Why did Rome destroy both Carthage and Corinth in the same year, and what does this tell us about her imperial ambitions? Carthage and Corinth were two very important cities in antiquity. Carthage was previously a major trading nation with strong ambitions for overseas expansion. This imperialistic ambition had previously led it to previous conflicts with Rome in the Punic wars and indeed had almost led them to Rome’s doorstep. Naturally, the Romans were apprehensive of Carthage despite their much-diminished power. Corinth was of course a significant Greek city and also a centre of anti-Roman feeling. The Romans had a long history of conflict with the Greeks, notably Philip V of Macedonia’s battles. Macedonia had also previously allied itself with Carthage when the Punic wars were at their height so Rome associated them strongly in their mistrust. The Greeks had a notable independent streak and as such the Romans had previously left them fairly autonomous though they did not flinch at fighting wars for plunder in the Hellenistic region. Their destruction in 146 was a definite show of Rome’s imperial ambitions in that she was willing to destroy potential enemies when they were weak. They were also used as an example to the rest of the world to show them how Rome treated her enemies. In the mid-second century when both Carthage and Corinth were destroyed, Rome had previously been involved in long drawn-out campaigns in impoverished Spain. These were not profitable and little success was achieved. Recruitment for these campaigns had proved especially difficult in 151according to Harris. This would not be a problem in a conflict with the hated Carthaginians. They had eventually gained control of much of Spain, but the Senate was apathetic about it. As such, a new theatre of war was sought: one that would be both profitable and swift. Roman military strength needed to be paraded to the rest of the world. Of course, plunder was very important as war was fought to make profit and gain prestige. In the end, the new theatres of war almost presented themselves. The Hellenistic world was almost constantly involved in political wrangling. The origins of this go back to the original formation of the Greek civilisation where it had grown up as a series of independent city states which each had the title of polis. This had meant that integration was low and each city was not willing to be subjugated by another. This had created the various kingdoms after the splitting of Alexander’s empire and the various factions achieving independence in mainland Greece – notably Macedonia, the Aetolian league and the Achaean league. This had played into Rome’s hands due to its alliance system as it could achieve expansion by allying itself with one faction in an internal conflict – a favourite tactic of the Romans. Many battles had been fought, leaving Greece nominally under Roman influence though it was not yet established as a province. The particular conflict that led to the destruction of Corinth was Sparta’s decision to seek secession from the league. The Achaeans were naturally opposed to losing such an important city from the league. Rome’s Senate was appealed to. Previously, in the winter of 150/149 the Senate had formally recognised Sparta’s place in the league and as such the Achaeans expected Rome’s support. Unexpectedly for the Achaeans, Rome sent an embassy under L. Aurelius Orestes to the Achaean League in 147 to demand the detachment from the league of Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Oetaean, Heraclea and Arcadian Orchomenos. Only Sparta and perhaps Heraclea had any wish to secede (Harris 241-243). This would have meant the total de-construction of the league and naturally the Achaeans were opposed to this move. That is not to say that all of the Achaeans wanted war, many of them were willing to give a lot of ground for peace, but in the end war was inevitable as Rome had the clear intention of waging war in Greece. In 148 in clear disobedience to Rome’s instructions, the league waged a short war against the rebellious state of Sparta. This did not directly lead to Rome waging war, but the demands to detach Corinth, Argos and Orchomenos were a challenge that they knew that the Achaeans almost certainly would not accept. It took until mid 147 for Rome to decide that direct rule in Macedonia was now required. War was thus launched leading to the decisive end in the total destruction of Corinth. This war was waged because Rome decided that they could no longer make money from Greece by occasional plunder from occasional wars and as such needed to impose direct rule and heavily tax the populace. The fact that the Achaean war occurred simultaneously with the war with Carthage was no coincidence. These two were former allies and both particularly rich places, especially when compared with the Spanish lands that had been the prior principal theatre of war. Glory and triumphs were required for the generals and the state and Achaea and Carthage were the places to obtain them. Carthage had of course severely threatened Rome under Hannibal’s leadership when much of Italy was under Carthaginian rule. In the end, Scipio Africanus had forced Carthage to surrender completely and in effect be officially inferior to Rome, having to make indemnity payments as well as surrendering all overseas territory. Carthage had no choice but to accept this. The payments were a good source of income to Rome, but according to the treaty they were only to last for