arms proliferation across Africa, William Eteki a Mboumoua, the former secretary-general of the OAU, current President of the Red Cross of Cameroon and distinguished member of the eminent persons group states: “S’est-on jamais demande pourquoi c’est surtout en Afrique que le SIDA prolifere? Il y’a une reponse: c’est la pauvrete. L’Afrique est l’ocean de la pauvrete.” Or, as former President Nelson Mandela points out, “the wars of Africa, like those in Europe and Asia, are not inevitable. They are caused by leaders who yield to the narrowest definition of self-interest and sacrifice their own citizens to their own greed, their ambition, their weakness.”
With small arms the weapons of choice and innocent civilians the victims, concrete and realistic steps in curtailing the proliferation of small arms are imperative. Such a clear and present danger to people in countries across Africa and around the world must be met by urgent, practical and comprehensive action. To this end, and with the 2001 UN conference in mind the eminent persons group, at its Washington convocation, May 2-4, has delineated elements of an international action agenda by calling for increased transparency, accountability and common standards in relation to transfers of small arms, commercial and non-commercial.
Agreeing with the UN secretary-general’s assessment that “the task of effective proliferation control is made far harder than it needs to be because of irresponsible behavior on the part of some States and lack of capacity by ohers, together with the shroud of secrecy that veils much of the arms trade,” the EPG calls for a cooperative regulatory approrach to focus on all aspects of small arms transfers. EPG calls for these weapons to be brought back into the control of the State and for the State itself being made accountable for its deeds. This essentially means empowering the state at one level, and using all tools available to induce more responsible behavior on its part, at another. The two approaches must be mutually reinforcing.
Highly supportive of the secretary-general’s call for the control of the proliferation of illicit weapons “as a necessary first step towards the non-proliferation of small arms,” the Eminent Persons Group views its efforts as complementary to and supportive of Mr. Annan’s resolute efforts to make meaningful progress in the near term in bringing SALW under effective control.
Towards that end, the EPG cooperative regulatory approach aims to promote a small arms control regime (SACR), broad in scope and global in reach. SACR should rest on at least two pillars: On the preventive side, such a regime should consist of (1) a Small Arms Register, (2) strengthened national controls, including import and export regulation, and (3) an international code of conduct. On the reduction side, SACT should consist of weapons collection programs, reconstruction programs and conflict prevention strategies.
One logical component of a small arms control regime would be a transparency measure, such as the creation of a UN Register on SALW. As an immediate, practical step towards an official register, one could usefully be set up on a private basis by competent NGOs. The Eminent Persons Group is starting consultations to this end with charitable foundations and NGOs. The support of your governments is wholeheatedly invited.
I shall focus my remarks today on recommendations of supply-side regulatory controls aimed to support the existence and enforcement of a Small Arms Control Regime.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
The problem of small arms and light weapons can be broken down into various components, providing more useful analytical units and an organizational framework for addressing the problem and proposing regulatory solutions.
The issues are first framed in terms of supply and demand. There would be no supply if there was no demand. Reciprocally, unrestricted supply amplifies the consequences of small arms related violence. Thus, supply and demand are intrinsically related. Proposing a holistic solution to the entire issue requires addressing both. However, it is not feasible, during the first stages of effort, to undertake such a large task. Rather, a foundation of smaller activities is more appropriate. From these programs a foundation for future success is built. Therefore, I shall examine only the supply side of the issue.
Controlling supply can also be broken down into two component parts: reducing existing stockpiles and preventing future supply. The former deals with removing existing guns from end-users. Such action is often contentious, as it deals with the grey area between weapons possessed for legitimate security reasons and those beyond pure security needs. The latter deals with preventing weapons, which have not yet been produced or have not yet been exported, from reaching their final destinations. This area also has a contentious nature, as many of the weapons are produced and exported legally.
