Melberg, Hans O., Organic explanations (Review of Z. Brzezinski The Grand Failure)

Melberg, Hans O., Organic explanations (Review of Z. Brzezinski The Grand Failure)

[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Organic explanations (Review of Z. Brzezinski (1989), The Grand Failure: The Birth and Decay of Communism in the Twentieth Century, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960409.htm]

Organic explanations

Review of Zbigniew Brzezinski (1989) The Grand Failure: The Birth and Decay of Communism in the Twentieth Century, New York: Charles Schribner's Sons
ISBN: 0 684 19034 6
Pages: 278

Of the many books written about the collapse of communism Brzezinski's book is special because it was written in 1988 - before the collapse of communism in Easter Europe and the USSR. That his predictions have turned out largely true makes one more inclined to believe that his explanation of the Collapse is correct. Yet, although this is an impressive book, I find myself unimpressed by some of the explanations offered. The main weakness as I see it is the overemphasis on the unclear notion of "organic rejection" and an underemphasis on the details of the specific causal links that created the collapse.

According to Brzezinski "the crucial fact" and "the key to understand the future of communism in Eastern Europe" (p. 105) - in 1988 - was that:

"Marxism-Leninism is an alien doctrine imposed on the region by an imperial power whose rule is culturally repugnant to the dominated peoples. As a result, a process of organic rejection of communism by Eastern European societies - a phenomenon similar to the human body's rejection of a transplanted organ - is underway." (p. 105)
To explain the continued existence of communism in Chine, Brzezinski writes that:
"In brief, unlike its organic rejection by Eastern Europe, communism in China faces the prospect of organic absorption by the country's enduring traditions and values" (p. 147)

The question is what Brzezinski means by the term "organic rejection." To answer this question I think it would be a mistake to follow his suggestion about the analogy to the human body's rejection of transplanted organs. It is obvious that societies are not living bodies and ideologies are not organs that are transplanted. Hence, the laws governing the transplantation of human organs are in no way the same as the laws governing the success of an ideology in a society.

What then does Brzezinski mean by "organic rejection?" When discussing the specific causes of the collapse of communism Brzezinski writes that the Marxist-Leninist ideology "failed to take into account the basic human craving for individual freedom ..." (p. 242). One might argue that organic rejection is what occurs when one tries to impose an ideology which denies people this basic freedom. This may well be a plausible story but what we want to know is exactly how and why this process occurs.

Under Communism there were no free elections, no freedom of organization, and no freedom of speech. It thus seems clear that individual freedoms were violated. The question is then in what way this is linked to the stability of the system. We should not simply postulate that a regime denying its people these freedoms is doomed to collapse. In fact, one might argue that the denial of these freedoms might makes a system more, not less, stable. The reason being that by denying individuals the above freedoms the regime also makes it very difficult for potential rivals to organise the overthrow of the existing regime.

One might try to argue that the short run advantage for a regime in denying its people individual freedoms is a source of instability in the long run. When asked why this is so, one might then simply answer that historical experience proves the argument, thus denying the need to provide the specific link. For example, R. Pipes argues along these lines in his book Communism the Vanished Specter 1. One of the major problems with this approach is that it does not specify how long the "long run" is. The Roman empire lasted for five hundred years, the Russian only seventy. This means that any prediction of collapse must specify a time length to be credible. Unless it does so it cannot claim that the actual collapse is explained by the theory even if the theory predicted a collapse. A regime is bound to collapse at some point in time and it might do so for many other reasons than postulated in a single theory.

"Organic rejection" has so far been interpreted to mean the rejection of an ideology with consequences incompatible with human nature. So far I have discussed only one aspect of human nature - the desire for freedom. Brzezinski also discusses a second characteristic: the desire for material well being. He writes that Marxism "neglected the organic connection between economic productivity and innovation on the one hand, and individual craving for personal material well-being on the other" (p. 242). I take this to mean that Communism was unstable because it was not an efficient economic system. Once again this seems like a plausible story. Communism was rejected because it was not as good as alternative systems of satisfying human material wants.

