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RACIAL PROBLEMS

IN

HUNGARY

By

SCOTUS VIATOR

 

 

 

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CHAPTER XXI

The Racial Question A Summary

"Race is everything : there is no other truth."Disraeli.

" A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races, condemns itself ; a state which labours to neutralize, to absorb or to expel them, destroys its own vitality ; a state which does not include them, is destitute of the chief basis of self -government. " — Lord Acton.

 

IN the preceding seven chapters I have endeavoured to analyse the chief grievances from which the non-Magyar races of Hungary are suffering, and to show that the Law guaranteeing the Equal Rights of the Nationalities has long remained a dead letter in almost every particular. Primary and secondary education, instead of resting upon the principle of instruction in the mother tongue, has been for a generation past enlisted in the cause of Magyarization ; the state never erects non-Magyar schools, and only grants subsidies to those already existing, in order thereby to enforce a stricter control. The local administration is in the hands of a narrow and powerful caste, which by means of an illiberal franchise is able to hold the non-Magyars in a permanent minority, and to exclude them from the control of their local affairs ; the officials treat the Nationalities as foreign interlopers, and show little or no consideration for their languages and national customs and traditions. A far-reaching system of electoral corruption and gerrymandering, backed by a complicated and unequal franchise, makes it impossible for one-half of the population to gain more than twenty-five seats in Parliament, and concentrates all political power in the hands of a small clique of influential nobles and ecclesiastics, professional politicians and Jewish financiers. The dependence of the Judicature upon the executive renders the non-Magyar leaders liable to continual vexations at the hands of the law ; judges, prosecutors and juries are all alike recruited from the ranks of their bitterest enemies, and a hostile verdict is thus only too often a foregone conclusion. The persecution of the non-Magyar Press is carried on with the deliberate purpose /392/ of reducing it to a state of bankruptcy or subservience. The absence of any rights of Association and Assembly place the Nationalities and the Socialists at the mercy of the authorities, and renders infinitely more difficult the task of organization ; while the petty annoyances and restrictions imposed upon those Slavs and Roumanians who remain loyal to the language and traditions of their ancestors, embitter their lives and aggravate racial differences.

Such is the briefest possible summary of the present situation of the Nationalities of Hungary; and the reader, if he has studied my quotations from the official statistics, from the Magyar daily press and from the utterances of Hungarian statesmen, will already be aware that the governing classes of Hungary have pursued an active policy of Magyarization for more than a generation past, and that the frenzy has increased rather than abated since the commencement of the new century. To-day in Hungary it is a test of patriotism to deny the right of any Hungarian race save the Magyar to a distinct national existence. Louis Kossuth once wrote in his famous organ the Pesti Hírlap, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, there never was and cannot be a Slovak nation in Hungary." Coloman Tisza, during a memorable debate in the Hungarian Parliament, made the arrogant retort, "There is no Slovak nation." And in our own day a Magyar student of the racial question has written as follows : — "Our Nation­alities can never substitute any other culture for the Magyar ; for a special Serb, Roumanian or Slovak culture does not and cannot exist."[1] Such an attitude forces us to inquire into the meaning of the word "nationality," and no better definition can be found than that of one of the greatest and most liberal Magyar statesmen. Baron Eötvös in a well-known treatise argues that "we must recognize as a distinct nationality every aggregate of people in which the feeling of their distinct personality is awake."[2] If this test be applied to Hungary, it can no longer be denied that the non-Magyar races do possess distinct national cultures and indi­vidualities of their own ; and the proud retort of the Magyars that the Hungarian constitution knows of no nation save the Magyar, is a mere legal quibble at the expense of patent facts. The Roumanians, the Slovaks, the Serbs of Hungary /393/ are keenly conscious of their national rights and traditions, and are more determined than ever to assert them.

When travelling in Hungary, I was continually met by the shallow argument that the nationalist movement among the non-Magyar races is the work of a few agitators, and that it will soon collapse if only these are muzzled and imprisoned. This argument contains a slight grain of truth : for every political movement since the dawn of history has been the work of the few rather than of the many, and the masses of the people are always helpless when deprived of their leaders. But the argument at once falls to the ground when applied to the case in point. The policy of muzzling has now been in force (with a brief interval) for over thirty years, and so far from crushing out the movement, each fresh persecution only serves to add fuel to the fire. Moreover, a careful study of the statistics of these persecutions reveals the significant fact that the movement is by no means confined to a few agitators. Out of the 363 Roumanians who were tried for political offences between the years 1886 and 1896, there were 41 journalists, 29 advocates, 6 students, 1 engineer, but there were also 12 women, 5 doctors, 32 teachers and pro­fessors, 42 priests and no fewer than 155 peasant farmers and proprietors. In the same way, out of the 508 Slovaks who have been haled before the courts since 1896 for political offences, as many as 316 were simple peasants and many of the others apprentices and workmen. These figures in them­selves sufficiently disprove the assertion of the Chauvinists that a few professional agitators are responsible for all the mischiefan assertion for which not a vestige of proof can be adduced, and which could be applied with equal truth to the national Magyar movement of the early nineteenth century.

More than one distinguished and really enlightened Magyar has told me that the nationalist agitation is a mere matter of place-hunting. Give their leaders a few good posts, they argued, and the whole movement will die down. To this there is one very obvious answer: If the remedy is so ex­tremely simple, why has it never been applied ? The place-hunting argument is merely a convenient libel in the mouths of racial monopolists, and has been ingenuously believed and repeated by men who are far too honourable ever to employ it in private life. In reality the nationalist leaders have everything to gain by a betrayal of their principles. As one of them said to me with pardonable bitterness ; "Surely /394/

the Magyars do not suppose that we enjoy going to prison ? '' It is true that imprisonment affords many of the non-Magyar leaders opportunities, which have hitherto been denied them, of learning foreign languages and other subjects which will help them in their future career. A Slovak doctor whose acquaintance I had the privilege of making, is at present following the example of Louis Kossuth, and learning English in a Hungarian prison ; while Father Hlinka is endeavouring to acquire a knowledge of Roumanian under similar circum­stances. In the same way one of the pioneers of Social Demo­cracy in Hungaryby birth an uncultured peasant, but a man of original and receptive mindowed to the repeated terms of imprisonment to which he was subjected most of the education and no small portion of the knowledge to which his success was due. The Government, by its shortsighted cruelty, is thus contributing to the education of its political opponents, just as the reactionary policy of the Government in the forties rendered possible Louis Kossuth's oratorical triumphs in Britain and the United States.

This, however, is a point of view which is scarcely likely to appeal to the victims, and has merely been alluded to as one more proof of the folly of persecution. A national move­ment is Hydra-headed, and the arrest of its leaders is of no avail, unless it is followed by their execution. The Magyar newspaper which regretted the abolition of the grand old custom by which the city gates were decorated with the heads of agitators,[3] was thus merely expressingsomewhat crudely for the nineteenth century and "the most liberal nation in the world" — the view which every Magyar holds as a secret conviction.

