Multilateralism, Regionalism, Isolationism
Isolationism Interventionism
Jeffrey Garofalo
New York University
Final Paper
Table of Contents
II. Reform of the International System: American Intervention and Idealism
1. Woodrow Wilson & The League of Nations: America intervenes to save the world
III. Reform of the International System: Regionalism
IV. Threats to Reform: American Isolationism
V. Conclusion
On September 17, 1796, President George Washington delivered his last formal message to the Congress of the United States. Written in elegant prose and with the aid of Alexander Hamilton's pen, Washington's Farewell Address set forth a set of axioms that the departing president implored his fellow countrymen to follow. In regards to foreign policy, Washington's language was lucid. "The great rule for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible."(1) Rather than intervention, America, in perfecting her political institutions, would lead by example. Ultimately, it would be Democracy itself which would render foreign wars obsolete.
While America spent the Nineteenth Century pursuing her Manifest Destiny, Europe struggled to contain a world which had been transformed by the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire. With the end of universality, the new international political system was being recast by the competition amongst nation states, each vying for power. This rising tide of nationalism, which culminated in Napoleon's quest for the domination of Europe, convinced the great statesmen of the day that their security rested in their mutual cooperation. With the fall of France at Waterloo, the Concert of Europe was constructed to preserve the peace. Metternich, Talleyrand and Castlereagh would forge an alliance, which, through their skillful diplomacy would preserve a period of relative peace lasting nearly a century.
With the destruction of the European balance of power system in 1914 by a bellicose Germany, a reluctant United States was forced to intervene in order to restore world tranquility. Briefly ending her historic role of isolationism, America, under President Woodrow Wilson, entered the war, not to restore the balance of power, but to construct a new world order based upon the rule of law and reason. In a reinterpretation of Washington's Farewell Address, Wilson argued that the time had come to recognize that American leadership at home was not sufficient to preserve harmony and peace abroad. International peace and security rested not in the balance of power, as Europe had proven, but in the collective will of the international community. Speaking with prophetic vision, on the heels of the Senate's historic vote on the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, Wilson said, "If we do not set up an agency to prevent war, another and more terrible holocaust will engulf the next generation."(2)
Twenty years later, armed with history as his great collaborator, President Roosevelt was determined to fulfill the ideals of world government, as espoused by Wilson. As allied armies achieved victories over the Wehrmacht in Africa, Italy, and finally France, FDR vigorously pursued the creation of a "United Nations" to preserve peace in the aftermath of the war. Careful to avoid Wilson's philosophical entreaties, FDR sought progressive reform of the international system through a compromise between himself, Churchill, and Stalin in the form of the Four Policemen. The Four Policemen, in effect the permanent members of the Security Council, would enforce the peace against any potential miscreant. Just as important to Roosevelt, the Four Policemen would safeguard his Four Freedoms for all peoples throughout the world.
Despite America's 20th Century entrance into the affairs of international relations, her commitment to interventionism has been challenged at times by her proclivity to withdraw and seek sanctuary in her "splendid isolation". In the aftermath of the Great War, with her innocence lost at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood, American foreign policy retreated back to the age of Washington and Monroe. Afterward, Germany and the Soviet Union demanded her attention, forcing her back to the world's stage. In recent times, with the Cold War a distant memory, the pendulum appears to be swinging back towards isolationism. Like the industrial and transportation revolutions of the Nineteenth Century, ultimately it may be the velocity of information technology itself which prevents the U.S. from further disengagement.
II. Reform of the International System: American Intervention and Idealism
1. Woodrow Wilson & the League of Nations
On the morning of July 1, 1916, the British Army launched their largest military offensive of the First World War. Greeted by a warm spring sun, the English climbed confidently out of their trenches and marched across the Somme toward the enemy lines positioned some 400 yards away. As they advanced towards the enemy, they were certain that they were about to deliver the decisive victory, one which would finally knock the Kaiser out of the war. Less than two hours later, in a haze of smoke and gun powder, sixty thousand Englishmen had fallen. History would record the day as the greatest single defeat (in terms of human casualties) ever suffered by the British Army. Yorktown, by comparison, had been a walk in the park.