fifty years and then the income from this once mighty nation would cease. Carthage was still hated by the Romans for the Punic wars and as such any excuse to fight them would have been taken if it were not for the tax imposed on them. Despite the heavy taxation imposed by the Romans, Carthage had managed to achieve some prosperity. The trading was being remarkably successful and the large quantities of good African land enabled them to recover. Cato had visited in 153 and informed the Romans of this. Cato’s reports had led the Senate to wish to wage war on Carthage, but they lacked sufficient reason to do so. Rome was growing increasingly anxious about this though in truth they had little to fear. When the tax ended, Rome started planning a war to completely destroy the still-hated Carthage. This would ensure much plunder and money. Rome had an ally next door to Carthage in Numidia. In fact, Numidia was an unreliable ally, having switched allegiance often during the first two Punic wars. The king, Massinissa, had imperialist ambitions and had already snatched much land from under Carthage’s influence. Carthage was naturally upset about this, but let it continue as Rome would not allow them to wage war on Numidia. When Massinissa took more of the land belonging to Carthage, Carthage took matters into her own hands and fought back. The Romans had already encouraged Massinissa to do just this. The treaty forbade this and so Rome was technically justified in making strong demands on Carthage, though not morally so. The demands were unprecedented in the ancient world. Demanding that the whole city be moved at least ten miles away from the coast was a task that was impossible. No civilisation would ever willingly destroy its own temples and religious places; Rome knew this and the demands were a challenge. Carthage made serious attempts to avoid war, handing over almost their entire arsenal to appease Rome. This did not work. Rome persisted in making demands and had already been preparing for war. Carthage recognised this and started a rapid re-armament program. In 149 Rome invaded, using the defector city of Utica as its continental base. The siege lasted a long time until 146. Glory was achieved for the consuls Manilius and Censorinus as well as Scipio Aemilianus. The Carthaginians were capable of defending their city with admirable aptitude and this has led some historians to doubt whether Rome really intended war, as they would have known that the Carthaginians were numerous enough to put up a credible defence of their home. They also point to the benefits for the aristocracy of the Senate of the end of exports from Carthage. This is incorrect as the Romans had this knowledge but were confident and truly hated the African nation. Much was to be gained by war; the cost was not going to be very high as the Carthaginians were bound to capitulate sooner rather than later. The Third Punic War was correctly described by Harris (234) as a ruthless attack by an overwhelmingly more powerful state on one of its neighbours. The motivation was both for the finance and for the fact that they hated Carthage. This event is a clear indicator of Rome’s imperial ambitions, as otherwise they would have had no wish to wage war on such a relatively weak nation despite their history. She should have been content with the seizure of the war-machines. The concurrence of the destruction of Corinth and Carthage actually shows that Rome was not particularly hateful of Carthage. Rome had no particular reason to Corinth as the reason that she had to detest Carthage. Therefore Rome destroyed Corinth and Carthage as examples to the rest of the world as well as the local populace that she was all-powerful and an example of the treatment rebellious peoples would receive. The imperial ambitions are clearly demonstrated in the concurrence as they proved that they could easily and decisively combat on two fronts against ‘formidable’ enemies and still triumph gloriously. If Rome was truly non-imperialistic at this stage, one would have waited for the other to end even if they had really had a need to fight. Both nations were no true immediate threat to Rome and so there was no need to fight both simultaneously. Overall, Rome destroyed Carthage and Corinth not just because she was determined to show the potential rival nations as well as the unhappy subjects that she was all-powerful and would not tolerate dissent but primarily to expand territory for the expansion of Roman influence, i.e. the desire for imperial expansion. Financial and reasons and the desire for prestige were also important though the concurrence of the two wars indicate that these were less significant than the imperialistic tendencies of the Roman Senate and the people. Total destruction was not necessary though the hatred for Carthage is understandable and the demolition of Corinth does merit some sympathy as it was the main bastion of Achaean resistance as many important Roman envoys had suffered derision and embarrassment at the hands of the Corinthians resident there. Bibliography E. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (California 1984) 514-28 W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Mid-Republican Rome (Oxford 1987) 234-44 J. A. North, The Development of Roman Imperialism, (JRS 71 1981) 1-9 S. Lancel, Carthage, A History (Oxford 1995) 396-427 Livy, summaries of Books 49-52 Appian, The Punic Wars, 67-136 Polybius 36.2-6, 9, 38.1-4 Pausanius 11.7-17 Velleius Paterculus 1.12-13