So long as the governing classes of Hungary retain their present power and inclinations, the racial question will remain a mere question of brute forceeine Machtfrage, in the expres­sive German phrase. Just as formerly it was thought necessary to force all men into the bosom of the Church for the sake of their immortal souls, so now denationalization is justified on grounds of political expediency and the moral wellbeing of the victims. "Le prétexte ordinaire de ceux qui font le mal-heur des autres, est qu'ils veulent leur bien." In reality, the state is made a Moloch to which six races are to be sacri­ficed in the interest of the survivor. The sole possible justifi­cation for such a policy of Magyarization would be its success ; /395/ and of success no one cognizant of the facts can venture to speak. Despite all the efforts of successive governments, Magyarization has only been achieved among the Jews (who will remain Magyars just as long as the State, and not a moment longer) and among the Germans of the towns, who are natur­ally more amenable to Magyar influences. In the thirty years preceding the last census (1870-1900), the Magyars have gained 261 communes, but lost no fewer than 456 (a net loss of 195) : while the Roumanians, though they lost 42 communes to the Magyars and 22 to other races, have gained 362 com­munes (a net gain of 298). The Slovaks have gained 56 com­munes from the Magyars, but lost to them 89 others ; but they have made good this loss by a net gain of 175 communes at the expense of the Ruthenes.[4] Meanwhile the genuine Magyar population is beginning to lose ground ; emigration has thinned its ranks, and in recent years the "two-children system" has made alarming strides, especially among the peasantry of Baranya and Vas.[5]

The ill success which has attended all the efforts of the Chauvinists, does not disprove the existence of a policy of Magyarization : it merely proves its impossibility. It proves that blood and fire are the only effective means of assimilating eleven million human beings, and that unless these methods are adopted, the oppressive "half-measures" which act as substitute for extermination, will bitterly revenge themselves upon their authors. Moreover, the Magyars are courting /396/ danger when they appeal to force rather than right in the racial question, or when they seek to conceal this appeal under an insistence upon historic right. Brute force and historic right are only too often merely two sides of the same question ; and indeed a similar train of argument to that employed by the Magyars, would justify a revival of the realms of Svatopluk, of Dushan or of Zvonomir, or even a reduction of Hungary to the position which it occupied under Leopold I, or after the capitulation of Világos. In short, the argument of force reduces itself to claims of conquest dating from the ninth century, and any serious attempt to apply such an argument would plunge all Europe into a con­dition of anarchy, from which not even Hobbes's theories could rescue it.

The natural haughtiness of the Magyar has invented a term of reproach for each of the races which share Hungary with him. The German is contemptuously spoken of as the "Sváb" (Swabian), the Serb as "Vad Rácz" or thieving Rascian, the Roumanian as "oláh" or "Wallach" ; while the Slovak figures in the notorious proverb, "Tót nem ember" "the Slovak is not a man."[6] The non-Magyar schoolboy is mocked at and abused by his Magyar comrades and even by his masters. A Roumanian leader has told the story how his little boy, who attended a Magyar school, was made to learn the poem "Magyar vagyok, magyar maradok" (I am a Magyar, a Magyar I remain). His father consoled the child at night with the assurance that he would not be called upon to recite it. Next day the boy returned from school in floods of tears. The master had summoned him to repeat the poem ; at first he hesitated and remained silent, but when pressed, he at length altered the opening words to "Román vagyok, román maradok," and was beaten for his insolence to the Magyar nation. "And what do the Magyars gain by such compulsion?" added the father as he told the tale ; "they simply plant hatred, the deadliest hatred, in the children's souls ; and they themselves will reap the fruits."[7] A Roumanian deputy, Mr. Maniu, put even the Chauvinists of the Coalition to shame, when in the autumn of 1906 he told the House how his kinsmen in Transylvania were greeted at school /397/ by cries of "Stinking Wallach." And never shall I myself forget the impression left upon me by a conversation with another Roumanian leader, a man of the highest culture and intelligence. "Whatever happens," he said to me, "I mean to send my children to Magyar schools ; but my wife does not approve of the idea." "Oh, really," I said, not much interested and little dreaming what was coming. "Yes," he went on, "I myself was educated at Magyar schools, and what we young Roumanians had to endure there, can never be forgotten in this life. I wish my children to go through the same experience : children of that age never forget."[8] The tone in which he spoke left me in no doubt as to the depth of his feeling ; and the incident gave me more insight into the racial question than many weeks spent in the study of books and statutes.

There are, of course, many educated non-Magyars who take the Magyar sidewho in fact go further and abjure their native language and customs, and load with abuse those who refuse to follow their craven example. But this does not prove the justice of the Magyar cause ; it only proves that, human nature being what it is, men will always be found who prefer "the loaves and fishes" to the bitter bread of adver­sity. For the young Slovak or Roumanian entering upon life, the choice of a career is a matter of grave difficulty. Every public position, every office high or low, almost every chance of distinction in life depends upon his accepting "the idea of the Magyar state" and becoming an advocate of Magyar as opposed to non-Magyar culture. An almost irresistible premium is put upon apostasy, and then we are told that apostasy is voluntary and not demoralizing in the highest degree. Those who are loudest in their profession of Magyar sentiments, will often be found to be renegades, alike in nation­ality and in faith ; and more than one Slovak landowner or Galician Jew has been known to denounce the scandal of per­mitting in Hungary any language or national traditions save the Magyar. But if once the wind blew steadily from another /398/ quarter, these "patriots" would strike a very different note. The growth of national feeling among the non-Magyar races is not, then, the work of a few agitators ; it is a natural evolution, a fresh stage in the history of South-Eastern Europe. The resistance of the Magyars to such a movement can com­mand neither our approval nor our respect; for it is at once a crime against civilization, and a futile attempt to hold in check the forces of nature. The Magyars persist in ignoring that moral and political country which Burke distinguished so carefully from the geographical. They aim at uniformity, and dream of "a national unitary Magyar state," which can only be erected upon the ruins of liberty. For "liberty provokes diversity, and diversity preserves liberty by supply­ing the means of organization. . . . The co-existence of several nations under the same state is a test, as well as the best security, of its freedom." "The denial of nationality implies the denial of political liberty."[9]

The various solutions which have been suggested for the racial question may be roughly grouped under four headsassimilation, autonomy, federalism and separatism.

(1) The first alternative that the non-Magyar races should abandon their national identity, languages and culture and should submit to assimilation by the Magyarsneed hardly be discussed seriously. Even the most degraded and back­ward people possesses the instinct of self-preservation, and in a much higher degree the races whom the Magyars would fain assimilate. The very variety of their traditions and culture increases the difficulty of the task; for it is not a struggle between two rival cultures, but a war of extermina­tion waged by a single culture simultaneously against five fronts. With the single exception of the Germans, all the non-Magyar races of Hungary are undoubtedly more backward than the Magyars a fact which must be ascribed to their misfortune rather than to their faults. But the difference lies not between culture and unculture, but merely between varying degrees of culture ; and the progress made by the Nationalities during the last thirty years has greatly diminished both this difference and the prospects of assimilation.

