Geza Jeszenszky is Hungary’s ambassador to the United States. A
historian, he was the country's minister for foreign affairs from 1990
to 1994.

By Geza Jeszenszky
Securing the peace is often as difficult as waging the war. While
there are encouraging signs that NATO has won its campaign to stop the
brutal mistreatment of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, a lasting peace
cannot come to the Balkans unless all interested parties take steps to
prevent new ethnic conflicts from erupting. Kosovo is not the only place
where such a threat exists; as the only NATO country that has a border
with Yugoslavia, perhaps no member of the alliance understands this
better than ours.
On the Yugoslav side of our common border, in the province called
Vojvodina, nearly 350,000 ethnic Hungarians have been virtual hostages
for the past several months--as both the Yugoslav authorities and some
local Serbs have constantly reminded them. As a ``NATO minority,'' these
Hungarians are a defenseless and easy target for Serbian anger over the
NATO bombing and the likely setback in Kosovo. Seeing the plight of
Kosovar Albanians, the Hungarians and other non-Serbs living in the
Vojvodina understandably fear that they might be the next victims.
History provides justification for their worries.
Yugoslavia, put together at the end of World War I, has always
included a large variety of nationalities that spoke several languages,
used two alphabets and belonged to various religious faiths and using
two alphabets. Its centralized government, dominated by Serbs, failed to
win the loyalty of the citizens. The country's post-1945 Communist
dictator, Tito, apparently learned from the mistakes of his predecessors
and reconstructed Yugoslavia along federal lines. Sensitive to Serb
national sentiment, he did not make Kosovo a separate republic, but
instead granted it wide autonomy, a kind of Home Rule. A similar status
was created in the north for the Voivodina, which prior to 1918 was part
of the thousand-year-old Kingdom of Hungary.
That territory suffered a kind of ``ethnic cleansing" between 1456
and 1718, when it was a war zone in which Hungary fought the invading
Ottoman (Turkish) Empire and most of the Hungarian population was killed
or deported to be sold as slaves. Liberated from the Ottomans, Southern
Hungary (today's Vojvodina) underwent a spontaneous and organized
repopulation that made it the most colorful ethnic mosaic of Europe. In
1910, its 1.3 million inhabitants included 30.2 percent Hungarians, 25.2
percent Greek Orthodox Serbs, 23 percent Germans ("Swabians"), 10
percent Roman Catholic South Slavs (Croats, Bunjevci), and 10 percent
other nationalities (Slovaks, Romanians, Rusyns).
But 70 years of deliberate colonization drives, expulsions and even
mass killings (in 1944, during World War II) significantly changed the
Vojvodina's ethnic composition. By 1991 the proportion of Hungarians had
been reduced to 16.9 percent, the Serb population had increased to 56.8
percent, and the Germans had been completely ``cleansed." In the last
few years, another 250,000 Serbs (refugees from Croatia and Bosnia) were
settled in the province, and 50,000 Hungarians have left, making today's
Serb percentage even greater.
It is unrealistic to expect the victims of war crimes and reprisals
to live happily with their perpetrators. But if the international
community does not want to redraw borders and create ethnically
homogeneous states through massive population transfers, it is necessary
to find ways for the continued peaceful co-existence of the various
ethnic communities. That can be achieved only by
decentralization--giving extensive administrative self-government to
smaller units having a special geographic, ethnic and economic
character, based on the Swiss model of national cantons.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban pointed out during the recent
NATO summit in Washington that NATO's military intervention in Kosovo
was meant to prevent the conflict from spreading further. So if and when
military actions stop, a Balkans conference should be convened to
discuss the widest possible range of regional issues, including the
security of the Vojvodina.
We in Hungary are confident that the Vojvodina will not become the
next scene of mass violence. Serbia has a strong interest to remain on
speaking terms with Hungary, its window to the outside world, where
essential lines of communication and access routes run. But there is
also a very real danger that, if and when a settlement is reached over
Kosovo, the multiethnic Vojvodina may be overlooked--just as Kosovo was
overlooked when the Dayton accord ended the hostilities in Bosnia.
What are the ``ironclad guarantees" needed in the Vojvodina? All
non-Serbs and also many Serbs who live in that province want the
restoration of the autonomy that was abolished ten years ago, along with
Kosovo's. Under a system of cultural autonomy, non-Serbs would regain
the right to use their native language and alphabet in public life, as
well as in schools and institutions of higher education. Most
importantly, if these measures are to remain more than empty promises,
the non-Serbs need guarantees in the form of an international presence,
such as a observer mission from the Organization of Security and
Cooperation in Europe. With such a presence the tragedies of Bosnia and
Kosovo could have been avoided.
After the war in Croatia eight years ago, when I was Hungary's
foreign minister, I wrote to all the interested parties and leaders
about how to address some of the problems in the Balkans. In my letter,
dated Dec. 8, 1991, I made the following appeal to the European
Community and to Cyrus Vance, then representing the Secretary-General of
the U.N.: ``The U.N. should immediately try to send peace-keeping forces
not only to the territory of Croatia but also to those areas of
Yugoslavia where there is still a fragile peace: to Bosnia and to the
two formerly autonomous provinces, Voivodina and Kosovo. Without that a
wholesale massacre may occur.''
As of now, even with the Yugoslav parliament's vote to accept NATO's
conditions for ending the bombing, we are far from discussing the best
post-war legal arrangements for the Balkans. Hungary, although one of
the NATO's newest members, has proved a loyal ally in NATO's fight.
Twenty-four F-18 Hornet fighter planes have been flying sorties from the
Taszar air base in southern Hungary, and a number of tankers have been
deployed at Budapest's civilian airport. We sent a medical team and
military personnel to help the refugees in Albania. We have done all
this because we are fully aware of the dangers represented by the
policies of the present Belgrade government.
But a democratic Yugoslavia is not a distant dream. By complying with
the demands of the international community, the Serbs can ensure that
the return of peace to the entire country and reconstruction can start
immediately. Both the European Union and the United States have outlined
plans for the economic stabilization of Southeastern Europe, from the
Black Sea to the Adriatic. Serbian democrats in Montenegro, in the
Vojvodina, in exile and also in Belgrade are eager to rejoin a
cooperative Europe and to heal the wounds.
Let us hope the Serbs see that the door is open and walk through.