The first part of this essay is a broad overview of the various ways in which different tendencies among Muslims relate to the other along with a brief comment on the ideological function of each. This relationship is discussed within a broader context of liberalism and globalization. Such a context problematizes overt religious or ideological proselytism when the object to which one is invited is often non-material (faith, God, salvation, etc.) but lauds more obviously similar covert activity when the objects are clearly material in the form of market commodities. The second part of this article advocates an alternative to the form of proselytization that regards the other as being in various states of damnation. The conclusion calls for intra-religious and extra-religious "proselytization" based on liberative praxis aimed at creating a world of socio-economic and gender justice where all human beings are free to explore and attain their unique fullness, intended with their creation.
Despite the risk of essentializing Muslims, after locating myself within the debate on Muslims and the other, I nevertheless, state the three main generalized assumptions which underpin my own understanding of Muslim responses to the question of engaging the other and the humanum.
I am a South African Muslim, belonging to a small minority community that have survived, lived and thrived among the other for three hundred and forty years. My years in Pakistan as a student of Islamic theology alerted me to the oppression of Christians in a Muslim country and my involvement in the South African struggle for liberation alerted me to the need to value religiousness and spirituality in the other (Esack, 1997). The challenges of poverty and Aids that face Africa particularly, and those of consumerism and the ongoing ravaging of our planet and its peoples by the forces of a faceless God, the Market, in general, lead me to believe that my South African Muslim appreciation of the other serves two purposes: a) It enables others to see how some Muslims are dealing with the challenges of pluralism in a world of injustice and b), it offers my Muslim co-religionists elsewhere a possible theological path whereby one can be true to one’s faith and to the voice of one’s conscience in a world where virtue is clearly not the monopoly of one’s co-religionists, nor vice a monopoly of the other.
Other than my own socio-historical context, the following assumptions about Muslims underpin my appreciation of how we relate to the other:
First, the overwhelming majority of Muslims, irrespective of the nature and extent, or even complete absence, of their religiosity, have an indomitable belief that the world would be a better place if people followed the religion of Islam. Comments such as "He's such an intelligent guy; how come he's not a Muslim?" or "Desmond Tutu is such a decent person, if only he were a Muslim" are common among Muslims. The notion of Islam as a given and all else as aberration is both based on and supported by a hadith (tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad that "every person is born in a natural state, it is the parent which makes the child a Christian or a Jew." The fact that Christianity and Judaism are portrayed as non-natural religions leads to the refrain that Islam is al-din al-fitrah, “the natural - also understood as ‘the obvious’’ – religion”.
Second, the notion that the "world is hungry for Islam; if only we were better examples" is widespread among Muslims. They are, therefore, genuinely surprised when encountering someone who has studied Islam and not embraced it. When, for example, they first encounter a non-Muslim person interested in Islam they are generally patient and happy to assist. After an extended period when they realize that such interest is not transforming the researcher into a searcher ready to discover Islam then, for most Muslims, there is only one conceivable motive for that person's: "He or she is learning about us in order to undermine us". This contributes to the widespread suspicion and antagonism, which lurks underneath the polite surface of inter-religious and even academic forums towards the professional non-Muslim Islamicist.
Third, much of conscious religiously motivated interaction with the other is based on the assumption that there is a stable "self" or "own community" with a package of essential and unchanging values, principles and beliefs which stand in contrast with the other equally stable, even if invariably “lesser”, other.The presentation of this package is intended to destabilize the other and, upon this instability, open the other to embrace this new package.
Muslims, of course, engage non-Muslims all the time and at different
levels. In this essay I am concerned with consciously religiously based
forms of engagement, where the responses to the other are on the basis
of that putative or actual otherness. [2]
This level of engagement is usually the terrain of those described as “Islamic fundamentalists” who often come from a professional background and have a more pronounced ideological thrust. These groups, which include the JordanianHizb al-Tahrir, the Egyptian Gama al-Islamiyyah, and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), follow, a program aimed at destroying the political structures of kufr (lit. ‘rejection’, i.e., rejection of Islam) and replacing these with an Islamic state. While always welcoming converts to“true” Islam, their proselytizationwork is in large measure aimed at other Muslims in preparation for the eventual showdown with kufr. A small segment of this persuasion regard the other in general and more particularly, the ideological leadership of the other, as beyond redemption. They would, therefore, either resort to withdrawing from “kafir society” along the lines of al-Takfir wa'l-Hijra or engage in active, often armed combat, against the agents of kufr such as the GIA. In these circles hostage-taking would be justified as would the death of civilians in the pro-active jihad against kufr.
Much has been written on the subject of religious fundamentalism as a response to modernity (Lawrence, 1989; Marty & Appleby 1991 pp vii-xiii). Whatever the varying sociological circumstances in different contexts, many of these Muslims feel moved and/or sustained by their religious sensitivities to seek refuge in what they believe is the ultimate certainty; an ahistorical and reified Islam. The following are some of the factors responsible for this: a) the unfettered global hegemony of the United States of America and the many agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund - viewed as mere adjuncts of neo-colonialism -, b) the virtual powerlessness of Muslim states and their seeming collaboration in their own subjugation, c) the moral - particularly sexual - flexibility of modernity and d) the intellectual/philosophical tentativeness of post-modernity.
While many of the activists at this level are familiar with the discourse and utilize the instruments of modernity such as the Internet, they lack an appreciation of how inextricably interwoven the fate of humankind had really become. Thus they still believe that one can carve out pieces of liberated territories as dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam) freed from foreign videos, CNN and mini-skirts. More pertinently, they are indifferent to the attempts of numerous other entities throughout the world who share their concern and disdain for way globalization is becoming synonymous with McDonaldization, with the hypocritical and self-centred nature of USA foreign policy and the lack of political freedom and abundance of repression in their own societies.
In this lack of recognition of shared concerns lies both their greatest
weakness and strength. As isolated entities, they are destined to remain
on the margins of humankind occasionally bursting to the fore in acts of
raw terror such as the massacre of tourists at Luxor or ofcovert terror
such as the closing of medical care facilities for women in Afghanistan
under the Taliban. Equally, as isolated entities, they can march forth
undisturbed by questions of the humanness of the other which will confront
them as soon as they discover a commonness in objectives to create a more
just world.