Above all the numerical strength of the Nationalities forms a fatal obstacle to their Magyarization. In point of fact all the non-Magyar races have shown a numerical increase at each census since the Ausgleich ; and the addition of two /399/ million recruits to the Magyar ranks between the years 1880 and 1900[10] is a statistical triumph which is open to the very gravest doubts. But even if we accept it as strictly accurate we find that the Magyars form only 54.4 per cent. (8,588,834) of the population of Hungary proper (exclusive of Croatia-Slavonia), as compared with 48.6 per cent. (8,132,740) non-Magyars. From the former figure must be deducted 594,451 Jews, to say nothing of the numerous Jewish converts and other renegades. Thus even according to the most favour­able estimate, we find that for every Magyar in existence there is one non-Magyar who must be assimilated before Hungary can become a "national Magyar state" ; and this is rendered infinitely more difficult by the fact that almost seven millions of the population do not even understand the language of their rulers.[11]

Obviously, then, Magyarization is a mere Utopian idea, such as could only be realized by exercizing the same pressure which sent the author of Utopia to the scaffold. The German Empire, with its 60,000,000 inhabitants, aided by an administra­tive machine as perfect as that of Hungary is faulty, has utterly failed in its efforts to assimilate the three million Poles of Posen. Seven centuries of English occupation have failed to destroy the feeling of Irish nationality ; and to-day, despite the gradual disappearance of linguistic differences and the support of a powerful Anglophil minority, we seem to be as far as ever from a solution of the problem. How, then, can eight million Magyars, a tiny drop in the Slav ocean, who do not possess a world-language like German or English, whose institutions cannot bear a comparison with those of Western Europe, whose culture, despite many excellent and brilliant features, is not of that outstanding quality which alone could endow it with expansive energyhow can they ever hope to assimilate races whose languages, despite their linguistic poverty, have a far higher economic value in the modern struggle for life ? The Magyar language, so far from being the barbarous jargon for which its enemies hold it, is expressive and sonorous, and possesses a rich poetic literature whose charm and originality cannot be disputed. But none the less it is and always will remain a fatal handicap to Magyarization, since it forms a linguistic backwater outside the main currents of European thought and culture. It /400/ is not spoken beyond the narrow bounds of Hungary,[12] and even within its own country occupies an inferior economic status to German, which is the lingua franca of commerce and finance throughout South-Eastern Europe. No foreigner will ever take the trouble to learn the Magyar language, unless he wishes to reside in Hungary or to make a special study of its institutions; nor would he do so, even if it were the easiest language in Europe, instead of being one of the most difficult. The non-Magyar races of Hungary are very differently situated; and interest as well sentiment prompts each of them to remain true to the language of their ancestors. The Germans can hardly be expected to renounce for the sake of Magyar unity the countless advantages which kinship with Austria and Germany confers; while the Slavs are even less likely to shut themselves off from intercourse with the hundred and fifty millions of the Slav world, and to restrict their out­look to the narrow provincial vista of Budapest. At present the Slovak pedlar can wander from Pressburg to Vladivostok without encountering serious linguistic difficulties; while the educated Croat or Slovak, after a month's study, can read Turgeniev or Dostoievsky in the original.  The "literary Panslavism " conceived of by Kollár is no fantastic ideal; that it has not been realized long ago is solely due to the backwardness of education in Slav countries.

But quite apart from the practical realities of linguistic Panslavism, each of the Slav races of Hungary forms with its own immediate kinsmen across the frontier a race which is at least as numerous as the Magyar. The Serbo-Croatian language is spoken by about nine million persons, and is spread over an area as large as Great Britain. The Ruthene or Little Russian language is spoken by almost thirty million people, and may be heard as far east as Azov and the Caspian Sea. Even the Slovak language is so closely allied to the Czech, that the two races can communicate without difficulty, the more so as Czech is still the church language of the Lutheran .Slovaks ; thus Czechs and Slovaks together amount to very nearly nine millions. Even the Roumanians are more numer­ous than the Magyars, reaching in the various countries which they inhabit a total of little under ten millions.

Thus even if we admitted assimilation to be desirable in the abstract, we should still regard its realization as a wild chimsera, utterly beyond the bounds of practical politics. /401/

(2) The natural antithesis to a policy of assimilation is to be found in separatist tendencies ; and as a matter of fact it has become an almost universal practice among the Magyars to charge the nationalist leaders not merely with lack of patriotism but with direct treason and disloyalty. Refusal on their part to adopt the Magyar language and culture earns for the Slovak or Ruthene the nickname of "Pansláv," for the Roumanian that of "Daco-Roman," for the Serb that of Pan-Serb ; and all these terms of abuse are glibly bestowed by adherents of the Pan-Magyar ideal, by the most violent racial propagandists of the modern world. The word " Pan­sláv," as applied to the Slovaks, is a misnomer for Slavophil. Every Magyar, either unconsciously or deliberately, confuses these two very different conceptions; and the loose habit, so widespread in the Magyar Press, of describing as "Pan-slavism" all agitation in favour of the Slovak language, has served to increase the confusion. As I have endeavoured to show in former chapters, it is little short of ludicrous to accuse the Slovaks of Panslavism in its true Russophil sense. All their traditions are Western, and ties of religion and language bind them to Prague rather than to St. Petersburg, while their spontaneous action at every crisis in modern Hungarian history, effectually proves that their sympathies lie with Austria rather than with Russia.

In the case of the Ruthenes, Russian sympathies would be more natural, since they form one of the two main branches of the Russian race, and since the Greek Uniate Church to which they belong has preserved more than one resemblance to the Orthodox Eastern Church.[13] Tactless Magyarization has actually driven some of the Uniate Ruthenes to secede to Orthodoxy, and fantastic tales of the Great White Czar are from time to time traceable among the ignorant peasantry. /402/

But to speak of active "Panslavism" among the Ruthenes is a patent exaggeration, and the modern movement in Galicia, which reacts upon the few leaders whom they possess, is quite as hostile to Moscow as to Cracow.

The Pan-Serb propaganda, of which so much has been heard during the past year, must be considered from a different standpoint. Historic traditions of several centuries justify and explain the close intercourse between the Serbs of Hun­gary and their kinsmen in Belgrad. Southern Hungary was long a harbour of refuge for the Serb race, whose Patriarch received numerous privileges from Leopold I and his suc­cessors. Neusatz (Újvidék) thus became a focus of Serb national culture in the days when a Turkish pasha misgoverned in Belgrad. Many Hungarian Serbs joined Kara George and Milosch Obrenovitch in their struggle for liberty, and volun­teers from Servia returned the compliment in 1848 and fought under Stratimirovič against the Magyars. This did not deter the exiled Kossuth from negotiating with Prince Michael of Servia and holding out the prospect of concessions to the Nationalities; but the hopes thus kindled among the Hun­garian Serbs were rudely dispelled by the severity with which Coloman Tisza crushed the Serbophil agitation of Miletič during the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876. Since then the Serbs of South Hungary have declined both in numbers and in influence, and do not constitute a danger for the Magyars. In Slavonia, where the Serb element is virile and progressive, the situation is different. It has been the settled policy of the Magyars for a generation past to sow discord between the Serbs and the Croats ; and Baron Ranch's recent campaign against persons suspected of Pan-Serbism is a despairing effort on the part of the Budapest Government to under­mine the unlooked-for "solidarity" displayed by the Serbo-Croatian Coalition in the Diet of Agram.

