Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Anti-Popper: Why unfalsifiable theories also are worth considering

[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Anti-Popper: Why unfalsifiable theories also are worth considering, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960321b.htm]

Anti-Popper: Why unfalsifiable theories are worth considering

_{ABSTRACT

In this short observation I argue that there is no need to reject a theory even if there
is no way we can assign it a zero probability of being true (i.e. falsify it) since we may
still judge it to be more or less probable.}

Popper's famous demarcation criteria between science and non-science is that scientific statements are falsifiable. I can prove that objects of unequal weight falls at the same speed (excluding the differences in friction caused by size). However, I cannot prove that strawberry ice-cream is better than chocolate. Questions of gravity is thus science, questions of ice-cream taste is not.

This stimulating demarcation has led many writers in the social sciences to dismiss theories because they cannot be falsified. I recently encountered this in a book by a Norwegian specialist on Russian affairs, Paal Kolstoe. On page 12 and 29 of his book (Kjempen vakler, a Norwegian book from 1990), he writes that two theories about why the Soviets wanted arms-reductions in the late 1980s are not falsifiable and, hence, not useful as analytical tools. The two theories he mentions are the so called "breathing-space/maskirovka" argument and the "force-to-space-ratio" argument. I the following I want to argue that we are wrong to dismiss these theories and in general that non-falsifiable theories also deserve consideration.

Let me first briefly recapitulate the two arguments. The "breathing-space" argument says that Gorbachev did not really intend to change the East-West relationship in the long run. The reforms represented only a strategic retreat in order to gather strength for a new attack. The "force-to-space-ratio" argument argues that the reason the Soviets wanted arms reduction in Europe was that if you want to attack it is better to have a small number of troops on both sides than a large (more complicated, but more precise: There is a non-linearity in the benefits of force reductions for eventual attackers or defenders). Hence, force reductions were consistent with continued Soviet aggression.

Now, I do not want to make any claims about the truth of these theories. However, I do not think they should be dismissed as not falsifiable and hence not worth examining. The reason being that it is sometimes possible to assign different degrees of probability to the theories even if they are not falsifiable.

First I should mention the reason why they are considered unfalsifiable. Kolstoe claims that there are virtually no observations which could be taken to falsify the theory, since whatever the Russians did it would be could be interpreted as some kind of covered aggressive measure, even if it appeared on the surface to be truly peace seeking. I am not sure he is correct about the non-falsifiability in this specific case, but this is not the point. The point is that I believe it is possible to argue that these theories are more or less probable.

On what basis are such arguments possible? Kolstoe himself agrees on page 12 that a leadership which has lied before, should not be surprised that people believe they are lying (even when they speak the truth). This leads me to think that historical experience may provide some measure of the probability that Gorbachev was "real" or simply "faking." If there is a historical pattern showing that the Soviet leaders have used the Leninist tactic of "one step back - two steps forward" then this makes it more likely that the mentioned "unfalsifiable" theories are true. (Lenin's New Economic Policy, Brest Litovsk and the Hitler-Stalin non-aggression pact comes to mind as historical examples. One could also note the historian M. Malia who has devoted a book to prove such a pattern in Soviet history, The Soviet Tragedy, 1994).

Another basis for judging the truth of a theory, is its internal consistency. Some theories consists of sub-theories that are internally inconsistent and because of that they must be judged less likely to be true.

There are probably more tools we could use to judge the probability of a theory even if it is unfalsifiable (Any suggestions are welcome). One should therefore not reject a theory simply because there is no way to ever assign it a zero probability of being true.

There might be some counter-arguments to the above argument. For example, one could claim that there is no scientific basis for assigning probabilities to various theories. I am aware of the great difficulties in assigning probabilities to all kinds of theories. I should probably restrict my claims to only some theories (since some more grand macro-theories may not have a truth value at all - for example if they are meaningless!). Further, I do not claim that it is possible to agree on a precise probability estimate of a theory. Maybe it is a bit like interpersonal comparisons of welfare: We are pretty sure that a starving person in a war-zone is worse off than the average person in a Scandinavian country, yet we cannot make precise interpersonal comparisons between two roughly equal Scandinavians. In the same way we may believe a theory is more or less probable than another without being able to create a complete probability ranking of all theories.

[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Anti-Popper: Why unfalsifiable theories also are worth considering, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960321b.htm]