The latter form of engagement is particular meaningful to Muslims who
feel disempowered through colonialism and the seeming religio-cultural
hegemony of “the West”. It is thus not unusual to find up to fifty video
tapes of Deedat in a single Muslim home in Britain or Abu Dhabi. The compulsion
appears to be “what we are losing daily in the world of economic and cultural
power can be compensated for by our victories in religious slanging matches”.
The number of Muslims, usually individuals rather than groups, engaged in such dialogue with the other are few and far between and where they are participants in organized forums then these have generally been organized by Christians. At this level there is some appreciation of the other, recognition of some worth attached to them and of the need to nurture this worth.(“These are good people; they would be even better if they were Muslim”). While there is an explicit acknowledgment of the duty of proclaiming “the good news” or “da'wah” the participants acknowledge the need to learn about the other for effective religious tolerance or proselytization. A number of Muslims initially enter such dialogues under the misunderstanding that their (usually) Christian counterparts are engaged in conversation because of the wavering nature of their own faith and, therefore, present fertile grounds for their own da'wah.
While many participants in inter-religious dialogue start at this level, the often ongoing nature as well as the unpredictability of the outcome of any truly listening experience ensure that, for some at least, the perception of the other changes and, along with it, their objectives in the dialogue. As for those who were incapable of listening, they normally just disappear after a few meetings, dismissing the exercise as “a waste of time”.
At a more scholarly level there are a number of Muslim intellectuals who form an intrinsic part of the ‘dialogue scene’. Some of them such as Jamal Badawi, the Toronto-based scholar, and to Mahmoud Ayoub, the Lebanese scholar based in Philadelphia, believe that exposing the other to the intellectual face of Islam, represented by them, is itself an invitation to Islam. There is little awareness among them that this very intellectualizing of the face of Islam means a transformation of the product and is, in effect, a denial of an essentialist Islam.
Despite the seeming objective nature of this approach, it is still essentially characterized by an assumption of superiority. First, it is not atypical to find suggestions in these circles that the Christians or Jewish partners - the “noble savage” - is actuallyy a muslim/Muslim, even if he or she is unaware of it. This notion of the “anonymous Muslim” assumes that goodness is synonymous with, even exclusive to, Islam. Many Muslims, when coming face to face with goodness, cannot relate this with integrity to the person as a person or as a Christian. Instead, they feel compelled to go through the initial act of making him or her “one of us”.
While the activities of this tendency are usually characterized by political
non-involvement, it does often support moderate political action in support
of “righteous causes”. At other times, those involved at this level may
also co-operate with each other in seemingly benign activities such as
tree planting or literacy campaigns. Seldom, if ever, in the forefront
of challenging unjust socio-political systems or practices, they often
play a significant role in the agenda of national states struggling to
fuse diverse cultural religious identities into a broader national one.
This scholarly and “objective” approach to the other is the position of a growing number of individual Muslim intellectuals such as Mohammed Arkoun, and Ebrahim Moosa who eschew any hint of a da'wah, however subtle, agenda. These individuals, often working on the margins of Muslim society, nonetheless, embrace a calling: “the creation of a new space of intelligibility and freedom" (Arkoun, 20). Utilizing this space, they may embrace ideals of finding areas of commonality. In many ways this approach is a classic liberal one which values individual freedom and space, and the intellectual quest for their own sake.
What is often ignored at this level is that liberal ideology is not without its hegemonic interests. Leonard Binder has raised the pertinent question whether the critique of Muslim liberals has not been a “form of false consciousness, an abject submission to the hegemonic discourse of the dominant secular Western capitalist and imperialist societies, an oriental orientalism, or whether it was and is practical, rational and emancipatory” (1988, 5).
The call for “knowledge as a sphere of authority to be accepted and respected unanimously, a knowledge independent of ideologies, able to explain their formation and master their impact” (Arkoun 1988, 69), does little other than further the ideological interest within which such knowledge is located and formulated. Knowledge, like any other social tool, while it can be critical, is never neutral. As Segundo has argued, “every hermeneutic entails conscious or unconscious partisanship. It is partisan in its viewpoint even when it believes itself to be neutral and tries to act that way” (1991, 25).
While this group of scholars make for the most interesting partners on the dialogue circuit, I do not share the enthusiasm of those who insist on letting a million thoughts bloom for the fun of diversity and pluralism, a kind of social venture which often claims to not take side because “this is the perfect ideology for the modern bourgeois mind. Such a pluralism makes a genial confusion in which one tries to enjoy the pleasures of difference without ever committing oneself to any particular vision of resistance, liberation and hope”(Tracy 1987, 90).
A second area of concern with dialogue at this level is that it is essentially
confined to those whom Muslims regard as “People of the Book”, i.e., Jews
and Christians. In some ways, this reflects the relative qur'anic gentleness
towards the People of the Book, the current politico-economic hegemony
and the social location of these thinkers. However, I believe that this
preference also betrays a more serious prejudice, a subject to which I
will later revert: that people of the Fourth World, often adherents of
“pagan” traditions, are of little or no consequence.
We live in a world where individuals are less and less formed by the wealth of their traditions and their own cultures. Rather, it is one where the Market is so all-pervasive that all of our so-called freedom of choices are steered into particular directions - all of them ultimately serving the Market and impoverishing the human spirit. While one must guard against essentializing any community and culture, even more so against glossing over the multifarious injustices, ranging from xenophobia to homophobia, often intrinsic to these, the truth is that globalization and the celebration of individual liberty are not ideologically neutral. For me, as a Muslim theologian, this represents the single most significant ideological and spiritual difficulty. I can only truly be who I am in my unceasing transforming self within the context of personal freedom. In today's world this freedom is intrinsically connected to all the ideological baggage of the modern industrial state along with the Coca colonization of global consciousness through a process of relentless MacDonaldization. In other words, my freedom has been acquired within the bosom of capitalism along with all of its hegemonic designs over my equally valued cultural and religious traditions.