The phantom of Pan-Germanism has also raised its head from time to time among the prosperous Swabian peasantry of South Hungary ; and the active anti-Magyar propaganda of the Pan-German League in Munich gave the Magyars some pretext for reprisals. The obvious impossibility of the scat­tered German colonies of the Banat and Transylvania ever forming part of a greater Germany, did not deter the Gov­ernment. The poem " Gedenk' dass du ein Deutscher bist " brought upon its author's head a charge of instigation against the Magyar nationality, and he was ejected from /403/

the land which had inspired the exquisite lyrics of Nicholas Lenau.[14]

In resenting the influence which Bucarest exercises upon the Roumanians of Transylvania, the Magyars forget that it is above all due to their own policy. Quite apart from the thousands of Roumanian labourers whom economic reasons have driven to emigrate, a numerous band of political emigres has found its way to Bucarest during the past forty years — • educated Roumanians for whom there was no opening in their native Hungary and who therefore sought their fortunes in the young kingdom of Roumania. That these persons, many of whom fill posts of distinction in their adopted country, are openly hostile to the Magyars and seek to inflame the public opinion of Roumania against them, finds its explana­tion in human nature. That certain exaltés dream of a Pan-Roumanian state stretching from Orsova to Kischinev and from Constanza to Grosswardein, would not be worth deny­ing ; for such fantastic schemes have their parallel in every civilized country. But they do not enjoy the support of any serious leader of opinion in either country, and the dangers which any attempt to realize them would involve alike for Roumania, for Austria-Hungary and for Europe, have long been clearly understood in Bucarest. The present Premier of Roumania, Mr. Demeter Sturdzaformerly a zealous champion of his Transylvanian kinsmensummarized this view in a notable speech in the Roumanian Senate in November, 1893. "No one in our kingdom," he said, "thinks of con­quering Transylvania, because we do not possess the strength for such an undertaking: because such an undertaking, even were it possible, would of necessity involve the disruption of Austria-Hungary, and because this destruction would be fatal to the Roumanians themselves and would cause a general disturbance in Europe. . . . The existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is a European necessity of the first order, just as the existence of the Roumanian state is also. As the former cannot undertake anything against the exist­ence of the Roumanian state, so the kingdom of Roumania cannot take steps against the existence of Austria Hungary. That is the political basis of the conditions in Eastern Europe, and hence all Irredentist tendencies are nothing but absurd and morbid fancies or criminal designs ; hence, fortunately, /404/ such tendencies cannot gain ground, and have no political significance whatever."[15]

The reckless charges of separatist tendencies levelled against the Nationalities need not be taken too seriously. The Magyars claim a monopoly of treasonable practices, and resent the stubborn loyalty which the Roumanians of Transylvania have always displayed towards the House of Habsburg. In reality the connexion with Austria shields Hungary from the very possibility of Pansláv or Daco-Romanist schemes being realized at her expense. For aspirations which are merely ridiculous when directed against the Dual Monarchy, would enter the realm of practical politics as soon as Hungary stood alone. In that event, Roumania, with her brilliant army and reorganized finances, could not be blamed for attempt­ing the conquest of Transylvania, while Servia might be in­clined to seek compensation in the Banat for the loss of Bosnia. Hungarian independence, in whatever form it might be achieved, would involve at least temporary military and financial disorganization ; and a Serbo-Roumanian alliance, with the possible co-operation of Bulgaria, would have strong prospects of success, the more so as the non-Magyar popula­tion of Hungary could not be relied upon in a war against their own flesh and blood.

Separatism, then, can only be regarded as a solution by those ignorant persons who believe in a dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and the inevitable European conflagration which that event would kindle.

(3) A third alternative is the revision of the present Dual system, and the substitution of a federal constitution for the entire Habsburg dominions. The most celebrated Federal proposal is that of the Bohemian historian Palacky, who advocated the formation of eight national groups or provinces,[16] /405/ each with its own local diet, but all subject to the central Parliament in Vienna in matters of defence, diplomacy, finance, commerce and customs. Curiously enough Palacky put forward the Hungarian constitutionpurified from certain obvious abuses as a model for the local diets ; for not all his Slav prejudices could blind him to the fact that the kernel of Hungarian institutions was thoroughly sound[17] and that its imperfections were mere temporary blemishes. In Palacky' s happy phrase, of the three constitutional systems which are possible in the Habsburg Monarchy, Centralism secures the hegemony to the Germans alone: Dualism partitions it between two races, the Germans and the Magyars; Federalism alone guarantees those equal rights of all nationalities which it is the historic mission of Austria to achieve. For him national equality simply meant the emancipation of the Slavs and Roumanians from the Germans and Magyars.

The October Diploma of 1860 would have made development upon Palacky's lines possible, without at the same time tilting recklessly at the Hungarian constitution as did the February Patent of 1861.[18] But the experiment remained on paper ; and the statesmen of the day, after vainly attempting to impose a rival Centralist scheme, were at length forced by external circumstances to adopt Dualism as a necessary com­promise of the moment. In the generation following upon the Ausgleich, political power was monopolized in Austria and in Hungary by the Germans and the Magyars[19]; and Palacky's ideas fell into abeyance. By an irony of fate, their revival has coincided with the most violent of all the Magyar onslaughts upon the Dual System, and has been reserved for one of the victims of a Magyarizing policy. Mr. Aurel Popovici, who in his student days was sentenced by a Magyar jury to four years' imprisonment for his advocacy of the Roumanian cause, published in the spring of 1906 a book entitled The United States of Great Austria. The facts that it has been adopted by the Jingoes of Vienna as the basis of their Pan-Austrian designs, and that the Hungarian Government thought it worthy of the honour of confiscation, have brought the book into further prominence.

Mr. Popovici propounds an elaborate scheme for a Federal /406/ Austria, composed of fifteen racial states,[20] each possessing a Diet where local affairs would be discussed in the local language, but each sending delegates to a central Parliament, to which all matters of diplomacy, defence, finance, customs, railways, coinage, patents and civil and criminal law would be referred. The central Government would be conducted by an Imperial Chancellor, and an Imperial Court of Appeal would decide disputes between the various states. The German language would necessarily be adopted as the official language of the Empire. Special privileges would be secured to the smaller racial enclaves scattered throughout the terri­tories of the larger nationalities; and the mediaeval historic boundaries would be definitely abandoned. As for the Mag­yars, ils morderont sur du granit (!) and their discontent would be paralysed by the gratitude and approval of all the other races of a regenerated Empire.

