Luke Morris

Advance Comp – Essay 3

3/3/2003

E.L. Godkin and the Insanity of Socialism

The ideas of economic, societal, and political Socialism gained prominence in the intellectual circles in the United States in the later years of the nineteenth century, though not all American thinkers found them respectable. The journalist Edwin Lawrence Godkin, for instance, pointedly attacked the absurdity of socialist ideology. In his essay “Who Will Pay the Bills of Socialism?” Godkin demonstrates how the theory of ‘ethical economy’ is impracticable and even insane in the reality of human society. Relying chiefly upon logical arguments, with notable satiric allusions, the author directly takes on the arguments of particular social theorists of his day and points out the weakness of the premises upon which those arguments rest. Godkin’s main persuasive strategies involve comparing socialist claims with hypothetical and real life examples, portraying the necessary causes and the inevitable effects of implementing new policies, and showing how such theories are incompatible with the very nature of man, economics, and the State.

E.L. Godkin begins his essay on socialism with a hypothetical example of a man who plans to greatly increase his standard of living without any increase of personal income. This line of thinking, the author claims, would lead one to conclude that “the poor fellow was insane” (325). Godkin then compares this type of dementia with the theories of the Socialists and ethical economists, demonstrating the inherent insanity of such ideas through example. These theorists assert, for instance, that “All the very rich men and the idle men are to disappear, and everybody is to be moderately well off” (326), which Godkin implies is as ridiculous an assumption as thinking that one can vastly boost his economic position without added income. The ethical economists, nonetheless, insist that a change is coming in the politico-economic and social systems, though the only evidence they offer for the imminence of such a sweeping reform lies in ideology and theory, rather than in demonstrated facts of reality (327). While a sane man would ask himself what a change in his personal lifestyle would cost and whether he could afford it, the writings of the socialists make no references to cost in regards to the coming social revolution (328-29).

Proceeding from his hypothetical example, Godkin further supports his point by clearly describing the added elements society will require in bringing about the effect the ethical economists desire, and the actual results that will arise from the implementation of socialist programs. In regards to the alleged societal change on the horizon, for instance, he states, “it will make a great increase in the mere living expenses of every civilized population, without any increase of income that I can see or hear of” (329). He uses past precedent to support this conclusion, as he writes that, in the past few centuries, “changes in the social condition of the civilized world have meant great improvements in the social income” (329), which is a fact that the academic socialists completely ignore. In demonstrating the results of the planned redistribution of wealth, then, Godkin quotes statistical figures and does a few basic calculations for the U.S. economy and several European markets, which show that the income of the average household will barely feel the benefits of said redistribution, while it will certainly suffer the costs (330). Industry will feel the effects very strongly, as well, as will by extension the working man, as the government seizes and redistributes profit and interest on capital, thereby destroying the businessman’s incentive to invest. As Godkin writes, “capital would promptly disappear, and next year . . . labor would have to depend on its own resources” (331). In other words, it is upon businessmen that the livelihood of the working man depends, so taking away the livelihood of the capitalist adversely affects that of the laborer. The basic economic reality of costs shows that the socialists could not produce their desired social evolution “even for a single year, without doubling the wealth of every country which tried it, while making no increase in the population” (336). Still, despite the lack of logic and ignorance of the facts involved, the socialists’ cry for State redistribution of wealth “is diffusing through the working class of all countries . . . envy and hatred of the rich . . . an increasing disinclination to steady industry, and an increasing disposition to rely on politics for the bettering of their condition” (334).

In addition to listing the effects and costs of implementing the program of the ethical economists, Godkin further portrays its absurdity by comparing its assumptions to rational and accepted definitions of human nature, economics, and the State. The socialists assume, he says, that the extension of the role of the State would automatically make its political leaders better and wiser men in carrying out their new duties, in direct contrast to our experience with human nature. Such men as these duties require do not exist and have never existed, and, as the author states in a rather wry satiric gibe, “The probabilities of biology, physiology, psychology, and sociology are all against their existence” (335).