While many 'enlightened' Muslim find Deedat's video cassette peddling embarrassing, or door knocking by the Tablighi Jama'ah irritating, there is little awareness the proselytization of the global Taliban of the Market, every millimeter as ruthless, tenacious and dogged as their Afghanistan counterparts. Thus I am afraid of the other which, for me, is not another community or other individuals but one which has entered my consciousness, the intangible and faceless market forces, my eternal companion in my back pocket in the form of my credit cards.
The dominant public Muslim discourse, of course, rather simplistically reduces this problem to Islam versus the West or Muslims versus Christians and Jews. The underlying assumption in this defensive posturing that the other is 'the enemy'. In Qur'an, Liberation and Pluralism, (Oxford: Oneworld, 1997), I have argued that for those who struggle to survive on the margins of society, living under the yoke of oppression and struggling with those from other religions who are equally oppressed in the hope of liberation, a pluralism of splendid intellectual neutrality or gentle co-existence within unjust socio economic or personal relationships are not dignified options.
We need to ask what are the causes being advanced by our commitment to pluralism and shared existence. When 'objective' scholars fail or refuse to recognize that all of human responses and refusals to respond are located within a socio-political context then 'understanding' and 'living together', de facto, become an extension of the dominant ideological status quo. When such a status quo is characterized by injustice and exploitation, the reduction of people to commodities and death by starvation and over-consumption, then the pursuit of understanding is itself reduced to co-option to strengthen the overall ideological framework of the powerful. I am thus arguing for a theological and concrete engagement with the Other which recognizes the intrinsic human worth of each person and which takes place within the context of a struggle to transform our world into a more just one.
Second, the nature of the world wherein we live today and the potency of our weapons of destruction mean that the fate of all of humankind is irretrievably interwoven. There is no selective existence for any particular community. The cake of humankind is beyond unbaking; we cannot now separate the sugar from the flour or the water. We sink or swim together. For people committed to the noblest in their religious heritage though, the question is not merely one of the survival of our own. Today the survival of the self depends on the survival of the other as much as the survival of the human race depends on the survival of the eco- system. We have gone beyond "no man is an island unto himself" to "no entity is an island unto itself". A vague and sentimental sense of attachment to the clan is not going to see us through the turbulent future of a world threatened by the gradual re-emergence of Nazism, environmental devastation, a triumphalist New World Order based on the economic exploitation of the Two-Third World, a world where women continue to just survive on the margins of dignity.
There are many ways of dying. There is, however, only one way to live;
through discovering what the self and other and their ever changing nature
are really about, to understand how much of the other is really reflected
in us and to find out what it is that we have in common in the struggle
to a world of justice and dignity for all the inhabitants of the earth.
To do so requires transcending theological categories of self and other
that were shaped in and intended for another era and context.
There are several reasons for the pre-occupation with this category. First, since most of the mushrikun(lit.'associanists, i.e., the 'pagans' who associated other deities with God) converted to Islam after the liberation of Mecca (AD 630) , at the earliest stages of its history, Jews and Christians were essentially the communities that Muslims and their jurisprudence had to deal with. Second, the historical encounter over territory (both ideological and geographical) was largely between Muslims and Christians. Third, in the modern period, as Muslims are struggling to overcome the divisions of the past and to find avenues of co-existing and co-operating with those of other faiths, they find it theologically easier to focus on a category which the Qur'an seems to have some sympathy with. Fourth, the present pre-eminence of the Western world - itself a product of a predominantly Christian and, to a lesser extent, Jewish heritage - in the fields of technology, science and politics, requires some Muslim focus on relations with the People of the Book, even only as one way of coming to terms with the fact of this pre-eminence or domination.
There are a number of problems in focusing on the People of the Book as a distinct contemporary religious group in the belief that this is the same referent as that in the Qur'an. The qur'anic position towards the People of the Book and even its understanding as to who constitutes the People of the Book went through several phases. There is, however, agreement that the term has always applied to the Jews and/or Christians whom Muhammad encountered during his mission. The Qur'an naturally dealt only with the behaviour and beliefs of those of the People of the Book with whom the early Muslim community were in actual social contact.
To employ the qur'anic category of People of the Book in a generalized manner of simplistic identification of all Jews and Christians in contemporary society is to avoid the historical realities of Medinan society as well as the theological diversity among both earlier and contemporary Christians and Jews. To avoid this unjust generalization, therefore, requires a clear idea from their sources of beliefs, as well as their many nuances, which characterized the various communities encountered by the early Muslims. Given the paucity of such extra-qur'anic knowledge, one would either have to abandon the search for a group with corresponding dogma today or shift one's focus to an area of practice and attitudes rather than dogma.
In practice, the latter option had always been exercised. In none of the disciplines of exegesis, Islamic history and/or legal scholarship have Muslims known anything approximating consensus about the identity of the People of the Book. There was even disagreement as to which specific groups of Christians and Jews comprised the People of the Book. At various times, Hindus, Buddhists, Zoroastrians, Magians and Sabeans were included among or excluded from the People of the Book depending on the theological predilections of the Muslim scholars and, perhaps more importantly, the geo-political context wherein they lived. In all of these attempts to extend the boundaries of the qur'anic People of the Book, Muslim scholars, implicitly acknowledged the situation-boundedness of the qur'anic categories.
A recognition of the need of solidarity of all oppressed people in an unjust and exploitative society requires going beyond the situation-bound categories of the Qur'an. I do not wish to suggest that there are no Christians who, for example, believe in the concept of a triune deity. Justice, however, requires that no one be held captive to categories which applied to a community or individuals fourteen centuries ago merely because they share a common descriptive term, a term which may even have been imposed on them by Muslims and rejected by them. "These are a people who have passed on. They have what they earned and you shall have what you have earned" (Q. 2:141).