The fatal objection to Popovici's scheme lies in his own admission that it could never be accomplished by Parliamentary means, and that the Emperor alone is capable of achieving this truly national coup d'etat. Racial prejudice blinds Popovici to the manifold injustice which would inevitably attend it, and to the deadly injury which it would deal to constitutional Government throughout South-Eastern Europe.

A far more brilliant and original proposal is that of Dr. Carl Renner,[21] better known under his pseudonym of " Rudolf Springer." Realizing that no system of provincial autonomy can hope to unravel all the intermingling racial threads of the Habsburg dominions, he boldly abandoned as imprac­ticable this solution of the racial question. Nation and State never have been, and never will be convertible terms, and so long as " the fetich of provincial boundaries " is not de­throned, friction between the various races is bound to con­tinue. " The Crown Lands (Kronländer) are the internal enemy of the Habsburg Monarchy." A clear distinction must be drawn between the state as a territorial conception, and nationality as a conception of individuality, of kinship, of mutual association. This distinction leads " Rudolf /407/ Springer" to the highly ingenious idea of creating a dual basis for the executivea territorial and a national; the individual citizen would thus in all national matters be subject to his own national corporation, but in all other respects to the ordinary civil authorities. In short, the national problem would be solved in the same way as the religiousand the Nationalities, like the Churches, would be recognized as cor­porate bodies in the State. The adherence of a particular citizen to a particular nationality would concern the State as little (or as much) as his adherence to a particular creed, and would altogether cease to be a menace to the unity of the State. National "universities" would be formed, in the mediaeval sense of the word "universitas" ; each nationality would form a corporation within the State ; and the new territorial unit of the Circuit (Distrikt or Kreis) would be the foundation upon which to rest the machinery of interracial com­promise.[22]

There is every reason to hope that " Rudolf Springer's " ideas will be realized in Austria before many years have elapsed ; a promising beginning has already been made in Moravia, where the system of national voting colleges for the elections to the Diet has been attended with very real success. But its application to the Monarchy, as a whole, is much more improbable. Some revision of the Ausgleich is doubtless inevi­table ůrthe course of the next twenty years ; but the abrogation of Dualism in favour of a federal system is only possible if the Independents of Hungary persist in their separatist policy, and thus drive Austria and the dynasty into alli­ance with Croatia, the Nationalities and the Socialists. "Ru­dolf Springer" does not appear to realize that his theories could be carried into effect both in Austria and in Hungary, without necessarily affecting the Dualist structure of the State. To him, as to Popovici, the Magyars are a fatal obstacle, which cannot be bent and therefore must be broken.

(4) A somewhat less revolutionary or improbable solution is the grant of autonomy to the various races. This might take two forms. Either the autonomy of Transylvania might /408/ be revived, the privileged position of the old historic nations[23] might be restored, and similar privileges assured to the other races of the country[24]; or new political divisions might be introduced, and local Diets created for each of the various nationalities, all subject to the central Parliament in Buda­pest. But not even the most uncompromising Roumanian leader of to-day regards Transylvanian autonomy as practical, or even desirable ; and it merely remains on their programme as a protest against the treatment meted out to them since the Union, and as an article of barter in view of possible nego­tiations. In the same way the pia desideria uttered by the Slovak leaders of the sixties, no longer commend them­selves to their more practical successors, and indeed have been abandoned by all save a few dreamers in provincial towns.[25]

Racial autonomy is a solution which is open to many grave objections; but its impossibility is clinched by the fact that the Magyars could never be induced to give their consent. In the words of Eötvös, "the question of nationality rests not upon logic but upon sentiment, and no solution can be accepted as just or permanent which is distasteful to any of the races of the country." Provincial autonomy would weaken not merely the Magyar race, but also the Hungarian nation ; while the possible advantages which it might secure to the Nationalities could be attained far more effectively by less drastic measures.

The lour solutions which we have discussed would all seem open to radical objections and difficulties. It would there­fore be mere presumption on the part of a foreigner to pro­pound a rival scheme. But there can be no objection to summarizing the most necessary of the reforms which are an essential preliminary to its solution.

I. There must be a wide extension of the parliamentary franchisewide enough to admit the vast mass of working men to political rights, and only withheld (if withheld at all) from those who cannot read and write. This reform must be based upon five leading principles : (a) secret ballot, with /409/ unsigned voting papers drawn up in all the local languages ; (b) polling in each commune ; (c) conduct of elections by officials sent from headquarters; (d) distribution of seats according to racial boundaries, and on a basis of population; (e) elaborate precautions against corruption, and their strict enforcement.

II.  This reform must be followed by a revision and demo­cratization of County Government on the following lines: —

(a)  Redistribution of the counties according to racial boun-

daries.

(b)  Wide extension of the franchise for the county assemblies,

but retention of a low tax qualification.

(c)  Abolition of "virilist" votes.

(d) Appointment of officials for life and revision of the

form of election.

(e) Employment of such officials only as have passed ade­quate tests in the various local languages. (f) Right of any member of a county or communal assembly to employ his own language during the debates, (g) Retention of Magyar as the official language of the minutes in all county and communal assemblies, but their publication also in any language spoken by one-third of the population in the county or commune in question.

In all this it should be possible to follow the principles of local government which are practised in the British Isles. In other words, it should be possible, without granting any kind of autonomy to the various nationalities, to introduce special legislation to meet their individual requirements. There is no reason why the Slovaks should not possess an educational system of their own, just as the Scottish nation has its own systems of education, law and local Government, without any system of " Home Rule." There is no reason why the law courts of Transylvania should not be specially organized to suit Roumanian and Saxon needs, just as the courts of Dublin and Edinburgh are essentially distinct from those of London.

III.  Judicial Reforms. The introduction of Slovak on equal terms with Magyar as the language of the courts of first instance in purely Slovak districts, and the extension of the same principle to the German, Roumanian, Ruthene and Serb districts.

IV.  Unrestricted Right of Assembly and Association.

 

/410/

Hence the right to found leagues, societies and clubs for any purpose, whether cultural or political. Incidentally the funds and buildings of the Matica Slovenska ought to be restored.

V.  Right of Petition. The right of every citizen to present petitions and complaints to the courts in his own language.

VI.  Liberty of the Press, and the abandonment of political actions against the Nationalities and the Socialists, save in altogether exceptional cases. Tins would involve a revision of paragraphs 171 to 173 of the Criminal Code, regarding "incitement of one nationality against another." If these offensive clauses are to be retained at all, they must at least be enforced equally against Magyars and non-Magyars, not exclusively against the latter as hitherto. For instance, the misuse of the word "Pansláv" to describe advocates of the Slovak language, should be rigorously repressed.