This dilemma highlights another organizing concept: licit versus illicit weaponry. Licit weapons are those which are produced legally, usually with the knowledge and consent of the government, and are purchased and shipped to legitimate buyers. Licit activities includes government to government sales, private company to government sales, and government to government transfers, most often for legitimate security reasons.
Illicit weapons are those which are not produced or transferred in the above fashion. Illicit production includes arms made by unlicenced producers or production over and above the allowable licenses and limits. Illicit transfers are black market activities, in which weapon brokers, non-state actors, or states illegally move weapons to end-users. A major facet of illicit activity is that much of it involves once licit weapons. The legally produced weapons are often illegally redirected to different end-users. Also, legally obtained weapons that have become surplus after a conflict are re-circulated in an illegitimate manner.
The last organizing principle is the level of action and implementation. This describes who the actors are in efforts to regulate and control the supply of small arms. Most commonly, the state is the primary actor, as it is usually the political unit which suffers the greatest consequences of small arms. It is also the unit which is usually in the best position to implement and support counter-supply activities. Other levels of action and implementation are the regional and international communities. Both these levels can play a role in synthesizing, planning, funding, executing, and evaluating supply controlling regulations. The involvement of the various levels in a specific regulatory circumstance is dependent on the nature and circumstance of the instance, but usually, all three levels work in concert to address and solve the problem.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I shall now propose what regulatory measures states within a Small Arms Control Regime (SACR) can take to limit the supply of small arms and light weapons, with specific focus on how to prevent the future supply of such weapons. As the goal of these recommendations is to provide feasible solutions, recognition of the limitations detailed above factor heavily into the recommendations. In addition, regulatory actions embraced by the regime need to be undertaken by all member states of the regime. With this in mind, the following regulatory actions are recommended:
Declaration of the Problem and the State’s Role.
- Addressing Illicit Supply
Transparency of laws, regulations, and penalties
Encouraging and helping support existing laws and regulations
Standardization of laws, regulations, and penalties
Agreement on extradition and other inter-jurisdictional issues
- Addressing Licit Supply
Transperency of production, licensing, and export regulations
Creation of an International Registry for Small Arms and Light Weapons
Marking newly produced weapons
Weapons purchase security deposits
Declaration of the Problem and the State’s Role Before any type of regulatory control can have an effect, states in the regime need to openly recognize the destabilizing and destructive nature of small arms and light weapons. They also need to declare both that the problem is a global epidemic requiring international agreement and action and that the problem is created from the proliferation of illicit and licit weapons. This declaration should also include a statement that the state will pursue, in conjunction with other regime members, a course of action that acts to stem the supply of small arms. The major supplier states are integral at this stage, as their leadership in making these declarations will help persuade other states to do the same.
Addressing Illicit Supply
Transparency of laws, regulations, and penalties. Because the success of the regime is partially dependant upon careful measured steps aimed at both reducing the supply and creating a culture of success and cooperation, the first measures adopted by the regime cannot be overly controversial. The greatest potential for minimizing controversy is by dealing with illicit supply first. No state is going to speak against the need for controlling illicit supply.
The first step is transparency. Regime members will make available, to other members, their laws, regulations, and penalties associated with illicit supply. Specifics include any gun control laws, definitions of what constitutes illegal production and trafficking, legislatively mandated production limits, licensing and export guidelines, rules about to whom weapons can be provided, and the punitive actions taken against those who act against these laws and regulations. This acts as a deterrent and an inhibitor of the illicit flow.
This transparency serves multiple functions. First, it allows for all regime members to have a sense for the different types of regulations in effect. This facilitates a greater understanding of where others stand when negotiation of further regulatory action begins. Transparency also provides members with ideas about what types of regulations are effective, efficient, and innovative. The collective pool of possible solutions is greatly increased. Conversely, transparency helps illustrate which regulatory policies are not effective. Lastly, transparency will begin to build confidence among regime members, allowing an open flow of information between states, thus helping to facilitate future agreements.