There is another significant reason why the category of People of the Book should be regarded as of dubious relevance in our world today. In the context of the political and technological power exercised by the Judeo-Christian world, on the one hand, and Arab monetary wealth on the other, Muslim rapprochement with that world, based on the simplistic analogy that Jews and Christians are the contemporary People of the Book, could easily, and probably correctly, be construed as an alliance of the powerful. A qur'anic hermeneutic concerned with inter-religious solidarity against injustice would seek to avoid such alliances and would rather opt for more inclusive categories which would, for example, embrace the dispossessed of the Fourth World.
This re-thinking also has to extend to another category which the Qur'an particularly singles out for demonization, the mushrikun. Initially referring to the Meccans who revered physical objects such as sculptures or heavenly bodies as religiously sacred entities worthy of obeisance, the term mushrikun was also employed to refer to the People of the Book by some Muslim jurists. Two factors led to an early recognition that all mushrikun are not the same and were not to be treated equally: a) the qur'anic accusation of shirk against the People of the Book (e.g., Q. 9:31), while simultaneously regarding them as distinct from the mushrikun and, b) the subsequent wider Muslim contact with the world of non-Islam. Later, as the Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam observes,
in the course of the dogmatic development of Islam, the conception of shirk received a considerable extension [... because] the adherents of many sects had no compunction about reproaching their Muslim opponents with shirk, as soon as they saw in them any obscuring of monotheism, although only in some particular respect emphasised by themselves [...]. Shirk has thus become, no longer simply a term for unbelief prevailing outside of Islam, but a reproach hurled by one Muslim against another inside of Islam. (S.E.I., s.v. 'shirk')
As with the category of the People of the Book, here, too, one finds
that the actual application of the neat divisions has been far more problematic
than what most traditional scholars are wont to admit. There is evidently
a need to re-think these categories and their contemporary applicability
or otherwise. It is now more apparent than ever that the religious situation
of humankind and the socio-political ramifications thereof are far more
complex than previously understood. The following are but a few indications
of this complexity: a) the emergence of the new religious movements where,
in some cases, people claim to be both Christians and Pagans or Buddhist
and Hindu Catholics in Japan and India respectively, b) the situation in
large parts of Asia, Australia, Latin America and Africa where people combine
a commitment to Islam, Christianity and even Judaism, with other traditional
'pagan' practices such as the veneration of graves, sacred relics and invoking
deceased ancestors for spiritual blessings or material gain and, c) in
the aforementioned areas, formal and institutional religion has been systematically
used to oppress, exploit and even eliminate entire nations among the indigenous
people. In these situations, the marginalized and oppressed have often
resorted to their ancient religions as a means of asserting their human
dignity.
Like tawhid, (divine unity) shirk had its socio-economic implications
in Meccan society and one needs to retain a sense of this in a contemporary
consideration of the believers in tawhid and mushrikun (1982, 1). Referring
to the early qur'anic texts, Fazlur Rahman has argued that they can only
be understood against their Meccan background, "as a reaction against Meccan
pagan idol-worship and the great socio-economic disparity between mercantile
aristocracy of Mecca and a large body of its distressed and disenfranchised
population" (1982c, 1). Both of these aspects", he says "are so heavily
emphasised in the Qur'an that they must have been organically connected
with each other" (ibid.).
While the context of individual verses dealing with the Other are often carefully recorded by the earlier interpreters, they do not show any understanding of the overall historical context of a particular revelation. The task of shedding historical light on various texts, has until recently, been primarily the domain of non-Muslim scholars. Muslim reluctance to deal with the question of contextualization beyond the search for an isolated occasion of revelation, has lead to a generalised denunciation of the other, irrespective of the socio-historical context of the texts used in support of such rejection and damnation.
The qur'anic position towards the other unfolded gradually in terms of their varied responses to the message of Islam and to the prophetic presence. Any view to the contrary would invariably lead to the conclusion that the Qur'an presents a confused and contradictory view of the other. The idea of the gradual and contextual development of the qur'anic position towards the Other has significant implications. One cannot speak of a 'final qur'anic position' towards the Other and, secondly, it is wrong to apply texts of opprobrium in a universal manner to all those whom one chooses to define as 'people of the book' 'disbelievers', etc. in an ahistorical fashion.
Beliefs and behaviour are not genetic elements such as the colour of one's eyes in supposedly homogeneous and unchanging communities. It is to guard against the injustices of such generalisations that, texts of opprobrium referring to other religious communities or the associationists are usually followed or preceded by exceptions (e.g., Q. 3:75). Furthermore, qualifying or exceptive expressions such as 'from among them' (Q. 3:75), 'many among them' (Q. 2:109; 5:66; 22:17; 57:26), 'most of them' (Q. 2:105; 7:102; 10:36;), 'some of them' (Q. 2:145) and 'a group among them (Q. 3:78), are routinely used throughout the qur'anic discourse on the other.
The Qur'an provides only the basis for the attitude of Muslims at any given time towards the other. The qur'anic position, in turn, was largely shaped by the varying responses of the different components which comprised the other, to the struggle for the establishment of an order based on divine unity (tawhid) justice and islam. More often than not, these responses assumed concrete political forms in decisions to side with the Muslim community or against it. Much of the qur'anic opprobrium is directed at the way doctrine was used to justify exploitative practices and tribal chauvinism. It was not as if the Qur'an avoided the discourse on power or denounced the exercise of political power; it was concerned about whom political power served and who suffered as a consequence of it.
