[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), The Blaming Game, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/961123.htm]
The Blaming Game
Does Gorbachev deserve praise for the peaceful end of the Cold War?
by Hans O. Melberg
This observation is about some of the conditions under which a person deserves blame or
credit for an action. It involves Gorbachev, a man hitting another, and Calvin &
Hobbes.
1. Gorbachev
In The Economist (November 16, 1996, Review, p. 8) there was recently a short
review of Archie Brown's book The Gorbachev Factor. According to the reviewer Brown
argued that Gorbachev deserves credit for the peaceful end of the cold war because he
"ruled out the use of force". I remember I once used a similar argument, but my
tutor (Mr. James Sherr) replied that the point was not so much that Gorbachev dismissed
the use of force (if he did that), but that he had put himself in a situation in which it
was not profitable to use force. His strategy for reforming the USSR depended on a calm
international environment and an invasion of Easter Europe would ruin the chances of
perestroika. Hence, the fact that force was not used do not prove that Gorbachev was
against the use of force. It simply means that it was not in his self interest to use
force.
Our moral intuition is that people who simply do what is in their self-interest do not
deserve praise. Sacrifice - in the sense of giving something up and not receiving anything
in return - is praiseworthy; Actions inspired by self-interest are not. In short, the
moral value of the action is not inherent in the action itself, but in the motivation
behind the action. If somebody steps on my toe I am not offended as long as he did not do
it on purpose. Using this reasoning it seems that Gorbachev's decision not to use force
does not provide grounds to declare him a saint.
One might argue that whether Gorbachev should be praised or vilified is simply not a
question historians should try to answer. Historians should, on this approach, avoid
making moral judgements on the actions of leaders. I have previously made some reflections
on this (see The Ethical Approach to History). Here I only want to make two short points.
First, that the moral evaluation seems to be implied in the description of an event since
the author may choose to put emphasis on the circumstances that makes the action rational
(as Mr. Sherr would do in the case of Gobachev) or the author may choose to focus on the
decisions of the leader (as with Mr. Brown).
Second, why should some questions like "Was this a just decision" or
"What was Gorbachev's role in the end of the Cold War" be excluded from the
historical works? One answer is that although these questions are interesting, it is
almost impossible give an answer because doing so would involve getting inside the heads
of individuals to reveal their intentions (since, as in the already mentioned case of a
person stepping on your toe, you have to know his intentions in order to decide whether he
should be blamed or not). Or, in the case of "Was this a just decision" the
answer must involve a discussion of what justice is - which, in turn, is a largely
normative issue. For these two reasons one might argue that it is not very fruitful to
evaluate the moral value of historical actions.
I admit that these are serious objections, but their importance is one of degrees, not
proofs that the ethical approach should be abandoned. Against the first objection I
believe it is possible to gain some insight into the intentions of individuals if we
examine the individual's actions under various circumstances. For example, if you argue
that a person only did a good act (give blood) because he received $10, we might falsify
this statement if we observe that he continues to give blood even when the hospital stops
paying their blood donors. Thus, by analysing the actions of the same person under various
circumstance we may gain a probable picture of the 'true' person and his intentions. In
this way the historian Martin Malia argues that the "real" Gorbachev was
revealed in his turn to the right in the fall of 1990 (rejecting the 500 day economic
reform program and appointing non-liberals to high positions, p. 479 of his The Soviet
Tragedy.)
As a parenthesis one might also note some of Malia's arguments against giving Gorbachev
credit for the peaceful withdrawal from Eastern Europe. As he writes "... Gorbachev
'liberated' Eastern Europe not knowing that this was what he was doing, and because he did
not have the means to do otherwise ..." (p. 463). There might be a slight
contradiction between the two arguments in this sentence since the same person cannot at
the same time not know what one is doing and consider himself restricted by the lack of
means to do otherwise (although objectively it might be true that one does not have any
alternatives). Nevertheless, both the availability of alternative actions and whether the
act was intentional are important factors when we judge the moral value of an action.
