Gender, Sexuality and Law: The Immutability Maze

Harper Jean Tobin

 

im·mu·ta·ble, adj: not capable of or susceptible to change

 

                The concept of immutability is deeply imbedded in the way we talk about equality under the law. The Supreme Court has long held immutability to be a significant (though not decisive) factor in deciding whether a classification is subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny. To date the Court has applied heightened scrutiny to such “immutable” traits as race, sex, nationality, alienage, and illegitimacy.

            Similarly, immutability plays a significant role in debates over civil rights legislation. While many laws protect characteristics that are clearly not immutable (marital status, veteran status, familial status, political belief), immutability has frequently been cited as a reason for or against statutory protections, particularly in regard to sexual orientation and gender identity.

            Most such discussions treat immutability as a fairly straightforward concept. Trouble is, it's not. Much ink has been spilled on this issue, and I will not reiterate the Byzantine debates on whether the analogy of race to sex in Equal Protection analysis reinforces discredited idea that race is a biological phenomenon, or whether sexual orientation is genetically determined, environmentally determined, voluntary, some mix of those, etc. etc. It is worth noting that sex can be changed (as a matter of law in most states) -- although recent scientific evidence suggests gender identity cannot. Whether race can be "changed" depends on what we take "race" to mean (physical features? lineage? identity?) -- but certainly a person of one race can "pass" for another. Aliens can become citizens, and illegitimate persons can be legitimized -- though these changes are not fully within one's own control. Nevertheless, we treat these characteristics as immutable.

            As concerns sexual orientation, an analogy to religion may be helpful (if probably controversial). Despite obvious differences, both characteristics are marked by what could be called "constructive immutability." (Fn1)

            No one contends that particular religious beliefs, affiliations or practices are hard-wired in the brain. On the contrary, it is generally accepted that religious belief is subject to change: we can find or lose faith, we can convert, and we can modify our religious views while maintaining the same general belief system. We may or may not claim the same religion as our family of origin. Some spend years, or a lifetime, discovering and solidifying their faith. Some devote their lives to encouraging others to convert.

            Despite all this, we treat religion in many ways as if it is immutable; courts have sometimes described it as "almost immutable" because this is the way most people experience it. Religious belief can change, but we don't usually expect it to. For many people it is stable throughout life; for others it changes so gradually as to escape conscious notice. When someone's religious belief clashes with social norms, we often make accommodations -- indeed, we are sometimes required by law to do so. The reason for this is that one's religion is such a deeply felt aspect of self that it is almost inconceivable that one could deliberately set about to change it in response to external factors.

            Most people experience sexual orientation in much the same way. We all have a sexual orientation and for most of us it seems to be stable and unchanging throughout life. Some discover, by falling in love with someone unexpected, that their sexual orientation is more flexible or more expansive than they had ever expected. Interestingly, dramatic changes in sexual orientation seem to be unusually common among people who undergo gender transitions. But these changes are not purposeful. Instead of us making them happen, they happen to us. Thus, the mental health professions have resoundingly rejected "reparative therapies" premised on the idea that one can make oneself an "ex-gay," not just because they disagree with their goals but because they know they cannot work.

            Another parallel between sexual orientation and religion is that both are linked to behaviors that are indisputably mutable. In ages past people were commonly forced to convert to practicing the dominant religion. Changing their practices was certainly possible, even if changing their faith was not. We could ask the same today of those whose religious practices conflict with social norms, but generally we do not. We recognize instead that matching one's religious practices to external norms instead of internal feeling is a deeply painful denial of self, and an unconscionable social expectation. The same can be said of sexual orientation.

            The crucial difference is that, as a society, we (ostensibly) embrace religious diversity. We accept that religion has not just a few but virtually unlimited varieties, and for the most part we nowadays view them all as valid and worth celebrating. At the same time, we recognize that while all religious paths may be equally beneficial to humanity generally, they are seldom interchangeable for individuals.

            As a society we do not presently embrace sexual diversity in the same way. As our society formerly took the view that one religion was superior to others, it presently values exclusive heterosexuality and devalues any other form of sexuality. We do not recognize that same-sex and opposite-sex attraction, though not interchangeable for most individuals, are equally good foundations for love, marriage and family. And so we argue about the immutability of sexual orientation in a way that we have never argued about religion.

            But why does immutability matter? Why is an immutable characteristic more likely "suspect" than a mutable one, or more worthy of statutory protection? It's been said that immutability matters because it's fundamentally unfair to punish someone for something they did not choose and cannot change. This statement has a certain superficial appeal, to be sure. It seems to imply, however, that it is okay to punish someone for something that they did choose or can change. Wouldn't that only be true if we valued some "choices" more than others? Do we, then, protect immutable characteristics because we would expect people to change them if only they could? When we inject the immutability question into debates over civil rights, are we saying that, if sexual orientation were truly mutable, we would expect people to have to choose between changing it and losing their job or their home? Would you consider changing your religion, or your sex, if posed with such a choice?

            In the end, immutability only really matters if we hold one way of being to be superior to others. We do not bar racial discrimination because one cannot help one's race, but because it is equally good to be a member of any racial group, period.

            Perhaps it is time to abandon the immutability concept. Perhaps we never needed it anyway.

Fn1: I use this term in a somewhat different sense than that originally employed by Samuel Marcosson in his thoughtful articles on this subject.

           

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