The Qur'an, in general religious terms, refers to various groups or types of people by various expressions of which the following are the most frequent: 'mu'minun', 'righteous', 'muslimun', 'people of the book', 'Jews', 'Christians', 'associanists', 'kafirun/kuffar' and 'munafiqun'. I want to make some brief observations about the qur'anic use of these terms before I examine the context of its attitude towards the other.
a) The terms usually used in translation are often, at best, approximations of their Arabic meanings. The Qur'an, for example, does not use the equivalent of the words "non-Muslim" or "unbeliever"; yet these are the most common English renderings of 'kafirun/kuffar' in both the process of translation as well as internal usage within the Arabic language.
b) Some of these terms are frequently used interchangeably in the Qur'an, such as mu'minun (lit. 'the convinced ones') and muslimun (lit. 'submitters') or 'people of the book' and 'Christians' or 'Jews'. It is essential to maintain the qur'anic distinction in their various uses in order to avoid a generalized and unjust rubbishing of the other.
c) In addition to these nouns, the Qur'an also employs descriptive phrases such as 'alladhina amanu' (lit. 'those who are convinced') instead of 'mu'minun' and 'alladhina kaffaru' (lit. 'those who deny / reject / are ungrateful') instead of 'kafirun' (lit. 'deniers' / 'rejecters' / 'ingrates'). These descriptive phrases express specific nuances in the text and indicate a particular level of faith conviction or of denial / rejection / ingratitude in much the same way as 'one who writes poetry' has a different nuance to it from 'poet'.
d) References to these groups are occasionally to a specific community within an historical setting and, at other times, to a community in a wider sense, transcending one specific situation.
e) Besides the terms of opprobrium such as kafir, munafiq (hypocrite), and mushrik, the other terms are rarely used in a negative or positive manner without exceptions. While praise or reproach are usually inherent in some of these terms, this is not without exception Indeed, the Qur'an, at times, describes the reprehensible acts committed by some of those from among the Muslim or believing community as 'kufr' or 'shirk' (Q. 39:7).
f) These terms are often used in the sense of an historico-religio-social group, but not always. The hypocrites and righteous were invariably referred to as individuals and the term muslim, and its various forms, for example, are also frequently invoked to refer to the characteristic of submission in an individual, group or even an inanimate object.
The Qur'an's general attitude towards the other which underpins the
more specific injunctions and doctrinal issues that it raises from time
to time are based on a number of fundamental principles. First, the Qur'an
relates dogma to socio-economic exploitation and insists on connecting
orthodoxy with orthopraxis. This is equally applicable to the communities
and individuals, in Mecca as well as Medina, who rejected the Prophet's
message of tawhid and social justice. The Qur'an makes it clear that it
was both the rejection and ignorance of tawhid that had led to social and
economic oppression in Meccan society. (Eg. Q. 83:1-11, 102:1-4, 104) Chapter
90 asserts that a denial of the presence of an all-powerful God causes
people to squander their wealth. "Does he think that no one has power over
him? He will say: I have spent abundant wealth" Q. 90:5-6). Furthermore,
this chapter links faith to an active social consciences: "to free a slave",
"to feed on a day of hunger" and "to exhort one another to perseverance
and to mercy" (Q. 90:13-15). By implication, it also links kufr to the
refusal to display mercy towards others. In this text those who reject
'the signs of Allah' are those whose actions do not correspond with the
ones who have chosen to "ascend the steep path". The rejecters of 'the
signs of Allah' are, therefore, those who deny mercy and compassion. This
linking of the rejection of Allah and din to the denial of mercy and compassion
is even more explicit in Chapter 107.
Have you observed the one who belies al-din?
That is the one who is unkind to the orphan,
and urges not the feeding of the needy.
So, woe to the praying ones,
who are unmindful of their prayer,
They do good to be seen,
and refrain from acts of kindnesses.
The texts of opprobrium revealed in Medina which relate to the various
Jewish and Christian communities and individuals encountered there by the
Prophet and the early Muslims reveal a similar relationship between 'erroneous'
beliefs and the socio-economic exploitation of others. Equally significant
is the fact that, although the Jews were closer to Muslims in creed, the
Qur'an often reserves the severest denunciation for some of them. Similarly,
the Sabeans were widely believed to have worshipped stars, even angels,
yet they were included among the People of the Book (Razi 1990, 3:112-113).
According to the Qur'an, the Jews and Christians justified their exploitation
of their own people by claiming that their Scriptures permitted such practices.
The Qur'an denounced this exploitation of the ignorance of ordinary illiterate
people who had no "real knowledge of the Scriptures" (Q. 2:78) by the priests
of the People of the Book. The contempt for and exploitation of the marginalized
by some of the People of the Book is further seen in their justification
that they had no moral obligation to be just towards the illiterate (Q.
3:75). This text is followed by a denunciation of those who "barter away
their bond with Allah and their pledges for a trifling gain" (Q. 3:77)
and of "a section among them who distort their Scripture with their tongues,
so as to make you think that it is from the Scripture while it is not"
(Q. 3:79). Thus, we see that while their bond and their pledges were with
a Transcendent God, their crimes were very much about the exploitation
of the people of God.
Second, the Qur'an explicitly and unequivocally denounces the narrow religious exclusivism which appears to have characterized the Jewish and Christian communities encountered by Muhammad in Hijaz. The Qur'an is relentless in its denunciation of the arrogance of Jewish religious figures and scathing of the tribal exclusivism which enabled them to treat people outside their community, especially the weak and vulnerable, with contempt. This contempt for other people, the Qur'an suggests, was very much rooted in notions of being the chosen of God. According to the Qur'an, many among the Jews and the Christians believed that they were not like any other people whom Allah had created, that their covenant with Allah had elevated their status with Him and that they were now the "friends of Allah to the exclusion of other people" (Q. 62:6). The Qur'an alleges that they claimed a privileged position with Allah merely by calling themselves Jewish or Christian. In other words, it was a claim based on history, birth and tribe rather than on praxis and morality. Thus, they claimed to be "the children of Allah and His beloved" (Q. 5:18) and "considered themselves pure" (Q. 4:48). In response to these notions of inherent 'purity', the Qur'an argues, "Nay, but it is Allah who causes whomsoever He wills to grow in purity; and none shall be wronged by even a hair's breadth" (Q. 5:49). The same text links these notions of being Allah's favourites to their socio-economic implications and suggests that this sense of having an exclusive share in Allah's dominion leads to greater unwillingness to share wealth with others: "Have they perchance, a share in Allah's dominion?" the Qur'an asks, and then asserts: "But (if they had) lo, they would not give to other people as much as (would fill) the groove of a date stone!" (Q. 4:53).
The Qur'an denounces the claims of some of the People of the Book that
the afterlife was only for them and "not for any other people" (Q.