The lurid landscape that morning was typical of later accounts depicting the fighting at Verdun, Passchendaele and Ypres. The First World War saw the introduction of modern weaponry whose destruction was never before experienced in combat. Describing this new technology, Henry Adams would remark, "Science has produced power never before wielded by man, speed never reached by anything but a meteor."(3) In this new warfare of machine gun fire, heavy artillery, tanks and fighter planes, 10 million lives were lost.(4) A whole generation of Europe's young was extinguished on the barren fields of France. Watching events unfold from across the Atlantic, President Woodrow Wilson would remark, "It appears that Europe has finally determined to commit suicide."(5)
Woodrow Wilson was raised in Augusta, Georgia by a family of Scots' Irish descent.
His father, a minister, was the chief executive of the Southern Presbyterian Church.
The young Wilson had been groomed early on to follow his father into the ministry.
While he never fulfilled that role in the traditional sense, Wilson would lead an international
crusade to inject morality and altruism into the affairs of nations.
For much of the First World War, America practiced neutrality. Separated by a vast ocean, the majority of Americans were indifferent to the struggle being waged in Europe. For Wilson, who ran for reelection in 1916 under the campaign slogan "He kept us out of the war", American intervention would be limited to the role of peacemaker. He pursued this course with passion from July 1914 to April 1917.
By the spring of 1917, Wilson became convinced that the Kaiser's ambitions, which rivaled those of Napoleon a century before, would eventually necessitate a military response. Despite repeated diplomatic overtures to resolve the conflict peacefully, German actions continued to be militant. On the high seas, Germany's reckless campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant and commercial shipping threatened the lives of Americans traveling abroad. At home, the interception of the Zimmerman Telegram uncovered a treacherous German plot to return the former Mexican territorial possessions of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona to Mexico in return for her support of the German war effort. The plan, which was intercepted by the British and subsequently handed over to the Americans, was in direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine and threatened American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.
Having decided to enter the war against Germany, Wilson then faced the challenge of rallying public support behind the American war effort. Despite repeated German acts of aggression, large sectors of the American population opposed U.S. intervention. In 1917, there were over eight million German Americans residing in the United States(6). Many could not support a war fought against their fellow countrymen. Likewise, over four million Irish Americans resisted efforts to aid England.(7) Still others argued that this was not "our war" and that our national interest was not at stake.
Looking to garner public support for the deployment of American troops abroad, Wilson harked back to his religious upbringing in Augusta and also to the republican values from the founding period. As Dr. Kissenger explains "Wilson grasped that America's isolationism could only be overcome by an appeal to its belief in the exceptional nature of its ideals."(8) Wilson defined the war in succinct moral language. This was a war between two opposing forces. On one side, there was autocracy and militarism. On the other, democracy and freedom. At a public rally, Wilson, in a dazzling rhetorical flourish, stated, "We are fighting for the rights of representative government, the rights of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations".(9)
Wilson also turned to the legacy of President George Washington to bolster support for his policy. In a reinterpretation of Washington's Farewell Address, Wilson argued that America's commitment to human rights and her love of liberty precluded her detachment from international relations. He asserted that Washington's concerns over our commitments abroad had been related to the purposes of foreign nations; Washington, in this new age, would recognize the exigency for American intervention to safeguard certain universal truths.(10)
With victory imminent, Wilson moved smartly to construct the post war order. The First World War had demonstrated that the European model had failed. While she skillfully preserved a period of relative peace in the aftermath of Waterloo, her ambitions and rivalries, which led to this great tragedy, would in time, lead to another. While the Concert of Europe had been a progressive response to European realpolitik, the calamitous nature of modern warfare demanded further reform. In this age of high technology, international peace and security would rest not in the balance of power but in a community of power. As mankind continued their journey through the Twentieth century, they would look back to the best of the Eighteenth to ensure peace for future generations. International relations would be governed not by selfish national interests but by the rule of law, reason and benevolence.