Returning to the objections against moral evaluations, we may note that the second
argument - that terms like justice and freedom are inherently normative - is true, but
this does not mean that they should be avoided. First of all there might be a core of
agreement on these terms (i.e. we agree that some things are unjustis even if we cannot
agree on the complete definition of justice). Second, if historians and social scientist
are seeking to draw lessons from history - to learn how to improve today's policies - they
can hardly avoid discussing what a good society is. In fact, historians should enter the
debate since they possess a wealth of concrete historical examples - a necessary quality
for a good debate and one which is often lacking among philosophers.
2. A man hitting another man
In the article "Intentional Action and Pure Causality" Tore Sandven
criticises Jon Elster for denying that a man which is moved by "pure causality"
is responsible for his actions (see p. 304-306). His example is that of a man hitting
another in the heat of an argument, but this action was caused by factors outside his
immediate control (he lost his temper). I agree with Sandven that our moral intuition does
not free the man for his responsibility even if he lost his temper or, with reference to
Malia, that it was not the "real self" who threw the punch. Yet, I do not
believe this contradicts Elster since his argument is that a "man only to a small
degree has responsibility for his immediate actions, but he does have a responsibility for
the character he builds up through a number of strategic choices with long reaching
consequences" (p. 82, Nytt perspektiv på økoniomisk historie, my
translation). In this case Elster might reply that the man is responsible for being a man
with a hot temper since it is possible to moderate these character traits by intentional
actions. In fact this is one of the central elements in Buddhist philosophy where they
consciously try to eliminate desires (i.e. to change one's character) in order to lead
harmonic lives.
3. Calvin and Hobbes
Reading the Elster vs. Sandven disagreement I was reminded of a cartoon in which Calvin
argued that Santa Claus should reward him more than the other kids for his (few) good
actions because it was very difficult for him - as opposed to those who by their nature
desired to do good things - to do what was right. It is easy to sympathise with Calvin.
Nevertheless, one might use Elster's reply that Calvin is also responsible for his nature,
though against this one might argue that a person's nature is largely beyond the control
of the individual. My genetic makeup and the formative effects of my childhood experiences
may be vastly more important than my attempts to change may character. In fact, these
factors may determine the degree to which it is possible for me to change my character.
Against this, in turn, one may argue that it is pragmatically inconsistent use the
"you are not responsible for your nature" argument since the person himself
cannot both be considered responsive to these arguments and a victim of pure causal
forces. If I try to convince you of something, it seems implied that I accept you as a
person who may be swayed by rational arguments i.e. that your beliefs and actions are not
always the result of pure causal forces.
4. So What
It may be interesting to reflect on whether we have a free will or under what conditions
people deserve praise, but does it have any significance beyond the mental gymnastics
involved? I believe it does because the allocation of goods and burdens are often governed
by moral evaluations. One obvious example is when a judge shows leniency because the
defendant had a difficult childhood. Another example is the allocation of scarce medical
goods (such as new kidneys), in which one of several criteria may be fairness. Yet another
example is the tax system which is also affected by considerations of fairness (We tax the
rich more than the poor; We discuss whether capital tax is fair or not; We decide that
some people deserve tax reductions because they have children). Hence, the debate about
blame is not purely academic. If we blame a person for being unemployed or if we think he
is to be blamed for a disease (such as cancer from smoking) we are less likely to favour
measures to help these people. On this background it is important to think systematically
about the factors that enter into our moral judgements. Whether there was any alternative
routes of action (and at what personal costs); Whether the situation was intentionally
created; And whether a person is responsible for his nature are all important questions to
discuss in order to determine whether a person deserves blame or praise.
Sources
The Economist - Reviews (1996), "The big enchiladas: How political biography aids
political analysis", November 16, p. 8.
Elster, Jon (1971), Nytt perspektiv på økonomisk historie, Oslo: Pax Forlag
Malia, Martin (1994), The Soviet Tragedy, New York: Free Press
Sandven, Tore (1995), "Intentional Action and Pure Causality", Philosophy of
the Social Sciences 25, pp. 286-317
Watterson (?), Bill, Calvin and Hobbes, unknown.
[Note for bibliographic reference: Melberg, Hans O. (1996), The Blaming Game, http://www.oocities.org/hmelberg/papers/961123.htm]