2:94, 111), that the fire (of hell) will only touch them "for a limited
numbered days" (Q. 3:24) and that "clutching at the fleeting good of this
world will be forgiven for us" (Q.7:169). The Qur'an, furthermore, takes
a rather dim view of the boasts of the Jews and the Christians that their
creeds are the only ones of consequence. While the Qur'an does not accuse
the Christians of claiming to be free of any moral accountability in their
behaviour towards the non-Christians, they too, according to the Qur'an,
held that they were the beloved of Allah. (Q. 5:18)
And they say: 'None shall enter paradise unless he be a Jew or a Christian'. Those are their vain desires. Say: 'Produce your proof if you are truthful.' Nay, whoever submits his [or her] whole self to Allah and is a doer of good, will get his [her] reward with his [her] Lord; On such shall be no fear nor shall they grieve. (Q. 5:18)And the Jews say the Christians have nothing [credible] to stand on and the Christians say the Jews have nothing to stand on while both recite the Book. Even thus say those who have no knowledge. So Allah will judge between them on the Day of Resurrection in that wherein they differ. (Q. 2:111-113)
Attempts to appropriate the heritage of Abraham and to make it the
property of a particular socio-religious group is also denounced (Q.3:69)
"It is not belonging to the community of Jews or Christians which leads
to guidance, but the straight path of Abraham" (Q.2:135) who "was neither
a Jew nor a Christian, but an upright person who submitted to Allah (Q.
3:67).
Third, the Qur'an is explicit in its acceptance of religious pluralism. Having derided the petty attempts to appropriate Allah, it is inconceivable that the Qur'an should itself engage in this. The notion that Abraham was not a Jew or a Christian, but 'one of us' (i.e., a Muslim) is at variance with the rejection of all exclusivist claims in these texts. For the qur'anic message to be an alternative one, it had to offer the vision of a God who responds to all of humankind and who acknowledges and responds to the sincerity and righteousness of all believers. The Qur'an, thus, makes it a condition of faith to believe in the genuineness of all revealed religion (Q. 2:136; 2:285; 3:84).
The Qur'an acknowledges the de jure legitimacy of all revealed religion in two respects: a) it takes into account the religious life of separate communities co-existing with Muslims, respecting their laws, social norms and religious practices and, b) it accepts that the faithful adherents of these religions shall also attain to salvation and that "no fear shall come upon them neither will they grieve" (Q.2:62). These two aspects of the Qur'an's attitude towards the other may be described as the cornerstones of its acceptance of religious pluralism. Given the widespread acceptance, among the most conservative Muslim, of respect for the laws of the other, even if only in theory, and the equally widespread rejection of their salvation, I want to focus on the latter.
The Qur'an specifically recognizes the People of the Book as legitimate socio-religious communities. This recognition was later extended by Muslim scholars to various other religious communities living within the borders of the expanding Islamic domain. The explicit details, restrictions and application of this recognition throughout the various stages of the prophetic era, and subsequently in Islamic history, point to a significant issue at stake in dealing with the other. The socio-religious requirements of the Muslim community, such as community building and security, rather than the faith convictions, or lack thereof, in these other communities shaped the Qur'an's attitude towards them.
There are a number of indications in the Qur'an of the essential legitimacy of the other. First, the People of the Book, as recipients of divine revelation were recognized as part of the community. Addressing all the Prophets, the Qur'an says, "And surely this, your community (ummah), is a single community" (Q. 23:52). Furthermore, the establishment of a single community with diverse religious expressions was explicit in the Charter of Medina. Second, in two of the most significant social areas, food and marriage, the generosity of the qur'anic spirit is evident: the food of 'those who were given the Book' was declared lawful for the Muslims and the food of the Muslims lawful for them (Q. 5:5). Likewise, Muslim males were permitted to marry "the chaste women of the People of the Book" (Q. 5:5). If Muslims were to be allowed to co-exist with others in a relationship as intimate as that of marriage then this seems to indicate quite explicitly that enmity is not to be regarded as the norm in Muslim-other relations. Interestingly, this text mentions the believing women in the same manner as the women of the People of the Book: "[... permissible in marriage] are the virtuous women of the believers and the virtuous women of those who received the Scripture before you" (Q. 5:5). The restriction of permission for marriage to the women of the People of the Book indicates that this ruling related to the social dynamics of early Muslim society and the need for community cohesion. The fact that most jurists, while agreeing on marriage to women of the People of the Book, who are also the People of Dhimmah, differ as to whether it is permissible if they are from states hostile to Islam, also reflects this point (Tabari 1954, 5:212-214). Third, in the area of religious law, the norms and regulations of the Jews and of the Christians were upheld (Q. 5:47) and even enforced by the Prophet when he was called upon to settle disputes among them (Q.5:42-3). Fourth, the sanctity of the religious life of the adherents of other revealed religions is underlined by the fact that the first time that permission for the armed struggle was given was to ensure the preservation of this sanctity; "But for the fact that God continues to repel some people by means of others, cloisters, churches, synagogues and mosques, [all places] wherein the name of God is mentioned, would be razed to the ground" (Q. 22:40).
The Qur'anic recognition of religious pluralism is not only evident
from the acceptance of the other as legitimate socio-religious communities
but also from an acceptance of the their spirituality of the other and
salvation through that otherness. The preservation of the sanctity of the
places of worship alluded to above was thus not merely in order to preserve
the integrity of a multi-religious society in the manner which contemporary
states may want to protect places of worship because of the role that they
play in the culture of a particular people. Rather, it was because it was
Allah, a God which represented the ultimate for many of these religions,
and who is acknowledged to be above the diverse outward expressions of
that service, who was being worshipped therein. That there were people
in other faiths who sincerely recognized and served Allah is made even
more explicit in the following text:
Not all of them are alike; among them is a group who stand for the right and keep nights reciting the words of Allah and prostrate themselves in adoration before Him. They have faith in Allah and in the Last Day; they enjoin what is good and forbid what is wrong, and vie one with another in good deeds. And those are among the righteous. (Q. 4:113)
If the Qur'an is to be the word of a just God, as Muslims sincerely
believe, then there is no alternative to the recognition of the sincerity
and righteous deeds of others, and their recompense on the Day of Requital.