Having entered the war to restore democracy, Wilson later championed an American commitment to assure the felicity of the world community. As the preservation of world peace and security no longer rested within the capitals of Europe, America, Wilson declared, must become the policemen for the world. He implored his countrymen to lead a "league of nations" to further the cause of progress and liberty for all peoples. Speaking to the Congress, Wilson stated, "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affirming mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity for great and small states alike".(11) Wilson insisted that America had the responsibility and the moral obligation to provide the leadership for this great experiment in world government. Tragically, his voice went unheard. In a historic vote, which would mark the end of the progressive era in American politics, the Senate voted against the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations.
Despite the American rejection, a League of Nations was formed. On January 10, 1920, 42 nations ushered in a new era of international diplomacy. As signatories to the League Covenant, each nation pledged their mutual respect for the territorial integrity of all states and renounced war as an instrument of foreign policy. Echoing Wilson, member states pledged their adherence to international law and their scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations.(12)
Peace would be maintained through collective security. Under Article 11 of the League Covenant, members states pledged their support for a unified response to acts of aggression.
As specified in Article 16, an act of aggression on the part of any member of the League Covenant would constitute "an act of war against all other members of the League."(13) In cases that arise, under Article 16, League members were given the mandate to impose economic sanctions against a bellicose state. In other cases, member states were to "contribute whatever military, naval, or air force" as may be necessary to protect the Covenants of the League.(14)
In a remarkable statement of the evolution in mutual cooperation, under Article 23, the members of the League were asked to "secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, both within their own countries and in all countries where their commercial interests extend". (15) In addition, members states were asked for their support in the war against disease and for their just treatment of all inhabitants under territories they controlled. The League had moved beyond peace and security to a new frontier where social responsibility would govern the affairs of nations.
While the League was an important step in progressive global administration, the League's failures underscored the inherent institutional incongruity of the organization. The League, and for that matter the United Nations, derives its legitimacy from the consent of its member states. These member states are sovereign, not supranational. A collective action by the League required the overwhelming consensus of these sovereign states. When consensus was not reached, the League became ineffectual in dealing with acts of aggression. This encumbrance to collective action was borne out in the League's response to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. The League Council, invoking Article 16, authorized an economic and military embargo against Mussolini in order to restore Ethiopian territorial independence. While member states agreed to enforce the sanctions, England and France, in a decision foreshadowing their disastrous appeasement policy, ignored the sanctions for fear of provoking a war with Hitler's Germany. Mussolini then became the Emperor of Ethiopia.
2. Roosevelt and the United Nations: America's reentry and Word War II
Twenty years after America had rejected the League of Nations, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt skillfully led a reluctant nation into the Second World War. In the
intervening years, America had retreated back to her historic role of isolationism.
Disillusioned by her experience in the First World War, she took comfort in her
"splendid isolation."American intervention in the First World war had been triggered by a
bellicose Germany. Likewise, American intervention in the Second World War had been in
response to German and Japanese designs for world domination.
Franklin Roosevelt was born and raised in Hyde Park, New York. He was taught early on in life that because he bad been born into wealth, he had a responsibility to serve his community well.(16) Like his predecessor Wilson, FDR would later attempt to project the values bequeathed to him during his childhood into the affairs of nations.
During the Second World War, Roosevelt, an ebullient and confident leader, held the alliance together in the war against Germany and Japan. As allied armies achieved victories over the Wehrmacht in Africa, Italy, and finally France, FDR shaped the creation of a "United Nations" to preserve peace in the aftermath of the war. Believing at the time that the Second World War had been the direct outcome of the First, President Roosevelt was determined to reform the international system to ensure peace for future generations.
