I. Beyond the median voter theorem

  A. Single-crossed preferences

Gans, J.S. and M. Smart (1996), "Majority Voting with single-crossing preferences", Journal of Public Economics 59: 219-237

Rothstein, P. (1990), "Order restricted preferences and majority rule", Social Choice and Welfare 7: 331-342

  B. Intermediate preferences

Grandmont, J.M. (1978), "Intermediate preferences and the majority rule", Econometrica 46: 317-330

  C. Probabilistic voting

Lindbeck, A. and J. Weibull (1987), "Balanced-Budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition", Public Choice 52: 273-297

  D. Lobbying and campaign contributions

Becker, G. (1983), "A theory of competititon among interest groups for political influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 371-400

Bernheim, D. and M. Whinston (1986), "Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31

Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 833-850
 

II. Fiscal Policy
 

Persson, T. and L. Svensson (1989) "Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: Policy with time-inconsistent preferences", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 325-345

Tabellini, G. and A. Alesina (1990), "Voting on the budget deficit", American Economic Review 80, 37-49

Rogoff, K., and A. Siebert (1988), "'Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles", Review of Economic Studies 55, 1-16

Poterba, James (1994), "State responses to fiscal crises: the effect of budgetary institutions and politics", Journal of Political Economy 102, 799-821

Roubini, N. and J. Sachs (1989a),  "Fiscal Policy:  Government Spending and Budget Deficits in the Industrial Countries" Economic Policy 0(8), pages 99-132.

Roubini, N. and J. Sachs (1989b), "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies"
European Economic Review; 33(5), May 1989, pages 903-33.
 
 

III. Labour Market Institutions

Saint-Paul, G. (2000), The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions. Oxford: Oxford U. Press

Saint-Paul, G. (1998), ''A Framework For Analyzing the Political Support for Active Labour Market Policy'', Journal of Public Economics, 67, 151-165

Saint-Paul, G. (1998) "The rise and persistence of rigidities'', American Economic Review, May 1997, 87(2), 290-294

Saint-Paul, G. (1996), "Exploring the political economy of labor market institutions", Economic Policy

Saint-Paul, G. (1993),  "On the Political Economy of Labor market flexibility", NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 151-195

Wright, R. (1986), "The Redistributive Roles of Unemployment Insurance and the Dynamics of Voting"  Journal of Public Economics; 31(3), December 1986, pages 377-99.

Hassler, John, and J. V. Rodriguez-Mora (1999), "Employment Turnover and the Public Allocation of Unemployment Insurance"
 Journal of Public Economics; 73(1), July 1999, pages 55-83.

Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, Zilibotti (1999), "Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance", CEPR

Rodrik, D. (1999), "Democracies Pay Higher Wages" Quarterly Journal of Economics; 114(3), August 1999, pages 707-38.

Grüner, Hans-P. (1998), "Unemployment and Labor Market Reform: A Contract Theoretic Approach",  Universitat Bonn Sonderforschungsbereich 303 Discussion Paper A/584, September 1998, pages 23.
 
 

IV. Adjustment, transition and crises

Fernandez, R. and D. Rodrik (1991), "Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in  the presence of individual specific uncertainty", American Economic Review, 81, 1146-1155

Rodrik, D.  (1995), "The dynamics of political support for reform in economies in transition", Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 9, 403-25

Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland (1992),  "Economic Reform and dynamic political constraints", Review of Economic Studies, 59, 703-30

Alesina, Alberto, Drazen, Allan (1991), "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?" American Economic Review; 81(5), December 1991, pages 1170-88.

Drazen, Allan and Grilli, Vittorio, "The Benefit of Crises for Economic Reforms" American Economic Review; 83(3), June 1993, pages 598-607.
 
 

V. Endogenous property rights

Grossman, H.I. (2000), "The creation of effective property rights", mimeo, Brown U, forthcoming, American Economic Review, May 2001

De Meza and Gould (1992), "The social efficiency of private decisions to enforce property rights", Journal of Political Economy, 1992

 Grossman,-Herschel-I. and " Kim,-MinseongSwords or Plowshares?  A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property"  Journal of Political Economy, 103(6), December 1995, pages 1275-88.

 Grossman, Herschel I.; Noh,-Suk-Jae (1994), "Proprietary Public Finance and Economic Welfare", Journal of Public Economics; 53(2), February 1994, pages 187-20

Hirshleifer, Jack (1995), "Anarchy and Its Breakdown" Journal of Political Economy; 103(1), February 1995, pages 26-52.

Tornell, Aaron, Lane,-Philip-R. (1998), "Voracity and Growth" Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper: 2001, October 1998, pages 44.

Tornell, Aaron (1997), "Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights" Journal of Economic Growth; 2(3), September 1997, pages 219-50.