However, also once again, the story is incomplete. Brzezinski documents the failure of the economic system (see for example page 36 and 37). But he does not enter into a detailed discussion of why the economic system failed, as he would have to do if he wants to provide an explanation as opposed to a description of the failure of communism. Exactly how is this "organic connection" between economic creativity and individual personal craving for his own wealth? I have discussed this issue in a previous review (Click here) where I gave three arguments why central planning was inefficient. However, although I agree with Brzezinski's postulate that innovation is positively linked with individual craving for wealth, one should also note the failures of this link. For example, it is most profitable for me to copy other people's innovations, thus avoiding the research costs. If this option was not illegal (by copyright and patent laws) individual craving for own personal advantage may not be the best system to create economic efficiency. Hence, I agree with Brzezinski but I think his specification of the link is incomplete.

Even if we accept the link between ideology and economic inefficiency, we must also specify the connection between economic inefficiency and instability. Obviously, people may try to overthrow the existing regime if their material needs are unsatisfied and in this sense an inefficient system is unstable. However, it is also equally obvious that a regime may prevent this happening by using force or other means to stay in power. Once again some will argue that this cannot work in the long run, though I remain unconvinced as long as the long run is not specified.

"Organic rejection" has so far been interpreted in terms of incompatibility between the fundamental characteristics of human nature and the Communist system. In addition to this incompatibility Brzezinski places much emphasis on the (in)compatibility between the Communist system and the culture of a country. He then uses this incompatibility to explain the degree of reformability of the various Communist systems. His discussion of these factors is provocative and interesting, but the importance of the arguments is very difficult to prove empirically.

When Brzezinski tries to explain why he thinks the Chinese system was more reformable than its Soviet counterpart, he argues that the "social receptivity [to economic and political reforms] is the major reason why China will probably succeed, while the Soviet Union will probably falter." (p. 177) When he elaborates he writes that "Unlike the Russians, the Chinese people have a talent for entrepreneurship." (p. 177) He also writes that "Unlike the Russians, the Chinese ... are not driven by thinly suppressed inferiority complexes toward the West." (p. 183). Both of these statements are highly contested.

I do not subscribe to the "politically correct" view that no cultures are inferior to others in any respect. It might be that the Chinese are better entrepreneurs than the Russians because of cultural difference. For example, Chinese immigrants are well known for their relative economic success, while we cannot say the same of Russian immigrants. However Brzezinski does not base his claims on a study of immigrants but on the argument that China, unlike Russia, has a deeply rooted commercial tradition. In contrast the Russian economy has always been dominated by the strong state. The effect of this may be that the 'economic tissue' that is necessary for an economy to work (commercial norms, expectations, trust) exists to a larger extent in China than in Russia. This may be true, but it is very difficult to quantify the importance of this cultural factor. My personal view is that the basic motor of commercial activity - selfishness - seems to exist in all societies, Russia included. Hence, to explain the success of the Chinese and the failure of the Russians I would place more emphasis on systemic factors (such as the laws governing co-operatives) rather than cultural differences.

Brzezinski's discussion of the consequences of a cultural inferiority complex is psychologically very interesting. On an individual level it is easy to recognise the effects Brzezinski attributes to the Russian and the Chinese cultures. An individual who feels inferior often compensates by pronouncing his superiority, by becoming extremely suspicious against the intentions of others, and by being too proud to learn from others. Confidence, on the other hand, creates a virtuous circle since it enables you to learn from others without fearing that your own identity is being erased. Although the picture is not as black and white as Brzezinski argues (there are also elements of the inferiority complex in Chinese intellectual life 2), it may well be true that the Chinese culture is more self-confident than the Russian and consequently more receptive to change and, in turn, more adaptable. For example the attitude towards foreign firms is different in China and Russia. While China has created special economic zones, Russia suffered (and suffers) under its suspicion that Western firms were trying to "exploit" them, or that the West was trying to turn the USSR into some kind of a colony from which the West could gather raw-materials. Hence, cultural differences may in this respect have some importance but it is difficult to quantify since the cultural variables (such as the degree of suspicion towards foreigners) do not lend themselves to easy quantification.