Roosevelt believed that the future peace and security of the international system rested not in the balance of power, but in a community of power. Both Prime Minister Churchill of Britain and Marshall Stalin of the Soviet Union sought to reconstruct the traditional balance of power or sphere of interest arrangement in the aftermath of the war. FDR, who had hoped to dismantle the balance of power in favor of international harmony, devised a compromise between himself, Churchill, and Stalin in the form of the Four Policemen. (His great compromise, including the veto power, may have also been necessary to enlist the Congress and the American people in support of the UN) Modeled after Metternich's Concert of Europe, the Four Policeman, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the U.S. would enforce the peace against any potential "miscreant". Just as important to Roosevelt, the Four Policemen would ensure his Four Freedoms for all peoples throughout the world.
The Four Policeman arrangement was formally institutionalized at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 with the establishment of the Security Council and, at the time, the unlimited veto power of the Four Policeman and China. At Yalta, a weary Roosevelt was able to gain a concession from Stalin who agreed to drop his demand for a veto on procedural matters. At San Francisco, the veto power and the permanent member status were codified into law with the signing of the UN Charter.
Roosevelt believed that the Four Policemen approach within the Security Council held great promise for maintaining peace and security. "He knew from the experience of the 1920's that collective security required enforcers."(17) This arrangement would necessitate the building of consensus, which when achieved, by itself would do well in preventing aggression. Learning from the experiences of the League Council, the Security Council was also given some needed teeth in its enforcement provisions. League actions had been based upon recommendations. League members could choose to avoid the recommendations.(as they did over Japan and Italy) Under Article 25 of the UN Charter, members of the Security Council were bound by international law to "accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present charter."(18)
In addition to peace through collective security, Roosevelt advocated peace through economic development. This philosophy was projected into the machinery of the UN through the creation of the Economic and Social Council as a permanent organ and through the language of the UN Charter. Article 55 of the UN Charter calls for the promotion of "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of social progress and development."(19) By providing a New Deal for the world's poor, wars would be averted and progress made. The UN also went beyond the League in the protection of human rights and in the protection of the environment.
The UN also established a General Assembly comprised of all member states. In effect the World's Parliament, the General Assembly became an important avenue for the nations of the world to raise issues of importance to them. A truly democratic body, it also afforded the developing world the opportunity to stand on equal footing with the developed world in the public discourse. During the Cold War, the General Assembly, under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, discussed issues of peace and security while matters were stalled in the Security Council.
The record of the United Nations is mixed. While innovations such as Peacekeeping have been a progressive development for international diplomacy, the UN has never realized the lofty ideals it was established to serve. For much of the UN's history, the organization was paralyzed by the bipolar power struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This ideological warfare spilled over into the Security Council where US/USSR veto power (and the threat of the veto) encumbered progressive world government. Likewise, nations who acted in ways subversive of civil liberties, wrapped themselves up in Article II-Section 7 in order to prevent the UN from interfering in their domestic affairs.
The UN, like the League, is comprised of sovereign member states. Actions taken by the UN are dependent upon the overwhelming consensus of these sovereign nations. In many cases, consensus is simply not feasible. In other cases, nations, acting in their self interest, pursue policies antithetical to the UN and the international community.
The UN, throughout its history, has been dominated by the great powers. In the Security Council,
the permanent members control the debate and any, and all, decisions. Efforts to reform the Security Council have been rebuked by the great powers.
III. Reform of the International System: Regionalism
The rapid growth of regional organizations since the Second World War has been an important development for international progress and reform. "A regional organization is a segment of the world bound by a common set of objectives based on geographical, social, cultural, economic, or political ties and possessing a formal structure provided for in formal intergovernmental organizations."(20)Regional organizations tend to consist of a small number of states, whom when acting in concert, can place great demands on other actors within the international arena.
Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, regional organizations are given the opportunity to adopt a regional approach to matters of peace and security. Regional organizations can settle a dispute locally before referring the matter to the Security Council.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the great powers sought to protect their security through the construction of regional military alliances which, in some cases, would complement the efforts of the UN to maintain peace and security. The western powers, led by President Harry S. Truman constructed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to contain communism. NATO was supplemented by several regional organizations such as SEATO and ANZUS that would protect those geographic areas from the menace of communism. The Soviet Union, in turn, constructed the WARSAW pact, consisting of the Soviet satellite states to counter NATO.