VII.  Education. The fulfilment of the State's pledge (1868, XLIV. § 17) to provide instruction in the mother tongue "up to the point where the higher academic culture begins." This would involve (a) the introduction of Slovak as the lan­guage of instruction in all primary schools in purely Slovak districts, and in a due proportion in mixed districts ; (b) the introduction of Slovak as language of instruction in a certain number of the industrial and commercial schools maintained by the State ; (c) the erection of at least three Slovak gymnasia and one Slovak Academy of Law; (d) provision for proper instruction in the Slovak language both in teachers' seminaries and in the Catholic and Lutheran theological colleges.

Similar treatment must be extended to all the other races of the country.

VIII.  Use of the non-Magyar languages in addition to Magyar on all taxation schedules, Government notices and circulars, and in all railway stations and post-offices.

IX.  Total abolition of the offence of laudatio criminis.

X.  Entire immunity of all members of Parliament for all political offences save high treason.

XI.  Substitution of the baton for the rifle in the gendar­merie, or at least the imposition of more stringent rules against the provocative and callous behaviour of the gendarmes, which so often leads to bloodshed.

XII.  The introduction of a clear distinction between the words "Hungarian" and "Magyar" in all legal documents and official communications, and the adoption of this distinc-

 

/411/

tion by the Magyar press. So long as the official language of the country employs one and the same word ("magyar") for two such different conceptions as "the political Hungarian nation" and "the ethnical Magyar race," and so long as responsible statesmen perpetuate this misunderstanding in their speeches, the fundamental condition for clear thinking upon the racial question is lacking, and the lamentable con­fusion of ideas which prevails in Hungary to day will continue or grow worse.

None of these suggestions in any way impair the sovereignty of the Crown of St. Stephen or the territorial unity of Hun­gary : and it cannot be argued that it would dethrone the Magyar language from its dominant position. They would merely deprive the Magyars of their unjust racial monopoly, and force them to rely for their supremacy upon moral and intellectual qualities. Magyar would still remain the official language of State, and the sole language of Parlia­mentary debate, of the central executive and of the courts of appeal. A complete mastery of the Magyar language would still be an essential qualification for every official in the Government departments, in the county jurisdictions and in the courts of law. The Magyar language would remain the official language of the two Hungarian Universities, and a compulsory subject in all secondary schools.

It must not of course be supposed that such a programme would be acceptable to the Coalition Government. But this need not disturb us, for Hungary's future does not lie with them. The day of reckoning is at hand, and Universal Suf­frage, even if it does not deprive the Coalition of their Parlia­mentary majority, will introduce new democratic elements into the House and infuse a new tone into public discussion. It is useless to expect reform from a racial oligarchy ; only the coming People's Parliament can regenerate Hungary.

The racial question in Hungary is not without its bearing upon the crisis in the Near East. So long as the governing classes of Hungary pursue a Slavophobe policy, and by their treatment of the Nationalities render cordial relations between the Dual Monarchy and her southern neighbours impossible, so long will the Northern Balkans remain discontented and unsettled, and the burning question of Serbo-Croatian unity — beside which that of a Big Bulgaria is mere child's play — will remain unsolved. The present political situation of the /412/

race is intolerable, and keeps the whole eastern side of the Adriatic in a fluid condition. The Serb race owns allegiance to five different states ; three millions are to be found in the kingdom of Servia, two and a half millions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, half a million in Turkey, a million in Croatia-Slavonia, and half a million in South Hungary. Add to this the Croats in Croatia and Dalmatia, and we have a homo­geneous population inhabiting a tract of country almost as extensive as England and Scotland together. That so numer­ous a race, whose national consciousness has long been thor­oughly awake, can be subjected indefinitely to uncongenial forms of government, is quite unthinkable in the twentieth century. Nowhere in Europe does historic tradition count for so much as among the southern Slavs, to whom the glories of Stephen Dushan and St. Sava, and the stricken field of Kossovo are living memories even to-day. But the present position of the kingdom of Servia is untenable. The feuds of rival parties still leave her internal policy at the mercy of the ex-Premier, Dr. Pašič, a man of ability but of chequered past ; while the sinister figures of the regicides lurk in the background and spin their intrigues even within the walls of the Konak itself. Externally Servia remains as ever at the mercy of the Dual Monarchy, whose occupation of Bosnia and the Sandjak cut her off from the sea and holds her in abject economic vassalage. The uncertain position of King Peter and his dynasty affects the country's prestige, while the smouldering feud with Bulgaria, which the new situation is likely to kindle into flame, adds to the general uncertainty and to the depression of trade caused by the recent tariff war with Austria-Hungary, The Bulgarian propaganda had endangered Servian influence in the Turkish province of Old Servia, and until the Turkish revolution suspended racial strife, Servia was straining every nerve to check the activity of the Bulgar bands and to reassert her claims to the Ottoman inheritance.

Meanwhile she is accused of Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia, where the growing discontent of thirty years can no longer be kept hidden from the outer world. Austro-Hungarian rule has worked wonders in the occupied provinces, and has reclaimed a desert for civilization. But no well-informed Austrian would attempt to deny that certain administrative abuses do exist, and that the Catholic propa­ganda of Archbishop Stadler has aroused intense resentment /413/

among the Orthodox and Mohammedan Serbs who together form over two-thirds of the population. Unhappily Baron Burian's tactful and enlightened endeavour to introduce self-government by instalments, has met with opposition from the permanent officials, the Magyar Government and the Catholic hierarchy, and has not been rendered easier by the Bosnians themselves. The idea that discontent in Bosnia is due to Pan-Serb propaganda can easily be traced to the present Ban of Croatia and to Budapest official sources; for the Magyars, having no kinsmen of their own, seem incap­able of realizing that ties of kinship are stronger than artificial frontiers. In reality most of the surplus energy at Belgrad which survives the endless feuds of Old and Young Radicals, of regicides and adherents of the Obrenovitch, had been ex­pended upon Macedonia, not upon Bosnia. Indeed the Bosnians need no prompting, and the telegram addressed by their refugee leaders to the sovereigns at Reval showed them to be alive to the situation and if necessary prepared for action. But this does not of course mean that the feeling of Serb solidarity has been weakened ; on the contrary it is stronger than ever, and the Bosnian crisis has dispelled the temporary friction between the Courts of Belgrade and Cettinje. Meanwhile the attitude of Austria-Hungary towards Servia is to a great extent determined by the situation in Croatia. Till recently the rivalry of Serb and Croatwho represent the difference between East and West, between Byzantium and Rome, between Athos and Monte Cassinoplaced Croatia at the mercy of the Hungarian Government for a whole genera­tion. But the rashness of Mr. Kossuth and the Coalition has destroyed the old Magyarophil party in Croatia : Croat and Serb are united against Budapest. To-day Agram aspires to be the capital of a South Slav kingdom within the Habsburg Monarchy ; and the most serious opposition to this comes not from Belgrad but from Budapest. The realization of this ambition would involve the substitution of "Trialism" for Dualism, and would deal a fatal blow to the Magyar hege­mony in Hungary. Even as it is, Croatia has been governed absolutely since February, 1908; Baron Rauch has degraded the high office of Ban of Croatia to that of a mere "exponent of the Hungarian Government"; he and his ministers (sectional chiefs) have not a single follower in the Diet of Agram, and therefore the Diet is not allowed to sit. The Croatian Aus­gleich has been violated by the important Railways Act of /414/

last year ; the autonomy of the Croatian University is in­fringed, and the prisons of Croatia are being filled with persons suspected of Pan-Serb leanings. All these oppressive measures have only served to strengthen the Serbo-Croatian solidarity ; and the Magyars, who deluged Europe with charges of Austrian absolutism, have themselves been converted by an irony of fate into the stern upholders of Absolutism in Croatia.