Encouraging and helping support existing laws and regulations. Accompanying transparency of laws, regulations, and policies related to stemming illicit transfers should be the regime’s declaration that member states should make their best effort to enforce these rules. By joining the regime, and making their rules transparent, a state is accepting that their policies will be more visible and more open to scrutiny. This, in turn, will help stimulate a state to enforce their laws. However, the regime needs to further encourage enforcement. Leadership of the major suppliers is again crucial. If they are not effectively enforcing their laws, other states will not feel the pressure, or need, to enforce theirs. It needs to be recognized that enforcement of such laws requires resources that are not always available. In such situations, other regime members should recognize this and resist stigmatizing the state lacking resources. However, states who do have the necessary resources should not be given the same leeway if they choose not to strengthen enforcement based upon political or other similar justifications. Again, enforcement serves the practical role of confidence-building, as states will be more willing to work together if they see indications of another state’s commitment towards reducing the supply of small arms.
Standardization of laws, regulations, and penalties. Building upon the successes and cooperation accompanying transparency and encouragement of enforcement, regime members can work toward the first complex and difficult agreement – a base standardization of laws, regulations, and penalties related to illicit production and transfer/sales. This step will be difficult to coordinate and execute. It requires agreement of all regime members as to what constitutes an illicit act, how to best regulate the issue, and what should be done to those caught breaking the rules. Problem states, with different perspectives as to what is, and should be, illicit could stall these negotiations. But base standardization is necessary.
First, it reinforces commitment to the goals of the regime by asking each state to alter its domestic laws for the greater good. Second, when states enact coordinated and standardized policies, they mutually support each others’ efforts. The regime becomes more unified – a blanket without any holes. Doing this servers as a stiffer deterrent against illicit activity, as the penalties for doing so are increased, thus reducing the territory from which illegal producers and suppliers can comfortably operate.
Coordinating a base standardization will involve long deliberations. It will prove very difficult to have all states agree to the same set of policies. Because of the necessity for member states to alter domestically created laws, the best form for a standardization agreement is a legally binding treaty. It should be expected that the negotiations of standardization will be a political process, involving compromise and trade-offs, which will be replicated at the domestic, treaty-approving level. This should not deter action. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), despite the U.S. Senate’s rejection, is a good example. After the Treaty was signed, but before ratification and entering into force, states observed a moratorium on testing. A similar plan is envisioned for the Small Arms Control Regime. When individual agreements, contributing to overall standardization, are reached, they should be encouraged to be enacted and enforced prior to completion of the treaty as to have the maximum impact on curbing supply.
Additionally, standardization can be reached and enacted regionally prior to reaching international agreement. Regional standardization efforts would be among the best strategies for creating the norms, and eventually the full treaty. Regional associations are both more familiar to the specific needs of the region, as well as the feasibility and limitations of proscribed actions. As seen with the Western African moratorium on importing small arms, if several countries in a region agree that they want to commit to standardize laws, regulations, and penalties, they can generate momentum in their region for others to support the agreement. This, in effect, works to broaden the span of the agreement and assists the eventual treaty process by bringing blocs of nations to bear on undecided states, pressuring them to act. Also, using regional associations and blocs helps mitigate accusations of Western dominance in determining the standardized laws, regulations, and penalties.
Agreement on extradition and other inter-jurisdictional issues. In addition to coordinating and standardizing illicit supply regulations, regime members should agree to wide ranging extradition and other inter-jurisdictional issues. This acts to further constrain illicit weapons producers and brokers. Not only will they be limited in where they can operate from and export weapons through, they will face roughly equivalent punishment regardless of where they are caught. By eliminating a patchwork of varying definitions of crimes, and the penalties for them, illicit producers and brokers will not be able to play games with extradition laws. This effect will be heightened if some member states pass laws more restrictive and mandates penalties more punitive than those standardized in the regime. The agreement to extradite, and other similar inter-jurisdictional activity, will again serve to build confidence and cooperation between members states. A further step would be to internationalize the crimes, by making them crimes against humanity, and relegate jurisdiction to the International Court or the United Nations. When wide ranging cooperation on this topic is reached, it should be built into a binding international treaty.