4. Economic Cooperation
Several regional organizations have been established which seek to promote economic development within a geographic area. The European Union promotes economic integration within Europe. Much of Europe today uses a single currency with matters related to monetary policy handled by a supranational organization. OPEC, whose members account for roughly 85 percent of the worlds oil exports, collaborate to control the ownership, production, and pricing of oil.
IV. Threats to Reform: American Isolationism
In the Twentieth Century, America became, in chronology, a great power, a superpower, and finally, the sole superpower. While it may be true that she has resisted the temptation to use this great power for, as John Adams once said, "to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy", America has also demonstrated the proclivity for turning her back on the world when the world looks to her, as the sole superpower, for further commitment and leadership(21).
American foreign policy is filled with contradiction and paradox.(22) Throughout American history, the conduct of her foreign policy has been subject to cyclical fluctuations of withdrawal and return, interventionism and isolationism.(23) Throughout the Nineteenth Century, as America tamed and subdued a vast continent, she avoided the affairs of the world's community. In the Twentieth Century, she emerged and played a decisive role in the two major military confrontations of the first half of the century, and the ideological war that dominated the latter half of the century. In the years preceding the Great War and those that followed, she retreated back to her historic role of isolationism. In the aftermath of the cold war, she appears to be doing the same.
Her idealism and leadership have also been subject to this great paradox. She would fight a war to "make the world safe for democracy" only to withdraw and destroy any hopes for its fulfillment. She would offer a Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, but would sit idly by as Africa and Asia starved.
Her contradictions have been both a source of energy for progressive world governance and an impediment for greater progress. During her periods of interventionism, she would be largely responsible for the creation of the Twentieth Century's two great experiments in government. During periods of withdrawal, she would be largely responsible for undermining their legitimacy and potential. As her interventionism is often challenged at home by either the Congress or the American people themselves, she is a constant threat to international reform.
Describing the role of history, the eminent historian Arthur M..Schlesinger Jr wrote, "History is to a nation as memory is to an individual. Individuals deprived of memory are disoriented and lost, not knowing where they have been or where they are going. So too a nation, denied a conception of its past, will be disabled in dealing with its future".(24) To better understand America's ambivalence to interventionism, we must search for the answers in her past.
5. Washington's Farewell Address: Foreign Policy and the American Character I
The seeds for America's proclivity towards isolationism were planted by her first
president, George Washington. Washington presided over a young republic that had
achieved their independence by defeating an English king with the monetary and
military assistance of a French king. Needless to say, Washington believed passionately
that America's great experiment in republican government could be jeopardized by her
entanglements with Europe's monarchies.
During his administration, he adhered to a strict policy of neutrality. During the Napoleonic Wars, Washington, fearful of renewed hostilities with England, issued the Neutrality Proclamation which abrogated America's 1778 treaty with her revolutionary ally, France. Explaining this revocation of Franco/American mutual solidarity, Washington stated, "We must avoid a passionate attachment of one nation for another for sympathy for a nation leads to an illusory common interest. We then may find ourselves participating in quarrels and wars with that nation to protect this illusion."(25)
In his last and most famous address to the Congress, Washington delineated the course he expected his countrymen to follow. On our association with Europe, Washington was clear. "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. We must avoid their politics, their ambition, rival-ship, interest, and caprice."(26)
6. The Monroe Doctrine: Foreign Policy and the American Character II
Some twenty five years later, President James Monroe would go one step further.
Faced with mounting danger on the continent, President James Monroe issued a stern declaration to Europe's monarchies, which America was prepared to back with force, known as the Monroe Doctrine. Delivered to the Congress on December 2, 1823, the Monroe Doctrine essentially established the political independence of Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Monroe, with the aid of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, divided the world into two opposing political systems. In the Western Hemisphere, there would be Democracy. In Europe, Monarchy.