Thus, the Qur'an says:
And of the People of the Book there are those who have faith in Allah and in that which has been revealed to you and in that which has been revealed to them, humbling themselves before Allah, they take not a small price for the messages of Allah. They have their reward with their Lord. Surely Allah is swift to take account. (Q. 3:198)And whatever good they do, they will not be denied it. And Allah knows those who keep their duty. (Q. 3:112-4)
We have revealed to you the Book with the truth, verifying that which is before it of the Book and a guardian over it. So judge between them by what Allah has revealed and follow not their desires, [turning away] from the truth that has come unto you. For every one of you we have appointed a shir`ah and a minhaj. And if Allah had pleased, He would have made you a single ummah, but that He might try you in what He gave you. So vie with one another in virtuous deeds. To Allah you will all return, so that He will inform you of that wherein you differed. (Q. 5:48)
In a similar vein, it says: "To every community, We appointed acts
of devotion, which they observe; so let them not dispute with you in the
matter, and call to your Lord. Surely you are on a right guidance" (Q.
22:67). Viewing the deceased adherents of supposedly abrogated shari'ahs
as the addressees of this text, as many orthodox exegetes are wont to do,
dispensed with the need for any detailed discussion on the text itself
or its implications for religious pluralism. The traditional interpretations
of the text present several difficulties and are evidently inconsistent
with both its context and apparent meaning. These difficulties compel me
to choose an alternative inclusivist interpretation.
a) The entire qur'anic discussion, including the preceding sentences of the same verse and the subsequent verse, refer to the relationship between the Prophet as arbitrator in an actual community. The context of this text makes it plain that other religious communities co-existing with the Muslims in Medinah are addressed and not an ahistorical community existing in a non-physical world or in a different historical context.
b) The text under discussion says that, upon returning to Allah, "He will inform you of that wherein you differed". If one supposes that this text referred to the pre-Muhammadan communities whose paths are acknowledged as valid, pure and divinely ordained for a specified period, as the doctrine of supercessionism holds, then there is no question of the Muhammadan community differing with them, nor a need of information regarding the differences.
c) The text asks that the response to this diversity be to compete with each other in righteous deeds. Given that any kind of meaningful competition can only be engaged in by contemporaneous communities who share similar advantages or disadvantages, one can only assume that the partners of these Muslims were to be those others who lived alongside them.
In the light of the above, the text can best be understood as follows: Looking at the context, one observes that it comes towards the end of a fairly lengthy discourse on the significance of specific Scriptures for specific communities. Q. 5:44-5 deals with the Torah which has "guidance and light", "should not be sold for a trivial price", and those Jews who do not judge by its injunctions are denounced as "ingrates" and "wrongdoers/oppressors" This is followed by Q. 5:46-47 which describes the revelations to Jesus Christ in similar terms ("light and guidance and an admonition for those who keep their duty") and a denunciation of the followers of Christ who do not judge by its standards as "transgressors" (see also Q. 7:170.). It is at the end of this chronological discourse on the significance and importance of adhering to revealed Scripture that the text "To each of you we have given a "path and and a way" appears. Given this context of recognizing the authenticity of the Scriptures of the other, it follows that the text refers to the paths of the other in a similar vein.
As for its meaning, the essence of this text is located in the words
shir`ah and minhaj; both relating to 'a path'. While paths must be clear,
comfortable and scenic and even, at times, a part of one's goal, they are
never synonymous with it. The word shari`ah and its variants appear only
three times in the Qur'an; the word Allah approximately three thousand
times. Hassan Askari, referring to the question of religious pluralism,
asks;
How may it be that the One and Transcendent, the Creator and Almighty be equated with the form of one religious belief or practice? And if we equate thus, we make a God out of that religion, whereas we are all called upon to say: 'There is no deity except God. (1986, 4)
The text thus means that God has determined a path for all people,
both as individuals and as religious communities; that one should be true
to the path determined for you. Furthermore, should it be so covered by
cobwebs that it is no longer possible for one to move along it, then you
are free to choose another of the paths determined by Allah. The purpose
is to vie with one another in righteousness towards Allah.
The text cited and discussed above (Q. 5:48) is one of two such ones which specifically employ the metaphor of competition. Both appear in a Medinan context of the Prophet engaging the People of the Book. The second one reads as follows;
And each one has a goal towards which he [she] strives / direction to which he [she] turns) (li kulli wijhah huwa muwalliha); so compete with one another in righteous deeds. Wherever you are, Allah will bring you all together. Surely Allah is able to do all things. (Q. 2:148)
The Qur'an makes several references to the theological difficulties of religious pluralism and of kufr. If God is One and if din originates with Him, why is it that humankind is not truly united in belief? Why do some people persist in rejection when "the truth is clearly distinguished from falsehood" (Q. 2:256; 23:90)? Why does God not 'will' faith for everyone? These were some of the questions which appear to have vexed Muhammad and the early Muslims. In response to these, several texts urge an attitude of patience and humility; these questions are to be left to God who will inform humankind about them on the Day of Requital. Other than the text under discussion (Q. 5:48), which addresses the people who have a shir`ah and minhaj, saying "unto God you will return, so that he will inform you of that wherein you differed", the following text also conveys the call to patience and humility:
God is your Lord and our Lord: Unto us our works and unto you your works; let there be no dispute between you and us. God will bring us together and to Him we shall return. (Q. 42:15; 2:139)
As for those who persist in kufr, the Qur'an says;
If your Lord had willed, all those on earth would have believed together. Would you then compel people to become believers? (Q. 10:99)If God had so wanted, He could have made them a single people. But He admits whom He wills to His grace and, for the wrongdoers there will be no protector nor helper. (Q. 42:8)
Revile not those unto whom they pray besides God, lest they wrongfully revile God through ignorance. Thus, unto every ummah have we made their deeds seem fair. Then unto their Lord is their return, and he will tell them what they used to do. (Q. 6:108)
If, as I have argued above, the Qur'an acknowledges the fact of
religious diversity as the will of God, then a significant question which
arises is that of Muhammad's responsibility to the adherents of other faiths.