This situation cannot last indefinitely, and the annexation of Bosnia will bring the Croatian crisis to a head. There are already signs of an approaching contest between Austria and Hungary as to the legal status of the new provinces. Hun­gary seeks to revive the ancient suzerainty of the Crown of St. Stephen over Bosnia, forgetting that to enforce the claims of Louis the Great would involve a war of conquest against Roumania and Servia. Austria on the other hand takes up the position that the original occupation in 1878 rests not upon historic right, but upon a mandate of the Powers and upon the necessities of her own geographical situation ; Bos­nia's position as a Turkish province is the sole historic fact which requires to be considered, and hence if claims of con­quest and suzerainty have any value, obviously the Sultan must resume possession. In this conflict of opinion, Croatian support will be an invaluable asset ; and when the new Bos­nian Diet meets, Parliamentary government can no longer be suspended in Croatia. The opposition of Servia and Mon­tenegro need not greatly alarm the Ballplatz, so long as Croatia approves of the annexation; but if the Croats were driven by the reactionary Magyar policy into the arms of Belgrade, then the position of the Monarchy would be one of real danger. Everything points to the need of a definite understanding between Vienna and Agram. This forms part of a natural evolution, and will only be delayed, not averted, by a postponement of electoral reform in Hungary. The politicians who supply in Budapest the place of statesmen, are between the Scylla of racial equality and the Charybdis of social revolution.

Meanwhile for Servia the all-important problem of foreign policy is a reconciliation with the Dual Monarchy; and more than one far-sighted politician has favoured closer union with her great neighbour. Economic and military unity need not affect Servian independence, as is shown by the present position of Hungary ; while the example of the Ger­man Bundesfürsten shows that such a step need not even involve /415/

the expulsion of the native Servian dynasty. For Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, the main problem is whether the union of the Southern Slavs is to be achieved with her aid or despite her opposition; and the voluntary inclusion of Servia within the Habsburg Monarchy might prove the first step towards a final solution of the complicated South Slav question. Unhappily the consent of Servia is more than doubtful, and the growing war fever may sweep King Peter off his feet. Servia's natural allies are Turkey and Italy, but it is probable that the latter has been neutralized by Austrian assurances of support in Tripoli or even in Albania. Servia's declara­tion of war without an ally could only result in the occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and then Russian intervention would be almost inevitable. The bellicose utterances of Prince George of Servia are sufficiently explained by a desire to restore the Karageorgevitch dynasty to popular favour, but they also represent a dangerous speculation upon the goodwill of the Russian Jingoes. A true instinct tells the young prince that Servia's final submission to the loss of Bosnia without territorial compensation, would cost his father and himself the throne ; but he seems less willing to realize the absolute madness of an aggressive policy. A close understanding between Servia and the Dual Monarchy would be desirable from every point of view; but unfor­tunately the trend of opinion in both countries is at present strongly in the opposite direction.

The Austro-Hungarian Government very naturally differs from those of her neighbours who affect to regard the occupation as provisional rather than permanent. But while all reasonable persons in this country will admit that the civilization of Vienna is superior to that of Belgrade, and that annexation was merely a question of time, they will, on the other hand, strongly deprecate Baron Aehrenthal's choice of time and will find it difficult to comprehend Austrian indifference to treaty obligations. The Treaty of London (1871), to which the Dual Monarchy was a party, expressly laid down that "no Power can break its treaty engagements or modify their stipulations except by friendly agreement and with the assent of the other contracting parties." These words defy all Baron Aehrenthal's attempts at explanation. At the same time it would be unjust to regard the Ballplatz as a mere dupe of Germany's desire to throw back the cause of /416/

disarmament; for (long before the present crisis) all serious statesmen were aware that the Balkan situation rendered disarmament impossible. Besides there are good grounds for believing that Baron Aehrenthal acted without consulting his German ally, whose faculty for keeping state secrets has been startlingly illustrated by the now famous interview in the Daily Telegraph.

In seeking to evade international control of the Bosnian question and to negotiate with the Porte alone, Austria-Hungary imagined a false analogy with the colonial policy of Great Britain, who in developing her Empire has shown but little regard for the wishes or interests of other Powers. The indignation expressed by the British Press at Austro-Hungarian action, is not unnaturally regarded in Vienna as mere cant and hypocrisy, since the Great Power which is responsible for the Cyprus Convention would seem to be peculiarly unqualified to pose as a stern upholder of the Treaty of Berlin. Yet the parallel between Bosnia and Egypt is far from exact, since the British Government fully recognized the special interests of France in Egypt, and only regarded the occupation as definitely irrevocable after the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement.

The real interest lies in the attitude of the governing classes of Hungary towards the annexation. In 1878 Magyar public opinion was markedly hostile to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and even Count Andrássy's presence at the Ballplatz did not suffice to allay the opposition to such a move. The unpopularity which the Tisza Cabinet earned by its consent was probably not without its influence upon Andrássy, when he declined Beaconsfield's proposal for annexa­tion instead of an European "mandate." In 1908 Andrássy's post is held by a German, the Hungarian Parliament is con­trolled by a Kossuthist and Pan-Magyar majority, and yet no Magyar voice has been raised in protest against the annexa­tion. The reasons for this complaisant attitude on the part of the Coalition Cabinet have not yet transpired; but it has already been suggested that their consent was purchased by the Crown's surrender to the reactionary Franchise Bill of the great Andrássy's son, the present Minister of the Interior. This, however, must be dismissed as an impudent reflection upon the honour of the Emperor-King, who pledged his word in 1906 for the introduction of Universal Suffrage in Hungary. It is far more probable that the Hungarian Government hopes, /417/

by raising the Bosnian question and all the complicated issues which it involves for Croatia, for Hungary and for the Monarchy as a whole, to divert attention from the franchise and thus to delay indefinitely the discussion of this much-needed reform.

The key to the whole Balkan question lies among the Serbo-Croatian race ; and the future of Bosnia and Servia depends upon the situation in Hungary and Croatia. Thus it is not too much to say that the racial question in Hungary reacts upon all problems of the Near East, and that the manner of its solution will exercise a decisive influence upon the Balance of Power in the Balkans. The extension of the Hungarian franchise is an event not merely of local, but of European importance, and it is well that the foreign public should realize the gravity of the issues involved.