Regarding American intervention in Europe, Monroe stated, "The U.S. did not intervene in Europe or its wars. We have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so."(27)
In return, Europe must stay clear of the Western Hemisphere. "The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power."(28)
This remarkable document, which would become the cornerstone of American Foreign Policy for much of her history, was a natural progression of Washington's Farewell Address. As Dr. Kissenger explains, "Up to that time, the cardinal rule of foreign policy had been that the U.S. would not become entangled in European struggles for power. The Monroe Doctrine went the next step by declaring that Europe must not become entangled in U.S. affairs."(29)
While it may be difficult to argue today that America's security is as perilous as it once was during the Age of Washington and Monroe, their ideas endure. Certainly, it must be recognized that the republican ideals that they wished to safeguard were in grave danger in 1917, and again in 1941. In the aftermath of both wars, with the enemy destroyed, it may have been only natural for America to retreat back to her traditional role in foreign policy. Americans, throughout their history, have taken great comfort in their "splendid isolation". "Americans have found it natural to interpret the security conferred on it by great oceans as a sign of divine providence."(30)
Almost one hundred years after Monroe left the stage, Wilson threatened to dismantle America's historic role in foreign policy in favor of interventionism and global activism. He was soundly rebuked. There are many reasons why Wilson and his "league of nations" failed in America. What follows are but a few.
Wilson faced vigorous opposition to "his league" from many of the same groups who had earlier opposed America's entry into the First World War. German Americans (and for that matter, the liberals) blamed Wilson for yielding too much ground to the English and the French over the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They correctly protested (as would an economist named Keynes) the colossal war reparations the German's would be required to pay the allies. They accurately predicted that what had been an instrument for a just peace would in time become the justification for another war (and not to mention, a great depression). Irish Americans, who controlled America's cities at the time, opposed the League, fearing that under Article 10 of the League Covenant, their boys would be sent overseas to fight for England. Also deprecating the League were a large number of Anglophobes who believed that the League of Nations was England's Twentieth Century plot to conquer the world (England was given 6 votes in the Assembly; Somehow this translated into dictatorship). On American Anglophobia, historian Thomas Bailey would write, "They were the men who had not outgrown the influence of their fife-and-drum textbooks, and who were still shooting redcoats at Bunker Hill and New Orleans."(31) While each of these factions had their own individual reservations to the League, when they banded together they would place tremendous pressure on public officials deemed sympathetic to its cause.
In the Senate, Wilson was confronted by a hostile republican majority that schemed to administer an embarrassment to Wilson in order to recapture the presidency. Wilson had been the first Democratic president since Andrew Jackson in 1832 to be elected to a second term. For much of those intervening years, the presidency was dominated by the Republican party. Desperate to rid themselves of an administration that had attacked their core constituents in big business, they conspired to sabotage "his league".
Led by the brilliant parliamentarian Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republicans cloaked their rebellion against the League into their eloquent attacks on Article 10 of the League Covenant. Article 10 essentially pledged the mutual cooperation of all members of the League in response to an act of aggression undertaken against any member of the League. Lodge made the case, rather convincingly, that Article 10 would enjoin America in wars she may not approve. Article 10 would result in a transfer of Congress's constitutional right to declare war to an international organization that was not accountable to the American people. This loss of sovereignty, it was feared, would have no end. The Republicans charged that the League would soon use this power to underwrite American immigration policies, tariff provisions, and other egregious acts.
In his brilliant work, The Age of Reform, historian Richard Hofstadter argues that the rejection of the League was intertwined with the abnegation of the progressive era. After twenty years of public activism and moral righteousness (including a crusade to prohibit the sale of alcohol), the American people demanded a return to normalcy. Wilson, who had pinned America's role in the war and her role in the League so exclusively to high moral considerations and sacrifice, insured his own failure when Americans denounced the progressive agenda.(32) "In repudiating Wilson, the League, and the war itself, they repudiated the progressive rhetoric and the progressive mood".(33)
While each of these reasons may be valid, it may be equally as true that America repudiated the League for fear of repudiating Washington and Monroe. As Thomas Bailey explains, "Wilson could do battle with live men, and he did. But he could not do battle with dead men".(34) The spirit of Washington and Monroe was alive and well in 1920, as it is today in the year 2000. Bailey, on U.S. ratification of the League, would write, "Washington would stir uneasily in his tomb at Mount Vernon if he should learn that we were about to underwrite a league of nations and keep an army of American boys ready to fight strange people in strange lands".(35)
The Senate's rejection of the League of Nations began a long retreat in American foreign policy back towards isolationism. America would adhere to this policy until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941. During these intervening years, America turned increasingly inward.