Controlling the illicit supply is a logical starting point for the regime. No state is going to openly contradict the legitimacy of this objective, thus making it much more difficult to not act in concert with the rest of the regime. Achieving the above-listed steps will not be easy. It will require international support and the leadership of the major arms producers and exporters. Although varying in nature and level of difficulty in achieving them, the steps outline measures that will have a positive impact on curbing illicit supply. They will also ensure that a spirit of confidence and cooperation is built among states during the process. This confidence and cooperation will be vital in helping regulate the licit supply, an area, by definition, that will be harder to reach consensus upon.
Addressing Licit Supply
Since licit weapons frequently become illicit, a mechanism for reducing licit weapon production and transfers must also be part of the regime’s efforts. This is much more difficult area to work within because of the legitimate resistance that exporting states will have to regulate legal commercial activities. Small arms producers and exporters will have to be willing to curtail legal activity for the greater good of reducing supply. Convincing these states to undertake such restraint is going to be difficult. Therefore, it must be approached tactfully and progressively, using the same type of step-by-step plan as the regulation of illicit supply.
Transparency of production, licensing, and export regulations. Again, the first step is transparency. Members should lay open their relevant laws and regulations concerning the legal production, sale, and transfer of small arms. As before, transparency serves multiple functions. Other regime members can learn from this information what other states are doing to regulate their production, what they are doing to ensure that the sales are legitimate, and that exports are directed to the appropriate end-user. Transparency also serves to highlight which states have both the most innovative and weakest rules, highlighting potential models and possible trouble sources. These measure also serve to foster cooperation and to build confidence. Unlike the illicit supply regulatory efforts, it would not be prudent to expand the transparency agreement into a standardizing agreement, as that would have little to no chance to succeed and would, instead, have a detrimental effect on he regime. The nearly universal support for curbing illicit supply, which is the basis for starting standardization work in that area, does not extend to licit arms. Trying to negotiate or impose standardized rules and regulations for licit arms production and export would highlight the differences between regime states, and negate progress obtained by successful cooperation in other areas. However, this does not mean that member states cannot collaborate to find the most effective policies that mutually support each other. Regional cooperation, and some standardization, could greatly enhance the positive effects of transparency.
Creation of an International Registry for Small Arms and Light Weapons. The next step is the creation of an internationally based register for small arms. Built upon the model created by the U.N. Register for Conventional Weapons, this new document would include data provided by each member state. The information included would center on the number and types of small arms and light weapons possessed and produced by each member, and how many were exported and to where. The new register would be administered by the United Nations and depend upon th voluntary provision of data by each member state.
The transparency achieved by this register would serve multiple function. First, it furthers the confidence-building and cooperative spirit among regime members. The Register would provide research data and help member states develop new strategies based upon the results of the research. It would help reduce redirection of legal weapons to illegal end-users. By requiring exports to openly and specifically state for whom, and where, the weapons were destined, it is easier to verify that the correct delivery has been made to the appropriate recipient. In addition, it provides a benefit to member states, which have access to the Register’s data. States will be able to determine an element of another state’s military power based upon the reported data. This form of intelligence, available to regime members only, serves to better a member state’s national security concerns and interests and provides an incentive for joining the regime.
The register will have limitations. It is limited to only licit arms, as black market weapons, by definition, are not able to be quantified and reported by governments. Additionally, the success of the Conventional Weapons Register cannot be expected to be repeated. The weapons systems contained within that document are fewer in number and larger in size. Therefore, there are fewer weapon systems to count and report, and those systems are much more difficult to conceal than small arms. And, it can be expected that some states will cheat and not report all their legal production, for whatever reason. Despite these limitations, however, the increased transparency in production, transparency, and destination remains useful.
