[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1993), Sovietology: Why the
totalitarian model is the best, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/931001.htm]
[Comments: This paper was written in 1993, while I was an undergraduate. Today I do not
agree with all the arguments, nor the way they are expressed. Nevertheless, this was
probably the essay for which I did the most reading. I also feel that the main views are
still sound. Lastly, I am still interested in the subject so I would like to receive
comments. On this background I feel confident enough to make it available on the Net.]
Sovietology: Why the totalitarian model is the best
This essay will argue that the attempts to classify and interpret the Soviet system in
terms of a concept is valuable because it focuses the debate on distinguishing the
significant from the less significant factors in the political system. The value of a
concept 1 thus depends on its success in focusing on the central
features of the system. By using this criteria for the value of a concept, the essay will
argue that the totalitarian model is the most helpful in understanding events in the
Soviet Union because it focuses on the lack of adaptability caused by the fusion of
politics and economics in a centralised ideological structure. That is not to say that
other concepts are unhelpful, for example a historical-cultural view is also valuable to
understand the central features of the Soviet system. However, other concepts, such as
corporatism and pluralism, are less helpful since they focus on the adaptability of the
system, not its rigidities.
The value of a concept and the definition of a system's central feature depends on the aim
of the researcher. If the aim is to find concepts that "facilitates comparison across
different political-economic systems" 2 , as Bunce and Echols
argue, then the central features of the Soviet system will tend to be those which are
comparable to the Western system, for example, the influence of various groups. If, on the
other hand, the interest of the researcher is to "locate the causal factors, the
changes which affect all other parts of the system", as Daniel Bell proposes, then
the importance of variables is determined by their causal strength. Hence, a useful
concept in this perspective must capture the causally important factors. A third
perspective to judge the significance of features and hence the value of a concept, is the
effect on individual life (liberty, scope of action), as implicitly suggested by Schapiro.3 The question is then by which arguments one can say that the
totalitarian concept and no other concept a) best captures the aim of research and b) best
captures the central features of the system as defined by the aim of our research.4
The ultimate aim of research in the social sciences cannot be proved logically, but it
seems intuitively correct to say that the aim is to improve the quality of life for
individuals (some important factors: income, freedom, justice, peace, stability). The
ultimate value of a concept is then given by its ability to locate the dynamics of the
causal factors which affect the quality of life for the people in that system.
In what way does totalitarianism capture and fulfil the aim of our research? There are
many definitions of totalitarianism, but the essence of all the definitions is the attempt
to establish "total control" over all spheres of life in order to create a new
society. As Schapiro writes:
Totalitarianism is "a form of personalised rule by a leader and an elite who seeks
to dominate both society and the regular legal structure which is called the 'state'"5
Implicit in this definition is the attempt to fuse economics and politics and the
consequent elimination of the division between the personal and the public sphere of life.
This is implicit because to gain total control the elite cannot allow rival institutions
such as the church influence over moral standards or free trade unions to control the
workers. Most important it cannot leave the individuals with the private property because
they would then have the economic resources to reject state control. Thus, the
totalitarian concept points out that the quality of life, at least with respect to
individual autonomy, liberty and political influence, is poor under totalitarian rule. The
main cause of this is the fusion of economics and politics under a centralised elite. All
this is validated by empirical evidence about the quality of life in the Soviet system.
Hence, the totalitarian concept fulfils the requirement that a concept should capture the
most important features affecting the individual quality of life.
Moreover the totalitarian model is not a static concept, as some critics claim. It is
fully compatible with changes in the system over time. For example, the economic growth
after Stalin and in the beginning of the Brezhnev period was precisely caused by the
fusion of economics and politics. It was this fusion which made possible the mobilisation
of enough resources to create extensive growth because the state could force people to
work. The totalitarian model can also explain the decline of economic growth and the
failures to reform the system. Extensive growth cannot go on forever since resources are
scarce and the totalitarian political system is not compatible with significant intensive
economic growth. This is so because the subordination of economics under politics destroys
the market mechanism which are vital to economic efficiency. When prices do not reflect
the real scarcity of goods, scarce resources may be sold cheaply, thus encouraging waste.
In theory the planners should be able to correct this, but what Hayek called
"information-overload" made it impossible. The system was simply too complex to
be planned in detail. In this way the totalitarian model contains both predictions about
economic growth and decline by focusing on the effects of the fusion between economics and
politics. This make the totalitarian concept very helpful to an understanding of the
Soviet Union from Stalin to 1985.
The intrinsic irreformability 6 of the Soviet system is also
predicted by the totalitarian model. As Brzezinski argues, the failure of Khrushchev's
reforms and his downfall in october 1964 exemplifies how the essential properties of the
system (in his opinion the political autonomy of the monopolistic party-state) could
prevent reform.7 The failure of the Kosygin economic reforms of 1965
further add to the evidence of the basic irreformability of the Soviet system. The
fundamental reason why it was irreformable was that the fusion between economics and
politics was inherent to the ideology of the regime and hence the justification of
Communist rule. The central insight of Marxist analysis was that private ownership of the
means of production is the basic problem of capitalism since it causes alienation and also
constitute an inefficient way to organise production (the relations of production do not
correspond to the productive forces). Consequently the most important change in a society
moving towards Communism would be the public ownership of the means of production i.e.
political control over the economy. So structural economic liberalisation (diffusion) was
necessary for economic growth, but impossible because the basic legitimacy of the regime
rested on the fusion of economics and politics. This made the system intrinsically
irreformable. 8 Once again this shows the central insight of the
totalitarian concept in identifying elite dominance in all spheres of life as the
characteristic causal feature of the system.
