[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Rational
Irrationality? - Describing and explaining the extreme right in Russia , http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/961025.htm]
Rational Irrationality?
Describing and explaining the extreme right in Russia
by Hans O. Melberg
Walter Laqueur
Black Hundred - The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia
Harper Collins, New York, 1993
ISBN: 0-06-018336-5, 317 pages
Introduction
It is important to study the extreme right in Russia because, as Laqueur shows, it was and
is one of several players determining the course of Russian history. The question then
arises as to how the phenomenon should be studied. Laqueur's answer, as it emerges
through his book, can be divided in two. First, Laqueur, being a traditional historian,
favours a largely descriptive approach above the more analytic approach used by social
scientists. Second, it is clear that Laqueur's approach is passionate in the sense that he
does not pretend to be neutral in his description of the ideas of the extreme right. As he
writes, "the ideas of the extreme right are not only mad but evil." (p. 296). In
this review I shall discuss both of these approaches. In the first section I shall argue
that the descriptive approach is justified, but not complete. Moreover, I shall make
extensive comments on Laqueur's explanation of irrational beliefs. In the second section I
shall argue that Laqueur is right in using the passionate approach as opposed to the
detached style of some historians.
1. The descriptive approach
Laqueur's book is mainly, but not exclusively, descriptive. He organises and presents a
factual overview of the extreme right in Russia - its historical background,
organizations, leading personalities, its doctrines and its influence - without going too
much into why the extreme right enjoys a level of support or what factors determine
the doctrines of the right. For some, especially social scientists like me, this is often
unsatisfying since welike books which try to explain a phenomenon, not simply to
describe it. However, lately I have becomed convinced that pure description is also
worthwhile because it satisfies an intellectual need - the desire simply to know facts.
For example, if I visit a church and I am told that its was built around the year 1000
(ad.) by Olav the Sacred (a Norwegian Viking) this piece of knowledge is in itself
pleasing. I know something I did not know before and this satisfies my inborn curiosity.
Hence, there is no need to justify the study of history by arguing that we can discover
laws or draw lessons which can be applied to today's situation.
Pure description may be boring but good historians, like Laqueur, always make an effort
to make the story interesting by providing fascinating details. For example, consider the
following sentence which occurs when Laqueur discusses one of the personalities of the
extreme right: "Emelyanov's work was interrupted for a number of years after he
murdered his wife and dismembered her body. (We shall deal with this part of his career
later on.)" (p. 115). The reader is then kept in suspense for about one hundred pages
until Laqueur reveals more about the career of Emelyanov (p. 210-11). Admittedly, this may
be to create suspense by appealing to the lower instincts of humans (fascination with
death and violence). However, in the name of fairness, it is only one of many devices used
by Laqueur to make a descriptive account interesting and it starkly exemplify the point
that descriptive accounts need not be boring.
Even if the descriptive approach is interesting and intellectually acceptable, we need
not restrict ourselves to purely descriptive accounts of history. The already mentioned
inborn curiosity of humans is not fully satisfied by knowing the properties of objects
(the house is red; the church was built in 1000 ad.), we also want to know how phenomena
are related (why is the house red; what determines the doctrines of the extreme right in
Russia). Of course, Laqueur's does not avoid these questions altogether. For example, in
two places he tries to answer why the extreme right got any support at all. (p. 19 and p.
258). In both cases he ends up explaining the support for the extreme right in terms of
people who have experienced rapid social change which in turn trigger psychological fears
which fuel right wing extremism. Thus, the Black Hundred (the extreme right in old Russia)
is explained by the rootlessness of the first generation of urbanized peasants. Similarly,
the appeal of the extreme right today is explained by the changes in the economic
(worsening economy), political (chaotic) and national (loss of an empire) situation after
the collapse of communism. Both yesterday and today these changes makes people call for a
strong hand and a return what is believed to be a more glorious past. Laqueur's story in
this respect is plausible and I do not intent to quarrel with him here.
On one point, however, is there reason to examine Laqueur's explanations more closely.
This is when he tries to explain the specific content of the doctrines of the extreme
right. Why, for example, did the extreme right place so much emphasis on anti-Semitism.
Why did some nationalists favour small Russia (to end what they considered was Russian
subsidies for the other Republics), while others favoured a large Russian empire (Others,
in turn, seems to favour both!). Why were conspiracy theories a prominent belief among the
Russian right? The problem in explaining the content and the differences in the doctrines
(over time and persons) is interesting because it, to a large extent, is an attempt to
explain irrationality. Some of the beliefs of the right were clearly inconsistent and/or
without basis in evidence, yet the right continued to hold some of these beliefs. How
should one explain this?
In some places, Laqueur argues that the beliefs of the extreme right cannot be
explained rationally. As he writes: "Anti-Semitism is not a rational phenomenon, and
the endeavour to look for rational explanations has seldom been altogether
satisfactory." (p. 109). However, in other places he uses considerations about the
rationality of beliefs to explain why a certain doctrine is rejected or advanced. For
example, Laqueur argues that the anti-Semitism can be partly explained by the large number
of Jews who figured prominently in the revolution (but not later). He also writes that the
right did not attack glasnost because it was glasnost which permitted them to express
their opinions (p. 159). Yet, I fail to see why irrational people should be prevented by
logical considerations of this sort. Clearly, people who believe that the Jews were behind
both the Russian Revolution, the collapse of the USSR, the Hitler regime and that
Gorbachev was the son of a Turkish woman(!) need not be restrained by rational reasoning
when they determine who and what to attack.