Marking newly produced weapons. Because a substantial portion of legally sold or transferred weapons end up being illicitly circulated, an international agreement should be reached on marking weapons. This agreement would require corporate producers to mark the weapons produced with a permanent marker stating a specific serial number, who made the weapon, where it was made, when it was made, and its destination. The agreement, however, is dependant that weapons could be successful marked in a way that is difficult to remove or distort. If this type of technology is not available, then energy and effort should not be expended in this area.
The marking will serve to accomplish three missions. First, marking acts as a deterrent against redirecting the weapon into illicit circles. Although there is no way to prevent the weapons from being redirected to the black market after the initial, legal sale and delivery has been verified, marking does deter this type of action. If the weapon can be identified, there is a greater likelihood that it can be traced, thus exposing the illicit broker to a greater possibility of prosecution. Similarly, states redirecting licit weapons will also be discouraged from undertaking this type of action because of similar logic. The second mission is that marking allows future analysts to better track the flow of weapons, identify the quantities of illicitly produced weapons, and infer how licit weapons are introduced into the illicit realm. Third, marking the weapons makes it easier to track inventories and provide information supporting a small arms register, or other forms of weapon production transparency. This can also function as a certification tool: if marked weapons legally sold or transferred to a specific recipient, and are later found to have been re-circulated on the black market, the recipient has to account for their redistribution activities or face weapon sales sanctions from regime members.
Marking weapons is not designed to be a process that tracks individual users to whom the weapons were legally sold. Such a database is both unnecessary and not feasible. None of the purposes listed above require that individual owners be tracked after they purchase weapons. Open declaration that such tracking will not be part of the regime will also help allay fears of firearm lobbies in democratic states. These lobbies pose difficult obstacles to ratifying regulations proposed by the regime and efforts to minimize the strength of their position, such as this declaration, should be employed whenever possible.
Weapons purchase security deposits. The last recommendation for regulating licit arms is to institute a type of security deposit for weapons purchases. The regime states would agree to a regulation that if an end-user, either a broker or state, wants to purchase a stock of small arms or light weapons, they need to first provide a security deposit. The deposit is only released back to the buyer when it had been verified the arms have been delivered to the designated recipient. This concept would be best presented to regime members as a tool to ensure that licit weapons are not illegally redirected. Major suppliers could potentially be the biggest supporter of this initiative if it is viewed as a program that helps preserve the viability of licit sales.
Among the issues that would have to be resolved is who the holder of the security deposit would be. It could either be the seller of the weapons or it could be a third party, most likely a international organization such as the United Nations. Another issue to be resolved during negotiations is how large of a deposit it should be. To make the deposit a useful tool for ensuring delivery to the correct, and certified end-user, the amount deposited has to be large enough to result in a substantial loss if the weapons are redirected. These issues should be able to be successfully negotiated in an environment where member states have effectively worked together on other issues, and believe in the viability of such a system.
The key to regulating the supply of licit weapons is to recognize the inherent legality and necessity associated with them. The production and export of these weapons is important for both producer, for profit, and recipient, for security. Any attempt to ban or overly restrict the supply will be met with strong resistence. For this reason, none of the recommendations ask member states to overly restrict their operations. Rather, they are agreements that prevent the redirection of legal arms to illicit transfers and end-users. This effort can be framed in terms of helping the legal market, thus encouraging the primary suppliers, who have the most to lose from licit supply regulation, to join an effort to control the supply. However, it needs to be reiterated that overstepping the acceptable efforts can negatively impact the regime and cause important member states to break ranks. This jeopardizes the practicality of the control efforts and the feasibility of future supply regulation.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Regulation of small arms and light weapons, via an international regime, will help minimize the death and destruction caused by such weapons. The regulation will address both licit and illicit weapons, engaging the international community on a range of different levels – state, region, and international. Most of the regulatory actions will affect supplier states, of which the most prominent are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The increased security, safety, and stability reaped from regulated supply will be most prominent in the developing countries of the world.