Rahman has correctly described the qur'anic position regarding this relationship
as "somewhat ambiguous" (1982c, 5). From the Qur'an it would appear as
if the fundamental prophetic responsibility was two-fold. First, with regard
to those who viewed themselves as communities adhering to a divine Scripture,
it was to challenge them regarding their own commitment to their own traditions
and engaging them regarding their deviation from it.
Second, with regard to all of humankind, to present the Qur'an's own guidance for consideration and acceptance.
There are two ways of approaching this ambiguity: a) to relate the first responsibility to the second one, for they are not entirely divorced from each other and b) to understand the context of different responsibilities and their applicability to specific components of the other at specific junctures in the relationship with the other.
The qur'anic challenge to the exclusivist claims of the People of the Book have already been dealt with above. At other times, various groups and individuals, among the People of the Book in particular, were challenged by Muhammad regarding their rejection of the signs of God (Q. 3:70-71; 3:98), their discouraging of others to walk the path of God, (Q. 3:98-99) and their knowingly covering the truth with falsehood (Q. 3:70; 3:98-9).
As for their Scriptures, Muhammad, as indicated earlier, was expected to challenge them regarding their commitment to their own Scriptures (Q. 5:68), their deviation from it, and their distortion thereof. Muslim scholarship have largely argued that, given the distortion of the Scriptures, nothing in it has remained valid. In dealing with the qur'anic references to the truth contained in these Scriptures and exhortations to the People of the Book to uphold it, they have limited this obedience to the Scripture to those texts which putatively predict Muhammad's prophethood. Notwithstanding this recognition of the legitimacy of the other revealed Scriptures, Muhammad is still asked to proclaim: "O humankind! I am a Messenger of God unto all of you" (Q. 7:158). Muhammad thus had a task of proclaiming and calling in addition to that of challenging (Q. 16:125; 22:67).
On the face of it, these seem to be a set of contradictory responsibilities
for, if a text is distorted, how can one ask for adherence to it? In the
second responsibility, that of inviting, the question arises regarding
the purpose of inviting to one's own path if that of the other is also
authentic. Firstly, the problem of the authenticity of texts as against
its being distorted and, therefore, invalid, only arises if one thinks
in terms of a singularly homogeneous and unchanging entity called 'the
People of the Book' and all qur'anic references to it divested of contextuality.
It has been shown above that this is not the case. The Qur'an itself is
silent about the extent and nature of this distortion and castigates "a
section of the People of the Book". As indicated earlier on, the uniformity
of praise or blame for a particular religious group is contrary to the
pattern of the Qur'an. It is thus possible that the references to the authenticity
of their Scriptures refer to those held by the rest. Indeed, even the qur'anic
denunciation of particular doctrinal 'errors' is not uniform in tone, indicating
thereby either a particular moment in the Muslim encounter with the other
or different components of the other with specific nuances to those 'errors'.
Secondly, Muhammad's basic responsibility in inviting was to call to God.
For some components of the other, the response to this call was best fulfilled
by a commitment to Islam, thus they were also invited to become Muslims;
for others the call was limited to islam. The invitation to the delegation
of Najran is one such example when, after they declined to enter into Islam
they were invited to "come to a word equal between us and you that we worship
none but God, nor will we take from our ranks anyone as deities" (Q. 3:64).
The Qur'an, thus, is explicit only about inviting to God and to the 'path
of God'. In the following text, for example, the instruction to invite
people to God comes after an affirmation of the diversity of religious
paths. Here again one sees the imperative of inviting to God who is above
the diverse paths which emanate from Him.
The pre-eminence of the righteous does not mean a position of a permanently fixed socio-religious superiority for the Muslim community. It was not as if the Muslims as a social entity were superior to the other for such a position would have placed them and their parochial God in the same category of others who were denounced in the Qur'an for the crimes of arrogance and desiring to appropriate God for a narrow community. There is no reason to suppose that the qur'anic reprimand to other communities that they cannot base their claims to superiority on the achievements of their forebears, should not be applied to the post-Muhammadan Muslim community: "That is a community that is bygone; to them belongs what they earned and to you belong what you earn, and you will not be asked about what they had done. (Q. 2:134).
Furthermore, the Qur'an does not regard everyone and their ideas as equal, but proceeds from the premise that the idea of inclusiveness is superior to that of exclusiveness. In this sense, the advocates of pluralism had to be 'above' those who insisted that the religious expressions of others counted for nothing and that they are the only ones to attain salvation in the same way. The relationship between the inclusivist form of religion and the exclusivist form can be compared to that of a democratic state and facist political parties, as Askari has cogently argued
If a group or party arises which does not agree to the democratic rule and works to overthrow the government of the day by violent means in order to create a fascist social order wherein there is no room for democratic expression and exercise of opinion and power, that group cannot lay claim to those rights enjoined by a democracy. (1986, 328)
Inclusivity was not merely a willingness to let every idea and practice
exist. Instead it was geared towards specific objectives such as freeing
humankind from injustice and servitude to other human beings so that it
may be free to worship God. As explained previously, according to the Qur'an,
the beliefs of non-accountability to God and shirk were intrinsically connected
to the socio-economic practices of the Arabs. In order to ensure justice
for all, it was important for Muhammad and his community to actively work
against those beliefs and not accord it a position of equality.
The responsibility of calling humankind to God and to the path of God will thus remain. The task of the present day Muslim is to discern what this means in every age and every society. Who are to be invited? Who are to be taken as allies in this calling? How does one define the path of God? These are particularly pertinent questions in a society where definitions of self and other are determined by justice and injustice, oppression and liberation and where the test of one's integrity as a human being dignified by God is determined by the extent of one's commitment to defend that dignity.
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Kuzmic, “History and Eschatology: Evangelical Views” in BJ
Lawrence, B. The Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age. San Francisco. Harper and Row
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