A third cultural difference between China and the USSR, according to Brzezinski, was that "as the legatees of China's ancient civilisation, they [the Chinese] had the intellectual and cultural self-confidence to carve out their own revolutionary experience and design their own strategy" (p. 148). This has important implications with respect to the reformability of the systems. To protect his reforms from accusations of heresy Gorbachev had to justify his policies by citing Lenin. But, as Brzezinski notes, "By having to assault Stalinism from the basis of a revitalized Leninism, they [the reformers] are also reenergizing and relegitimizing, and thus perpetuating the very ideological-political forces that directly led to Stalinism" (p. 49). The Chinese avoided this vicious circle because they were confident enough to base their policies on their own arguments, independent of what Lenin or the Russians said.

In the name of fairness one should also note that Brzezinski gives more "hard" evidence why reform was more difficult in the USSR than in China. For example, the Soviet peasantry had been wiped out while the Chinese peasants were able to increase production when agricultural policies were changed. Furthermore, Brzezinski points to the multi-national character of the Soviet state which means that "a decentralized China will still be one China; a decentralized Soviet Union most probably would become a dismanteled Soviet Union" (p. 178). I am not sure whether these factors should be labelled "cultural" (as Brzezinski does), but there is little reason to argue about labels as long as I agree with the argument.

In addition to discussed theory of "organic rejection" the book has a number of strengths and weaknesses. One strength is the discussion of the often ignored attempts to strengthen the ties between the USSR and Eastern Europe (by military and economic and elite cooperation) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Another strength is the factual information content of the book, such as the categorised list of fatalities from the Communist experiment - estimated by Brzezinski to be at least 50 million people (p. 238) - and the amount of energy and steel used to produce $1000 worth of GDP in the USSR and the West. However I must express my doubt about some of the facts. For example, Brzezinski quotes, without dissent, an estimate of the number of Soviet households without running hot or cold water as respectively 2/3 and 1/3 (p. 237). I am also unsure whether it is correct to say that 40% of the population lived in poverty (p. 237). Since I have no detailed knowledge in these issues I can only express my surprise and my intuitive doubt about their accuracy.

Finally Brzezinski should be given credit for his accurate and fascinating political instincts when he writes about the future prospects for the USSR. In 1988 he identified five alternatives: 1. Successful pluralization, 2. Protracted crisis, 3. Renewed stagnation, 4. Coup (KGB, Military) and 5. The explicit collapse of the Communist regime. He also described how these alternatives may follow each other (for example, a renewed stagnation - the option he think is most likely - may lead to a coup which in turn could lead to the explicit collapse of the USSR). Ex-post we know that Brzezinski was mainly correct, but that he too was wrong about the timing of the events and also on how the dismantling would occur. He wrote that the actual demise of the communist system is "at this stage a much more remote possibility" than alternative 2 of renewed stagnation (p. 245) and he believed that the chances of some form of communism existing in Soviet in 2017 was a little more than 50% (p. 243). As for whether the evolution to post-communism would be evolutionary or violent his verdict was "most likely turbulent" (p. 255). This shows that Brzezinski's predictions were not quite as prophetic as they first may seem, although he should still be given credit for taking the option of collapse seriously before most other researchers began to even consider this possibility.3

Overall this is a book I would recommend. It is informative, well-written and thought-provoking. However, because of the lack of detailed specification of the causal connections it is in no way the definitive academic analysis of the collapse of communism in the twentieth century.

NOTES
1. For example on page 43 Pipes writes that "live manages to assert itself" "even against the most ingenious schemes which violate human nature and ignore human desires"

2. For more on this: J. Elster (1991), Chinese Leaps, London Review of Books 25. April 1991, p. 9 (note especially his discussion of "ti-yong")

3. In addition to the book under review, Brzezinski has written and edited a number of other books which always took seriously the option of Collapse. See for example his edited volume Dilemmas of Change (1969) and Between Two Ages

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1989), The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century, New York: Charles Schribner's Sons
Elster, Jon (1991), Chinese Leaps, London Review of Books 25. April 1991, p. 9
Pipes, Richard (1994), Communism: The Vanished Specter, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press

[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Organic explanations (Review of Z. Brzezinski (1989) The Grand Failure: The Birth and Decay of Communism in the Twentieth Century, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/960409.htm]