The general sentiment in America during this time was that the Great War had been a great calamity. Over fifty thousand American doughboys had perished on the western front at St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne.(36) Americans were told during the war that they were fighting for morality and reason. It became clear shortly after the war that Europe had no intentions of honoring these principles. With peace at hand, Europe moved swiftly back to her historic vices of authoritarianism and rivalry.
The Congress, in the aftermath of the war, enacted several pieces of legislation that were designed to insulate America from economic and military provocations that might entangle her in the next conflict. In 1934, Congress passed a bill that prohibited loans to governments that were in default on their existing obligations to the U.S. Beginning in 1935, the Congress enacted a series of Neutrality Acts. These included (remembering the Lusitania) an act which declared that Americans traveling abroad did so at their own risk. A separate Neutrality Act established that "if a state of war existed between foreign states, the U.S. would impose an embargo on the shipment of arms to all belligerents".(37)
These acts handcuffed President Roosevelt. When in 1935, the League of Nations imposed an embargo on Italy for her invasion of Ethiopia, Roosevelt could only watch as America continued to supply oil to Mussolini. As the producer of more than half the world's oil at the time, America's decision ultimately doomed the League's action. Had she participated in the embargo, it is reasonable to conclude that Mussolini may have altered his course. America's decision ultimately became a signal to Mussolini, and more importantly, Hitler, that America would not intervene in Europe's conflicts. Winston Churchill, writing in the aftermath of the Second World War would write. "The inability of the powers to stop Mussolini's war of aggression played a part in an unfriendly and terrible war."(38)
During the Cold War, America would participate in a bipolar power struggle against the Soviet Union. During these years, she was actively engaged throughout the world to contain the expansion of communism. She would fight wars in Korea and Vietnam, not to uphold international law, but to prevent dominoes from falling. She would attempt to overthrow governments in Cuba, Lebanon and Libya because her "national interest was at stake."
On the diplomatic front, the Cold War paralyzed the institutions of the United Nations. As two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the U.S. and the Soviet Union held hostage the promise for greater economic progress and prosperity.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the American cycle appears to be in motion once again. Without an "evil empire" to destroy, the pendulum appears to be swinging back towards isolationism. This became clear during one of the recent presidential debates. George Bush, perhaps reading about the Age of Washington,(well, maybe not) declared that America must not look to become "nation builders." As if we had not "rebuilt" much of Europe and Japan. Gore argued persuasively that America has a responsibility to ensure peace and freedom in places such as the Balkans. He pointed out correctly that America's isolationism had been partly responsible for the Twentieth Century's two major military confrontations. While both men spoke, it appears that the majority of the "electors" agree with Bush. Americans have grave reservations about sending their boys to places like Somalia, East Timor, and Rwanda. Americans are more welcome in places such as Grenada and Panama.
A more ominous expression of America's retreat towards isolationism was Senator Jesse Helm's speech before the United Nations Security Council. In a clear and belligerent style, Helms declared that the U.S. would not become entangled in the activist interests of the United Nations. America, despite her treaty obligations to the UN, would reserve the right to ignore UN sanctioned programs that are antithetical to U.S. national interests. Anything less, he decried, would be to the detriment of American sovereignty. Invoking Lodge, he would remark that, "Treaty obligations can be superceded by an act of Congress. This was the intent of our founding fathers who cautioned against entering into entangling alliances."(39)
V. Conclusion
American foreign policy is filled with contradiction and paradox. Throughout her history, the conduct of her foreign policy has been subject to cyclical fluctuations of withdrawal and return, interventionism and isolationism. Often times, these shifts in her policy are a reflection of the ever changing public mood.