A genuine Reform Bill is the first step towards a solution of the racial question in Hungary a question whose continued neglect might prove fatal to the Dual Monarchy and the Habsburg dynasty. The Young Turks have recognized all races of the Ottoman Empire as their brothers: the Russian Government is on the brink of an understanding with the Poles: public opinion in Austria demands every day more strongly a final compromise between the rival races of Cisleith-ania ; in Germany a large section of the nation condemns the unjust and short-sighted policy adopted towards the Poles of Posen. Among the Magyars alone is public opinion unani­mous in favour of racial monopoly ; and Count Andrássy's reactionary project of plural and public voting would, if passed into law, merely give a new lease of life to the oligarchy which upholds this monopoly in the interests of its own narrow class. A settlement in Croatia would then be rendered impossi­ble, the constitutional position of Bosnia would remain uncer­tain, and a serious blow would be dealt at Austro-Hungarian prestige throughout the Balkans..

The fate of the Near East depends, less upon the attitude of the Porte or the Czar of Sofia, than upon the course of events in Agram, Budapest and Vienna. The historic mission of the House of Habsburg is the vindication of equal rights and liberties for all the races committed to its charge. The aban­donment of this mission would leave Russia supreme in the Balkans, and would endanger the very existence of a Great Power upon the Middle Danube. /418/


 


[1] E. Baloghy, A Magyar Kultura és a Nemzetiségek, p. 210.

[2] Die Nationalitätenfrage, pp. 12-3.

[3] Magyar Hírlap, September 22, 1894 ; cit. Brote, op. cit. p 92.

[4] Balogh, Népfajok, pp. 944-52 — a work published in 1902 under the aegis of the Minister of Education.

(A) Number of Communes gained from

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

By

M

a

g

y

a

r

s

G

e

r

m

a

n

s

S

l

o

v

a

k

s

R

o

u

a

n

i

a

n

s

R

u

t

h

e

n

e

s

S

e

r

b

s

C

r

o

a

t

s

O

t

h

e

r

s

T

o

t

a

l

 

Magyars

X

45

89

42

40

22

15

8

261

Germans

76

X

15

13

1

30

28

5

168

Slovaks

56

15

X

3

176

3

 —

 —  

253

Roumanians

309

42

 —  

X

 

11

 —  

 —  

362

Ruthenes

2

 

1

1

X

 —  

 —  

 —  

4

Serbs . .

2

6

__

X

 —

 —  

8

Croats . .

10

14

1

 —  

 —  

21

X

 —  

46

Others . .

4

 —  

 —  

 —  

3

X

7

Total .

 457

116

108

65

217

87

46

13

X

(B) Number of Communes.

 

Gained.

Lost.

Net result.

 

Gained.

Lost.

Net result.

Magyars

261

456

- 195

Roumanians

362

64

+ 198

Germans

168

116

+ 52

Ruthenes

4

217

-213

Slovaks

 253

106

+ 147

Serbs

8

87

- 79

 

 

 

 

Croats

46

46

0

 

[5] See articles of Gustav Beksics and Julius Vargha m Budapesti Hírlap of May 12 and June 2, 1904 : cit. Popovici, op. cit. pp. 111-2.

[6] It is by no means uncommon at popular concerts to supplement the national anthem by the scurrilous song '' Hunczfot a német " (the German is a craven rogue).

[7] Schultheiss, p. 74.

[8] Most Scotsmen or Irishmen who have been brought up at English private schools, will remember how their nationality was generally made a term of reproach ; but with us the intolerance of the small boy changes at a public school to good-natured chaff and at the uni­versity to friendly tolerance. In Hungary, on the contrary, the prejudices of the small boy, instead of being checked or rebuked by his masters, are fanned to white heat, and grow more and more bitter as he approaches manhood.

[9] Lord Acton, Essays on Liberty, pp. 289, 288.

[10] Ung. Stat. Jahrb. xii. p. 18.

[11] Appendix v.

[12] Except by the 9,000 Magyars of the Bukovina.

[13] The Greek Uniate Church in Hungary is composed of two quite distinct branches : (a) the Ruthene Church which is a fragment of the Uniate Church of Poland (originally founded in 1595, when the metropolitan of Kiev and seven bishops acknowledged the Pope). In 1771 Clement XIV erected the Uniate bishopric of Munkács for the Ruthenes of Hungary, and in 1816 a second Uniate bishopric was founded at Eperjes ; (b) the Roumanian Church, which dates from the Union of 1698. It possesses a metropolitan, residing at Blaj (Balázsfalva), and three bishops, of Nagyvárad (dating from 1776), Lugos (1850) and Szamos-Újvár (1873), each with a chapter of six, canons. In 1900 there were 1,841,272 Uniates in Hungary, of whom 246,628 Magyars, 101,578 Slovaks and 410,775 Ruthenes belonged to (a) and the 1,064,780 Roumanians to (b).

[14] The poet Lenau was a German Hungarian.

[15] Mr. Take Jonescu, the Conservative leader, says in his pamphlet La politique étrangčre de la Roumanie, p. 11, "S'il y a une accusation contre laquelle tous les Roumains, ceux des provinces soumises aussi bien que la jeunesse universitaire qui a pris ľinitiative du récent mouvement patriotique, se défendant avec vehemence, c'est celle de suívre une politique irredentiste. En effet, la politique irredentiste est impossible pour ľétat roumain."

[16] 1, German Austria ; 2, Czech Austria (with Slovak districts) ; 3, Polish Austria ; 4, Ruthene Austria (with Ruthenes of Hungary and Bukovina) ; 5, Illyrian Austria (all South Slavs) ; 6, Roumanian Austria (Transylvania and the Roumanian parts of Hungary proper and Bukovina) ; 7, Magyar Austria ; 8, Italian Austria.

[17] Palacky, Oesterreichs Staatsidee, p. 61.

[18] See pp. 119-120.

[19] While their fellow-conspirators the Poles and Croats sank into a period of political stagnation.

[20] German Austria, German Bohemia, German Moravia and Silesia, Czech Bohemia, Magyaria, Transylvania, Croatia, West and East Galícia, Slovacia, Carniola, Voivodina, Szekelland, Trentino, Trieste.

[21] Dr. Renner, who was till recently an assistant librarian in the Austrian Reichsrath, is now a member of the House, sitting for Neun-kirchen in the Social Democratic interest.

[22] The above is a very inadequate interpretation of the ideas which underlie Dr. Renner's epoch-making books, Der Kampf der österreichi­schen Nationen um den Staat (1901), and Grundlagen und Entwick­lungsziele der oesterreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie (1906). Both are indispensable for the student of modern Austria.

[23] The Saxons and Szekels in Transylvania, and the Serbs of the Banat.

[24] The Slovaks, Ruthenes and Roumanians.

[25] The idea of transforming Hungary into a "monarchical Switzer­land," as advocated by Dr. Polit, the Serb deputy, does not of course involve the erection of local diets, but merely a thoroughgoing reform of the present system of county government.