Rhenquist
This inquiry does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather
a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures.
To attach definitive weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when
the very question at issue is whether the court has actually departed from
the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce
the explicit requirements of Article II.
Ginsburg
I might join THE CHIEF JUSTICE were it my commission to interpret Florida
law. But disagreement with the Florida
court’ s interpretation of its own State’ s law does not warrant the
conclusion that the justices of that court have legislated...Surely the
Constitution does not call upon us to pay more respect to a federal administrative
agency’s construction of federal law than to a state high court’ s interpretation
of its own state’s law. And not uncommonly, we let stand state court interpretations
of federal law with which we might disagree.....In light of the constitutional
guarantee to States of a “Republican Form of Government,” U. S. Const.,
Art. IV, §4, Article II can hardly be read to invite this Court to
disrupt a State’s republican regime....Yet THE CHIEF JUSTICE today would
reach out to do just that. By holding that Article II requires our revision
of a state court’ s construction of state laws in order to protect one
organ of the State from another, THE CHIEF JUSTICE contradicts the basic
principle that a State may organize itself as it sees fit....Federal courts
defer to state high courts’ interpretations of their state’s own law. This
principle reflects the core of federalism, on which all agree.
Souter
Whatever people of good will and good sense may argue about the merits
of the Florida court’s reading, there is no warrant for saying that it
transcends the limits of reasonable statutory interpretation to the point
of supplanting the statute enacted by the “legislature” within the meaning
of Article II.
Breyer
The Court was wrong to take this case. It was wrong to grant a stay.
It should now vacate that stay and permit the Florida Supreme Court to
decide whether the recount should resume.... there is no justification
for the majority’ s remedy, which is simply to reverse the lower court
and halt the recount entirely. An appropriate remedy would be, instead,
to remand this case with instructions that, even at this late date, would
permit the Florida Supreme Court to require recounting all undercounted
votes in Florida...and to do so in accordance with a single-uniform substandard....
Whether there is time to conduct a recount prior to December 18, when the
electors are scheduled to meet, is a matter for the state courts to determine.
And whether, under Florida law, Florida could or could not take further
action is obviously a matter for Florida courts, not this Court, to decide.
See ante, at 13 (per curiam).
Stevens
When questions arise about the meaning of state laws, including election
laws, it is our settled practice to accept the opinions of the highest
courts of the States as providing the final answers.
What must underlie petitioners’ entire federal assault on the Florida
election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality
and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions
if the vote count were to proceed. Otherwise, their position is wholly
without merit. The endorsement of that position by the majority of this
Court can only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work
of judges throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women who
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of
law. Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted
by today’s decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may never
know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It
is the Nation’ s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the
rule of law.