The examples could be multiplied. Laqueur sometimes explains the non-existence (or
reduced degree of emphasis) of doctrines by arguing that it stretched and strained
credulity too much. But this argument relies on the assumption that there was at least a
certain level or irrationality which even the extreme right wing could not accept. In
short, there is a tension between Laqueur's argument that the phenomena cannot be
explained rationally and his actual arguments which sometimes tries to do precisely that.
The tension is interesting because it is important to understand the causes of
irrational behaviour. It is important because we may hope to reduce irrationality if we
understand its causes (either by institutional design, personal precommitment or simply by
being aware of its causes). One prominent theorists in this field is Jon Elster who has
done much research on why we have irrational beliefs and, more controversially, irrational
desires. This is not the place to go deeper into these theories (the interested reader is
referred to Jon Elster (1983) Sour Grapes - Studies in the Subversion of Rationality,
See The Jon Elster Page .), however one
mechanism mentioned by Laqueur should be discussed. He writes that "It is a well
known fact, in the life of individuals as of nations, that facing a clear and present
danger may have a sobering effect, curing (at least temporarily) manias of this kind. A
person in danger of drowning will understand, one would assume, that the real danger
facing him is not being chased by lions in the desert." (p. 177). This seems to me
both partly wrong and inconsistent with Laqueur's earlier claims.
Except for the false and misleading analogy between individual persons and nations, the
theory is wrong because a crisis may be precisely the time in which irrational beliefs are
created. In a crisis the need for a scapegoat is more acute than in calm times. In a
crisis the rapid changes make it difficult to form correct beliefs. In a crisis various
irrational mechanisms, such as wishful thinking, have greater effects on our beliefs than
in clam times. Hence, I do not agree with Laqueur's "well known fact."
Moreover, Laqueur himself cannot agree with the theory. Firstly, he goes on to argue
that the crisis did not have the expected effect on the Russians, thus falsifying his
original claim. Secondly, and more importantly, the quote is inconsistent with his
explanation of why the extreme right enjoyed and enjoys the support it does in Russia. As
previously explained this theory rested on the argument that rapid changes create
psychological tensions which resulted in right wing support. In other words, crisis
produce irrationality, not rationality.
2. The passionate approach
In a previous observation I made some comments on the passionate approach of R. Pipes as
opposed to the detached style of E. H. Carr (See, Should historians
make ethical judgements?) . The arguments for the passionate approach are the same as
before.
First, a spade should be called a spade. Of course, this is not as simple as it sounds
because we are using essentially contestable concepts such as "evil." What one
author calls evil, another may call good. Nevertheless, I believe we should use these
terms. Why should we force the reader to read in between the lines to learn our moral
position on the issue? Is it not better to state it openly? Furthermore, historians should
not leave the definition of terms such as evil, to philosophers. Instead they should
actively enter the debate with historical examples - a feature lacking in many
philosophical accounts. By allowing historians to use contestable terms the debates about
the precise meaning of terms is enriched.
Second, this is not a question about the evaluation of evidence. When we interpret the
degree to which a document proves or undermines an argument we should not attempt to
exaggerate its importance even if we want to prove a thesis. This is, of course,
elementary. It is also equally obvious that historians and social scientists constantly
engage in this king of mistaken belief formation. However, those who argue for the
passionate approach do not argue that passionate belief-formation is a good thing.
Third, we are forced to use normative concepts when we want to describe a state of
affairs since we need (given time and space limitations) to invent terms which denote a
number of features. It is simply impossible to mention all the features of the Soviet
system. We may then use the term Totalitarianism as a shorthand. This term, in turn
necessarily has normative connotations because it focuses on some features (not all i.e.
the selection must be done on a criteria which is normative(?)) and because in the course
of a debate what was detached terms gain emotional content (witness the attempt to change
the term "handicapped" to get rid of the emotional connotations. The result, of
course, is simply, that the new term after some time gets the same negative emotional
connotations because the connotations are not inherent to the word, but to the subject it
describes).
Fourth, it is desirable to use passionate terms because this is at least one part of
what history is about: to investigate which systems created good societies and which
created bad societies; which actions were good and which should not be repeated.
These were some arguments in favour of the passionate approach. This does not mean that
I favour an inflationary use of contestable terms. There is no point in attaching an
emotional adjective to every noun. That would only weaken their effect and reduce its
usefulness. Lastly, I should add that I am open to counterarguments against the passionate
approach (mail me ).
A disagreement
Before concluding I would like to comment on Laqueur's argument that "The
balkanization of the former Soviet Union is a tragedy; it will certainly make
democratization infinitely more difficult" (p. 275). This may be the case, but I have
heard Zbingniew Brzezinski making the opposite argument: That a continued existence of the
empire would make it impossible to create a democratic Russia. In fact, there are
mechanisms which could justify both conclusions. The first argument could be supported by
the argument that the collapse of the empire stimulated a form of nationalism - the desire
for a strong man - which makes democracy less likely. The second argument, as Brzezinski
presented it, is that to keep the empire united (especially forcing Ukraine to remain a
part of Russia) would require a great strengthening of those institutions which oppose
democracy (the army, the security organs, the whole military-industrial complex). Both
effects are possible and the net effect is ambiguous and time dependent. In the short run
the anti-democratic forces may be strengthened, but in the long run the disintegration may
be good for democracy. Thus, I believe it is wrong to be as categorical as Laqueur is.
Conclusion
I have used Laqueur's book as a launching pad for some of my own reflections. Judged by
this the book was successful in creating intellectual tension, at least in my mind. As a
descriptive book I also found that Laqueur was good. There were not too many surprising
facts or analyses, but if one wants an overview of the extreme right in Russia Laqueur is
a good place to start.
[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), Rational
Irrationality? - Describing and explaining the extreme right in Russia , http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/961025.htm]