One suggested problem for the totalitarian conception, is its inability to explain the
desire for reform in the first place. If the central feature of the system is an elite
using total domination as a tool for constructing their ideal, why would there be reforms
which even tried to distribute power, such as Khrushchev's distribution of power to
regions or Brezhnev's "trust in cadres" which gave the regional party
secretaries much more power and security. There are several ways of explaining this within
the totalitarian model. Martin Malia suggests in his concept of "The New
T-model" that there was a rhythm of alteration between relaxation and the building of
Communism. This was caused by the need for breathing spaces to collect resources to build
communism, exemplified by the NEP period under Lenin. In my view the key is to view the
Soviet system not as being fully totalitarian, but as an attempt to use total control to
create Communism. This explains why there was what T.H. Rigby calls a shadow culture of
fresh ideas when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Neither society nor the elite were
completely monolithic because this is obviously impossible. But the important fact was
that unanimity was the ideal. Pluralism of values was by definition evil inheritance from
old class antagonism.
On the basis of the arguments so far it is clear what was wrong with many of the other
concepts of the Soviet system. Concepts like corporatism and pluralism was of little value
and of little help in understanding the system since they focused their attention on the
wrong issue. What Amann calls Group B theories mistakenly focused on the indicators of
change and adaptability, not the signs of continuity and stagnation. The following example
shows in more detail how Group B theories failed and hence why they are of little value.9
One model which intends to describe the whole Soviet system is Valerie Bunce's concept of
corporatism. This is defined by him as:
"a decision-making structure in which major functional interests groups are
incorporated into the policy process by the state and its leaders."10
The evidence for making this the central feature of the Soviet system, under Brezhnev
is taken to be the rising supply of consumer goods, the increased emphasis on consulting
"experts" and "scientific management", the low rates of turnover in
important positions and the stability of the budget allocations over time. Using the
concept of corporatism Bunce argues that "...consensus, co-optation and co-operation
were the essential characteristics of developed socialism." 11
By the criterion used in this essay this is, to put it mildly, misleading and hence the
concept is of little value.
The totalitarian concept is misleading because it mistakenly gives prominence to the
indicators of adaptation (responsiveness from pressures from below), while the real
essence of the system was the continuity of rigidities. This is implicitly conceded by
Bunce when he contradicts himself in two different articles. In the first he argues that
"the study of Soviet politics is first and foremost the study of eras, periods
associated with specific leaders doing specific things"12 In
other words he argues that there is no one Soviet system, but, as A. Meyer writes and
Bunce quotes, "a succession of political systems..." 13 In
a later article, still defending the corporatist concept, Bunce writes that "the
policy process during Brezhnev's time, as during the Khrushchev and Stalin periods, was
shaped by the fusion between political and economic realms in the Soviet system."14 This is inconsistent because the first quote says that the essential
features of the Brezhnev period were unique to his era, while the second quote makes the
defining features of the system under Brezhnev common to the period of other Soviet
rulers. Hence, the ambiguity in judging the central feature of the Soviet system is
another weakness in the corporatist concept.
The only other main concept which is of any value, except for the totalitarian approach,
is the historical cultural approach as R. Tucker rightly argues. This concept is valuable
because it helps explaining central features such as the lack of distinction between a
private and a public sphere (Byzantine, not Roman law); the Russian attitudes to time
(long term view), authority (Asiatic), and work (storming); and how generational change
may influence politics (new values - attempted reforms). Lack of space prevents a closer
elaboration on these issues, but the point is that the explanatory power of the historical
cultural approach gives it value, though it lacks the ability to make a clear distinction
between more or less significant features.
In conclusion it may seem that the arguments in this essay about the value of totalitarian
concept presents an over-deterministic view of history, as Alexander Dallin warns against
in his article. But: how can it be over-deterministic to say that an attempt to try to do
the impossible is bound to fail? This essay has argued that the essence of the Soviet
system, as defined by the totalitarian model - the attempt to build Communism by fusing
everything into politics - was bound to fail because of the breakdown of efficient
allocation of resources. Would it be over-deterministic to say that humans cannot fly like
birds? By this I do not mean that everything in the Soviet system had to happen as it did.
There is room for detailed variations, but from a structural point of view the system was
doomed to fail.
Ybarra: "The totalitarian model endured as long as it did ... because it tried to
answer the right question: how did such a police state survive and flourish?" 15
NOTES
1. In this context only the value of general concepts are discussed, not concepts that aim
at describing details of the system.
2. Bunce and Echols, p. 2
3. "For the Soviet citizen the ruler-ruled relationship is therefore the only one
which retains any meaning or validity in determining his life, his liberty, and his scope
of action." (Scapiro, p. 118)
4 It should be noted that there is no necessary connection between the value of a concept
and its ability to capture the essence of a system. As Alex Inkles suggests a concept may
have value because it opens unexplored perspectives which, if examined closer, will
increase our knowledge.
5. Schapiro, p. 102
6. J. Kirkpatrick
7. Breslauer, p. 215
8.The events after 1985 is outside the scope of this essay, but the failure of these
reforms give further weight to the totalitarian view that the system was irreformable and
had to collapse.
9. One important qualification must be made here. Very few people defended the concept of
pluralism and other Group B concepts as a characterisations of the central feature of the
system. Rather they though about their concepts as additions to the existing models of
totalitarianism which they viewed as unable to cope with the changing details of the
Soviet system. So not everyone in the Group B category can be accused of using the wrong
concept to describe the whole of the Soviet system, since this was not the intention
behind their concepts. 10. Bunce and Echols, p. 3
11. Bunce, p 135
12. Bunce and Echols, p. 1
13. Bunce and Echols, p.1
14. Bunce, p. 131
15. p. 222 (article?)
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[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1993), Sovietology: Why the
totalitarian model is the best, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/931001.htm]