During her periods of interventionism, she would be largely responsible for the creation of the Twentieth Century's two great experiments in government. When her national interest coincides with international law, as was the case in Iraq, American intervention adds tremendous legitimacy to the mandate of international organizations.
During periods of withdrawal, she would be largely responsible for undermining the legitimacy and potential of international law. America's repudiation of the League of Nations effectively relegated the League to a "coffee club." Echoing the days of Washington and Monroe, America argued that the League of Nations was incompatible with the Monroe Doctrine. By obliging America to become involved in disputes outside the Western Hemisphere, the League was in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. By inviting the international community into the Western Hemisphere, the League was in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Scholars should take no great comfort in the prospects for greater American participation in the UN. While America professes to foster a better relationship, the UN faces the same ghosts that destroyed the League.
Hope may lie within the velocity of information technology. In the Nineteenth Century, the development of railroads, steamships, telegraphs and telegrams compressed time and space. These revolutions in technology fostered economic interdependence. This interdependence, in turn, fostered mutual cooperation. The Nineteenth Century saw the creation of several international organizations such as the International Telegraph Union and the International Postal Union to cope with these changes. It may be the case that the Internet Revolution prevents the U.S. from further disengagement.
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Bennet, A. Leroy, International Organizations (New Jersey, 1977).
Brinkley, Douglas, Witness to America (New York, 1999).
Hofstadter, Richard, The Age of Reform (New York, 1955).
Johnson, Paul, The Birth of the Modern (New York, 1991).
Kennedy, David M., Freedom from Fear (New York, 1999).
Kissenger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York, 1994).
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The Cycles of American History (New York, 1986).
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., The Age of Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1957).
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., A Life in the Twentieth Century (New York, 2000).
Ziring, Lawrence, The United Nations (New York 2000).
1. Brinkley, Douglas. Witness to America. Pg 37.
2. Bailey, Thomas. Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal. Pg 6.
3. Adams, Henry. The Education of Henry Adams. Pg 415.
4. Keegan, John. The First World War. Pg 3.
5. Auchincloss, Louis. Woodrow Wilson. Pg 69.
6. Auchincloss, Louis. Woodrow Wilson. Pg. 68.
7. Ibid 68.
8. Kissenger, Henry. Diplomacy. Pg. 44.
9. Ibid 48.
10. Ibid 48.
11. Bennet, Leroy. International Organizations. Pg. 21.
12. Ziring, Lawrence. The United Nations. Pg.485.
13. Ibid. Pg. 491.
14. Ibid. Pg.491.
15. Ibid. Pg.494.
16. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. The Age of Roosevelt. Pg. 324.
17. Kissenger, Henry. Diplomacy. Pg. 397.
18. Ziring, Lawrence. The United Nations. Pg. 504.
19. Ibid. Pg. 511.
20. Bennett, Leroy. International Organizations. Pg. 350.
21. Schlesinger, Arthur M.,Jr. The Cycles of American History. Pg. 53.
22. Ibid. Pg. 51.
23. Ibid. Pg. 51.
24. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Life in the Twentieth Century. Pg. 46.
25. Brinkley, Douglas. Witness to America. Pg. 37.
26. Ibid. Pg 37.
27. Johnson, Paul. The Birth of the Modern. Pg. 646.
28. Ibid. Pg. 646.
29. Kissenger, Henry. Diplomacy. Pg. 35.
30. Ibid. Pg. 32.
31. Bailey, Thomas. Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal. Pg.28.
32. Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform. Pg. 279.
33. Ibid. Pg. 281.
34. Bailey, Thomas. Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal. Pg. 31.
35. Ibid. Pg. 32.
36. Kennedy, David M. Freedom from Fear. 386.
37. Ibid. Pg. 394.
38. Ibid. Pg. 397.
39. www.senate.gov/helms